



Debunking the “[Reading List on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics](#)” of /r/swcc:

Exposing the Revisionist Deception Part 2



This document exists as a guide to show the real story of China, the one that the revisionists won't tell you. Any further updates on revisionist China will be posted [on the /r/rwcc wiki](#). Compiled by Leftist Critic in April 2018, finished on May 8, 2018, as part of the second issue of Collective Mind-Meld.

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Preamble

In assembling this document, I continue what I started in part 1, attempting to show the reality of China and effectively counter revisionist deception. Originally, this was supposed to be an all-in-one document, but the amount of material from revisionists compelled me to write another document which addresses their claims, and show what China is really like to all fellow comrades!

This publication follows part 1 and serves as issue 2 of the new e-magazine, *Collective Mind-Meld*. This publication is only one of the many topics what will be covered within this e-magazine. Before I finished part 1, I was summarily sacked as a moderator at /r/swcc. To be frank, I was planning on leaving as soon as these publications were finished but I never got the chance to do so. Despite this, I am glad to no longer be a moderator of /r/swcc and am sad that many good comrades are still moderators of that subreddit, promoting a distorted view of China which misleads comrades to think that China is “socialist” when in reality it is on the capitalist road without question. Two recent articles in Chinese state media attested to this. One by Wong Cong in *Global Times*, noting that “the opening-up policies have been long in the making as China is making a concerted effort to continue its reform and opening-up process that propelled the country to become the second-largest economy in the world” and also showing the Chinese nationalist disposition which gives them the gumption to say they are prepared to “fight to the bitter end” in a trade war with the US.¹ Again, this does not indicate that the country is magically “socialist.” Such a claim is further invalidated by the second article, saying that “the private sector has played a significant part in the long-term rapid development of the Chinese economy...the number of private industrial businesses [has increased]...the government has been unwavering in its support of the private sector”² This shows that China has fully accepted market precepts as part of their falsely named and conceived “market socialism.”

1 Wang Cong, “[Chinese market cannot be opened up by threatening rhetoric](#),” *Global Times*, Apr 15, 2018.

2 “[Private sector significant to Chinese economy: NBS](#),” *Global Times* (reprinted from Xinhua), Apr 16, 2018.

The Western Left and Revisionist China

There are a set of seven articles within a section of the /r/swcc document which talk about the Western Left and revisionist China. The first of these is an article by New York grad student and teacher Adam Chimienti in *Dissident Voice*.³

He begins by introducing Andre Vltchek while declaring that “the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become a major international force in economic and diplomatic terms,” adding that the interview would be “a rare opportunity to discuss the issue of China’s international presence with someone who is unapologetically hailing China as a great hope for the world.” This already bodes badly for the interview that is to follow. In response to a question about growth in China “post-1978” Vltchek declared that “lifting hundreds of millions from poverty is what makes China a truly successful socialist country.” He added that

The more successful China is, the more vicious and vitriolic Western propaganda against it becomes...a successful socialist nation is the worst scenario for the manufacturers of global Western hegemony. Western propagandists prefer to highlight inequality and pollution in China to discredit it...China moved to a mixed-economy, allowing some individuals to become rich through trade and other activities. This does not mean, of course, that it ceased to be socialist. Its development is centrally planned. All key industries are in state hands...Regarding pollution, it is another farce...Western propaganda is not interested in facts. It rests mainly on one pillar: ignorance. Those who visit China periodically...see how the reality of the PRC differs from Western mass media propaganda.

It is worth responding to this first. Vltchek has a valid point that there is undoubtedly distorting media propaganda about China. However, his claim that China is a “successful socialist nation” and has gained from its economic growth, thanks to bringing in market measures, misses the reality: the

3 Adam Chimienti, [“It’s Not China that Should be Feared: It’s the West,”](#) *Dissident Voice*, May 30, 2013

country has accepted market precepts and is pushing forward its own form of capitalism, capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, he misses that the “growth” has not been evenly distributed. This was noted by one World Bank economist in October 2016 who said that “poverty reduction goes together with an increase in income inequality for at least the past 20 years,” saying that while the “per capita net income among the rural population rose...the top quintile household increased their income” at a higher rate, with income inequality rising “largely because the top quintile households had increased their income much faster than their poor counterparts.”⁴ Add to this what the UNDP pointed out: that while “China has made great leaps in reducing poverty...Not everyone has been able to benefit equally from the development and economic growth, with rural and ethnic minority areas lagging behind.” Vltchek seems too proud in defending revisionist China to admit this reality. He does admit that the “mixed-economy” has allowed “some individuals to become rich through trade and other activities” but seems to forget that this is the formation of a bourgeoisie! To say its development is centrally planned is absurd. As H Khoo, a revisionist, even pointed out, “nowadays 96 percent of prices are set by the market, but key product prices remain state controlled.”⁵ Again, Vltchek doesn’t want you to know this reality. It shows China’s development is not “centrally planned.” As noted in part one, to say that “all key industries are in state hands” is deceptive, especially since such state enterprises operate on market principles! Furthermore, for him to say that “regarding pollution, it is another farce,” is faulty. There is undeniable pollution in China. In China, there are some of the “largest areas under groundwater irrigation” in the “developing” world, apart from India, and “water scarcity is particularly acute and projected to worsen...[in] large parts of India and China” while some rural areas have prospered “but others have stagnated with high levels of poverty” especially “in the interior of China.”⁶

4 Guobao Wu, “Ending poverty in China: What explains great poverty reduction and a simultaneous increase in inequality in rural areas?,” *World Bank*, Oct 19, 2016; UNDP, “[Poverty, Equity, and Governance](#),” accessed Apr 15, 2018.

5 H. Khoo, “[The Class Nature of the Chinese State: A critique of “China’s Long March to Capitalism”](#),” *China Marxist Analysis*, Nov 26, 2009.

6 World Bank, “[World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development](#),” 2007, accessed Apr 15, 2018, pp 182, 236 specifically.

This is clearly a failure of market-based policy. Vltchek does make a good point that “Western propaganda is not interested in facts. It rests mainly on one pillar: ignorance” but that this doesn’t make China socialist! This is an absurd fallacy!

Vltchek goes on. He declares that

many Western scholars are trained and paid to dismiss the truth about China, as they were paid to twist the truth about the Soviet Union...In the past, China was forced open, plundered, raped and humiliated by Western powers. Corruption was implanted...It’s time to decolonize our mind!...Chinese people know much more about Western culture, different economic systems, and ways of life than those who rely on Western mass media know about China.

What he is saying has a valid point. However, it would be wrong to say that we should not criticize China for its movement down the capitalist road, from which there seems to be no return!

Vltchek ain’t finished at all. He describes that

the West is choking the rest of the world economically, ideologically, and culturally...it is trying to destroy and humiliate and discredit those great and proud countries that are resisting its fascism, including Cuba, Venezuela and China...It is a true mafia-like approach; it’s banditry...China is very interested in forging alliances within Latin America, with Russia and lately even with India...A multi polar world is essential for the survival of humankind and China knows this; it understands...The alliance between China and Russia is essential as it defends the weak and defenseless at the United Nations and elsewhere...it would be unthinkable for China to not foster good relations with other countries and support a multipolar world

Vltchek is right about the approach of the West to the world. But, I would not be so proud of China for resisting “fascism” of Western influence because it really on the socialist road and is nationalist, having no pretense of proletarian internationalism. Sure, the country is interested in alliances across the world, and sure it wants to form a multi-polar world, but even such a multi-polar

world could easily accommodate the imperialists! What is needed is a global socialist world, not one with varying degrees of revisionism and acceptance of capitalism! To say that “the alliance between China and Russia is essential as it defends the weak and defenseless at the United Nations and elsewhere” is deceptive. I say this because Russia and China are more than willing to defer to the imperialists, only engaging in such an alliance if their national interests are at stake. Russia and China have nationalist foreign policies and each accepts capitalism, albeit in different ways.

The interview goes on. Vltchek says that

the terror the West has been spreading throughout the world for centuries is unimaginable...China is hated mainly because it is the only truly socialist Asian power...I feel that it is hated even by many Western ‘leftists’...they can’t accept that the largest Asian nation is actually capable of building its own socialist model...China is a very old culture, and very peaceful in its essence...All those fears about China are never based on anything rational, documented, or founded however...I see the fear of China as irrational and often openly racist.

Again, he makes a valid point when it comes to Western terrorism. However, there are justified reasons to criticize China. I do not “fear” or “hate” China, but am rather critical of the path China has chosen: a plan to stay on the capitalist road. Sure, there are Westerners whom are racist toward China, and may even fear it, but that doesn’t preclude reasoned criticism.

After getting a criticism of BRICS by problematic Patrick Bond, Vltchek declares that “BRICS is not one monolithic entity. India is a feudal, semi-fascist part of the world...China is a socialist country...Brazil is trying to be one, while appeasing its powerful elites. South Africa has been searching for its own direction...[and] Russia has a socialist heart but a capitalist economy...I also support pragmatic Chinese socialism.” He is right that BRICS is not a monolithic entity but he sees many of these countries wrong. Sure, we can grant that he’s right about India, but China is not a socialist country but rather a country with a leadership which preaches the false idea of “market socialism,”

meaning that they have accepted market precepts. Brazil is not and has never been, in recent history, pursuing socialism. South Africa has been corrupted by elites who abandoned the Freedom Charter. Russia does not have a “socialist heart” anymore. It is all capitalism, capitalism, capitalism. To quote Vltchek at the end of his interview, “socialism is about the people. On the other hand, I also believe that there are moments when personal, and even regional interests, should be sacrificed for the common good—that of the country or the entire continent. To strike the balance is always very difficult.” If we accept this viewpoint, then it is yet another reason that China is not socialist. The people have, on the whole, suffered, through the loss of their power, while the bourgeoisie have gained power.

The second in a set of seven articles of the /r/swcc document is an article by Vltchek himself, titled “The Irrational, Racist Fear of China.”⁷ He writes that

we are told to fear China...we are ordered to be conscious of China's rise...it is China, naturally, which is unacceptably endangering the European and North American's inherited right, to reign over the world...it is China whose guilt is being manufactured, inflated and implanted in the brains of people... China began helping, in the spirit of internationalism; the way a socialist country should...When the Chinese media interviews me, I am often asked the same question: “What can China do to appease the West”...The West tries to destroy socialist China as it had been trying to destroy Vietnam...China is too timid, too soft, as actually almost the entire world is, compared to the Western political and economic gangsters...China, many times a victim of Western aggressions, now finds itself on the defensive...China is portrayed as a threat...In Vietnam, the US clearly exploits old rivalries, pitching two socialist states against each other...China still executes more people than the US...which is unfortunate...To claim that there is no racism in the way China is perceived would be ludicrous...China is...developing its own model; it is clearing and creating its own path through unknown territory...China is

7 Andre Vltchek, “[The Irrational, Racist Fear of China](#),” *CounterPunch*, Jan 4, 2013.

growing and trying to understand the world, to interact with it...There will be no Chinese Yeltsin. By standing firm, China is showing an example to the world.

He makes a good point about Western propaganda. But, he is too trusting of the Chinese revisionists. Since China is integrated into the global capitalist economy and with their acceptance of capitalist precepts, they are not a “socialist country.” If this was the case, then why would Chinese media ask him, the question, “What can China do to appease the West” at all? He soft-pedals China’s past too much. Sure, the Western propaganda overblows China but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be critical. We don’t have to be racist, like a good amount of Westerners, to be critical of China’s path, which has stayed on the capitalist road. For his comment that “China is...developing its own model; it is clearing and creating its own path through unknown territory,” the only model it is developing is capitalism with Chinese characteristics, nothing more, nothing less. Also, for him to say that “there will be no Chinese Yeltsin,” seems doubtful considering their past trajectory. Considering all the market measures shown, they aren’t a good “example to the world.” Neither is the West. Oh, and speaking of the “proud ‘African Cuba’ – Eritrea – is being tortured by sanctions,” as he describes it, what does he have to say about his glorious Chinese who never have once voted against sanctions on this country, not in 2000, not in 2009, not in 2010, not in 2011?⁸ He must have forgotten this reality.

Just as bad is Roland Boer’s article in *MR Online*.⁹ He snarled that

through increasing visits to China, to teach, travel and engage in endless discussions with Marxists, I have found most of my preconceptions thoroughly dismissed and utterly complexified. Slowly, I began to share the sense of my Chinese interlocutors that Western

8 “What is Eritrea anyway?,” page on /r/yellowstarofafrica wiki; United Nations, “[Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Eritrea over Its Role in Somalia, Refusal to Withdraw Troops Following Conflict with Djibouti](#),” Dec 23, 2009; “Ethiopia gains upper hand in war with Eritrea,” *The Guardian*, May 18, 2000; United Nations, “[COUNCIL CALLS ON STATES TO PREVENT SALE, DELIVERY OF ARMS TO ETHIOPIA, ERITREA; DEMANDS IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES](#),” May 17, 2000; UN Security Council, “[Security Council Extends Mandate of Group Monitoring Weapons Bans in Somalia, Eritrea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1916 \(2010\)](#),” Mar 19, 2010; United Nations, “[Security Council Tightens Sanctions Regime on Somalia, Eritrea, Extending Mandate of Monitoring Group for 12 Months](#),” Jul 29, 2011.

9 Roland Boer, “[Before October: The Unbearable Romanticism of Western Marxism](#),” *MR Online*, Oct 8, 2011.

Marxist engagements with China were wanting in sophistication. So I contacted the organisers of an energetic annual conference, a vibrant journal and book series — Historical Materialism...The response was disappointing and predictable: ‘Is China really communist anymore?’ ‘Are there any Marxists left in China?’ ‘If so, they do not know what they are talking about’. ‘What about freedom, democracy, workers?’ To the suggestion of a conference panel I received a flat ‘no’, dismissing Marxism in China as at least unsophisticated, if not having betrayed some impossible ideal. I had thought the Historical Materialism people would be more open to a vigorous debate, one that explored issues in a manner that would move past such preconceptions. Yet, this response was also predictable, for I have encountered similar responses from one Western Marxist after another: China is not really communist, so it is not worth considering. Sometimes my interlocutor will suggest that China is ‘evil’, that it is out for world domination, that we need to fear the Chinese Empire. If I press further, my interlocutor will refer to an article in the Washington Post, the New York Times or another Western newspaper as ‘evidence’...if I refer to a Chinese source, it is dismissed as tainted or unreliable. On such matters, these Western Marxists are no different from bourgeois critics of China.

Now, that seems pretty bad, from his perspective, but perhaps he should have tried to recognize why Marxists do not see China as communist. But Boer’s views clouded this possibility. Obviously not everyone is a revisionist and the world is better off for it! I doubt that all of those Western Marxists are the same as bourgeois critics of China. Perhaps some are, but others undoubtedly have a well-formed critique of China’s current path. The publication he mentioned had events such as “Foxconn beyond China: Capital-labour relations as co-determinants of global organisation of production” in London, has reviewed varied books on China, has written about Chinese Trotskyists (not sure why that matters), and advertised the Second World Congress On Marxism at Peking University in May of this year!¹⁰ There

¹⁰ [“Foxconn beyond China: Capital-labour relations as co-determinants of global organisation of production - 9 May, London,”](#) *Historical Materialism*, Apr 27, 2017; [“Books for Review,”](#) *Historical Materialism*, 2013 book; [“Prophets](#)

also have been varied articles written on China within *Historical Materialism*, some of which will be cited later on in this publication, with some of the writers also being published in *Monthly Review*, a more well-known socialist publication. So Boer's slight against these Marxists is petty and shows that he really cares more about his views than those of others.

From here we move onto an op-ed in the *New York Times*, which already seems pretty fishy.¹¹

The writer, Eric X. Li, declares that China is

*the second largest economy in the world, a great power with global influence, and its people live in increasing prosperity...[that] the Chinese government enjoys popular support that is among the highest in the world...The Communist Party's Politburo, the highest ruling body, consists of 25 members. Currently, **only seven of them come from any background of wealth or power**, the so-called princelings. The rest of them, including the president and the prime minister, come from ordinary backgrounds...China's Communist Party **may be one of the most meritocratic** and upwardly mobile major political organizations in the world — far more meritocratic than the ruling elites of most Western countries and the vast majority of developing countries...China no doubt restricts freedom of expression, especially political speech. But does that impede innovation in Chinese society?...No one, not least the party itself, disputes that corruption is a significant problem in China*

First, worth addressing, is his comment that China is a “great power with global influence.”

Note that he does not call China a socialist nation, like misled revisionists. Sure, China's government enjoys “popular support that is among the highest in the world.” But that doesn't magically make it socialist, now does it? Assad and Putin have high approval ratings, and they aren't socialist! Then we

Unarmed” book; “[Second World Congress on Marxism](#),” *Historical Materialism*, accessed Apr 16, 2018; Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, “[China and the Dynamics of Transnational Accumulation: Causes and Consequences of Global Restructuring](#),” *Historical Materialism*, Volume 14, Issue 3, pages 3 – 43; Christiansen Flemming, “[Arrighi's Adam Smith in Beijing: Engaging China](#),” *Historical Materialism*, Volume 18, Issue 1, pages 110 – 129; “[Finance Capital Today](#)” Nov 2016 book.

11 Eric X. Li, “Counterpoint: Debunking Myths About China,” *New York Times*, Jul 18, 2011.

get to his claim that most of the “Communist Party’s Politburo, the highest ruling body...come from ordinary backgrounds.” That may cause revisionists to cheer, but remember he admits that seven of those on the Politburo “come from any background of wealth or power, the so-called princelings.” If China was socialist then why are these people even allowed in the Politburo at all! Finally we get to his declaration that the “China’s Communist Party may be one of the most meritocratic and upwardly mobile major political organizations in the world.” I’m not sure that is necessarily positive. Shouldn’t the party be democratic and geared toward the people, not meritocratic. His final comments about restriction of speech is weak: he admits that this restriction of course. Sure, lets say it doesn’t “impede innovation in Chinese society” but who does that innovation ultimately benefit: the bourgeoisie without question. His final comment, saying that no one disputes that “corruption is a significant problem in China,” is fine and nice but it misses the reality: that corruption is the cause of the horrid market-based policies since 1978! Clearly, like Vltchek, he doesn’t want you to know this at all!

The last three articles all come from English-language Chinese sources. The first of these is an article by Doris Jones Yang, a former writer for *Business Week*, in *People’s Daily*.¹² The article begins by saying that they were “surprised by its [China’s] widespread economic prosperity—no longer based on cheap labor or exports,” further declaring that

...more than 81 percent of China’s GDP is now fueled by its own domestic demand...Wages are rising in China...What really struck us was how well-off ordinary Chinese are now...Construction cranes dot the skyline of China’s major cities—too many to count, as the urban population booms....Highways are packed with Mercedes, BMWs, Toyotas, Fords, and—one of the most prestigious models—Buicks. Most are made in China, with joint venture partners. Shiny shopping centers are popping up everywhere, many with imported designer brands like Gucci, Guerlain, Burberry, and TUMI. In Shanghai, we visited a Tesla dealership,

12 Doris Jones Yang, “[What Americans don’t get about China](#),” *People’s Daily*, Jun 13, 2017. Also see [page 2](#).

next door to a shop selling high-end drones. A huge two-story Apple store dwarfed the one at home, and at a Sony store we tried out the latest virtual reality headset. Even Chinese tea and pineapple cakes are packaged as high-end products...American misperceptions are fed by media reports about China's flaws and lack of Western-style freedoms...On the subways, about 90 percent of riders stared at their smart phones—some using Apple, some Samsung, some a Chinese brand you've never heard of...One gap the Chinese do mind is the growing inequality between rich and poor....the same free-market reforms that opened opportunities to all have also created more than 400 Chinese billionaires, and that fosters resentment. Peasants in remote regions are acutely aware of how far they lag behind...The gap between Americans' perception of China and their perception of themselves doesn't bother most Chinese. They have the opportunity to make life better for themselves and their children. As their incomes rise, generation by generation, they are closing what was once a yawning gap between living standards in the United States and China. That's a gap worth minding.

While this article portrays the Chinese as “prosperous,” does that mean they are a socialist country? No, not at all. As comrade Chin Chih-po wrote in the *Peking Review* in 1976, the revisionist, capitalist roader line, “denies that the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the principal contradiction in socialist society, that revisionism is the main danger in socialist society,” trying to “reverse the correct appraisal of the Great Cultural Revolution and settle accounts with it, so as to attain the aim of replacing the socialist system with the capitalist system and replacing the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.”¹³ The latter is what has happened to China after 30 years of the Dengist period, started in 1978. Interestingly, Yang does not deny inequalities in China or bourgeois tastes, but passes them off as Chinese being more “refined,” a disturbing thought to say the least!

¹³ Chin Chih-po, “[Denial of the Difference Between Socialism and Capitalism Is Not Allowed](#)—Repudiating the theme about “white cat, black cat,” *Peking Review*, #16, April 16, 1976, pp. 18-21.

We then get to an article in *China Daily* by CATO Institute member Doug Bandow declaring that China is not an “evil empire” threatening the US.¹⁴ He begins by writing that there is is

no serious cause for conflict if Washington is willing to accommodate Beijing's rise...there are many hawks in the US who are presenting China as the next big threat...the Pentagon's latest report on the Chinese military suggests this is not for the purpose of protecting US territory, population and liberties, but rather to preserve Washington's dominance in Asia...In its report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2017", the US Department of Defense noted that China had improved its capacity to undertake joint operations and fight short conflicts further from the mainland...Washington would prefer a docile China that accepts the US lead. But rising powers rarely agree to remain a vulnerable second...Most important, Beijing has only modest ability to project power, especially to attack the continental US. In contrast, the US military has multiple means to strike China...In short, in the near to middle term, at least, in any real sense the US has little to fear from China...What China seeks is to end Washington's dominance along the former's coast, an objective more defensive than offensive...The US and China will inevitably have disagreements. However, they have no vital interests in conflict. Indeed, there is no serious cause for conflict if Washington is willing to accommodate China's rise. The US government's primary duty is to protect Americans' interests, not Washington's influence.

This article seems to miss the obvious: the spectre of US global hegemony. It also glosses over the reality that while “China has been upholding its non-interventionist line for decades to gain the trust of the world...it is outgrowing its ability to do that, as it admits in its own military white papers.”¹⁵ The argument he makes, pokes a hole in the revisionist claim that China is valiantly fighting US imperialism. If this was the case, then why would they be so willing to cooperate with each other?

14 Doug Bandow, “[China is not an evil empire facing the US](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 16, 2018.

15 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

Then we get to the final article in Chinese media, by Yukon Huang, “senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and a former World Bank country director for China,” in the *Global Times*.¹⁶ Huang declares that

...China needs a transformative leadership to move the country forward, to have the system evolve in a way that's right for a new era. That means strengthening institutions and human capital while changing the structure of the economy. China is no longer a low-income country. It's upper middle-income country, and the structure of the economy is different...markets should be decisive in allocating resources, but the State should play a leading role in the economy...Look at what's happening in e-commerce, Internet activity in China: the State is not much involved, but the private sector is very creative and dynamic, doing things that are even more advanced than in Europe and the US. The State has given them opportunities to flourish. This is what I call good collaboration between the State and the private sector. In areas where private entrepreneurs are not likely to go in because of risks or costs, it's quite appropriate for the State to give support...Unbalanced growth is actually the consequence of a very dynamic growth process...[China's economy is] neither a market economy nor a State-driven economy. It's actually something in the middle, and it's unique. China's economy is different from those in the West...China's debt level has surged, and it needs to be carefully managed...Let's look at the situation 15 years ago. There was virtually no private property market...What's missing in China is a rental market....should Chinese be allowed to buy property overseas? The answer is yes. Every prosperous country, household, or company invests everywhere to spread risks. The Chinese have lots of wealth and assets today, and it does not make sense for them to invest only in China....If we look at China in the past 20-30 years, we see rapid urbanization...Financial reforms have stages and phases. You have to figure out when you liberalize and allow people to

16 Li Qiaoyi, “[What Western observers got wrong in assessing China](#),” *Global Times*, Oct 18, 2017.

move money in and out, how you will allow the exchange rate to become more flexible. China realizes that if it's done too quickly, it'll create problems. I think the sequence is very important. China wants to internationalize the yuan. But I am a bit critical of this reformist drive, because to have a fully internationalized yuan, the country essentially lets the exchange rate be fully flexible and funds move at will...A country's strength doesn't lie strictly in such measures. It's the institutions, human capital - whether people are well-fed, well-educated, have a comfortable life. China realizes this when it talks about a prosperous society. The question is what China can do to strengthen its institutions and increase its human capital base

These comments do not “prove” that the country is “socialist” but show capitalism, evidenced by his talk about markets being “decisive in allocating resources,” saying that the “private sector [in China] is very creative and dynamic,” especially in regard to e-commerce, complaining that a rental market is missing in China, saying that there should be more “financial reform,” and using the Western buzzword “human capital” a couple times. This shows that the *Chuang* journal has a valid point: that China has “transformed from an isolated state-planned economy into an integrated hub of capitalist production” with waves of new investment creating “billionaires like Ma Yun while the millions below...struggle to escape fates of endless grueling work.”¹⁷ Such integration into the global capitalist economy is recognized by the capitalist poles of power, but laughed at by the revisionists, who want to hide this reality. As the CIA’s *World Factbook* declares, “since the late 1970s, China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role.”¹⁸ Hence, the country has embraced capitalist precepts, becoming one with the global capitalist system, the “world market” as Marx and Engels called it. This is a reality no matter how much the revisionists toot their “market socialist” horn, a deceptive and false call just like the wild declaration of deranged

Howard Beale in the 1976 anti-Arab film, *Network*.

17 “[About](#),” *Chuang* journal, accessed Apr 17, 2018.

18 CIA, entry for “China” on *The World Factbook*, accessed Apr 17, 2018:

Are Capitalists in China afraid?

In their multi-page document, /r/swcc lists thirteen links within a category titled “Repression of “bourgeois elements” of society” to again support their fallacious claim that China is socialist.

The first link comes from *Forbes*, often a magazine that, like *Fortune*, is a literal mouthpiece of the global bourgeoisie. In the article, the writer, Mitch Free, who defines himself as a “Global Entrepreneur, Innovator and Digital Manufacturing Expert,” literally a mouthpiece for the bourgeoisie, writes about Chinese workers taking the president of a company hostage:

Late last month, workers in a medical supply factory outside Beijing heard rumors of an impending plant closure. In the U.S. this might have resulted in heated whispering among employees, formal demands for severance, and strongly worded memos advanced through proper channels. The Chinese workers took a more direct and disturbing approach: they barricaded the building’s exits and took the company president hostage...American entrepreneur Chip Starnes was held prisoner for nine days by employees of his medical supply company. During his captivity, he occasionally appeared at his office window, wearing the same clothes and looking increasingly wan. Some reports indicate workers used bright lights and loud noises to prevent him from sleeping, and that he may have signed contracts under duress... such hostage-taking to resolve disputes is relatively common, and police are not only unhelpful but sometimes actively assist the kidnappers...This latest in a series of reported (and unreported) incidents has American entrepreneurs and businesspeople reconsidering the wisdom of doing business in China...The Chinese government seems eager for foreign investment and economic development, but not to enforce the rule of law that investors and developers expect and rely on...The Chinese government provides inadequate channels to prosecute such wrongdoing, and so advances the message that such behavior is acceptable and

*tolerated. By failing to get involved, authorities are sending a message to entrepreneurs and investors: you'll have to fend for yourself, and no one is in control...The Chinese people have much to gain through partnership with entrepreneurs, investors and developers....Only through appropriate protection of those partners, though, can the Chinese government bring the benefits of investment to its people*¹⁹

This radical measure by the workers show that the Chinese proletariat have gained power in their workplaces. Still, it does not mean that power extends to the state apparatus, which generally favors the Chinese bourgeoisie. Even so, the current revisionist Chinese leadership wants to stay in power, so they don't want to crackdown too hard, or else there would be further social unrest. As such, they are hesitant to "get involved" as this *Forbes* writer says. The power the Chinese proletariat have gained is due to their own action, no thanks to the Chinese revisionists.

With this we move onto the second article in *The Atlantic*, which is broadly liberal and annoyingly so.²⁰ They write about some Chinese billionaires ending up in prison. The article notes that

*In most places, being ranked by a prominent magazine among the wealthiest people in the country constitutes a great honor. Not in China...In the last fifteen years, China has produced greater overall wealth than any other country. The number of its billionaires has gone from a mere 15 to around 250 in just six years, but **for a number of these people** this vaulted status is short-lived..In a business environment in which personal connections and favors -- referred to as *guanxi* in Chinese -- predominate, many tycoons have amassed large fortunes **without concern of rules and regulations**...China's wealthy also leverage their *guanxi* with government officials strike mutually beneficial deals...In a country where so many struggle to get ahead, such gaudy displays of wealth **present a challenge to social stability**...Deng*

Xiaoping...famously advocated "letting a few people get rich first". More than three decades

19 Mitch Free, "[Held Hostage: Entrepreneurs Uneasy Over Chinese Government Inaction](#)," *Forbes*, Jul 11, 2013.

20 Rebecca Chao, "[Why Do Chinese Billionaires Keep Ending Up in Prison?](#)," *The Atlantic*, Jan 29, 2013.

later, life for these rich has grown increasingly precarious. For China's numerous poor, alas, the second part of Deng's bargain has not yet arrived.

This effort is not as widespread as revisionists could think. It is the “bad apples” approach, as the article notes, as the bourgeoisie continue to rake in more wealth. The fact that flaunting their wealth would lead to more social instability shows that such a naked show of exploitation of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat cannot be shown. The revisionist Chinese leadership wants people to be lulled into happiness, not revolt against the current system, although Chinese proletariat and social activists are pushing against the accepted market principles in China, pushing forward measures that increase their power in society, undeniably weakening the hold of the Chinese bourgeoisie. So this article actually doesn’t have much to say to support the revisionist point of view. I am reminded here of what a comrade from MIM (Prisons) wrote about China:

the reality that the state sometimes imprisons its billionaires does not change the fact that this once socialist society, which guaranteed basic needs to all, now has billionaires. Billionaires can only exist by exploiting people; a lot! Fifty years ago China had eliminated the influence of open capitalists on the economy, while allowing those who allied with the national interest to continue to earn income from their investments. In other words they were being phased out. Some major changes had to take place to get to where China is today with 319 billionaires²¹

This reality is easily ignored by the revisionists. They brush it off like a mosquito coming to bite them and suck out their blood for its own sustenance.

The third article is one in the *LA Times*, saying that some of the Chinese bourgeoisie have vanished.²² What better than a mystery story to sustain the false ideals of revisionists! The story says, point-blank, that “on recent years, dozens of senior executives have mysteriously vanished. Most are

21 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

22 Ann M. Simmons, “[Some of China's richest and most powerful men have mysteriously vanished](#),” *LA Times*, Jun 14, 2017, accessed Apr 17, 2018.

believed to have been caught up in an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that has targeted financial industry executives, government officials and the heads of state-owned companies. In many cases, the disappeared have returned. In others, they have turned up in custody or were found dead.” Without getting into the specific cases, this again does not mean that the state is magically socialist. If it was, then it wouldn’t have billionaires or even a bourgeoisie as prominent! Revisionists fail to realize this.

After this is an article in the *Washington Post* quoting some annoyed “Chinese entrepreneurs,” members of the bourgeoisie, who want the country to move faster down the capitalist road.²³ Basically they want state control to be weakened and private enterprises to have even more control:

...If the country’s economic miracle is to be sustained, its private entrepreneurs will be expected to do more to foster growth and innovation....many business leaders say the economic playing field is tilted sharply against them and in favor of the country’s mammoth state-owned enterprises...Although many entrepreneurs undoubtedly still make a lot of money, some have begun to complain that they survive only at the whim of a distrustful Communist Party...Within China, most business leaders try to keep their heads down, concentrating on maximizing returns to shareholders and investors. A small but growing group....says the time has come to speak out for political reform, for the rule of law and a judiciary independent of the Communist Party, and for the protection of private property and civil rights....they are breaking a taboo in Communist China that business leaders never discuss politics.

Again, this article does not prove the case of Chinese revisionists that the country is socialist. Sure, there are a few butt-hurt capitalists who support the efforts by Western-funded activists and members of the bourgeoisie who want to move fully toward a Western bourgeois democracy. But, if most of the bourgeoisie are glad and don’t “discuss politics,” then this means that they are generally fine with the current trend in China toward more and more markets.

23 Simon Denyer, “[Chinese entrepreneurs, unsettled, speak out for reform](#),” *Washington Post*, Aug 26, 2013.

The link afterword is to comments on *Quora* in response to the question “How is China a communist country with many billionaires?”²⁴ The answers are varied. The top commenter, Steven Haddock, with a B.A. in Political Science writes that “the Chinese economy has not been run on strictly Communist principles for some time...[after] Hong Kong and Macao...had to be integrated into China in the late 1990s....China decided to partially privatize most of its industry...Chinese billionaires, as a result, are mostly the creation of political patronage rather than entrepreneurial spirit.” Of course, the revisionists would praise this answer as he declares that there isn’t “capitalism” in China, even though he admits it, by noting that the country had accepted market principles. Another commenter, Mas Miwa, former Engineer at Hughes Space and Communications, says that “...if you’ve been keeping up with the news, you should know that China, since Deng XiaoPing changed China’s course to ‘one with Chinese characteristics’, China has allowed capitalism to mix with socialism. It is the capitalist content that has created private wealth. It is capitalism that has now made China the second biggest economy in the world. It is capitalism that will soon propel China to shortly become the largest economy in the world.” It is this reality that Haddock whitewashes with his absurdist analysis. Apart from some commenters who don’t have much to say²⁵ there’s Kevin Zheng who comments that “China’s “many billionaires” are often capitalists who venture abroad to make money...a lot of the richer Chinese capitalists are travelling and/or working overseas for greater profit, and lower taxes” while Véronique Bellamy, a self-defined Trotskyist, declares that “China allows foreign companies to come in and exploit their workforce for cheap labour, thus furthering the cause of capitalism.” This is a valid point, even from a Trotskyist. This is echoed by James Feigenbaum, an economics professor at Utah State University, claims that China has a “socialist economy,” basing this falsity on government ownership, but admits it is “also a capitalist country in the sense that the government does what it can to preserve the profitability of capital...[arguably] China is the most capitalist country on Earth” or a “John Smith”

24 [“How is China a communist country with many billionaires?”](#), *Quora*, accessed Apr 17, 2018.

25 This encompasses commenters Allen Wang, Guy Taylor, Selim Inges, Banson Chong, and Ryan Rod.

saying that “China is a communist country in name only. If anything, China has a centrally-planned capitalist system. If there is ever a coup formed in China, it will likely be a communist party trying to overthrow the current communist party.” Other commenters, like Chen Dalun, a Chinese national, say that “China is a capitalist country with a powerful overwatching government. Its governors are technicians passed through numerous filter to be the best person for the job. It means, you’ll start by managing a village before 40 years later when you can manage the country” or Heide Knight who wrote that there “was a time when it could be considered Marxist Leninist...but it underwent a liberalisation of its markets and opened itself to trade.” Finally, commenters like James Graham say that “though China is run by the communist party...its economy is mostly capitalist,” and self-declared anarchist R.B. Galker says that the “PRC is a capitalistic country run by a party that was founded by communists and currently may just have, at best, some vestigial communists in its ranks.” That may be too fair of an analysis of what is going on in China at the present.

The link after this is yet another article in *Forbes*, written by a contributor named Rob Cain.²⁶

He declares that in modern-day China

...it’s not easy being a billionaire captain of industry...[with] wealth, status and latitude to make business decisions are all subject to the whims of the powerful heads of the Communist Party of China....It had been previously unreported that new measures aimed at stemming the flow of outbound capital from large private companies were implemented with Xi’s explicit blessings. Beijing party leaders recently decided to block state-owned banks from furnishing any new loans to big companies with aggressive track records of making overseas acquisitions...The abrupt shift in policy has thrown a wrench into the works of many Chinese and international companies planning to conduct M&A activities, and has cut deeply into the earnings prospects of numerous investment bankers, lenders, attorneys and finance industry professionals who had

²⁶ Rob Cain, “[Wanda Billionaire Wang Jianlin's M&A Plans Were Thwarted By President Xi Himself](#),” *Forbes*, Jul 24, 2017, accessed Apr 17, 2018. Also see [page 2](#).

come to depend upon the loose-spending ways of major players in the PRC...The government's moves are widely seen as part of a campaign to assert greater control over the country's vast and increasingly powerful private sector...they serve as reminders that doing business in China can sometimes feel like trudging through a minefield, with possible heart-stopping dangers lurking at every step of the way.

For one, this article makes you feel “bad” for the capitalist. But, you really shouldn’t. The Chinese government may annoy the bourgeoisie from time to time, promoting nationalist interests, but it allows them to exist and thrive. This is accepted and known by the global capitalist class but again missed by the revisionists who would laugh it off.

After this article in *Forbes* is another from the *Financial Times*.²⁷ It focuses on the arrest of “Xiao Jianhua, one of China’s most politically connected and wealthy men” by Chinese government agents, worrying the global bourgeoisie. As one person familiar with the case told the *Financial Times*, “most Chinese billionaires are like geese — they get fat on their political connections and close ties to party leaders, but at some point the emperor decides he wants to eat foie gras.” This doesn’t give me any confidence that the country is socialist. In fact, this means that the bourgeoisie are even more part of the political system than what revisionists will acknowledge!

Then there’s yet another article from *Financial Times*.²⁸ It notes that the “son of Zhou Yongkang, China’s disgraced former security and energy tsar, has been fined an eye-catching \$54m and sentenced to 18 years in jail, in an unusual acknowledgment of the wealth that can be extracted by officials’ relatives,” and that, as a reminder, that “Zhou Yongkang, who was once among China’s most powerful figures, had supported a power bid by Bo Xilai, a politician and political rival to Mr Xi,” along with giving other details of the case. This shows that the Chinese leadership, dominated by “determined” capitalist roaders, wants to suppress any “progressive” capitalist roaders, who also

27 Jamil Anderlini, “[China sends its billionaires a chilling message](#),” *Financial Times*, Feb 1, 2017.

28 Lucy Hornby, “[Former China security tsar’s son sentenced to jail](#),” *Financial Times*, Jun 15, 2016.

believe in “market socialism” but want to slow the effects, bringing in more social welfarist measures. Once again, the “determined” capitalist readers have won, raising the question if it is even worth fighting through the Communist Party of China (CPC) to make changes in China. It seems impossible.

Following this article is one from *Fortune* magazine.²⁹ It notes that “a Chinese billionaire often called “China’s Carl Icahn” will go to prison for his role in crashing his country’s stock market,” named Xu Xiang, a hedge fund manager whom has been accused of “illegally manipulating stocks, as well as insider trading” and has to pay a fine of “more than \$1.6 billion (11 billion yuan), the biggest fine an individual has ever had to pay for a white-collar crime in Chinese history,” but the penalties could have been “far worse, as he faced as much as 10 years in prison.” The magazine also notes that this “crackdown on Xu comes as China is struggling to convince international market makers that it can effectively regulate its own stock market in accordance with global standards.” So, this is basically a message to the Chinese bourgeoisie and to the global bourgeoisie that it can manage its own markets? That shows that the country has accepted capitalist precepts without question.

The next article is from the right-leaning British publication, *The Telegraph*.³⁰ It focuses on the executing of a Chinese capitalist “famed for his love of casinos, cigars and luxury cars” named Liu Han, a “49-year-old mining tycoon once worth at least £4.2 billion.” He was arrested in 2013, with a court saying he headed “a cabal of ferocious gangsters” but skeptics believed this was either part of a political purge, or an act to convince “Chinese citizens he was successfully slaying powerful and corrupt “tigers”...without simply exposing a Party that was rotten to the core.” Interestingly, Liu said at one his proceedings that “I’ve been framed.” If that is true, then it would mean the whole trial and everything that surrounded it was a ruse. If he was lying, which is equally possible, then this would again be a strategy of going after the “bad apples” but not the whole barrel, because if the Chinese leadership did, their public legitimacy as leaders of China would be undermined.

29 Jen Wiczner, “[The 'Carl Icahn of China' Is Going to Jail](#),” *Fortune*, Jan 23, 2017.

30 Tom Phillips, “[China executes Ferrari-loving billionaire 'gangster'](#),” *The Telegraph*, Feb 9, 2015.

Next was an article in the British publication, *The Independent*.³¹ In the article it was declared that “Chinese billionaires and company bosses keep vanishing. Most reappear days later; others end up in prison or fall from buildings...Bloomberg reports that senior executives from 34 listed companies disappeared in 2015.” This doesn’t prove that the country is socialist. It shows that they are serious about their nationalism and gaming the market, but that’s about it.

Following this was an article in the *New York Times*, which has all the lies fit to print.³² The article notes that

China’s relationship with entrepreneurs like Mr. Guo, already complicated, has become strained. The Communist Party, which suppressed private enterprise after taking power in 1949, officially welcomed it to join its ranks early last decade [in August 2001], recognizing that the country needed private business to power growth and innovation. But the state is now asserting its authority over private business...China is showing signs that it is aware of unease in the private sector...In an unusual move in September, China’s top leaders sought to assure entrepreneurs that it would support and protect their rights...“The central government’s policy is very positive,” Mr. Guo said. “But what is key is the issue of enforcement. The gap between the central government and local governments is still quite large.” The government has also made it easier for small businesses to get loans and stepped up the country’s once-weak intellectual property laws...Private businesses have become a major driver of China’s development...At the same time, China’s business tycoons have become a powerful constituency...“Look at Trump, a businessman who could even become president,” Mr. Guo said. “For us to be like America in recognizing the importance of entrepreneurs, I think we still need a little more time.”

31 Ben Chapman, “[Chinese billionaires and CEOs keep disappearing in ‘state-sanctioned abductions’](#),” *The Independent*, Feb 6, 2017, building off Bloomberg reports.

32 Sui-Lee Wee, “[China’s Entrepreneurs Squirm Under Xi Jinping’s Tightening Grip](#),” *New York Times*, Oct 23, 2017.

This article actually shows China as more market-friendly than the revisionists would like to admit. The Chinese bourgeoisie are nervous and annoyed, but this relates to the non-uniformity of standards across the government, mainly in the area of enforcement. So, the country still is on the capitalist road and the revisionists shouldn't even try to use the previous article to prove their case, since the words from the bourgeoisie themselves disprove their case.

The final article is from *BBC News*.³³ The article declares that

...there is one Chinese export product that is seemingly unstoppable at the moment – millionaires...Entrepreneurial, well-connected or just plain corrupt, it does not matter how they made their fortunes, there is mounting evidence to show that China's super-rich are heading for the exit...In 2006 Chinese nationals were granted just 63 visas under the scheme. Last year the figure had leapt to more than 2,408 and this year it is already above the 3,700 mark. It means a tidal wave of Chinese money is currently pouring into US infrastructure projects...China's rigid and opaque political system is perhaps one reason for the wealth-drain...Add to that the fears that China's decade-long economic boom may be losing steam and it is perhaps not surprising that China's rich are on the run...But in these economically uncertain times, there is a growing temptation for those with money to take it, and themselves, somewhere a little safer.

This again does not prove that China is “socialist” but just shows a bunch of butt-hurt bourgeoisie. In fact, this article shows that these bourgeoisie are involved in exporting capital, meaning that China is meeting one of the standards for an imperialist state. This was pointed out by Renato Reyes Jr, Secretary General of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) who said that “China is no longer a socialist state. It is now entertaining imperialist ambitions.”³⁴ He obviously has a more developed viewpoint than any of the revisionists, by far, who want to obscure the reality and hide what is really happening from China, to support their faulty viewpoint.

33 John Sudworth, “Rich Chinese seeking overseas residency,” *BBC News*, Aug 22, 2012.

34 George P. Moya, “[Philippine Left slams China's 'imperialist incursions'](#),” *Rappler*, Apr 22, 2014.

Role of State-Owned Enterprises in China

This chapter aims to determine the role of state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, in China as a whole. In the process, varied links are not analyzed, including a Wikipedia listing of the “Largest Chinese Companies” which is not reliable because of Wikipedia’s bourgeois character, a page about the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission or the “Role of the State in Chinese Economic Development” as the latter two articles are already discussed in part 1 of this publication. Otherwise, every other link is analyzed.

Let’s start with the first link. It is an article from the *International Business Times*, saying that chiefs of SOEs may face a 50% salary cut.³⁵ The article notes that this is part of Xi’s reforms, an effort to “more tightly regulate executive salaries and to curb “unreasonably high” compensation. He also called on SOEs to rein in other spending, such as on cars and accommodation. The reforms are aimed at addressing public discontent over some SOE officials' compensation and rewards, which are perceived as being excessive...SOE bosses are often also paid like Western business executives, despite the fact that the organizations they lead are often national monopolies.” This shows that this effort is meant to soothe social discontent, not necessarily as some “progressive” move.

The next article is one from the flagship publication of the British bourgeoisie, *The Economist*. It expresses annoyance that SOEs in China are advancing. It says, and I quote, “the general trajectory [over the last 40 years] has seemed plain enough: towards a greater role for market forces” but the “retreat of ...SOEs...has stalled...Their share of industrial assets hovers stubbornly near 40%...Mr Xi remains well aware of the need for reform...The entrenchment of state firms brings dangers both for China and for the wider world...SOEs also risk provoking a backlash as they target increased foreign sales” and goes on on what they think is “Mr Xi’s belief in tighter state control.”³⁶ Yet, this doesn’t

35 Mark Hanrahan, “[China State-Owned Enterprises Chiefs Face 50% Salary Cuts As Xi Jinping Launches Reform](#),” *International Business Times*, Aug 21, 2014.

36 “[China’s state enterprises are not retreating but advancing](#),” *The Economist*, Jul 20, 2017.

make China less friendly to the market. As one article in *Qiushi*, organ of the CPC's Central Committee, declared in March 2012, "the development of a market economy under socialism represents an unprecedented undertaking of great proportions and a necessary choice for the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics."³⁷ Of course, there is no "socialism" in China. They admit the importance of developing a market economy, saying they directly abandoned a planned economy in the past, with developments since 1978 including "prices for competitive commodities and services were liberalized across the board; the dual-track price system for the pricing of means of production...gradually phased out; market-based reforms for real estate and factors of production such as capital, labor, technology and information," while also establishing a mechanism whereby "prices are primarily determined by market forces" to name a few aspects. After all, as the article admits, "the Chinese market has become an important component of the world market." So much for the varied revisionists who say that China is not integrated into the global capitalist system! This proves that they are dead wrong.

The article after this is again from *The Economist*.³⁸ They declare that there is a "financial weakness of...SOEs," adding that

SOE reforms are stuck in a rut...It is hard to overstate the importance of getting SOE reforms right...The fate of China's state firms is also a global concern. By international standards, they are already massive...Back in 2013 Mr Xi seemed to grasp that change was needed. He vowed that market forces would play a "decisive role" in allocating resources and declared that reform of SOEs was a priority...Some promising ideas are afoot. After years of discussion,

37 Zeng Peiyan, "[The Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy](#)," *Qiushi Journal*, Vol.4 No.3 July 1,2012. Other than declaring that socialism is part of the economy, which is incorrect, they quote Deng as declaring in 1992 that "the proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, because there is planning under capitalism too; a market economy is not capitalism, because there are markets under socialism too. Planning and market forces are both means of controlling economic activity." So the next time a revisionist makes such a ridiculous argument, know it derives from Deng.

38 "[Reform of China's ailing state-owned firms is emboldening them](#)," *The Economist*, Jul 22, 2017.

China has started to let state firms award shares to employees as part of their pay packages...Another potentially promising idea is “mixed-ownership reform”, a fancy term for allowing SOEs to sell stakes to private investors...What can be blamed on the government are conflicting messages...he [Xi] wants state firms to be better run—hence the emphasis on the market—but only so that they better serve the party by helping it to manage the economy at home and carry China’s flag into foreign territory...the government has capped pay for senior executives, concerned that they were getting more than government employees of equivalent ranks, stoking resentment. Yet on an international basis, SOE bosses are dramatically underpaid...Signs suggest that after seeing morale suffer without any improvement in performance, the party is rethinking at least some of its policies...The risk is that such supersized SOEs could hurt the global economy...the state accounts for more than 80% of market capitalisation in sectors such as energy, industry and utilities...But the state accounts for 40% or less of market value among consumer, health-care and IT companies...The state may turn out to be a wise investor but experience suggests otherwise...Cutting state firms down to size and opening them up to competition ought to be the point of SOE reform. Instead, China is beefing them up and driving them into new territory.

Revisionists undoubtedly will try to use this to “prove” that China is “socialist” but this is false. Consider two articles from *Qiushi* itself, noting that China is putting forward “market supervision and regulation to make its business environment more inviting,” and that while it encourages the “vitality of the public sector, especially state-owned enterprises” it also supports and guides “the development of the private sector” by giving “the market a decisive role in allocating resources.” That sounds more capitalistic than anything else!³⁹

39 “[Premier Li: More dynamic market cornerstone for development](#),” *Qiushi Journal* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jan 5, 2017; Li Zhihui, Wang Aihua, and Tian Zijun, “[Socialism with Chinese characteristics: 10 ideas to share with world](#),” *Qiushi Journal* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Oct 9, 2017.

The next two articles are from *Financial Times*. The first focuses on the CPC writing itself into company law in Hong Kong.⁴⁰ The article says that the CPC (sometimes called CCP) is “writing itself into the articles of association of many of the country’s biggest companies in a blow to investor hopes that Beijing would relax its grip on the market. More than 30 Hong Kong-listed state-owned enterprises...have this year added lines to their central documents that place the party, rather than the Chinese state, at the heart of each group” with the changes billed “by the companies as part of Beijing’s efforts to improve efficiency and productivity at SOEs,” adding that “Investors have voiced frustration with their inability to stop the changes...The changes are causing consternation among Hong Kong regulators.” Again, this doesn’t prove that socialism exists in China. It shows that China is pursuing a strategy that “integrates market forces with the role of the government in the regulation of the economy, is able to effectively prevent the failure of the market” which involves “large-scale economic reforms” and efforts to “maintain the stability of the macro-environment.”⁴¹ That is all this is. A similar response can be made to the second article in the *Financial Times*.⁴² It states that the “ruling Chinese Communist party has maintained representative committees inside SOEs for decades...That has been changing over recent years, as President Xi Jinping and the head of his anti-corruption campaign, Wang Qishan, seek to extend the ruling party’s representation in — and control over — the state-backed groups.” They add that “for better or worse, people who do business with or invest in SOEs are going to be seeing a lot more of the party.” As such, this again, is not a departure from the capitalist road.

Following this is an article in *Fortune* about the biggest companies in China.⁴³ The article states that taking a “look at the number of Chinese companies on this year’s *Fortune* Global 500 list and it’s hard not to come away impressed—even a bit intimidated...But dig a little deeper, and China’s rise

40 Jennifer Hughes, “[China’s Communist party writes itself into company law](#),” *Financial Times*, Aug 14, 2017.

41 Zhang Weiwei, “[Analysis of a Miracle: The China Model and Its Significance](#),” *Qiushi Journal*, Vol. 3 No.3 Jul 1, 2011.

42 Tom Mitchell, “[China’s Communist party seeks company control before reform](#),” *Financial Times*, Aug 15, 2017.

43 Scott Cendrowski, “[China’s Global 500 companies are bigger than ever—and mostly state-owned](#),” *Fortune*, Jul 22, 2015, accessed Apr 18, 2018.

begins to look less imposing. First, the top 12 Chinese companies are all state-owned...Of the 98 Chinese companies on the list, only 22 are private.” The article does onto say that SOEs “enjoy massive state support, which fosters growth and insulates them from competition...the Chinese companies are anything but global brands. They enjoy monopolies or oligopolies at home, but often struggle to expand their business outside of the protected borders of their home country...But until Chinese companies grow international brands commensurate with their size back home, they will be like B-movie actors who count 1 million Twitter followers: they will never be as impressive as their revenue numbers suggest.” As such, this “growth” is faulty, as *Fortune* magazine admits itself. As noted by some informed critics of China, while “self-proclaimed "communists" still refer to China as socialist, or a "deformed workers' state...most of them base their position on the strength of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China...[but] the obvious refutation is: socialism is not defined as a state-run economy, at least not by Marxists. SOEs in China operate based on a profit motive.”⁴⁴

After this is an article in the *Global Times*. It says that “China's centrally administered State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have seen both an increase in assets and improved quality of their growth during the past five years...[and that] reforms in central SOEs have made progress while maintaining stability.”⁴⁵ The article adds that “there has also been notable scientific and technological progress in a wide range of sectors...Central SOEs continue to invest heavily in research and development” and also quotes Zhang Chunxiao, professor of economics at Peking University, that “a general adoption of market principles has been completed. Value chains have been expanded, enhanced and optimized...more SOEs are going global, improving their competitive capabilities in the international market.” They sound like they are operating on the profit motive here, without a doubt. Wang Jiang, director of the Central SOEs Think-tank Alliance, admits this, saying that changes among SOEs allows “the enterprises to develop in an appropriate manner and achieve better profits”! The article goes onto

44 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

45 Chu Daye and Dong Feng, “[Central SOEs leaner, stronger](#),” *Global Times*, Sept 28, 2017.

say that “central SOEs have been actively engaged in the campaign to cut excess capacity,” that “during the past five years, there have been mergers involving 34 central SOEs,” that “68.9 percent of central SOEs have undergone mixed-ownership reforms” and that many SOEs are “investing in the B&R route” showing that this is just a way for the Chinese bourgeoisie to spread their capital. Even the Peking University professor, Zhang is quoted as saying that “on the one hand, private capital should be welcomed into SOEs, and on the other, SOEs can invest in private companies.” This sounds like courting the market and the bourgeoisie, not building socialism! To say otherwise is to lie.

The next article is from the *South China Morning Post*, a conservative Chinese paper.⁴⁶ It noted that of the “40 million people who work for China’s state-owned industrial behemoths, more than 10 million are Chinese Communist Party members...many question whether China’s efforts to enhance centralised control of its state enterprises goes against its promise to spearhead market-oriented reform of the state sector...the 102 big conglomerates [in China]...contributed 60 per cent of China’s outbound investments by the end of 2016.” This merely shows that the state has control of their SOEs. They undeniably try to make sure they turn a profit, as this is a necessity for the Chinese bourgeoisie. After all, ultimately it would not be a shock if China ultimately agrees with the global bourgeoisie’s assessment: that China’s SOEs must shrink with privatization measures.⁴⁷

Following this is an article from *People’s Daily* about the “Top 500 Enterprises List” in China. The list notes that “China’s largest 500 firms have generated a staggering combined revenue of 64 trillion yuan (9.9 trillion US dollars), an increase of 7.64 percent from the previous year,” adding that “a separate report accompanying the list reflects China’s focus on infrastructure as well as a trend in

46 Wendy Wu, “[How the Communist Party controls China’s state-owned industrial titans](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Jun 17, 2017, accessed Apr 18, 2018.

47 Eric Ng, “[China must shrink state-owned enterprises if it wants reforms to succeed, says former WTO chief](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Apr 11, 2018. In the article, Xiao Yaqing, chairman of the state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, who oversees China’s 97 SOEs, was quoted as saying that “the fact that the state-owned sector remains the core of our economy was a result of four decades of economic reform and competition, there is no doubt that SOEs must remain core of the economy and they need to become bigger and stronger, as long as their growth is subject to market-based competition.” It is again accepted that SOEs have a profit motive.

business mergers...research and development efforts remain high among top Chinese enterprises, with 414 of them reported to have invested more than 735.9 billion yuan in the area.”⁴⁸ While a number of those in the top 10 enterprises are state-owned, this still doesn’t prove that China is socialist, just that it has a certain form of capitalism in place.

The article following is again from *People's Daily*.⁴⁹ It notes that “debt risks at China's centrally-administered state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are totally under control...the average debt-to-asset ratio of China's central SOEs dropped to 66.5 percent...to further keep the debt ratio under control...the government will step up efforts in supply-side structural reform and the restructuring of SOEs. The Chinese government has been actively restructuring central SOEs in a bid to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.” This further proves the integration of SOEs into the Chinese and global market without question.

The next article is from *Xinhua*, yet another state media outlet.⁵⁰ It states that SOEs in China have seen “strong growth in the past five years,” adding that “the central government has been actively restructuring its SOEs in a bid to improve their efficiency and competitiveness...The mergers and reorganizations have helped the SOEs lift their global competitiveness,” with the article admitting that SOEs are “industrial giants,” basically another word for monopolies as the article later admits. The article does onto say that “the mixed-ownership reform, which diversifies the ownership structure of SOEs, has started to take off in recent years” and quotes Xiao Yaqing, chairperson of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), saying that China welcomes “the participation of foreign enterprises in the process, if they are interested.” This shows that SOEs are integrated into the global capitalist system.

After this are two more articles from *Financial Times*. The first of these articles focuses on

48 [“China reveals latest Top 500 Enterprises list,”](#) *People's Daily*, Sept 11, 2017.

49 [“China says debt risks at central SOEs under control,”](#) *People's Daily*, Sept 28, 2017.

50 [“Economic Watch: Powerful reform strengthens Chinese state firms,”](#) *Xinhua*, Sept 28, 2017.

business reform in China's SOEs.⁵¹ It grumbles there there is a "blurring of the line between private enterprises in China and SOEs....Rather than freeing up state enterprises to act more efficiently, the latest step move by Beijing is all about asking private companies to subsidise them," adding that "to many investors the latest "mixed ownership" reform is a case of two steps backwards for every step forward," saying that "it seems that China's so-called reform policy is moving in only one direction — backwards." Still, this grumbling means that this *Financial Times* writer is unhappy with China's moves currently, but does not mean that the country is unfriendly to capitalists. It is doing its best to be friendly for the global bourgeoisie!

The final article from *Financial Times* is again about reform in China's public sector.⁵² This article notes that the "the official heroes of China's state-sector reform programme range from dedicated anti-graft investigators...to strategically minded administrators determined to create a stable of disciplined, world-beating multinationals" but some critics say that "state-sector reform has been one of the biggest policy disappointments of Mr Xi's first term. Much is riding on the success or failure of state-sector reform in China." The article also states that Xiao of SASAC "has reduced the number of centrally administered SOEs from 117 to 98 through strategic mergers" but noted that "other government data show a prolonged slump in SOEs' return on assets." Again, this just shows capitalism with Chinese characteristics alive and present in China.

The next article is from the *South China Morning Post*.⁵³ It grumbles that

market-based principles are increasingly subordinated to long-term national strategic ambitions...Rather than breaking up state monopolies, China's reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) focus on mixed ownership and public-private partnerships. The idea is to bring in private companies to help transform SOEs into financially sound, innovative and

51 Henny Sender, "[China's state-owned business reform a step in the wrong direction](#)," *Financial Times*, Sept 26, 2017.

52 Tom Mitchell, "[The curious career paths of China's public-sector bosses](#)," *Financial Times*, Oct 2, 2017.

53 Max Zengelin, "Why economic reforms in China mean a bigger role for the state," *South China Morning Post*, Sept 21, 2017, accessed Apr 18, 2018.

internationally competitive national champions...It will be harder to evaluate the competitive landscape in China as lines between policy-driven and market-driven forces blur...China's leaders do not plan to withdraw state influence from the economy. Political stability and the pursuit of national interests take priority over market principles.

However, this grumbling rests on faulty premises. For one, even in articles in the *Qiushi* which claim incorrectly that there is still socialism in China, note that “China allows development of the market and the private sector...and still has some reservations about it,” adding that “the state sector retains a very strong presence in key economic sectors...China has been cautious in adapting to economic globalization...China has not copied the free market economic model of Europe and the United States...there are capitalist factors in the Chinese economy.”⁵⁴ This muddled mess of words is clarified by articles saying that China “gives the market a decisive role in allocating resources, and the government can play a better role in macro-policy efficiency” and that China needs “give more play to the basic role of the market in the allocation of resources” while talking about the “public sector,” basically saying that SOEs operate on market principles.

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released a report by Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle on October 26, 2011 titled “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China.”⁵⁵ I wrote about the summary of this report in part 1 of this publication. Szamosszegi and Kyle begin by writing that

China's economy has been undergoing a historic transformation since 1978, when private enterprise was frowned upon...since that time, market-oriented reforms have produced an economy that would have been unthinkable in the mid-1970s. China's economy is the world's

54 Liu Guoguang, “[The Chinese Model Gives Us Hope That China Will Be the First to Recover](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol 1, No. 1, Oct 1, 2009; Li Zhihui, Wang Aihua, and Tian Zijun, “[Socialism with Chinese characteristics: 10 ideas to share with world](#),” *Qiushi Journal* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Oct 9, 2017; Miao Wei, “[Accelerating the Transformation and Upgrading of Industries](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Apr. 1, 2012

55 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “[An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China](#),” *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, Oct. 26, 2011.

second largest national economy, a powerhouse in international trade, and a major destination for foreign investors. China not only has a private sector, but private entrepreneurs are allowed to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China has not one stock exchange but two, and Chinese firms...raise funds in international capital markets...The state-owned and controlled portion of the Chinese economy is large...the share of GDP accounted for by the non-state sector...is also approximately 50 percent...Based on the current direction of economic policy making, the state sector in China will continue to play an important role, even if the state's share of GDP shrinks further...First, the ruling CCP has not expressed an interest in becoming a bastion of free market capitalism...China's SOEs are potentially formidable competitors because they benefit from a number of government preferences in China...When it joined the WTO in 2001, China promised that the government would not influence, directly or indirectly, the commercial decisions of SOEs. China does not appear to be keeping this commitment.

This beginning comment does not deny that these SOEs operate on market principles. Let us recall what the World Bank wrote about China, since revisionists would undoubtedly lap it up, making it valid to use as a source here. They declared that “China launched a bold but gradual set of reforms in 1978” including “raising prices for agricultural commodities; then decollectivizing agricultural production, making the farm household the residual claimant; and finally beginning to slowly but steadily dismantle the state-run procurement and input supply systems.”⁵⁶ They also added that China has an agricultural futures exchange “to facilitate a wider range of financing and risk management transactions,” that that 2003 Rural Land Contracting Law aims at “strengthening farmers’ property rights and reducing the scope for discretionary intervention by officials.”

We then move onto the introduction to this long analysis. It declares that “a number of economic, political and policy trends demonstrate that the Chinese economy has become more market-

⁵⁶ World Bank, “[World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development](#),” 2007, accessed Apr 15, 2018, pp 104, 126, 142.

oriented,” also noting that “Chinese statistics show a dramatic rise in the number of ostensibly private enterprises since the late 1970s” and saying that the country “now has stock exchanges in two cities and hundreds of Chinese firms now have listings in exchanges beyond the mainland.” They add to this (bolding is my emphasis) that

*Chinese firms, including privately owned firms, are now major competitors in advanced country export markets and major foreign investors...although **China’s reliance on private enterprise and market-based incentives has been growing**, and the CCP’s treatment of private enterprises and entrepreneurs has been changing, it would be a mistake to write off the country’s SOEs as dying vestiges of China’s Maoist past or to minimize the current role of the state and the CCP in shaping economic outcomes in China and beyond...**the private sector nominally is responsible for a growing share of economic activity in China**. Still, the Chinese government and SOEs remain potent economic forces. Indeed, some of China’s SOEs are among the largest firms in China and the world. They are major investors in foreign countries.*

This does not prove the revisionists right in their assessment of China as “socialist” as the above shows their connection with the global capitalist system. Sure, SOEs are important, but that doesn’t make them some mavens of socialism in China!

The study goes on to say (bolding is my emphasis) that

*China’s state sector consists of SOEs reporting to central, provincial, and local levels of government...The SASACs are analogous to holding companies; they hold the shares of SOEs that previously were held directly by the state...**In all, there are approximately 300 SASACs in China**. In addition to the central government SASAC, there are about 30 provincial SASACs overseeing provincially controlled SOEs, and scores of municipal SASACs supervising local SOEs...the state sector remains a potent force in the Chinese economy...State-owned enterprises*

are business entities established by central and local governments, and whose supervisory officials are from the government...It turns out that a high proportion of shareholding companies are controlled by SOEs...the definition of the private sector is specific. **It consists of economic units invested or controlled by natural persons who hire labor for profit-making activities...**the growing role of private enterprise in China...In addition, despite the fact that foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) have formed joint-venture operations with state and collective sector firms, they have been officially categorized as FIEs, the implication being that they are private enterprises...**the Chinese government has restructured SOEs, particularly in the industrial sphere, to mix state-owned and private capital...**China's data on fixed investments show that the state sector remains an important focus of national policy...In contrast to the **fall in employment by pure SOEs** [from 78% of urban employment in the late 1970s, to 21% in 2010], the wages paid by SOEs have been rising since the late 1990s...Chinese data indicate[s] that the state sector remains a significant force in the Chinese economy...China's economy **has undergone dramatic reforms since the late 1970s**. The most dramatic of these changes has been the introduction of private enterprise into what had been a centrally planned economy completely dominated by SOEs...**The expansion of the private sector in China since the late 1970s is indisputable...**the output, value added, and tax payments of SOEs and SHEs expanded substantially, though not as **rapidly as the private sector did**. The exception is employment, which reflects not only the growth of the private sector, but also the restructuring of bloated SOEs since the late 1990s...There are as of this writing 120 central SOEs. Yet Chinese statistics indicate that state-owned entities exceed 100,000...central SOEs frequently contain numerous subsidiaries...it appears that the vast majority of SOEs in China are owned by sub-national governments...In general, the state's role in pillar industries is **notably smaller** than its role in strategic industries...The level of state ownership in the

banking sector is comparable to that of China's strategic industries...Numerous firms controlled by SOEs raise money on international capital markets. Firms that list on stock exchanges have specific reporting requirements, and submissions to market authorities typically contain information about the controlling shareholders, grants received from the government, official capital injections, amounts borrowed from state-owned banks, financial guarantees received and offered, preferential tax rates, etc...SOE-owned firms that raise capital in international capital markets continue to benefit from a number of subsidies and other forms of preferential treatment.

The above shows that such state-controlled enterprises in China benefit from subsidies from the state and that these enterprises directly participate in the global capitalist system. This belays any absurdist claims from misinformed revisionists on China.

Further comments in the study itself show the prominence of the market in China:

*In the 1980s, the Chinese countryside was an example of entrepreneurial capitalism...Today, with its present mix of state-controlled and private enterprises and overt government guidance, China is arguably most similar to **state-guided capitalism**...The banking sector has been the subject of reform since the late 1970s...Following the initiation of market reforms in 1979, **the government separated four of PBOC's divisions and set up four commercial banks**: the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)...As a result of country-wide economic reforms and government budgetary considerations, SOEs **became increasingly reliant** on bank loans to finance their operational and investment needs...At the end of 1997, the government **took a number of steps** to increase the commercial orientation of its banks. Despite these efforts, credit continued to be allocated on a noncommercial basis...The 1995 Commercial Bank Law...[requires] commercial banks [to be] responsible for their own profits*

and losses, [and] must protect the interests of their depositors...China has the highest level of state ownership of banks of any major economy in the world. The sector's assets are **extremely large** relative to the size of the economy...Despite changes in the legal framework ostensibly aimed at pushing the state-owned commercial banks (SOCB) **toward more commercially oriented lending patterns**, they continue to favor state-owned firms. This preference for SOEs has persisted despite generally **low levels of profitability** and more rapid growth in other segments of the Chinese economy...Over the years, the state-owned banks have provided significant benefits to central and subnational SOEs...The irony of this situation is that **the private sector in China has been more productive than the state-owned sector and has been growing more rapidly**. For example, private enterprises are more than twice as productive as wholly owned SOEs. Indeed, productivity **increases** with each form of ownership that moves progressively away from direct state-ownership.

Again, it is clear that the state sector is there, but is part of capitalism as it exists in China itself. Qiushi, the journal of the CPC's Central Committee, can deny this and declare that "socialism" exists in China, but they are wrong without a doubt.

The study goes on to note that

*The government has no intention of releasing the banks [which are state controlled] from its control. The CBRC has affirmatively stated that the government will maintain a majority interest in the Big Four for at least the next decade...Given this policy environment, **it is not surprising that market reforms have progressed slowly in China's banking sector**...In short, state-owned banks continue to favor SOEs and give short shrift to the private sector. They are likely to continue this behavior as long as the CCP maintains the ability to appoint key managers and local SASACs attempt to influence the lending behavior of local branches...China's government procurement market has been growing as well. As many areas*

of China are improving infrastructure, government procurement in China is of great interest to businesses inside and outside of China...**By almost any independent measure, China's government operates a substantial procurement market...**China uses its government procurement market to support SOEs and to create national champions in key industries and incubate "indigenous innovation"...Many procurement opportunities are in industries dominated by SOEs, such as power. Although such projects are in theory open to all comers, **SOEs have a natural advantage** because the national and/or provincial governments have a vested interest in the success of SOEs...U.S. and other foreign firms have had some notable successes in tapping the Chinese government procurement market, directly and indirectly...SOE participation in the U.S. federal procurement market is, if anything, indirect...China's SOEs have played a key role in the process of acquiring foreign technology to develop industries favored by the Chinese government. **China's high speed railways were built using foreign technology, some of which was secured through joint ventures...**SOEs now seek to make money, and many have succeeded in recent years...China's SOEs continue to be influenced by policy considerations...The most recent wave of SOE reforms was aimed at embedding SOEs into a modern enterprise system...when fiduciary duties of management at listed firms conflict with China's government priorities, management will...**face an incentive structure that pushes it to chose the interests of China** over the interests of private shareholders...the executives of China's important SOEs face two sets of incentives....they want the SOEs they **manage to be profitable...**On the other hand, their career paths are ultimately determined by the CCP's COD, which is more concerned with how well the executives carry out the goals of the state.

The above passage does not invalidate the reality of SOEs: that they follow market principles.

Sure, they are creatures of the state, but that does not make them socialist. It means that they will

follow nationalist goals of the Chinese government. This reality was pointed out in *Qiushi*, with one article noting that the Chinese state “must fully exert the role of the market in regulating the economy; on the other, we must properly define the role of the government and ensure that this role is performed effectively.”⁵⁷ Another article added, point-blank that

*More than three decades of reform and opening up **have brought about profound changes** to the management systems and operational mechanisms that China’s state-owned enterprises employ. As a result of these changes, China’s SOEs **have now essentially been integrated into the market economy**. However, with the deepening of reform, a number of constraining factors that are preventing SOEs from integrating further into markets...many large SOEs have made slow progress in restructuring themselves as joint-stock companies. The operational mechanisms they employ are not yet **fully geared to the market economy**...a lack of supporting reform measures externally has had an undermining effect on efforts to comprehensively deepen the reform of SOEs...We need to step up reforms to diversify the equity ownership of SOEs, engage in active efforts to develop mixed ownership, and better enable state capital to expand its functions...**we must continue to orient our reform towards marketization**...we need to promote the development of a fully modern corporate system for SOEs by improving corporate governance structures and establishing market-oriented operational mechanisms...The proportion of central government-owned enterprises and their subsidiaries that have become enterprises under mixed ownership through the introduction of non-public capital **is now as high as 52%**...we will provide an institutional guarantee that will allow SOEs to come out on top in market competition...we need to explore means of allowing the employees of enterprises under mixed ownership **to become shareholders**.*⁵⁸

57 Zheng Xinli, “[The Relationship Between the Government and the Market—The Core of Economic Restructuring](#),” *Qiushi*, May 28, 2013

58 Huang Shuhe, “[Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 6 No. 3, Jul 1, 2014

With this, we move onto yet another quote from this report. It notes that the “State Council has substantial power to legislate and regulate,” adding that

*SOEs employ millions of Chinese. They have an obvious interest in the financial success of the SOEs at which they work **because failure could lead to unemployment**. This is no idle threat because past SOE closures did lead to job losses...The Communist Party and the government cannot be separated...SOEs have evolved from being parts of government ministries involved in production activities to **something more nearly resembling stand-alone enterprises**...Workers, too, are under the eye of the Party. Unions are created under the umbrella of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU); independent unions are **in practice not allowed**...The institutional interests of SOEs suggest that U.S. and other foreign business are likely to be disadvantaged in China whenever doing so would advance the interests of China in the eyes of the CCP...SOEs are a tool used by the CCP to develop China’s economy, carry out macroeconomic stimulus, and, increasingly, to secure the economic security of China and **advance China’s economic interests abroad**...Private entrepreneurs are now encouraged to join the CCP as well as consultative bodies. The situation for private capital in China has significantly improved in recent years...During the past ten years, China’s major SOEs have extended their reach beyond China in response to the **government’s goals of enlarging markets for Chinese goods and services**, securing access to raw materials, obtaining advanced technologies, and enhancing international awareness of Chinese brands...China’s rapid development has caused an insatiable appetite for natural resources...**Australia has been the number one national destination for Chinese investment**...The United States is nominally the second destination...Latin America, especially Brazil and Argentina, have seen an upsurge of Chinese investment...Africa has also seen a large rise in energy and mineral investment...The financial crisis in the West has given impetus for China **to accelerate its overseas investments***

*and further support its national champions...Despite the indisputable growth of the private sector in China, and the presence of foreign investment, the state-owned sector remains important to China's economy...As far as we can tell, the guiding principle of economic reforms from the time of Deng –including the acceptance of foreign direct investment, the increased role of the private sector, and the use of capital markets to raise funds for SOEs – **has been to improve the performance of China's economy**...Still, saying that China is reforming its economy and becoming more market oriented is not the same as saying that it is abandoning the state sector...To the extent China is capitalist, **China is pursuing state-guided capitalism**, where the overall direction of the economy...is guided by government policies.*

Revisionists may be reading this and cheering. However, this study does not deny that China had accepted market precepts. In fact, it shows that China has done this, but that the state sector still has a slightly dominant edge, while it operates on market-based model. Hence, there is capitalism in China without question. This means giving the bourgeoisie more rights. This is again, acknowledged by Qiushi, which endorsed falsely named and conceived “market socialism,” in 2012:

the essential requirement for developing a market economy is to confirm the property rights of market entities and define the exchange relationships and competitive relationships between different market entities in accordance with the law...The law must be used to ensure that the government safeguards the legal rights and interests of market entities, administers and serves various market entities in accordance with the law, and creates a favorable environment for fair competition...it should restrict the government's improper interference in the economy. This is a necessary precondition for the market to play a basic role in the allocation of resources.⁵⁹

Following this is one final study cited by the revisionists. It is by Chinese scholar Fan Gang and bourgeois scholar Nicholas Hope, titled “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese

⁵⁹ Ma Kai, “[Accelerating the Development of a Socialist Law-Based Government with Chinese Characteristics](#),” Qiushi, Vol. 4, No.2, Apr 1, 2012.

Economy.”⁶⁰ It begins by noting that SOEs in China have a long history, dating back to 1949, with state enterprises, at that point, undertaking “all the nation building tasks” since there was no private wealth or organized structure at the time, and over the years have continued to play an important role in people’s livelihoods. They add, however, in the rest of the executive summary, that

*Since economic reform and opening-up policies began in 1978, China’s SOEs have undergone a long process of gradual and progressive transformation. To reduce their claim on budgets and/or bank loans, **many inefficient and smaller SOEs have been closed down, merged or sold.** The resulting unemployment and restructuring problems were painful. The transitional difficulties were made less disruptive because China maintained rapid economic growth and established...safety-net arrangements...**many large SOEs in key and strategic sectors have been successfully transformed,** from inefficient production units operating under the state’s economic plan, into profitable, incorporated business entities...The share of SOEs in the country’s gross industrial output, for example, **fell from one half in 1998 to one quarter in 2011.** The number of SOEs owned by the central government has fallen from 196 in 2003 to 115 in March 2013...**the subsequent successes of the large Chinese SOEs have become a source of friction between China and some of its trading partners,** as these companies have become increasingly formidable competitors in both the Chinese and global markets...Some complaints are justified. For example, SOEs do enjoy some preferential treatment, including in licensing and in winning government procurement contracts in the China market, particularly at the local government level...**many SOEs compete against each other very aggressively, and they should not be seen simply as government-controlled monopolies...**in May 2012, China committed to developing a market environment of fair competition and treating all enterprises without discrimination...Given the long history of SOEs and the enormous social*

60 Fan Gang and Nicholas Hope, “[The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy](#),” China-United States Exchange Foundation, accessed Apr 18, 2018.

responsibilities imposed on them, China's gradual approach to SOE reform is understandable...**China's main SOEs will continue to play a major role in both the domestic and global markets**, particularly in strategic industries and sectors. But China's SOE and market reform should continue, as the government has pledged.

Already, this introduction indicates that these SOEs operate on market principles. Hopefully, this throws the misled revisionists into a tizzy. With these enterprises having such a role in the Chinese and global market, it means they are part and parcel of the global capitalist system. That should be obvious to any observer, except the revisionists of course.

Then we move onto main part of the report, which states that

*In recent years, issues surrounding SOEs have **become growing sources of friction** between China and some of its trading partners, including the U.S...the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) argued that the past five years have witnessed a reversal of the trend towards less government control of the economy and greater market openness. Whether this assessment is true or not, **both the U.S. and China could benefit from measures that would alter perceptions** about how Chinese SOEs compete in domestic and foreign markets. State ownership of enterprises is not a China-specific phenomenon...**Reforming the state enterprises has been an important component of China's transformation...**since 1978. As competition emerged in the Chinese economy and prices increasingly became market determined, many SOEs found their profitability eroding...After being registered under the Company Law that was introduced in 1994, **SOEs began to transform themselves into limited liability companies or shareholding companies**...Corporatization is designed to separate ownership from management so that the company can be run on a commercial basis while ownership of the company could be diversified or otherwise changed by trading shares in the company. **More than 80% of central SOEs, including their subsidiaries, have implemented***

shareholding reform through corporatization...In contrast to the declining weight of the state sector, the private sector has become a vibrant force that powers economic growth and generates employment, and is also the most dynamic source of innovation...After three decades of reform and market liberalization, SOEs no longer play dominant roles in many labor-intensive and contestable industries such as the manufacture of textiles, rubber, medicines, general machinery and printing...As the market-oriented reforms proceed, SOEs have been facing increasingly stiff competition in the domestic market from private firms and foreign-invested enterprises, particularly in highly contestable sectors...Even in sectors where central SOEs remain dominant – such as telecom services, petroleum and petrochemicals and financial services – inter-SOE competition is intense...The reform of SOEs is inevitably a gradual process, given their long history and the many people who would be affected.

Taking all of this into account, it is evident that SOEs are fundamentally beings of the market. By that I mean they act and work like corporate entities, especially with corporatization and inter-SOE competition, the only difference being they are state-controlled. As such, they are not by any stretch “socialist” entities, but are fully integrated into the global and domestic economy. This also seems to put into question the whole report by the *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC)* noted earlier in this chapter, making its conclusions seem even more remote.

This report continues, adding that

...SOEs are relatively less risky than private firms and therefore are more creditworthy, banks tend to lend more to them and at lower interest rates. Such lending considerations and decisions are common, not only among the state-owned banks in China, but also the foreign banks that operate in China...From the perspective of U.S. businesses, many SOEs in China are market incumbents that continue to benefit from a legal or natural monopoly in their industrial sector...Market access by foreign investors is also subject to changes in China’s

*industrial policies as economic circumstances and development strategies change...However, foreign investment in alternative-energy automobiles **is favored**...But from a macro perspective, compared to other transitional economies and developing countries, **China is relatively open to foreign investment**, as reflected by the high level of inward FDI China has attracted over the years...Chinese enterprises are rapidly expanding their footprint around the globe in an effort to purchase natural resources, **develop overseas markets** and acquire much-needed technologies...China has long been a prominent recipient of FDI, but its level of outbound investments was insignificant in the past and **has only started to increase rapidly***

This passage shows that China has integrated itself into the global capitalist economy. Sure, it has SOEs but they operate on market principles and foreign investment within China is encouraged on a broad basis, with some exceptions for nationalist reasons. After all, this is asserted by *Qiushi* once again.⁶¹ They state that since “the start of China's Reform and Opening-up, especially in the 10 years after China joined the WTO [in 2001], Chinese enterprises have carried out in-depth reforms and connected with the market in all aspects.” The same article declares that “large-scale state-owned enterprises of China, especially the central enterprises, are actually leaders of many realms in China's economic development” and claims that “China does not encourage monopolization of its central enterprises and always tries hard to guarantee the fairness of enterprise competitions. Facing the Antimonopoly Law, the state-owned enterprises of China do not have any privilege.” Obviously the latter (that SOEs have no privilege) is an utter lie, but it shows they are committed to market principles. SOEs are not unique to China. As this same article notes, “it is obviously not reasonable to refuse Chinese enterprises in the name of the so-called 'non-market.’” The revisionists seem to miss this point entirely, declaring the firms operate on non-market principles, which is laughable. Of course they operate on market principles! How could someone not realize this elementary fact?

⁶¹ Zhong Sheng, “[China's state-owned firms not synonym of 'non-market' entity](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *People's Daily*), Apr 12, 2012, accessed Apr 18, 2018.

Relationship with private corporations in China

This chapter aims to tackle varied articles about the relationship between private corporations and the Chinese revisionists. Some links are not analyzed here, as they were analyzed in part 1 of this publication, like the property rights law in China and an article on the Heritage Foundation website.⁶² All other articles are tackled in a critical manner.

The first article is from the *Financial Times* by U\$ Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross.⁶³ In this article, Ross says that China is participating in much of the “theft, piracy and espionage” of U\$ goods, declaring that

...rather than building a globally competitive free market economy in order to compete, China has chosen instead to compel American companies that want to operate in China to turn over proprietary technology and intellectual property. China does this by making joint ventures with Chinese companies a prerequisite for market access...Through investments like this, Chinese companies gain access to breakthrough technologies...The Chinese actively search for those US companies that pioneer the technologies that China lacks...Less well known are the efforts of Chinese lawyers to initiate antitrust actions in Chinese courts to invalidate patents on the theory they create illegal monopolies...Our allies and partners who share our commitment to innovation and value open competition are also harmed by China's activity. They should be equally alarmed. We will protect our intellectual property first, but will also lead in restoring the rules-based free and fair economic system.

Basically Ross is trying to defend the bourgeoisie in the U\$ who have technology and property reportedly stolen by the Chinese. Sure, they do not have the “globally competitive free market economy.” However, this doesn’t mean their economy isn’t capitalist. It just means it isn’t a copycat of

62 These articles include: [Chinese Property Rights Law](#) and [Liberalization in Reverse](#).

63 Wilbur Ross, “[American genius is under attack from China](#),” *Financial Times*, Aug 14, 2017.

the Western capitalist model. This is a valid point. As such, China has its own form of capitalism, what can be accurately called capitalism with Chinese characteristics.

The next article is from *Bloomberg*.⁶⁴ It states that while there are “public-private partnerships to fund roads, bridges and railways and keep a lid on rampant debt growth” many of the partners are actually SOEs, with 60% “of the nation’s non-financial corporate debt” traced to them. But this isn’t a victory for the revisionists. As Ding Jianchen, professor of public finance at University of International Business and Economics in Beijing, was quoted, “the government will try to open the projects further to foreign companies and lower the barrier for private entities. More private companies will join. They will realize that in China, you can only make money working with the government.” Hence, the Chinese form of state-backed capitalism will continue onward.

Following this is an article is from the *Financial Post*.⁶⁵ It declares that “China is heading for a degree of government ownership and central planning unseen since Mao’s passing” with the article adding that “China thinks it can pick losers...and will ensure their demise” and that “China, disdainful of what it sees as the West’s weakling management of its economies, is confidently taking the helm of its own.” The article describes what they think is central planning, adding that “Western firms have been accepting China’s terms.” However, this is faulty: China abandoned its “highly centralized planned economic system” for a market economy, since 1978, which the Chinese claim is “market socialism” but is anything but socialism.⁶⁶ So, saying there are elements of a “planned” economy left in China is an utter joke which only the revisionists would claim is true.

The next link is to a *Reuters* article about a CPC push for influence in foreign firms.⁶⁷ This article declares that “late last month, executives from more than a dozen top European companies in

64 “[In China, Public-Private Partnerships Are Really Public-Public](#),” *Bloomberg News*, Feb 28, 2017.

65 Patricia Adams, “[Nationalizing China](#),” *Financial Post*, Jun 23, 2011

66 Liu Shibai, “[A Great Revolution: Developing a Socialist Market Economic System](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 1, No.1 Oct. 1, 2009

67 Michael Martina, “[Exclusive: In China, the Party’s push for influence inside foreign firms stirs fears](#),” *Reuters*, Aug 24, 2017, accessed Apr 20, 2018.

China met in Beijing to discuss their concerns about the growing role of the ruling Communist Party in the local operations of foreign firms,” since companies in China “are required by law to establish a party organization, a rule that had long been regarded by many executives as more symbolic than anything to worry about.” The article said that “a significant number of major foreign companies operate in China through joint ventures with state enterprises.” The article adds that others said the “role of party units was benign and could help to resolve issues with officials.” Once again, this does not prove any “socialism” in China. In fact, if the party units are within these companies, exploiting the proletariat, then that means that the CPC is complicit in such exploitation, and is no longer a friend of the Chinese proletariat. Of course, revisionists wouldn't tell you that.

After this is an article from a U\$-China investment website.⁶⁸ It notes that the CPC “is writing itself into the articles of association of many of the country’s biggest companies” which has angered investors, with “more than 30 Hong Kong-listed state-owned enterprises...[adding] lines to their central documents that place the party, rather than the Chinese state, at the heart of each group.” Like the *Reuters* article, this article makes it clear that the CPC is participating in the Chinese form of capitalism, which hurts the proletariat and benefits only a few.

Next was an article from *CBS News*.⁶⁹ This article notes that “in recent years, the Chinese have regarded America as one big yard sale...China’s aggressive takeover record of U.S. companies speaks for itself. The list of targets is long and not really random...China also likes America’s lucrative agricultural market...the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission wants to block Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs) from carrying out takeovers in America because they may be “tools to advance [China’s] national security goals” ...by owning U.S. businesses, the Chinese control the products these companies produce and the people they employ. Dislodging China’s grip on American business will require a lot more than tough talk.” This just shows the fear of China by the U\$

68 [“China’s Communist party writes itself into company law,”](#) *US China Investment News*, Aug 14, 2017

69 Ed Leefeldt, [“U.S. businesses, now owned by China,”](#) *CBS News*, Feb 10, 2017

bourgeoisie when it comes to entering “their” home turf. Interestingly, such protectionist notions by the US echoes measures in China to limit foreign capitalists. So, perhaps China isn’t unique after all.

Then we get to a description of real property law in China, courtesy of the Library of Congress.⁷⁰ Of course, the revisionists use this to “prove” that the land in China is owned by the people. The summary of such law in China begins by noting that

Individuals cannot privately own land in China but may obtain transferrable land-use rights for a number of years for a fee. Currently, the maximum term for urban land-use rights granted for residential purposes is seventy years. In addition, individuals can privately own residential houses and apartments on the land (“home ownership”), although not the land on which the buildings are situated. Real estate may be transferred through sale, gift, or other legal means. When real estate is transferred, the land-use rights and home ownership are transferred simultaneously. Restrictions that may apply to the transfer of real estate include prohibiting transfer when the land-use rights are reclaimed by the state in accordance with law, or when the property has not been properly registered and certificates of ownership have not been obtained. Both urban land-use rights and home ownership are subject to registration.

So, Chinese people cannot privately own land. However, they may have land-use rights for up to 70 years and may have property on the land itself! The state has power of the land, but this doesn’t mean it is magically owned by the people. In fact, such an arrangement as described above could easily benefit the bourgeoisie, without question.

The Library of Congress description goes on to describe how the Constitution of the country “provides for the protection of private property,” adding that “the 2004 amendment contained the Constitution’s first clear recognition of the “private” nature of such property and its constitutional “inviolability,” although prior to the 2004 amendment the Constitution had provided protection for “the

⁷⁰ [“China: Real Property Law,”](#) Library of Congress, accessed Apr 19, 2018, Prepared by Laney Zhang, Foreign Law Specialist in October 2014, updated July 2015

right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property.” It also talks about the Property Rights Law, exclusively reviewed in Part 1 of this publication, which “establishes a framework of property rights protection, including protection for movable property and real estate.” It also notes that “China regulates real property through a series of other laws and regulations” and that “land in urban areas must be owned by the state, whereas land in rural and suburban areas must be owned by the state or by local collectives...Individuals can, however, obtain the right to use land from the state.” Again, this allows an opportunity for the state (or the local collectives in this case) to be used as an instrument by the bourgeoisie for their own means. On such land they use, individuals can “privately own real estate, including residential houses and apartments (i.e., buildings and structures on the land)” and furthermore, “real estate may be transferred, mortgaged, or leased.” This again provides an opportunity for certain individuals to profit!

Following this summary by the Library of Congress is the official text of China’s Land Administration Law.⁷¹ This law, adopted by the Ninth National People’s Congress on August 29, 1998, entered into force on January 1, 1999, amended from its original version on June 25, 1986. Article 2 of the law declares that “ownership by the whole people means that the State Council exercises the right of ownership of State-owned land on behalf of the State.” This again, provides an opportunity for manipulation and distortion by the bourgeoisie. This is enhanced by the fact that individuals or units have the right to use such land, but that the state may even take away land from collectives, meaning that they cannot follow their own development policies, an effort to keep everyone on the faulty “market socialist” train which declares that “to get rich is glorious” as Deng once declared. Later on, Article 4 declares that “land for agriculture” refers to land “directly used for agricultural production, including cultivated land, forest land, grassland, land for irrigation and water conservancy and water surfaces for aquaculture.” Adding to this, is Article 8 which says that “land in the urban areas of cities

⁷¹ [“Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China,”](#) Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China, Oct 11, 2007.

shall be owned by the State...house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly land shall also be owned by peasant collectives.” Again, yet another opening for the bourgeoisie. The economic organization of such collectives are allowed, under Article 14, to own land for 30 years under contract “for crop cultivation, forestry, animal husbandry or fishery.” Such bourgeois stricture like contracts reappears in other articles, like Article 15 about operating on state land, Article 19 on land utilization principles, and Article 27 about a state-established land survey system. The latter article also says that “landowners and users shall cooperate in the work and provide relevant materials,” another possibility for manipulation toward the interests of those with more power. Later articles focus on when “wasteland” can be used (Article 36), when “state-owned barren hills, wastelands or waste tidal flats” can be used (Article 40), a contract “for the temporary use of the land” (Article 57), illegal occupation and use of land (Articles 77 and 83, i.e. anti-squatter language). The law ends with an article saying that it shall be “applicable to land used by Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures and foreign-capital enterprises. Where laws provide otherwise, the provisions in such laws shall prevail” (Article 85). Lest us forget, however, that state-owned land does not mean a country is socialist. Take the “great land grab” in what would become the U.S. Private ownership of land was broadly accepted, and land was seen as “irrevocable and inheritable.”⁷² However, the state provided land to landholders, including former veterans of the Revolutionary War, military districts and other areas such as the Northwest territory, established by the land ordinances in 1785 and 1787, encompassing scores of indigenous land. As academic Henry S. Stout describes it, “as owner and regulator of the public domain, the federal government assumed enormous potential strength—the ability to employ fiscal and military powers—to acquire land through treaty or war and to regulate its sale and distribution,” with settlers on the frontier and speculators depending “on the government and its laws to preserve their right to property,” with their claim to land grounded in their payment of taxes.

⁷² Henry S. Stout, *American Aristocrats: A Family, a Fortune, and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), pp xiv-xv, xvii, 11, 12, 15-19

He also writes that in England, land was described collectively as “crown lands,” implying that all land was “ultimately owned by the crown,” but that in the US the government “installed allodial tenure, a form of absolute private ownership independent of any superior landlord,” with the right of the landowner to private ownership not able to be superseded and requiring the “full enforcement power of the state in perpetuity.” There are some important parallels to China today. Of course, the situation is not the same as this historical example, but it shows that state-owned land does not say that a state is socialist. In fact, state-owned land can work easily under capitalism!

Following this description and analysis of China’s Land Administration Law is the company law for China, last revised in 2013.⁷³ It begins by saying that it was enacted to standardize organization and activities of companies, “protect the lawful interests of companies, shareholders and creditors” while also safeguarding the “social and economic order” and promoting the development of the country’s market economy. While *Qiushi* calls China’s path unique, it admits that the country has “launched and deepened market-oriented economic reform” incorrectly claiming this is under “socialist” principles, but admits that there is no planning left in the economy, while the market becomes even more dominant, as part of the so-called “economic miracle” of China.⁷⁴ Coming back to the law at hand, it declares that companies can refer to “limited liability companies and companies limited by shares,” says that a company is an “enterprise legal person” with “independent corporate property and enjoys corporate property rights.” The latter is a form of corporate personhood! After outlining rights for shareholders of a company, and saying that companies need to abide by laws and regulations, follow “social morality and business ethics,” accept supervision by “the government and public,” and bear “social responsibilities,” even though this is limited because “lawful rights and interests of companies” shall be protected by law, not “infringed upon.” Yet another win for the

73 “[Company Law of the People's Republic of China \(Revised in 2013\)](#),” *Invest in China*, Dec 28, 2013.

74 Yuan JiuHong, Guo Guangyin, and Chen Shuo, “[A Historical Perspective on the Uniqueness of the Chinese Path](#),” *Qiushi*, Oct-Dec 2017, Vol.9, No.4, Issue No. 33.

bourgeoisie. The law goes on to talk about the establishment of a company, notes whom will act as the legal representative, that a company can establish branches, that a company may “invest in other enterprises,” and that a “company shall protect the lawful rights and interests of its employees, and enter into labor contracts with its employees.” Then there’s an article which revisionists would undoubtedly point out: that in a company, a CPC organ will be established to carry out CPC activities. However, this again makes the party complicit in any exploitation the company participates in over the Chinese proletariat. Later articles focus on capital contributions by shareholders, paid-up capital contributions, and the power of shareholders (including giving them voting rights). The law also touches on state-owned companies, saying that they shall not have a board of shareholders but rather the functions of such a board are exercised by the state-owned assets supervision and administration authority, noting that such companies shall have a manager and that there will be a board of supervisors, appointed by the authority. So where’s the internal democracy in such SOEs? The law goes onto talk about shares and registered capital of companies, that they will be one board chairman and possibly vice-chairs, after-tax profits of companies, mergers or divisions of companies, representatives for branches of foreign companies in China, and fines for false registration. All in all, this seems to benefit the bourgeoisie more than anything else.

Then we get to an article in *The Economist*.⁷⁵ It states that ownership is not straightforward in China, noting that when Mao died, “land was opened up for commercial development, each plot came with only a 50-year government lease.” It also added that “several Chinese industries...are both capital-hungry and politically sensitive” and, in the mind of *The Economist*, “need foreign investment, but the law bans foreigners from owning stakes in them.” To get around this, “eager investors and canny locals” have created an investment vehicle called a “variable interest entity” or VIE, a structure which is “known as the “Sina” model...[and] it is used by about half of the Chinese companies listed in

75 [“Who owns what?”](#) *The Economist*, Jul 7, 2011.

America.” However, as the article notes, the Chinese government “has begun to frown on VIEs,” but China has been under more “pressure to spell out what is permissible, and what is not” since big foreign firms apparently have the risk of their investments in China becoming “illegal or worthless.” This doesn’t support the claim that China is “socialist” but only says that the state wants to make sure certain industries are protected, with foreign companies wanting even more openness. Back in 2013, *Qiushi* acknowledged that the “reforms” were uneven:

*...economic reforms were carried out throughout various sectors, with some taking place sooner, faster, and on a deeper level than others. Moreover, these reforms were almost always accompanied by special policies and various forms of preferential treatment. As a result, though the market economy was able to grow, there was no guarantee of equal opportunities to compete in the market. Accordingly, levels of development in different sectors of the economy varied significantly, with certain areas of the country racing ahead and becoming wealthy while others were left lagging behind. In structural terms, this has been manifested as a major imbalance in the profitability of different industries, and significant disparities in the policy conditions that underpin the development of industry in different areas of the country.*⁷⁶

This reality is what plays out in China today.

After this is an article from a Japanese media site, *Nikkei Asian Review*.⁷⁷ It declares that “no matter how successful” a private business is in China’s economy, “it cannot avoid interference from the government” with instructions for Chinese private companies “to invest in the domestic economy” rather than abroad. The article says this could be a “warning signal that the real economy could be in worse shape than official data would suggest,” with the moves by the government to “reclaim control over supply, competition for which has driven the fight for wealth in China since the early days of the economic opening and reform policy in the 1980s,” with the amount of credit ballooning in China, with

⁷⁶ Jin Bei, “[The Strategic Direction for the Restructuring of Industry in China](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5, No. 3, Jul 1, 2013.

⁷⁷ Christopher Aston, “[Pressure on tycoons won't get Beijing all it wants](#),” *Nikkei Asian Review*, Sept 21, 2017.

overseas dealmaking linked with national security in the past. Additionally, it was reported that apart from capital flight, “authorities have also been concerned with the use of...[a] strategy [which] involves domestic banks issuing a guarantee for funds borrowed overseas,” making it harder “for state banks to recover funds in case of default.” Furthermore, the CPC seemed to be encouraging companies to “invest in debt-laden SOEs.” Additionally, the article notes that “without sufficient demand, trapped excess funds in China have gone into speculative hot money flows, creating bubbles in property, stocks, bonds and more recently, commodities.” With all of this, it is clear that China has capitalist characteristics of its economy, with the Chinese leadership acting in a nationalist manner.

The next article is from the conservative *South China Morning Post* by the German ambassador to China, Michael Clauss.⁷⁸ He writes that “reform of state-owned enterprises has been key in China’s continuing transformation from a command to a market economy” but that some are worrying “about the direction current reforms have taken” with mega-mergers and private money leading SOEs to hold “some two-thirds of corporate debt.” He also notes recent media reports and what some analysts say, claiming there is political and CPC influence in business decisions. He declares that if “this trend persists, it may fuel further suspicion about the proper functioning of the market in China” and adds that “a possible surge in conflicts of interest will most likely negatively affect the performance of joint ventures.” With all this, he says that “China has vowed to fully embrace market principles...economic reforms since 1978 have helped market forces take huge strides towards becoming the dominant factor in the Chinese economy. They helped create enormous economic growth...more market rather than less is key to sustaining China’s economic growth in the long term. It’s time to reconsider the most productive relationship between the Communist Party and the Chinese economy.” So, he is calling for more market measures in China. Still, he admits that market principles have been accepted in China. This is something that not even the revisionists can deny.

⁷⁸ Michael Clauss, “[Between the market and the party, are China’s reforms moving in the right direction?](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 27, 2017.

Following this is another article in the *South China Morning Post*.⁷⁹ It states that the party congresses of the CPC are important for investors to keep an eye on because “significant policy changes have ensued...leading to profound impacts on the economy, the market and society at large.” They declare that the CPC congress for 2017 is important as it will give clues to “how the senior leaders address the internal and external challenges will be important for the future of the economy and financial markets.” The article also says that

we think China’s more assertive stance will continue as it projects itself as a re-emerging global power...While the party congress itself may not be a major source of market volatility, we think the risks could lie in the speed and quality of policy design and execution thereafter...The party has also implemented changes that strengthen its control of SOEs, whereas the market has anticipated mass privatisation...Assessing the prospect of reforms will therefore require examining both the political changes at the party congress and detailed policy announcements and implementations thereafter.

This doesn’t say much that hasn’t already been said. Clearly, “market considerations” are an important part of government policymaking. As Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei said in June 2016, China would cut excess production capacity, but rely on market forces, not government-set targets, saying that “China has bid farewell to the planned economy, so the government can not dictate to industries on this. More than half of the country’s steel makers are privately owned.”⁸⁰ So, the planned economy ain’t coming back anytime soon.

After this is an article in *CNBC*.⁸¹ It talks about some U\$ companies leaving China, like Seagate, “the world’s biggest maker of hard disk drives,” closing its “factory in Suzhou near Shanghai last month with the loss of 2,000 jobs” and many others who “attributed the country’s high tax regime,

79 Aidan Yao, “[Why investors should care about China’s Communist Party congress](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 13, 2017, accessed Apr 20, 2018.

80 “[Market forces must guide industrial capacity cut: finance minister](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jun 7, 2016.

81 Jane Li, “[Why foreign companies are shutting shop in China](#),” *CNBC*, Feb 2, 2017.

rising labor costs and fierce competition from domestic companies” to the reason they are leaving the country. Apparently they were not assuaged by Xi Jinping’s speech at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in January 2017, defending globalization and promising “improved market access for foreign companies, a positive sign seen by many that China is still sticking firmly to its opening up policies” first begun by Deng. The article also noted that “Panasonic...stopped all its manufacturing of televisions in the country in 2015,” that Sony “sold all its shares in Sony Electronics Huanan, a Guangzhou factory that makes consumer electronics, and British high-street retailer Marks & Spencer “announced it was closing all its China stores amid continuing China losses,” along with some others, like “Metro, Home Depot, Best Buy, Revlon, L’Oreal, Microsoft, and Sharp.” The article went on to claim that “foreign companies now appear to have fallen out of favor,” adding that the “fierce competition from Chinese rivals” is drawing away some multinationals, with “gradual phasing out of preferential policies for foreign companies,” and noting that “unclear laws and inconsistent interpretation of them have also been blamed for the flight of some foreign firms. Still, investment in China by foreign companies has not ended, as China is integral to the world capitalist economy.⁸² After all, the country is still committed to making its “business environment more inviting.”

Another *CNBC* article echoed what the first one put forward.⁸³ It declared that “for a long time, a lot of American companies saw China as the world’s biggest business opportunity. But that time may be over.” However, even some who note that “China is a tough, tough market” admit that it is worth it, with some firms bucking the trend like Starbucks which plans to “open more than 5,000 stores in China by 2021” and US farmers continuing “to do well in China.” Those Western companies are leaving as “China is also maturing as an economy” but also added that “another possible opportunity may lie in financial services.” So foreign capitalist exploitation of the Chinese proletariat isn’t over yet.

82 “[Premier Li: More dynamic market cornerstone for development](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jan 5, 2017.

83 Evelyn Cheng, “[More and more American companies have decided their big China opportunity is over](#),” *CNBC*, Dec 8, 2016, accessed Apr 19, 2018.

Following this is article in the trash *New York Post*.⁸⁴ It declared that “US companies have less of a future there [in China] than many had hoped” with the “dazzling lure of the Chinese consumer push[ing] many multinationals to locate offices and factories in the country” and claiming this “turned out to be a mirage for many companies.” The article goes further to say that “there are signs that some multinationals have had enough. Many are closing offices and factories in China, as costs rise and the government shuts foreigners out of the domestic market” but also claiming that “in the long run, I suspect China will suffer even more...If China loses the benefits of economic openness that it enjoyed in past decades, its growth will slow before it gets rich, and the Chinese people may become less satisfied with the regime they live under.” It is the latter that the capitalist class is hoping for. If there could be an even friendlier government, they would cheer. However, as they deal with the current conditions, they wish to see even more openness to the market.

Following this is an article in *DW*.⁸⁵ It noted that “one out of four US companies active in China has started moving out of the world's second-largest economy, or is planning to.” However, this means that 75% of the companies are staying in China. For those that have left, apparently “rising labor costs prompted their exit...[and] regulatory challenges” are challenges. Even through all this, while “64 percent said their Chinese businesses were turning a profit.” That’s still a relatively high number.

After this is an article in *Shanghaiist*.⁸⁶ This was yet another article on the business climate survey of the American Chamber of Commerce in China. It said that “77 percent of its 496 respondents reported feeling “less welcome” in China last year,” meaning that that means that many were welcome. Wal-Mart has a strong presence in the country, as does Microsoft, while foreign companies in the services, consumer, and industrial & resources see an even playing field with local companies.⁸⁷

84 Noah Smith, “[Why US companies have started fleeing China](#),” *New York Post*, May 17, 2016.

85 Janelle Dumalaon, “[US firms moving out of China](#),” *DW*, Jan 20, 2016.

86 Shanghaiist, “[25% of US companies in China are planning to leave, says AmCham survey](#),” *Shanghaiist*

87 David Fu, “[Walmart’s Devotion to Diversity Pays Dividends](#),” *AmCham China*, May 3, 2017; Rhine Yuan and Randall Handcock, “[AmCham China Launches Tech & Innovation Initiative](#),” *AmCham China*, Apr 12, 2018; Evan Schmitt and Jenny Chen, “[Driving Toward the Future in China](#),” *AmCham China*, Mar 22, 2018.

Following this is an article in the *Wall Street Journal*.⁸⁸ It notes that “the Chinese government is pushing some of its biggest tech companies...to offer the state a stake in them and a direct role in corporate decisions,” adding that “a management role would give Beijing a direct hand in innovative companies that service hundreds of millions of Chinese” and that the “ban on private ownership was lifted in the 1980s.” It also noted that “at Mr. Xi’s urging, a campaign is under way to set up party units in private companies” while some capitalists furthered “a government goal of bringing private-sector money into state companies.” It ended, at the end, that “small startups will get direct investment from state-owned firms, while larger deals will be done by government-backed funds. For the biggest companies, he says, it is possible that they will “donate” shares to the government or government funds.” Such a government role in companies should be no shock. After all, China has committed itself to the “development of a market economy” but recalled that “excessive dependence on finance...by developed countries since the outbreak of the international financial crisis has inevitably had an impact on China’s open economy,” leading to the “financialization of assets and the emergence of an asset bubble.”⁸⁹ Since these quotes comes from two *Qiushi* articles, clearly such nationalism, as manifested in government stakes, is a rational move for such revisionists, based on their logic.

After this article is an another article from the *Wall Street Journal*.⁹⁰ This article says that Xi’s rivals include “China’s new class of wealthy entrepreneurs” with the Chinese leadership dreading “a Soviet-style collapse” and are worried about the aftermath, when the “Russian oligarchs...snatched control of state assets and turned themselves into billionaires and pushy political players” with Xi determined to not let that happen in China. In order to stop this, “Xi has decided to pre-empt any threat by taking the fight to them first” by working to “corral the private sector” whom have other ideas than the leadership, which still gives lip-service to Marxism. One professor noted, however, that “the party

88 Li Yuan, “[Beijing Pushes for a Direct Hand in China’s Big Tech Firms](#),” *Wall Street Journal*, Oct 11, 2017

89 Jin Bei, “[Developing the Real Economy](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Jul 1, 2012; Zeng Peiyan, “[The Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.4, No.3, Jul 1, 2012.

90 Richard McGregor, “[China Takes On Its New Tycoons](#),” *Wall Street Journal*, Oct 13, 2017.

cannot control everyone in China in the private sector forever.” The article went on to say that there are coming struggles “between the party and the business class” and that the CPC “took a long time to declare its love for business,” with capitalists seen as building capitalism with Chinese characteristics, and since then, “Beijing has tried to colonize the private sector to make sure entrepreneurs stay under control.” The article also added that as “tens of billions of dollars have headed offshore in recent years in search of foreign assets, Beijing has feared that a plunge in foreign-exchange reserves would destabilize China’s currency...Despite Mr. Xi’s concerns about tycoons, his career should have helped him appreciate the role that business could play in making China—and the party—great again. Between 1985 and 2007, he was posted in Fujian and Zhejiang, two coastal provinces south of Shanghai that are among the most entrepreneurial in China...Mr. Xi’s vision hardly seems to be one of unfettered entrepreneurship. Speaking recently about China’s private sector, he declared that entrepreneurs owed their country a political duty.” However, this does not make the country socialist by any stretch. It shows the Chinese leadership has taken some lessons from history and is determined to make sure it stays in power. Such lessons include the acknowledgment that “the international financial crisis has created unprecedented difficulties and challenges for the Chinese economy. It has brought about a marked shrinkage of overseas demand, overproduction in some industries, a sharp decrease in orders, stagnation in sales and a shrinking of profits...Unemployment has worsened in urban areas and a large number of rural migrant workers have left urban areas and returned home...this has created the gravest situation for China so far this century” as noted in *Qiushi* in April 2011.⁹¹ The next article analyzed here is even more absurd.

Following this is an op-ed in the *New York Times*.⁹² It begins with the sentence “there, they said it: China is not a market economy,” going on to say that “no, China is not a market economy. But it’s worse than that” with control by the CPC, declaring that the “modern Chinese economy is a party-

91 Liu Yunshan, “[How China Is Dealing with the Global Financial Crisis](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.2 No.2, Apr 1,2010

92 Yi-Zheng Len, “[China, the Party-Corporate Complex](#),” *New York Times*, Feb 12, 2017.

corporate conglomerate.” The article does onto declare that by 2002, “much of the political elite, including relatives of party and government officials, had become the owners and managers of private businesses” and that in return “for becoming politically acceptable, capitalists and top business managers at private firms would come under the party’s chain of command.” It gets more absurd with statements like “the problem isn’t just that the Chinese economy isn’t a market economy in that the government won’t let it operate freely enough. Its very structure, including in the private sector, has been designed...to serve the C.C.P.’s will and its interests, economic and political.” First of all, this is giving the CPC too much credit. Secondly, it denies that markets are at work in China’s economy. *Qiushi* acknowledges this, writing about how “in the 1980s and 1990s, China took advantage of its cheap production factors to actively participate in domestic and foreign market competition in an open manner, rapidly expanding production capacity and market share” and about China’s “resolute action to liberalize the purchase and sale of grain on a nationwide basis in 2004...complemented by the enforcement of a minimum purchase price policy,” with a reform which “subjected the circulation of all agricultural produce to market forces,” ensuring that “the market could play a basic role in the allocation of agricultural resources”!⁹³ That sounds like pure capitalism, if you ask me.

After this is an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald*.⁹⁴ This article says that having a CPC organ in all companies is important “because the private sector employs 140 million working class Chinese,” quoting a CPC official, Qi, adding that “the new push for more party involvement in foreign companies is part of Chinese president Xi Jinping's ideological push for a wave of “party building.”” It was also noted that “in his report to the 19th congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Mr Xi said the party had a central role in guiding China to becoming a global power by 2050” and focused on new measures. This is clear nationalism and maintaining their power base, nothing like socialism.

93 Wen Jiabao, “[China’s Agricultural and Rural Development](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.4 No.2, Apr. 1,2012.

94 Kirsty Needham, “[Chinese Communist Party wants to 'build' its presence inside foreign companies](#),” *Sydney Morning Herald*, Oct 19, 2017.

Finally, there is an article in the *Wall Street Journal*.⁹⁵ It claims that “the compromises made by Western firms to do business in China are becoming increasingly uncomfortable now that President Xi Jinping is pushing to embed the Communist Party deeper into the world’s second-largest economy,” adding that “Chinese regulators recently proposed that the state take 1% stakes in major Chinese internet companies,” and also noted that “the Communist Party now numbers about 89 million—about 6.5% of China’s population. Among them are corporate leaders and entrepreneurs, who were officially welcomed into the party in the early 2000s.” Before going further, this proves that the CPC is a powerful force in society, but is a minority, a smaller group. If only 6.5% of the population are CPC members, that means 93.5% are not members, showing the society is not as representative as revisionists would claim. The article ends by quoting a CPC member as saying “foreigners don’t understand the Communist Party. They fear that the party would organize the workers and challenge management” while another says that CPC organs have become “a good discussion partner for our management.” As such, this again does not “prove” the supposed socialist nature of China, which has been shown so far, is anything but socialist, and in fact is much more capitalist. This is fundamentally ingrained in the country, sadly. There has been “agricultural supply-side structural reform” in order to “fully exert the role of the market in deciding resource allocation and enable market forces to guide agricultural restructuring, to reduce ineffective supply and increase effective supply.”⁹⁶ Additionally, China has declared that “the path of development all less advanced countries must take is opening up wider to the outside world and taking advantage of the international market,” another worrying remark considering how much the world has been ravaged by the global capitalist system! Without a doubt, China is on the capitalist road and there is no signs of it leaving this road for any other.

95 Chun Han Wong and Eva Dou, “[Foreign Companies in China Get a New Partner: the Communist Party](#),” *Wall Street Journal*, Oct 29, 2017.

96 Wang Yang, “[Advancing Agricultural Supply-Side Structural Reform and Fostering a New Impetus for Agricultural and Rural Development \(Excerpt\)](#),” *Qiushi*, Jul-Sept 2017, Vol.9, No.3, Issue No.32; Chen Deming, “[Understanding Domestic and Foreign Trade](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.1, No.1 Oct. 1, 2009.

China and foreign trade

This section of the /r/swcc document was relatively weak. It only had three links. The first was an article from *CNBC* about the worries of the Chinese leadership.⁹⁷ One Chinese economist Andy Xie told *CNBC* that China's crackdown on companies "moving money out of the country and borrowing too much...has a lot more to do with politics than economics," saying that "the issue is that the economy is politicized, especially in China in the last few years," adding that

China is still in this mode of walling the money inside. Otherwise they will lose control over the game; that is paramount to the government...The whole country now is in a standstill mode, nothing moves. We are not going to see anything in the near future...I'm not sure their intention is to say, 'This financial leverage is wrong and it's illegal, it's not good for the financial system in the long run, so we should shift the financial system from a command-and-control system to a more market-based, rule-of-law-based system'...[adding that the measures are] to prevent a crisis from coming down, that's the imperative. It's not really about the health of the financial system in the long run.

This, again, does not show that the country is socialist. Rather it shows that the leadership has a nationalist character. This should be no surprise considering the Chinese pledge to "correctly address the relationship between the rate of capital adequacy in banking, the prevention of risks in the banking sector, and the stability of the capital market so as to rationally guide market expectations, stabilize market confidence, and promote the sound development of the capital market" as noted by former Chinese leader Wen Jiabao, to give one example.⁹⁸

The next article is from *Financial Times*. It says that "for China's ruling Communist party, its foreign exchange reserves are a symbol of national strength and are a crucial buffer against economic

97 Huileng Tan, "[China's crackdown on its own companies has nothing to do with their financial health, economist says](#)," *CNBC*, Aug 1, 2017.

98 Wen Jiabao, "[The Current Macroeconomic Situation and Tasks in Economic Work](#)," *Qiushi*, Vol. 3 No.4 Oct. 1, 2011.

shocks.”⁹⁹ It goes on to say that “as more than \$1tn left the country over the previous 18 months amid a flurry of large overseas acquisitions, a sense of crisis grew within the party...in an abrupt turn, a group of businessmen once lauded as the international face of China are now derided in state media as the instruments of systemic financial risk.” The article adds that “attacks on private financiers have allowed him [Xi] to pick off the support base of rival factions.” It goes on to quote Zhu Ning, professor at Tsinghua University’s PBC School of Finance, saying that “in some sense, the ban [on outbound investment] probably makes sense from a financial stability perspective. However, such bans without fundamental reform will eventually be futile in reining in capital or adjusting the economic growth model.” That may be the case, but it hasn’t stopped regulators or their allies in China’s security apparatus, with “the entrepreneurs formerly lauded as the face of China’s global soft-power push have rushed to embrace the new order” and smaller companies saying they would “take over some of China’s most disastrous state-owned firms in order to gain political protection.”¹⁰⁰ It ended by saying the message was that “it was time for private entrepreneurs to start banging the gongs and publicly welcome more “supervision” by the state.” This seems to, again, raise terror at further state control in the economy. This is a distortion. Take for example the “procedures or mechanisms must be specified in order to minimize the harm and prevent the abuse” of anti-dumping and countervailing measures, “which pertain to China’s status as a market economy and to product-specific safeguards”: China believes that they would be abolished “after a specified period of time.”¹⁰¹ Also take into account, that Chinese corporations are restricted by “strict control and regulation” in India’s market, choosing “Vietnam, Cambodia and even Myanmar as their investment destinations,” showing that China

99 Lucy Hornby, “[Chinese crackdown on dealmakers reflects Xi power play](#),” *Financial Times*, Aug 9, 2017.

100 In one part of the article, it says that “in 1955, the few “capitalists” still left in Communist China banged gongs, staged jubilant parades and invited lion dancers to signing ceremonies that handed over to the state a direct share in their businesses, now rebranded as state-private enterprises. The events marked the end of private business in the country for the next quarter of a century.” Whether that story is true or not, it means that during the Maoist period, the capitalists were pushed out of existence.

101 Li Shishi, “[China’s Accession to the WTO and the Development of Its Legal System](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.4 No.2 Apr. 1, 2012; Ding Gang, “[China’s sunset industries ripe for India](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Nov 27, 2014.

recognizes the “concern” of foreign bourgeoisie as they have asserted similar concerns themselves in non-Chinese markets! As such, the Chinese leadership is strongly nationalistic, but also market-driven, regardless how many times they keep using hollow “Marxist” rhetoric.

We then get to the final article in this poorly sourced section of the /r/swcc document, an article from *Forbes*.¹⁰² It notes that “over the past two years, some of China’s large private companies have taken to the international arena like kids set free in a theme park — buying this, acquiring that, and dropping boatloads of exchanged RMB on foreign soil in the process” which is a “spending spree that was intensified in the wake of China’s 2015 stock market fiasco, where the Shanghai and Shenzhen composites were inflated far out of proportion before descending back to earth, sending a shockwave through the country.” In response, “Beijing responded to this with ever-stricter capital controls, which sought to dam up the torrent of RMB that was pouring out of the country by limiting the amount of money that could be exchanged into foreign currency as well as scrutinizing big foreign transactions.” They also noted that “Beijing is all for foreign investment, just not the kind that it doesn’t control — i.e. state-owned enterprises as opposed to private companies” and adds that the “vanguard of the Belt and Road will not be...the tycoons who lead dynamic and innovative private companies like Wanda, HNA Group, and Anbang -- but shadowy state-owned firms with ambiguous acronyms that start with the letter C.” As such, this is a clear nationalist move. The Chinese recognize that “trade has a general function,” especially in a market economy, and also believe in exports to other countries, 124 of which China is the “largest trading partner,” claiming this frees them from “market fundamentalism” or neoliberalism, only wanting their own form of market measures.¹⁰³ Basically, they want capitalism with Chinese characteristics, which is integrated into the global capitalist system but not dominated by the global capitalist class outside their country. Such a nationalist approach should be no surprise.

102 Wade Shepard, “[Xi Jinping To China's Private Sector: Go Home, The New Silk Road Is Not For You](#),” *Forbes*, Jul 25, 2017, accessed Apr 20, 2018.

103 “[China’s Rise Creates More Space for World Development](#),” *Qiushi*, Jul-Sept 2017, Vol.9, No.3, Issue No.32; Chen Deming, “[Understanding Domestic and Foreign Trade](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.1 No.1 Oct. 1, 2009.

China's relationship with NGOs

Like the previous section, this part of the /r/swcc document is relatively weak. The first link is an article in *New Eastern Outlook*, an alternative media source, by Eric Draitser.¹⁰⁴ He writes, apart from describing Western backing of protests in Hong Kong and in the province of Xinjiang, that

China has recently taken an important step in more tightly regulating foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) inside the country...[with the] Overseas NGO Management Law....The NGO advocates portray this proposed legislation as another example of the violation of human rights in China, and further evidence of Beijing's lack of commitment to them...amid all the hand-wringing about human rights and democracy, what is conveniently left out of the narrative is the simple fact that foreign NGOs, and domestic ones funded by foreign money, are, to a large extent, agents of foreign interests, and are quite used as soft power weapons for destabilization...one of the main tools of modern soft power is civil society and the NGOs that dominate it. With financial backing from some of the most powerful individuals and institutions in the world, these NGOs use the cover of "democracy promotion" and human rights to further the agenda of their patrons. And China has been particularly victimized by precisely this sort of strategy. Human Rights Watch, and the NGO complex at large, has condemned China's Overseas NGO Management Law because they quite rightly believe that it will severely hamper their efforts to act independently of Beijing...the reality is that they act as a de facto arm of western intelligence agencies and governments, and they have played a central role in the destabilization of China in recent years...The destabilization of China takes many forms. From a manufactured protest movement in Hong Kong sponsored by NGOs connected to the US government, to a fabricated propaganda war peddled by other NGOs sponsored by the US

104 Eric Draitser, "[China's NGO Law: Countering Western Soft Power and Subversion](#)," *New Eastern Outlook*,

government, to a terror war fomented by a NATO member, China is a nation under assault by soft and hard power. That Beijing is finally taking steps to curb the pernicious influence of such NGOs, and the forces they represent, is...an absolutely necessary [step]...The national security and national sovereignty of the People's Republic of China requires nothing less.

He has a valid point about Western meddling inside China's borders. Such sovereignty is important for the Chinese revisionists who want to have their own form of capitalism on their own terms, as they become more integrated into the global capitalist system. The article Draitser links to at the beginning of his writing is a *Reuters* article stating that "the bill requires overseas NGOs to register with, and be approved by, authorities if they want to set up representative offices or operate temporarily," with deputy public security minister Yang Huanning saying that "the bill aims to regulate the activities of overseas NGOs in China, protect their legal rights and interests, and promote exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and foreigners," also saying that "it is necessary to have a law to regulate, guide and supervise their activities."¹⁰⁵ Again, this supports what I've previously stated.

The other article is about how some international NGOs in China "are suspending operations, cancelling events and losing partnerships in the country six months after the government introduced a law requiring them to register with the police."¹⁰⁶ This is wholly about maintaining order and security in China. However, this still doesn't make them socialist, with the article saying that "Beijing says the law boosts Chinese state support for foreign NGOs and only need worry a handful of illegal groups whose political and religious work harms China's national security." Even with this, the country is not completely against NGOs. In Xi's speech last year to the Belt and Road Forum, he said that "we will also develop a network for cooperation between NGOs in Belt and Road countries."¹⁰⁷ Basically, they

105 "[China to 'regulate' foreign NGOs with new law](#)," *Reuters*, Dec 22, 2014.

106 Christian Shepherd and Michael Martina, "[International NGOs' China operations hit by registration delays under new law](#)," *Reuters*, Jul 6, 2017.

107 Xi Jinping, "[Working Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road](#)," *Qiushi*, July-September 2017, Vol.9, No.3, Issue No.32; "[Full text of President Xi's speech at opening of Belt and Road forum](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), May 15, 2017.

are willing to tolerate NGOs, but not those that engage in meddling. This seems to belay Draitser's point that "foreign NGOs, and domestic ones funded by foreign money, are, to a large extent, agents of foreign interests, and are quite used as soft power weapons for destabilization." Taking that as it may, it means that China believes that not all NGOs follow this model, clearly. So, they not as "anti-imperialist" as revisionists claim. Varied articles from *Xinhua* show this to be true. Last year, hundreds of NGOs were registered and Xi called for NGOs to "contribute to enhancing mutual understanding and friendship between people of different countries, promoting common development, and building a community of shared future for mankind" along the Silk Road.¹⁰⁸ The same was the case within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as noted in an article this year. Additionally, if the registered NGOs can still go about their business, then are being given the license to continue being agents of foreign interests! Of course, the revisionists won't point this out. I fully support countries defending themselves from imperialism, but if China was totally serious about fighting NGOs, it would ban them outright rather than just having them register, like Robert Mugabe did for those who would have observed the 2018 elections or Tanzania's similar restrictions.¹⁰⁹ I say this because these NGOs are clearly supporting efforts to speed up capitalist restoration in China. But, we should not let the Chinese revisionists off the hook and side with the position of the PSL: that we should defend the Chinese revisionists from imperialist attack. Instead, we should side with the Chinese proletariat, rather than the Chinese government, as they are the ones under attack from the global capitalist system and Chinese revisionists, attacks of differing degrees. This is something that the revisionists cannot do. There must be rejection of the agenda of such NGOs but there also should be a rejection of the agents of the revisionists, all of whom want to integrate into the global capitalist system, without a doubt.

108 ["More overseas NGOs organize activities in China,"](#) *Xinhua*, Nov 4, 2017; ["Xi calls on NGOs along Silk Road to enhance cooperation,"](#) *Xinhua*, Nov 21, 2017; ["NGOs urged to promote regional peace, cooperation within SCO,"](#) *Xinhua*, Apr 9, 2018.

109 ["Zimbabwe's Mugabe says West-funded NGOs banned from observing 2018 elections,"](#) *Xinhua*, Oct 27, 2017; ["Tanzania suspends registration for new NGOs,"](#) *Xinhua*, Aug 21, 2017; ["Zimbabwe's Mugabe says West-funded NGOs banned from observing 2018 elections,"](#) *Xinhua*, Oct 26, 2017.

Comparison between China and formerly socialist countries

Like the last section, this section in the /r/swcc document is relatively weak. At the opening of this section, the /r/swcc write that “following overthrow of socialism in eastern Europe and central Asia, capitalism was restored which lead to millions of premature deaths due to the severe drop in living standards. If capitalism was indeed restored in China, we would expect to see a similar phenomenon. How does China compare with the regions that formerly part of the Soviet Union?” For one, this creates a false idea that capitalist restoration always has the same results. Since the countries in Eastern Europe are not the same in terms of ethnic and social distribution, their historical path and political developments, such a comparison is absurd to say the least. To “prove” their comment, they cite a blog from *Financial Times* saying that “Eastern Europe’s population is shrinking like no other regional population in modern history,” but also notes, in one of the charts, that China’s population has also been declining, but not as rapidly as in Eastern Europe.¹¹⁰ This is because the same policies put in place in Eastern Europe were not put in place in China. That doesn’t mean that they are socialist, but rather that they implemented capitalistic policies in a different manner.

The next link is an article about China’s “achievement.” It declares that “China’s economy since 1978 is the greatest economic achievement in world history...the scale of China’s economic achievement is frequently underestimated...in only slightly over thirty years China...has moved from being one of the world’s least economically developed countries, to a position where less than one third of the world’s population lives in countries with a higher GDP per capita.”¹¹¹ However, the some of commenters would not have such hogwash, with one adding that “...it is somewhat misleading, however, to begin the analysis with 1978 or to not address its historical roots...China experienced very high growth rates over much of the period from 1949 to 1978 as well, but the benefits of these were

110 Valentina Romei, “[Eastern Europe has the largest population loss in modern history](#),” *Financial Times*, May 27, 2016.

111 John Ross, “[China’s achievement is literally the greatest in world economic history](#),” Feb 19, 2012.

distributed in a much more egalitarian fashion...The post-1978 expansion would have been inconceivable without the expansion of access to higher ed for working class and peasant youth that was in fact central to the Cultural Revolution. Giving Mao credit for anything is of course anathema to the hegemonic narrative, but there you go.” Let us also, here, consider that for one, “development” has been “uneven and some areas are still fairly backward and are unable to fulfill their responsibilities” as *Qiushi* admitted in 2010.¹¹² Such uneven development was also noted by the World Bank, which praised the “growth” from the “household responsibility system and market liberalization.” In their 2007 report, this mainstay of capitalism noted that poverty in China remains rural, labor is relatively immobile, and the urban-rural divide is increasing even with “industry” and other investment brought to rural areas, including in agriculture.¹¹³ They note that rural poverty declined, but that farm sizes are getting smaller, that groundwater continues to be overdrained, land rentals have increased, and migrant workers continue to suffer. Additionally, Bt cotton, a genetically-modified product, has been rapidly adopted in China, to the detriment of Chinese peasants, as their overall sovereignty is weakened. That’s not all. As *Qiushi* noted in 2011, China is working to “meet market demand, respond to various risks and challenges, and maintain the steady and rapid development of its society and economy” by enhancing the “capacity of our seed industry to innovate, increase the competitiveness of our enterprises, ensure a sufficient supply of seeds, and conduct effective market supervision” with all efforts “subject to market forces.”¹¹⁴ This shows that their “answer” to the problems China is facing is to further integrate into the global capitalist system! Socialism is needed in the country without a doubt, but the current Chinese leadership will definitely not provide it. Only a determined struggle by the Chinese proletariat will allow such socialism to blossom in China once more.

112 Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “[Socialist Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: Features and Strengths](#),” Vol.2 No.3 Jul 1,2010

113 World Bank, “[World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development](#),” 2007, accessed Apr 15, 2018, pp 4, 6, 14, 22, 26, 27, 34, 36, 40, 43, 45, 53, 64, 73, 91, 92, 129, 142, 177, 178, 216.

114 Han Changfu, “[Grain Production in China](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.3 Jul 1,2011.

Comparison between China and India

Unlike the last section, this part of the /r/swcc document has many more links. It begins with a comment by those compiling the document: “India and China share similar histories of imperialist oppression and underdevelopment, population size, and conditions. India won its independence in 1947 and has pursued capitalist development; the People's Republic of China was established in 1949 and has pursued socialist development. Given the similarities between these two countries, it is illustrative to examine how they compare.” It is with that quote that this section begins.

The first article is from the *New York Review of Books* by Amartya Sen.¹¹⁵ The article begins by listing a number of statistics “about China and India, drawn mainly from the World Bank and the United Nations,” noting that in China life expectancy is higher, infant mortality rate is lower, mortality rate for children under five is lower, years of schooling is higher, and adult literacy rate is higher, than in India. The article goes on to declare that “when we consider the impact of economic growth on people’s lives, comparisons favor China over India” but adds that while Indians are critical of serious flaws in their country, “most Indians are strongly appreciative of the democratic structure of the country” while this is not the case in China, which is coupled with the “monolithic system of newscasting permitted by the state in China, with little variation of political perspectives on different channels.” He also adds that “China often executes more people in a week than India has executed since independence in 1947” and notes that as a result of the economic “reforms” in China, the leadership eliminated the “entitlement of all to public medical care (which was often administered through the communes),” resulting in many people “required to buy their own health insurance, drastically reducing the proportion of the population with guaranteed health care,” sharply reducing “the progress of longevity in China” meaning that its “large lead over India in life expectancy dwindled during the following two decades.” He goes on to say that “China now has a considerably higher

115 Amartya Sen, “[Quality of Life: India vs. China](#),” *The New York Review of Books*, May 12, 2011.

proportion of people with guaranteed health care than does India. The gap in life expectancy in China's favor has been rising again." Even with these statistics, it doesn't mean that China is socialist. Perhaps it is doing better than India, but that isn't a high bar to go above, as India is raked by capitalism and fascism, without question. Still, the revisionists have been pursuing stronger relations with India, to counter what seems to be an imperial divide and conquer strategy of the West. A recent editorial in *Global Times* advocated for this, saying that while there are "many controversial issues in Sino-Indian relations, most of them old," there should still be "strategic unity in order to reshape the old international political and economic order," declaring that "China and India must build a new strategic framework that faces the future...China and India should set up a bilateral strategic dialogue mechanism...China and India should also set up joint scientific research projects aimed at analyzing the origin and influence of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict...China and India should promote cultural exchanges...China and India enjoy a profound shared history."¹¹⁶ Such an approach does not turn China into a paragon of virtue, but rather one that wants to continue its nationalist foreign policy which is not proletarian internationalism by any stretch!

Following this is an article in *The Guardian* from 2014.¹¹⁷ This article again attempts to compare the two. It notes that the unemployment rate in China was higher than India, that each country has a military of over 1 million personnel, that China had many more nuclear warheads than India, that China has a "strikingly high proportion of women workers" unlike India, and that more people are literate in China than India. However, they also note that China's fertility rate is dropping, that China "enjoys more votes at the IMF than India - but still fewer than the UK, never mind the US" and that China "claimed 88 medals at the 2012 Olympics in London, while India took just six," showing their nationalist determination, that "China's Swiss watch imports have still dwarfed those of India," that

116 Zhang Jiadong, "[China, India must build new unity to reform old global order](#)," *Global Times*, Apr 23, 2018.

117 Tania Branigan and George Arnett, "[China and India - 13 charts that show how the countries compare](#)," *The Guardian*, Sept 16, 2014, accessed Apr 21, 2018.

both countries have problems with “press freedom” and that the “proportion of children that died within 28 days of birth was three times higher in India than it was in China.” Even with these realities there is still a basis to criticize China. Like India, it accepts market precepts, although in a different form, of course, meaning that both countries have a bourgeoisie.

From here, we move to World Bank data, starting with India.¹¹⁸ It says that the poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day reduced from 31.1% in 2009 to 21.2% in 2011. It also shows a growing total population and higher GNI per capita, but a slightly reduced GDP growth. Charts show there is hundreds of millions of people in poverty in India, while the richest part of society is raking in more gains than any other group. Then there’s the data for China.¹¹⁹ It says that the poverty headcount ratio has reduced from 1.9% to 1.4%, claims that there is some “shared prosperity,” notes an increased total population, and a higher GNI per capita. However, the richest part of society is gaining more than any other group, like with India, and even as poverty is declining by all measures, the most expansive poverty line, the upper middle income poverty line (\$5.50) shows over 400 million still in poverty. Of course, the revisionists will cite the lowest number possible, the international poverty line of \$1.90, showing less than 2 million in poverty but not the lower middle income poverty line of 129.5 million in poverty. If we use the same categories for India, over 762 million are in poverty using the lower middle income poverty line and over 1 billion using the upper middle income poverty line. This shows that while China is clearly doing better than India, there are some inherent problems, especially with the concentration of wealth among the capitalists of each country.

The next article is from *TeleSur English* by perennial revisionist Ajit Singh.¹²⁰ Like many articles in *TeleSur English*, it is “takes a position today upholding China as an ally of the oppressed nations” as Wiawimawo of MIM (Prisons) noted. It begins by noting that current tensions between

118 World Bank, “[India](#),” Poverty and Equity Data Portal, accessed Apr 21, 2018.

119 World Bank, “[China](#),” Poverty and Equity Data Portal, accessed Apr 21, 2018.

120 Ajit Singh, “[India and China Rivals or Potential Partners in Liberation?](#),” *TeleSur English*, Aug 31, 2017.

China and India “take place in the context of India’s growing ties with the United States and the U.S. military “pivot” to China.” The article goes onto further remark that

Following India’s neoliberal reforms, beginning in 1991, U.S.-India relations have steadily grown closer....coinciding with growing military collaboration...India has increasingly aligned itself with U.S. imperialism. Most significantly, supporting the U.S. strategy against China, which seeks to maintain U.S. global hegemony...However, while this partnership deepens, India’s capitalist development at home produces destitution for the majority...India’s people require a new way forward, as the current capitalist, U.S.-friendly path does not meet their needs...Although portrayed as a “rival” by ruling class elites, India’s working and oppressed peoples do not benefit from the anti-China orientation. Rather, learning from China’s experiences and developing positive relations can support their struggle forward.

While we can easily accept the analysis of India’s position in the world, it is an open question of whether the Indian proletariat will benefit. Already, *Qiushi* has decried “private ownership of land” in India as causing “huge social trauma,” adding that “issues pertaining to land therefore cannot be left entirely to the market,” but in doing so, admits that the market should be part of the calculations, an absurdist position!¹²¹ Other articles in *Qiushi*, some reprinted from *Xinhua*, talk about India as part of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and engaging in nationalist positioning.

Singh’s article doesn’t stop there. He notes that “India and China have faced similar challenges of pursuing national development and addressing the needs of immense populations” but that they have apparently “followed opposite paths: capitalism and socialism” further noting the issues in “capitalist India,” calling it “subordinate to imperialism and severely underdeveloped,” adding that “only by breaking with U.S. imperialism and the domestic capitalist ruling class, will India’s people begin their

¹²¹ Ke Tizu, “[Public Land Ownership: A Key to Explaining the China Miracle](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.4, No. 1, Jan. 1, 2012; “[“BRICS Plus” pushes for global governance reform](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 6, 2017; “[Chinese defense ministry demands immediate withdrawal of Indian troops](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Aug 4, 2017.

journey from formal independence toward liberation.” At the same, Singh, in typical fashion, holds up China like it is the Gerber baby:

...in China living conditions are consistently improving...income inequality...has been steadily decreasing in China since 2010...China explicitly stresses the importance of multinational unity and of combating chauvinism, particularly of the Han majority. China systemically supports the development of national minorities...China is also significantly ahead of India in the struggle against patriarchy...China has experienced unprecedented economic development and is now the second most powerful economy in the world. Since 1978, China has pursued a policy of economic reform, contrasting sharply with Indian neoliberalism...China is building a modern, moderately prosperous society...China works in cooperation with oppressed nations, providing beneficial alternatives to imperialism...A key example of China’s global impact is the Belt and Road Initiative...China is the primary force building a multipolar, more democratic international order, ending 500 years of Western imperialist dominance. As such, China’s rise supports the liberation of all peoples oppressed by imperialism.

You can say China is a “progressive” bastion, but that is distorting the reality. For one, China’s Ambassador to the Great Britain, Liu Xiaoming, wrote that Xi recently “outlined a new round of practical and effective measures aimed at further opening up China's markets...Opening up has been key to our economic growth, and it will continue to be in future. We will, for example, significantly broaden market access, create a more attractive investment environment, strengthen protection of intellectual property rights and expand imports...We must make economic globalisation more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial to all..We are also hoping to launch the Shanghai-London Stock Connect, allowing traders in both countries to buy on each other's markets across time zones.”¹²² This

¹²² “[The Daily Telegraph Publishes a Signed Article by Ambassador Liu Xiaoming Entitled A More Open China Helps the Whole World](#),” *China Daily*, Apr 24, 2018; “[China to broaden market access, expand imports: ambassador](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 24, 2018, accessed April 24.

sounds more like distorted market garbage than anything that is even an ounce progressive! How can anyone, after reading this, say that China is socialist? So all this talk about Chinese living conditions “consistently improving” or decreasing income inequality flies in the face of reality as market approaches are strengthened, rather than weakened. Additionally, as noted earlier, the richest part of society is gaining more than any other group, as it is with India, coming from World Bank data cited by revisionists! You can also say that China “stresses the importance of multinational unity and of combating chauvinism,” but this doesn’t stop sexist job ads by Chinese firms or easing of restrictions by foreign investment, leading to further capitalist exploitation!¹²³ Further belaying his claim that “China is also significantly ahead of India in the struggle against patriarchy” is the fact that sexual assault lingers on in China, with continued dangers for women, with persecution of women who have been assaulted, as the county struggles with MeToo, with those affected remaining silent rather than speaking out! While there has been some progress with changes of law to include male rape in recent years, the overall situation is still horrific. Even worse is widespread prostitution which was made illegal after the 1949 revolution in China, which mostly removed it, but it surged after 1978!¹²⁴ Onto his other claims, about “unprecedented economic development” and a “policy of economic reform,

123 Michelle Toh and Jethro Mullen, “‘Beautiful girls are needed.’ Chinese tech firms under fire for sexist job ads,” *CNN Money*, Apr 23, 2018; “[“Only Men Need Apply”: Gender Discrimination in Job Advertisements in China](#),” *HRW*, Apr 23, 2018; “[China publishes master plan for Xiongan New Area](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 21, 2018; Jocelyn Eikenberg, “[On sexual assault in China \(and how my husband “guards my butt”\)](#),” *Speaking of China*, Nov 10, 2014; Zeng Jinyan, “Sex Assault Victims Suffer Twice in China,” *HuffPost*, Nov 3, 2011; Matt Rivers and Steven Jiang, “China struggles to find its #MeToo movement,” *CNN*, Mar 23, 2018; Joanna Chu, “[For Chinese Victims of Sexual Assault, ‘Going Viral’ Is Best Revenge](#),” *Foreign Policy*, Apr 15, 2016; “[Rape victims choose silence over losing face](#),” *China Daily*, Apr 18, 2018; Sharon LaFraniere, “Rape Case Is a Rarity in Chinese Justice System,” *New York Times*, Sept 22, 2011; Ai Ping, “[Tough facts about rape in China](#),” *China Daily*, July 8, 2014; Paxcely Marquez, “[Rape in China](#),” *US-China Today*, May 7, 2009; Ashley Money, “[I was Raped in China \(An American's Perspective\)](#),” *Yahoo! Voices*, Jul 18, 2013.

124 Palash Ghosh, “Prostitution Thriving In China: The Dark Underbelly of Economic Prosperity,” *International Business Times*, May 7, 2013; “Teenage prostitution case shocks China,” *BBC News*, Jan 23, 2002; Justin McCurry and Rebecca Allison, “40m bachelors and no women... the birth of a new problem for China,” *The Guardian*, Mar 8, 2004; Zhong Wei, “[A Close Look at China’s “Sex Industry”](#),” Oct 2, 2000; “[Chapter 1: Historic Liberation of Chinese Women](#),” part of Information Office of the State Council White Paper titled “[The Situation of Chinese Women](#),” June 1994; Barbara Onnis, “[The Scourge of Prostitution in Contemporary China: The “Bao Ernai Phenomenon.”](#)” *Asian Culture and History*, Vol 4, No 2, Jul 2012, pp 91-98; Jiang Pei, “[Commentary on the Reform of Tianjin Puxi Industry: 1949-1957](#),” *Chinese Social History Review*, 2004 second series; Sun Shidong, “[Before and after the new China took down the brothel](#),” *Xinhua*, Jul 6, 2005; “[Luo Ruiqing wiped out Beijing prostitutes overnight \(with photos\)](#),” *People’s Daily*, 2000, accessed Apr 24, 2018.

contrasting sharply with Indian neoliberalism,” this can be easily countered. For one, obviously China and India are not on the same path of development. However, this doesn’t make China socialist. Consider two 2011 articles in *Qiushi*, one that admits that “China has found it impossible to grow all of the food it needs and has consequently formed closer ties with the world food market...The total amount of food traded in the international market can hardly meet half of China's demand” and another saying that China “will vigorously implement a strategy to develop free trade areas,” noting that “China deems FTAs as important means of opening up further, promoting the development of a harmonious world, and diversifying export markets. FTAs are conducive to settling international trade disputes, and will help China to convey itself as a major country that is open and responsible.”¹²⁵ Sounds more like it is spoken out of the mouth of a “well-meaning” capitalist, than a socialist, by any means! This also nullifies his point that “China is building a modern, moderately prosperous society” especially since prosperous doesn’t necessarily mean socialist (prosperous for who?). As for the comment about working in “cooperation with oppressed nations, providing beneficial alternatives to imperialism,” the “Belt and Road Initiative” and the declaration that China is part of the “multipolar, more democratic international order, ending 500 years of Western imperialist dominance” with its rise supporting “the liberation of all peoples oppressed by imperialism” I refer to other parts of this publication as I feel it is unnecessary to say the same thing twice.

Following this is an article from the revisionist website, *Learning from China*.¹²⁶ The article begins by saying that the “world’s two most rapidly growing major economies are China and India,” saying that they both “show a common pattern of development which differs sharply from the slowly growing Western economies” with “fast expanding economies...[with] rapidly growing state investment.” To “explain” this, the article declares that “in 2015 China’s per capita GDP growth was

125 Gao Hucheng, “[Promoting Economic Globalization and Opposing Trade Protectionism](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.3 July 1, 2011; Zhou Siyu, “[Food security to be concern in 2012](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *China Daily*), Dec 28, 2011

126 “[Why Are China and India Growing So Fast? State Investment](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 21, 2018.

6.4% and India's 6.3% on World Bank data. These are easily the fastest growth rates for any major economies," adding that "in China up to June 2016 the year on year growth of state-owned fixed-asset investment growth was 23.5%...this is the overall pattern in China." The article goes on to say that

China's overall pattern of a strong increase in state investment with only slowly rising private investment is clear from the national trends. India, the other rapidly growing major economy, shows the same pattern as China....In summary, the world's two most rapidly major growing economies, China and India, are both being driven by rapidly rising state investment while private investment shows very low growth or it is even falling...The vast growth outperformance by China and India compared to the Western economies is evident...The correlation between rapid growth of state investment and fast economic growth in China and India...is...factually clear...Both the Chinese and Indian government have made clear that they have deliberately taken the decision to increase state investment in order to stimulate economic growth...While China and India are easily the most important examples, because they are major economies, it is also clear that policies of state investment have achieved notably success in other economies...This slowdown in China is far less severe than in the advanced Western economies...The major economies with high rates of growth of state investment (China, India) have high rates of economic growth. The major economies with low growth rates of state investment, such as the US, have low rates of economic growth....India has broken with the 'Washington Consensus' of 'state bad, private good' to use state investment as the driving force of its economic development...for economic success China requires both the 'invisible hand' and the 'visible hand'.

This again, does not "prove" the socialist nature of China. As I noted on reddit, recently, state ownership does not make a state automatically socialist. After all, "more than 90% of China's SOEs have become joint-stock companies" and most of these SOEs "now employ a standardized corporate

governance structure that consists of a shareholders' meeting, a board of directors, an executive level, and a supervisory committee" while they have also "diversified their equity ownership, becoming limited companies with mixed ownership," meaning that "a large number of enterprises have thrived in a competitive market environment, and have been "successfully integrated into the market economy," to quote from a 2014 article in *Qiushi*.¹²⁷ So, even if you say that state ownership stands against the privatization trend, it doesn't mean that countries like China are independent of the global capitalist system. To quote another *Qiushi* article, large banks are fine in China as long as they "follow the regulatory guidelines and minimum requirements," with expansion allowed in certain degrees!

After analyzing the revisionist piece in *Learning from China*, it is worth addressing an article by James Manor in an academic publication.¹²⁸ He begins by saying that "the policy process in India differs (and has always differed) in important ways from its Chinese counterpart – because the two political processes, which lie at the root of policy change, differ." He adds that there has been a "great transformation" in China after 1979 (I would say 1978), "when Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues introduced marked changes in politics and policy...and used well established experimental techniques to that end." For India he describes the changes over the years from the 1960s when the "Indian National Congress...found it impossible in most parts of the country to maintain one-party dominance in what has always been a multi-party democracy" to new momentum in the late 1970s, and India ruled, since 1989 by "minority governments or multi-party coalitions" while in 1991, "a Congress minority government introduced market-oriented economic reforms." To this he adds that in China, "most experiments are carried out within small arenas, and those which prove their worth are then incorporated into national policy" while in India policymakers "would like nothing better than to test ideas in carefully crafted pilot projects before applying them more broadly" but have shunned this

127 Miao Wei, "[Implementing a Fully Modern Corporate System for State-Owned Enterprises](#)," *Qiushi*, Vol.6 No.2 Apr 1, 2014; Jiang Dingzhi, "[Coping with Financial Risk](#)," *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.1 Jan. 1,2011.

128 James Manor, "[Politics and experiment in India—The Contrast with China](#)," *China Analysis*, No. 74, Jun 2009.

approach as they have little time, meaning that “experiments almost always take the form of grand gambles, leaps in the dark.” On China, Manor adds that “most experimentation in China has occurred well below the regional level, in quite small arenas” while in India “the main sites for experiments have been entire states in the federal system.” In one area, Manor finds common ground: India and China have made little use of ideas from aid agencies, in China since 1979 and in India especially since 2003 when “most bilateral donor agencies were invited to leave.” However, there is one policy that comes directly from the West: the “one-child policy,” adopted in September 1980 after being introduced the previous year, restricting the child bearing of mainly Han Chinese couples to one-child each, and it was a failed “political decision,” restricting women’s reproductive autonomy, and relied on repressive force, only ending officially in January 2016, changing to the “two-child policy,” returning to the idea put in place in 1970, the later Maoist years.¹²⁹ Western money seems to be behind the effort, specifically through the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), since their predecessor praised the one-child policy publicly in 1983, although it seems to not endorse it now, and possibly the Rockefeller Foundation. Additionally, as some researchers put it, “China’s one-child policy is a product of blind imitation of Western population science,” since then-Chinese official Song Jian was influenced “by the Club of Rome’s writings and other Western doomsday writings in the 1970s.” This puts into question how many ideas China has used from aid agencies.

129 Karen Hardee, Zhenming Xie, and Baochang Gu, “[Family Planning and Women’s Lives in Rural China](#),” *International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health*, Jun 2004; Matt Rosenberg, “[China’s Former One-Child Policy](#),” *Thought.Co*, Jan 31, 2018; Feng Wang, Baochang Gu, and Yong Cai Wednesday, “[The end of China’s one-child policy](#),” *Brookings Institution*, Mar 30, 2016; Simon Butler, “[The Dark History of Population Control](#),” *Climate & Capitalism*, Nov 23, 2009; “[China’s One-Child Policy a Threat to Workforce, Report Finds](#),” *Philanthropy News Digest*, Apr 23, 2007; Alexa Olesen, “Experts challenge China’s 1-child population claim,” *AP*, Oct 27, 2011; Information Office of the State Council Of the People’s Republic of China, “[Family Planning in China](#),” Aug 1995; Zhihe Wang, Ming Yang, Jiaming Zhang, and Jiang Chang, “[Ending an Era of Population Control in China: Was the One-Child Policy Ever Needed?](#),” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Sept 6, 2016; “[UNFPA Hopes Policy Changes Will Lead to Fulfillment of Chinese Couples’ Rights on Family Size](#),” *UNFPA*, Oct 30, 2015; Mark Leon Goldberg, “[UNFPA Does Not Support China’s One Child Policy](#),” *UN Dispatch*, Oct 5, 2011; Congressional Quarterly, Inc., William E Hudson, *Global Issues 2012*, p 283; Austin Williams, *China’s Urban Revolution: Understanding Chinese Eco-Cities*, p 35; CBC News, “5 things to know about China’s 1-child policy,” *CBC*, Oct 29, 2015; *Place Randomized Trials: Experimental Tests of Public Policy*, Vol. 599, ed. Robert F. Boroch, pp 247, 259; “[United Nations Population Fund](#),” *United Nations Association*, accessed Apr 24, 2018; Elina Hemminki, Zhuochun Wu, Guiying Cao, and Kirsi Viisainen, “[Illegal births and legal abortions – the case of China](#),” *Reproductive Health*, 2005; 2: 5.

With this we move onto other claims in Manor's article. He says that "civil society in India is far stronger and is flush with constructive ideas...not radically, different from that in China" while since 1979, in China, "its leaders have largely forsaken ideology" while in India they have "become a little more inclined to use ideology as a source for experimentation." He adds that "China's leaders have been in determined flight from Marxism-Leninism-Mao-Zedong-Thought," further declaring that "the predominant aim of experimentation in China has been to spur economic growth – indeed, "growth by any means"" while in India, such experiments have more diversity, focusing on more than just economic growth, unlike the Chinese. He also says that "in China, experiments have mainly been aimed at achieving economic growth" but that that "the dominant motive behind the Indian experiments is a desperate quest by politicians for votes." He also noted that "since the 1940s, changes in policy in China have occurred more swiftly and with greater clarity and single-mindedness" and adds that "leaders in both India and China have largely ignored ideas that originate from beyond their borders, and have paid only limited heed to civil society within their countries." He ends by saying that "Indian leaders are far less capable than their Chinese counterparts to concentrate minds and energies behind highly focused experiments (or almost anything else)." None of these claims can, when taken together, support a revisionist argument, except if you widely distorted them. In fact, his claims can easily be used to support anti-revisionist arguments, like this publication is aiming to do. It is here that is worth noting a number of articles on Sino-Indian relations. Clearly, the Chinese want "healthy and stable relations between China and India," but also are willing to openly criticize India over the border dispute, although they have made more breakthroughs in recent years.¹³⁰ Not only have high-level

130 "[Xi, Modi stress stable, cooperative China-India ties](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 6, 2017; "[Border issue may still poison Sino-India Ties](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Apr 21, 2014; Hu Shisheng and Zhong Bing, "[A Handshake Across the Himalayas](#)," *Qiushi*, Vol. 5 No.4, Oct 1, 2013; "[China never backs down in defending sovereignty](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Aug 17, 2017; "[Will China dominate the 21st century?](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Jan 20, 2014; "[Chinese president's visit to Kazakhstan to boost bilateral ties, SCO development](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jun 6, 2017; "[BRICS Plus pushes for global governance reform](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 6, 2017; "[China, India pledge to boost partnership](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), May 27, 2016; Ding Ging, "[China's sunset industries ripe for India](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Nov 27, 2014; "[Xi holds phone talk with Modi on bilateral ties](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Mar 21, 2018; "[China](#)

Chinese officials visited India, but in some sense, the Chinese sometimes see themselves as competitors toward India, and are critical of India's cozying up with the West, while others say that India should be part and parcel of Chinese-led initiatives, since they are part of BRICS after all, with the Chinese bourgeoisie wanting a road into the "Indian market"! Such relations should not be seen as a "happy" scenario for everyone, but rather as something will benefit one group over another, even though Chinese deals are undoubtedly more fair than those from imperialist powers like the US.

At the end of James Manor's paper is a comment by academic Sebastian Heilmann.¹³¹ He says that while the "Chinese approach to policy experimentation may appear as rigorous" compared to Indian policy, it is actually "decentralized experimentation," serving as a way for "the Communist Party's leadership to avoid accountability for local policy failures while receiving recognition for economically successful policy innovations generated by local initiative." He also notes that "post-Mao experimentation in China...resulted in serial, and cumulatively radical, redefinitions of policy parameters for economic activity over time." This is undoubtedly the case. Such redefinitions of policy has meant that China has taken up capitalistic methods, including promoting the idea of "wage differentials," and is no longer socialist, with inequality across Chinese society!¹³² Moving onto Heilmann's other points, he writes that "the record of administrative capacity and cross-level

[clarifies position on Indian border incursion](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Aug 3, 2017; [Full text: Premier Li Keqiang meets senior editors of Asia News Network members](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jun 2, 2016; [India being swept up by missile delusion](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Apr 19, 2012; Qu Xing, ["China Will Remain a Developing Country for a Very Long Time"](#), *Qiushi*, Vol. 3, No.1, Jan 1, 2011; Lan Jianxue, ["Solid foundations of Sino-Indian relationship critical in turbulent times"](#), *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Apr 11, 2014; Chen Ping, ["The China Enigma and the China Way"](#), *Qiushi*, Vol. 2, No.4, Oct 1, 2010; Yu Ning, ["Success of Sino-Indian rail pact to set stage for more deals"](#), *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Global Times*), Nov 27, 2014; Wen Jiabao, ["The Current Macroeconomic Situation and Tasks in Economic Work"](#), *Qiushi*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Oct 1, 2011; Hu Angang, ["China's Success Comes from its Political System"](#), *Qiushi*, Vol. 2, Apr 1, 2011; Wang Yi, ["Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation Through Commitment to Peaceful Coexistence"](#), *Qiushi*, January-March 2015, Vol.7, No.1, Issue No. 22; ["Hometown diplomacy highlights Modi's Xi'an tour"](#), *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), May 15, 2015; ["One Belt One Road" initiative achieves series of important early-stage harvest](#)," *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), May 24, 2016. All articles accessed on Apr 25, 2018. "BRICS Plus" means countries such as "Egypt, Mexico, Thailand, Tajikistan and Guinea," to quote from the article.

131 Sebastian Heilmann, ["Comments on James Manor's Paper 'Politics and experiment in India—The Contrast with China'"](#), *China Analysis*, No. 74, Jun 18, 2009.

132 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), ["China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?"](#), *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

administrative integration in China is much more mixed than one would expect in a polity that is ruled and shaped by a Communist Party hierarchy...In effect, the Communist Party hierarchy thus serves as the core institutional pillar for controlling the extent and direction of policy experimentation in China.” That may be the case, but it does not make China socialist. In fact, as *Qiushi* admitted in 2011, China has been “working especially hard in recent years to develop a fundamental market system, resolutely working to carry out reforms and make innovations in the capital market, strengthening efforts to ensure regulation in accordance with the law and actively and carefully working to resolve deep-rooted issues and structural problems.”¹³³ That sounds like capitalist thinking, not that of socialist comrades.

Heilmann moves onto other topics. He claims that “the broadening of China’s key developmental goals beyond economic growth to the inclusion of environmental and social sustainability” is because of “rising tensions and visible disasters in the ecological and societal realms” and due to “a revitalization of socialist welfare ideology under the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration in China since 2002/2003...an attempt to bolster Communist Party rule by referring to the welfarist ideals of the socialist tradition.” But he admits that “many cadres...have a very limited interest in political and economic egalitarianism” while the Chinese masses have an interest in a “just and equitable society.” This shows a fundamental problem in the CPC itself, showing they are not some progressive warriors fighting on the side of justice and improving the lives of the Chinese people. As MIM (Prisons) noted rightly, while the “state sometimes imprisons its billionaires does not change the fact that this once socialist society...now has billionaires. Billionaires can only exist by exploiting people; a lot!...Some major changes had to take place to get to where China is today with 319 billionaires.”¹³⁴ This reality is something the revisionists loath to even accept. If they accepted the point of MIM (Prisons) their whole argument that China is “socialist” would fall apart.

133 Shang Fulin, “[Reform of the Capital Market to Support Transformation of the Pattern of Economic Development](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 3, No.2, Apr 1, 2011.

134 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

His next point pokes a hole in the argument that China “developed” after 1978 all on its own. He notes that “selective learning from “advanced foreign experience” has played a central role in the Chinese policy debate,” saying that while it has lost some recent momentum, China has “adapted individual elements of the foreign experience in a highly selective and experimental manner, foreign models have been a constant and influential element in the policy debate,” adding that “World Bank advisors played a key role, for example, in the profound remodelling of development planning during the 1990s” from “socialist planning...to planning with and for markets,” and helped with the “restructuring of China’s state industry sector.” To this day, this element of China has not changed. In fact, in 2010, the Chinese advocated for more initial public offerings (IPOs), as part of the “merging and reorganization of enterprises to provide support for improving and upgrading the industrial structure” of China, even advocating for an expanded bond market, and advocating for “commercial banks to trade bonds in the stock market.”¹³⁵ These are all signs that China is still on the capitalist road!

Heilmann ends his article by declaring that “India and China are protagonists of “transformative governance” as opposed to the “protective governance” that is characteristic of most other polities” and claims that “China’s unorthodox approach to policymaking that can be paraphrased in a short formula as “foresighted maximum tinkering”...may become a huge processual advantage in the years to come, if this variant of steady, yet flexible governance is being maintained and adapted in creative ways,” claiming that “China is in a position to be at the forefront of “neo-statist” trends.” This would be supported by commitment of Chinese leadership toward the state (not public) sector, including listing SOEs on Chinese stock exchanges, but is complimented by the development of the private sector of the economy, allowing “market entities...to compete on equal terms,” which provides many of the jobs in the country to the Chinese proletariat.¹³⁶ Hence, China is still on the capitalist road!

135 Shang Fulin, “[Developing the Capital Market System to Speed Up Transformation of the Pattern of Economic Development](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.2, No.3, Jul 1, 2010.

136 Zheng Xinli, “[The Systems That Guarantee the Sustainable Development of the Chinese Economy](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5 No.1 Jan 1, 2013, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

Comparison between China and U\$

This section only has four links, two from revisionist sources. The first is from the World Economic Forum, reprinting from a capitalist website, *Visual Capitalist*, which was originally compiled by the *South China Morning Post*.¹³⁷ It notes that there are more broadband subscribers, high technology exports, foreign currency reserves, gross national income, and educational enrollment in China than the U\$. However, it also notes that more money is spent on health in the U\$ than China, that workers in the U\$ earn more than those in China, and that more natural gas production occurs in the U\$ than China. Additionally, the U\$ has higher government revenue, a higher GDP (and GDP per capita), higher per capita disposable income, and a higher amount of international travelers. On a negative note, there is more coal and ignite production occurs in China than the U\$, along with more overall energy production which is not surprising considering the huge population in China. As the *Visual Capitalist* notes, “the economies are the two strongest globally in absolute terms...While comparable in total size, the makeup of each economy is totally different.” The data may be somewhat dated, as it was compiled in September 2015. The fact that these statistics are bandied around by capitalists is troubling, showing they know something about China that revisionists refuse to accept: that China is on the capitalist road. The country clearly has some problems lingering in the future. The demand for commodities such as cement, copper, steel, nickel, coal, and pork has expanded, importing almost half, a little more, of the world’s supply of previously mentioned commodities!¹³⁸ As the *Virtual Capitalist* notes, “it’s said that in China, a new skyscraper is built every five days” with China’s demand for certain commodities equalling or exceeding “that of the rest of the world combined.” This will undoubtedly lead to further exploitation of the global proletariat since taking in more resources will entangle China more deeply into the worldwide capitalist system itself!

137 Andrea Willige, “[The world’s top economy: the US vs China in five charts](#),” *World Economic Forum*, Dec 5, 2016; Jeff Desjardins, “[China vs. United States: A Tale of Two Economies](#),” *Virtual Capitalist*, Oct 15, 2015; Dennis Wong, “[INFOGRAPHIC: China vs the US - a tale of two economies](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 29, 2015.

138 Jeff Desjardins, “[China’s Staggering Demand for Commodities](#),” *Virtual Capitalist*, Mar 2, 2018.

This brings us to the second article shared by the revisionists, from *CBS News*.¹³⁹ It aims to discern whether income inequality is worse in China or the U\$. It summarizes a recent paper by economists Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman, saying that both countries “have witnessed an extreme rise in income inequality since the 1970s.” Further summarizing the paper, it says that while in the U\$ the top 1% “now take home about 20 percent of the country’s pretax national income, compared with less than 12 percent in 1978,” in China “the top 1 percent doubled their share of income, rising from about 6 percent to 12 percent.” The article says that the “problem may be more dire on American soil,” and declares that “economic growth in China has been so strong that -- despite widening inequality -- the incomes of the bottom 50 percent have also “grown markedly,”” saying that this makes “rising inequality much more acceptable” in China itself. With this, it is worth looking at the original study itself and what it says about China as inequality in the U\$ is already well-known. The study is by Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman. While it cannot be read openly online, even through the Internet Archive.¹⁴⁰ However, through some online sleuthing, I was able to find a copy of the paper. I found a short five-page copy of the paper, and it is written a way to benefit their benefactors like the Ford Foundation, the Sandler Foundation, and the Institute for new Economic Thinking, although the study still has validity, of course.¹⁴¹ It shows that the income share of the top 1% in China has gone from around 5% in 1978 to over 13% in 2014, while the share of the bottom 50% of society has dropped from 28% to about 15%, a 13% drop! They write that “China had very low inequality levels in the late 1970s,” undoubtedly due to Maoist policies (although they won’t admit this), but is “now approaching the United States.” That’s something the revisionists don’t want you to know! Furthermore, while the disparity in the U\$ from the top 1% to full population is more stark in the U\$, it is undoubtedly still present in China. As they note, “in China, the top

139 Aimee Picchi, “[U.S. vs. China: Whose income inequality is worse?](#),” *CBS News*, Feb 13, 2017.

140 Here is the [current online link](#) and here is the [oldest link](#) in the Internet Archive. Also see an abstract [here](#).

141 Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, “[Global Inequality Dynamics](#),” *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings* 2017, 107(5): 405, 406, 407, 408

experienced very high growth rates, but average growth was so large that the bottom 50 percent average income also grew.” Hence, the capitalist class in China grew in power, but some of the benefits also went to the proletariat, appeasing them from revolting to remove the revisionists! The article goes onto say that “the ratio between net private wealth and national income” has risen in China, being “100 percent of national income in 1978, while it is above 450 percent in 2015” meaning that China “is now approaching the levels observed in the United States (500 percent), United Kingdom, and France (550–600 percent).” And we are supposed to accept this is a socialist society? That’s utterly absurd. After all, the wealth of this capitalist class has markedly risen from 15% in 1990 to about 30% in 2014, with data not available before that point. They also write that “the very unequal process of privatization and access by Chinese households to quoted and unquoted equity probably played an important role in the very fast rise of wealth concentration in China.” MIM (Prisons) talks about this as well, noting that in the privatization of the 1980s, communes and collective were dismantled, and that people don’t own the land anymore, with the communes being broken up by the Chinese state leading to immediate negative effects on agriculture and the environment.¹⁴² The 21-page PDF by the same authors makes similar conclusions. They make points related to those they made in the 5-page article, but make some additional points.¹⁴³ They write that in China “the share of public wealth in national wealth dropped from about 70% in 1978 to 35% by 2015” which was coupled with a “corresponding rise of private property” and also note that the “very unequal process of privatization and access” by Chinese households likely played “an important role in the very fast rise of wealth concentration in China, particularly at the very top end.” Later charts in the 21-page PDF show a strong concentration of wealth among the top 0.01% and 0.001%, much higher than in the US or France! Such stark inequality shows that the CPC isn’t serious about equalizing gains in Chinese society.

142 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

143 Facundo Alvaredo, Lucas Chancel, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, “[Global Inequality Dynamics: New Findings from WID.world](#),” NBER Working Paper No. 23119, Feb 2017.

With this comment, we move onto another article from the revisionist *Learning from China* website.¹⁴⁴ They declare that “China’s development model” has influenced many states, again going with the false idea that “China and Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Laos People’s Democratic Republic” are socialist states, when none of these listed are socialist, but rather all accept the false idea of “market socialism.” The article goes onto declare that the “development model followed by China was the unique creation of China’s economic policy,” claiming that it “outperformed alternatives” like the Washington Consensus “advocated by the IMF and World Bank” which states that its “overriding goal is the strongest guarantees of private property.” From here, it declares that China’s strategy is “radically different in its entire framework and directly counterposed on key policy issues” going onto say that “China’s economic model not only produced more rapid growth than developed economies but also capitalist economies at the same stage of economic development (level of per capita GDP).” It also declares that “from 1978 onwards China’s rate of growth was almost six times the world average...China’s...model...was a huge success while the Washington Consensus was a failure...[a] demonstration of the superiority of China’s...path to any capitalist alternative.” Lets say this article is totally accurate in its claims, which I doubt. The fact is that such “success” benefited a small group, a growing capitalist class in China. Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman wrote an article on China in April 2017, which can easily counter these claims, with research funded by the European Research Council.¹⁴⁵ They note that Chinese inequality is now quickly approaching US levels! While they claim that “between 1978 and 2015, China has moved from a poor, underdeveloped country to the world’s leading emerging economy,” which can easily be appropriated by revisionists, they found that “the national wealth-income ratio has increased from 350% in 1978 to 700% in 2015,” that the “share of public property in national wealth has declined from about 70% in 1978 to about 30% in 2015,” that

144 “[China’s Socialist Development Strategy Far Outperformed Western Alternatives](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 25, 2018, edited from the [Chinese original](#).

145 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 3, 4, 5, and 6.

more than “95% of the housing stock is now owned by private households, as compared to about 50% in 1978” and while “Chinese corporations” are mainly still state-owned, 30% are owned by private Chinese capitalists and 10% by foreigners. While they call China a “mixed economy with strong public ownership,” a distortion of the reality, they admit that “China has moved a long way toward private property between 1978 and 2015” while it does not have the same “property regime” as elsewhere in the world. Apart from also writing about wealth concentration among Chinese capitalists, they note that an “income tax has been in place since 1980,” making it a Dengist policy, meaning that there was no income tax before that point! As such, Maoist China would be even more progressive, as it was like Juche Korea is today: it had no income tax! They also write that while in the late 1970s, “China’s inequality levels were “less than European average levels,” that now China is quickly “approaching U.S. levels,” with the wealth share of the Chinese top 10% being 67% in 2015, “getting close to that of the United States (72%)” and is much higher than countries such as France, where it is 50%.

With this, we move onto the next article, again from Jeff J. Brown, the resident revisionist of the *Greenville Post* whose articles I have countered before.¹⁴⁶ He starts out by recounting his own experience: living in China from 1990-1997 and since 2010. He declares that he sees “China’s civilizational transformation, evolution and warp speed progress...[with] visionary and daring architecture,” further adding that “Western capitalism is simply unable to build a country and a society like this,” saying what is happening now is the “irrefutable, long-term success of China’s evolving communist system,” and that Westerners are behind the delusions of what he calls the “Great Western Firewall.” He goes onto embrace “China’s communist-socialist system of governance” as he falsely calls it, attacking “imperial Westerners, feeling inherently racially superior in every way to the non-White world,” recounts a meeting between Xi and Jerry Brown in June 2017, he then writes that “with communism-socialism’s mantra of harmony, sharing, cooperation and stability for the greater good...the

146 Jeff J. Brown, “[How Can Western Capitalism Beat This? That’s The Rub, It Can’t](#),” *Greenville Post*, Oct 26, 2017.

Chinese are laughing all the way to a much higher standard of living and better quality of life,” again another deceptive argument. His arguments are shown to be faulty because while the “private property of agricultural land...is relatively unsecure,” the “rights of private owners have gradually increased over time,” and a stock market (not multiple ones) has existed since 1990, while the national statistical authorities in China massively underestimate top incomes!¹⁴⁷ This all serves the Chinese bourgeoisie and their revisionist friends in the West.

Brown goes onto mock those who criticize China, while also advertising for his book, claiming that China is a “centrally planned country with no private real estate and the top 100 industrial sectors are fully or majority people owned, including banks and insurance companies.” He also claims that capitalist Jack Ma of Alibaba “is a communist-socialist capitalist” and then claims that “the Chinese people can thank Mao Zedong for his visionary leadership over a communist system of governance and socioeconomics, from 1949-1978,” which is accurate except that he thinks that Deng is a continuation of this, not a counter-revolutionary! He then declares taking his viewpoint “will give you the courage and the optics to see history and current events differently, in contrast to all the 24/7 brainwashing propaganda behind the Great Western Firewall.” Such viewpoints distort the reality. Take for example Shen Jianguang, managing director and chief economist with Mizuho Securities Asia, whom wrote a recent piece in *Global Times*, summarizing Xi’s keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in April 2018 in which Xi said that “China will accelerate the opening-up of the insurance industry, ease restrictions on the establishment of foreign financial institutions and expand their business scope, and open up more areas of cooperation between Chinese and foreign financial markets.”¹⁴⁸ Jianguang endorses this, remarking that “this round of financial opening is a trailblazer of a new tide of reform and opening-up in China, and the measures announced at the BFA are equivalent to admitting the

147 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 9, 10, 16.

148 Shen Jianguang, “[New round of financial opening can be second WTO entry](#),” *Global Times*, Apr 23, 2018

country to the WTO for a second time...the country has made substantial headway in moving toward market-oriented exchange and interest rates and opening up its capital account...foreign ownership limits in the financial sector should be eased further...foreign investors should be treated equally with their domestic counterparts...Accelerated financial opening is merely a small part of the new round of reform and opening-up. But the reform pledges made by the Chinese leadership at the BFA, which aim for higher-level opening-up of the economy, are equivalent to ushering in a second WTO entry.” This hardly sounds like a “communist-socialist” approach. The article Jianguang links to, confirms his observations, showing that the Chinese leadership had the same message in 2017.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, Brown’s declaration that China has a “centrally planned country with no private real estate and the top 100 industrial sectors are fully or majority people owned, including banks and insurance companies” is a statement which is incorrect in so many ways. For one, China has noted in many official documents that it does not have a planned economy anymore, but has a market economy. Automakers from across the world have “set their sights on the China market,” digital marketers are happy in China, and the “rural market is vast with a huge potential for increasing consumer spending,” as *Qiushi* articles note.¹⁵⁰ This is the language of capitalist thinking. Additionally, saying that Jack Ma of Alibaba “is a communist-socialist capitalist” is a joke. As a 53-year-old married (and college educated) capitalist, he heads a huge e-commerce business and his net worth is over 38 billion, meaning that he is not only exploiting over 50,000 employees for Alibaba, but the whole Chinese proletariat!¹⁵¹ Sure, he may favor the Chinese leadership, but does not make him a communist or socialist. A “communist-socialist capitalist” does not exist and never has existed. Such a term is an affront for all that Marxism-Leninism stands for, which Jeff J. Brown doesn’t even follow anyway.

149 “[President Xi congratulates opening of Boao Forum for Asia](#),” *Global Times* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Mar 25, 2017

150 Li Chengyu, “[Rural Markets Are Key to Expanding Domestic Demand](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.2, No.2, Apr 1, 2010; “[Advancing by Opening Up](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *Beijing Review*), Dec 8, 2011; Gao Yuan, “[Digital marketing: The future](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *China Daily*), Jan 7, 2013.

151 “[Number of full-time employees at Alibaba from 2012 to 2017](#),” *statista*, accessed Apr 25, 2018; “[Jack Ma](#),” *Forbes* profile, last updated Apr 25, 2018.

China's economic "growth" and revisionist distortion

The first article in this section is from *Global Times* by revisionist John Ross, senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China.¹⁵² He declares that "the top four fastest growing economies...all follow, or are highly influenced by, China's development model," being "China, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos," adding that "capitalist development models, including the Washington Consensus, have been a failure." He further claims that the CPC is following a "socialist development model" looking at the data of the four countries previously mentioned, saying that for China it "indicates the success of the Chinese model." He declares that the "data breaks down the claim that capitalism is the main drive behind rapid economic growth and poverty reduction," and ends by saying that "China's policies...are successful in producing both economic growth and poverty reduction...the top four most rapidly growing economies...all use the Chinese socialist development model demonstrates of the superiority in China's path to capitalist alternatives." However, such "success" should not be as applauded as Ross does, without much thought. Foreign capitalists want to tap "the mammoth market of China" because of its quick development, even as others shy away, and rental properties are expanding around Beijing, benefiting private developers, even though some grumble about some government requirements.¹⁵³ Such tapping of the market has been embraced by China, with China's central bank recently unveiling "a slew of measures to open up its financial sector to foreign investment...including the removal of foreign ownership caps for banks"! Additionally, as domestic capitalists are more supported, the Chinese government has said it will not abandon its push forward for more of a market economy than the one that already exists!

152 John Ross, "[China's socialist model outperforms capitalism](#)," *Global Times*, Aug 23, 2016. His article, "[Data shows China's 'socialist development model' outperformed capitalist development strategies](#)" seems to be an expansion of this *Global Times* piece, so it is not reviewed in this publication.

153 John Zane, "[What 'Made in China 2025' Means for You](#)," *AmChamChina*, Sept 1, 2015; "[Why American companies refuse to make China their main innovation hub](#)," *US China Investment News*, Apr 19, 2018; "[China Vanke's US\\$287,000 rental challenge: 'we freeze monthly rents if you prepay a decade upfront'](#)," *US China Investment News*, Apr 19, 2018; "[Chinese developers warn more rentals will hammer margins](#)," *US China Investment News*, Apr 19, 2018; "[China pledges to open up financial markets amid threat of US trade war](#)," *US China Investment News*, Apr 12, 2018. All links accessed Apr 25, 2018.

With this, we move to yet another article on China's "model" from John Ross, yet again!¹⁵⁴ It is very similar to the article I just noted. He declares that "China has followed an economic development strategy, as analyzed below, that is radically different from the neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" advocated by the IMF," adding that "the emphasis placed by China on development strategy and its socialist orientation has obvious implications for other countries," noting it began in 1978 with its "economic reforms." He also declares that "from 1978 onwards China ranked first among all economies in terms of economic growth...This data...also refutes the claim that capitalism and free market policies produced rapid economic growth and poverty reduction." As I've reviewed similar claims before, so I'll make sure not to repeat myself. For one, Ross does not touch on the fact that "income inequality has increased markedly since the beginning for the market reform process" with the share of the top 10% of the population increasing "from 27% in 1978 to 41% in 2015, while the share going to the bottom 50% has dropped from 27% to 15%" meaning that that "bottom 50% of the population used to have about the same income share as the top 10%" but their "income share is now about 2.7 times lower" and by extension, their "average income is now about 13.5 times lower."¹⁵⁵ Additionally, China, in the later 1970s, "used to be substantially more equal than France and the United States" but now it "is more unequal than France...and is now approaching U.S. inequality levels," along with a "strong rise in the top 10% income share and a strong decline in the top 50% income share from 1978 to 2015." This shows an inherent problem in the China model.

With this we move onto another article of Ross.¹⁵⁶ He writes that "the fastest growing economies since the putting forward in 1989 of the 'Washington Consensus'...were not those following this model advocated by the IMF/World Bank but instead those following or deeply influenced by the

154 John Ross, "[How China's Socialism Outperforms Capitalist Development Strategies](#)," *China-United States Exchange Foundation*, Jan 3, 2017.

155 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, "[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#)," June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 27, 30, 34.

156 John Ross, "[Why Did China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Grow So Fast?](#)," *Key Trends in Globalisation*, Sept 15, 2016, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

entirely different [strategy of] China.” He further wrote that “China’s economic thinking since Deng Xiaoping is so superior to that of the ‘Western left’,” countering a commentary in *Global Times* itself, showing he doesn’t totally understand China’s trajectory. He further said that “China, Vietnam and Laos declare themselves socialist - Cambodia designates itself a monarchy but is decisively influenced by China,” adding that “the practical meaning is China has state ownership of a large enough sector of the means of production to regulate its overall investment level,” claiming it is not a “capitalist economy,” saying China succeeded because it was “open and socialist...not closed and capitalist.” Yet, this leads to a fallacy. A “closed” economy is not necessarily a bad one. Juche Korea has a relatively closed economy and its not necessarily bad. I would say that the most open economies are the capitalist ones. China is inherently not “open and socialist” because of state ownership in the economy and from some previous restrictions on foreign ownership, although those are being relaxed. After all, despite heavy Chinese investment in Africa, many of the countries there still see the US\$ as the top world economic superpower, with a similar assessment in Latin America, while those in Western Europe, Russia, Canada, and Australia see China as the top world economic superpower.¹⁵⁷ Such an economic position has allowed China to become the leader of lithium-ion megafactories, which will only expand further by 2020. China is an open economy, but it is not socialist. After all, if China was socialist then it certain would not have such extreme debt accumulation, especially among the corporate sector.¹⁵⁸ Now, what about Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia? Vietnam has become an “emerging manufacturing hub” and “emerging market” in Southeast Asia, and has a dispute with China over claims to the South China Sea.¹⁵⁹ However, this isn’t the whole picture. Using the World Inequality Database, I was able to find

157 Jeff Desjardins, “[Chart: Is U.S. or China the World’s Economic Superpower?](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Aug 3, 2017; Jeff Desjardins, “[China Leading the Charge for Lithium-Ion Megafactories](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Feb 17, 2017.

158 Jeff Desjardins, “[China’s Debt Bomb: No One Really Knows the Payload \[Chart\]](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, May 13, 2016.

159 Jeff Desjardins, “[IMF Growth Forecasts: Missing the Mark So Far \[Chart\]](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Apr 8, 2016; Jeff Desjardins, “[Explained by Graphics: Tension in the South China Sea](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Jul 15, 2016; Jeff Desjardins, “[Visualizing the Emerging Markets of the Future](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Oct 6, 2015; Jeff Desjardins, “[Visualizing a Global Shift in Wealth Over 10 Years](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Jan 26, 2018; Jeff Desjardins, “[Southeast Asia: An Emerging Market With Booming Digital Growth](#),” *Visual Capitalist*, Feb 26, 2018.

charts showing rising national income and GDP. However, they listed no data on income inequality, sadly.¹⁶⁰ The same was the case for Laos. While the World Bank said there was “only modest increases in income inequality,” concerns over inequality have risen, with “substantial differences in economic conditions by geography and ethnic group” and continued “inequality of opportunity for children remains a concern in Vietnam.” They also noted that “the number of super-rich in Vietnam is similar to that of other countries at Vietnam’s level of income” and that “eight in ten urban residents said they worry about disparities in living standards in Vietnam.”¹⁶¹ There has been stark income inequality which threatens the stability of Vietnam itself, with “Vietnam’s wealthiest citizens are increasingly flaunting their success, or excess.” So much for being an alternative to the Washington Consensus! Of course the Washington Consensus is horrible and despicable, but the “market socialism” in Vietnam has problems as well, with such inequality rooted in their market policies.

Then there’s Laos. Long a “poor, landlocked, sparsely populated country,” Laos started “experimenting with free-market economics in 1986” with a system that evolved along similar lines to China, with the Chinese using “Laos as a forward base and transit route for a major communications link between south-west China and south-east Asia.”¹⁶² As the OECD put it, “Cambodia and Viet Nam have diversified their economies away from agriculture and both are currently fostering eco-tourism and new green industries” but income disparities persist, with inequality widening in Laos, hampering efforts of poverty reduction. Basically, as one study notes, “since the early 1990s...measured inequality

160 See the pages for [Laos](#) and [Vietnam](#).

161 “[Inequality in Vietnam: A Special Focus of the Taking Stock Report](#),” *World Bank*, Jul 8, 2014; Scott Duke Harris, “With Vietnam’s economic advance comes stark income inequality,” *LA Times*, Mar 1, 2015; Georgianna Vaughn, “[Widening wealth gap threatens Vietnam’s stability](#),” *Global Risk Insights*, Mar 10, 2014; Oxfam, “[Even it up: how to tackle inequality in Vietnam](#),” Jan 12, 2017; Gabriel Demombynes, “[Inequality a global trend, but Viet Nam should worry](#),” *Viet Nam News*, Jul 10, 2014; Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt, and Brian McCaig, “[Growth with Equity: income inequality in Vietnam 2002-14](#),” *J Econ Inequal*, Feb 16, 2017; “[The World Bank In Vietnam](#),” Overview, *World Bank*, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

162 Bruno Philip, “Laos, south-east Asia’s new emerging economy,” *The Guardian*, Nov 6, 2012; Peter Warr, ANU, Sitthiroth Rasphone, NERI, and Jayant Menon, ADB, “[Rising inequality hampers poverty reduction in Laos](#),” *East Asia Forum*, Oct 24, 2015; OECD Development Centre, “[Poverty and inequality disparities in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam](#),” 2013.

has increased at the national level” while “absolute poverty has halved” meaning that while “the poor of Laos have become better off in real terms...the rich have benefited more in both proportionate and absolute terms.” Those rich are the Laotian bourgeoisie, who have benefited from such inequality, just like the Vietnamese bourgeoisie. The Asian Development Bank had a similar assessment, saying that “inequality has increased throughout the country” while “access to publicly provided services has become more equal,” with the increase in inequality showing the true face of such “market socialism” in Laos, where the population continues to suffer.¹⁶³

Finally, there’s Cambodia. It is as bad off as Laos and Vietnam. Once again, the World Inequality Database has no income inequality data.¹⁶⁴ However, assessments of inequality are elsewhere. While it has become “a prominent tourist destination, developed a recognizable middle class and threw off its history as a country tainted by the Khmer Rouge regime,” its “economic ‘success’ has been praised by international organizations such as the IMF and UN,” the Cambodian proletariat toil in factories, mostly owned by Malaysians, for low wages, people are forcibly evicted from their homes, with a Cambodian bourgeoisie becoming richer, as the West now likes Cambodia, unlike in the past.¹⁶⁵ Even the World Bank has to admit that poverty is still widespread, that the gap between the rich and poor has widened, along with inequality within the countryside itself! Additionally, regional disparities have cropped up in the country as a whole as well.

Noting all of this, it seems laughable to pose China, Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia as an alternative model to the Washington Consensus. As such, previous socialist policies in China, during the Maoist period, provides much more of a viable alternative to the Washington Consensus, than market policies in Cambodia and “market socialist” policies in the others.

163 Asian Development Bank, “[Two Decades of Rising Inequality and Declining Poverty in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic](#),” Nov 2015. To read the full publication, not just the abstract, go [here](#).

164 Cambodia [page](#) on World Inequality Database.

165 David Nathan, “[The truth behind Cambodia’s inequalities](#),” *The New Internationalist*, Sept 12, 2014; “[Growth, poverty and inequality in Cambodia](#),” *World Bank*, Feb 2008; Suraj Kumar & Ny Boret, “[Inequality and Regional Disparity in Cambodia](#),” Background Paper for Cambodia Human Development Report 2014.

It is worth now analyzing China's GDP has changed over time. An article in *The Guardian* says that since 1980, the real GDP growth of China has gone from 7.9% in 1980 to 8.4% in 2000, after dipping to 3.8% in 1990, showing some problems with "market socialism."¹⁶⁶ The gross domestic product, current prices (US\$, billions) has risen from about \$202 billion in 1980 to about \$12 trillion in 2016. Additionally, the gross domestic product per capita, current prices (US\$) has gone from about \$205 billion in 1980 to \$8.5 trillion in 2016. However, the unemployment rate was still 4% in 2016, population was rising, the value of oil exports had decreased, the volume of exports of goods and services had decreased, and the volume of imports of goods and services had decreased, along with gross national savings, and total investment (% of GDP). This raises some questions about such growth. The data displayed by Google, coming from the World Bank, World Development Indicators says the same as the Guardian article but only focuses on GDP in current US\$ dollars.¹⁶⁷ Other data from the same website, shows rising Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), worker remittances, CO2 emissions, energy use, and external debt, along with declining renewable freshwater resources. There are some problems with such an analysis. For one, GDP only "measures goods and services sold through markets" but doesn't account for "anything that is produced but not sold...does not factor in a country's underground economy of tax evaders and criminal enterprises" and "purports to determine a country's growth and standard of living," only does so "from a material perspective and does not factor in actual social welfare."¹⁶⁸ Additionally, GDP does not necessarily indicate activities detrimental to the long-term economy, meaning that "environmental degradation is rarely accounted for" and GDP may, in some regards, "overstate the economic well-being of an economy." Using GDP as such a measurement is further complicated by varied international prices, currency conversation, and hidden economies.

166 "China GDP: how it has changed since 1980," *The Guardian*, Mar 23, 2012.

167 [Gross Domestic Product of China](#), Google, accessed Apr 25, 2018. Data from 2011.

168 "[What Are the Different Problems with GDP?](#)," *WiseGeek*, accessed Apr 25, 2018; "[A Problem with GDP as a Measure of National Economic Health](#)," *MongaBay*, accessed Apr 25, 2018; "[Limitations of GDP](#)," *Economics Online*; Pierce Gordon, "[Op-Ed: Gross Domestic Problems: Issues with GDP and Possible Improvements](#)," Oct 21, 2013; "[Problems with GDP as a measurement of well-being and alternatives to GDP. part 2](#)," Sept 2011.

We then move onto yet another article from *The Guardian* about a “big data valley” in China in a series backed by the Rockefeller Foundation.¹⁶⁹ It notes that “Guiyang...has typically been known more for poverty than innovation” but now it is becoming more of a tech center, with companies like Foxconn the first to open at “the strategic heart of Guiyang’s technology aspirations,” with public transportation in the works, and increasing “big data investment” along with efforts to “boost Guizhou’s tourism.” The article also says that in the area “housing is cheap,” and it remains to be seen “whether Gui An can draw China’s best tech brains from established hubs like Beijing’s Zhongguancun, the state-backed “China’s Silicon Valley”, which has been housing technology companies since the 1980s.” People can applaud this all they want. However, domestic and foreign capitalists will benefit. Recently, “AmCham China and Microsoft partnered to co-host a high-level event on” the future of cars in China, while “leaders from both the ICT and Automotive industries shared their insights regarding the digital transformation of the auto industry, China’s cybersecurity law and other relevant regulations and policies,” with Christopher Millward, President and Managing Director of the United States Information Technology Office (USITO), saying that in order to “maximize the impact of further developments, automotive companies must develop open technology, the Chinese government must listen to the voice of industry and provide a platform for collaboration where information and communications technologies are built into the foundation.”¹⁷⁰ China is fully listening to that message. The e-commerce industry is rapidly expanding in China, consumers are becoming “more confident in spending their money on a number of categories,” Alipay and Wechat pay have become “the most popular online payments in China,” and “the importance of social media has increased.” At the same time, China is opening “up wider to the outside world” and will continue to let the market play a decisive role in resources allocation” as Liu He, Vice-Premier, State Council of the

169 Helen Roxburgh, “[Inside China's 'big data valley': the rapid hi-tech transformation of Guiyang](#),” *The Guardian*, Jul 13, 2017, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

170 Evan Schmitt and Jenny Chen, “[Driving Toward the Future in China](#),” *AmChamChina*, Mar 22, 2018; Vishal Bali, “[This is what you need to know about China’s e-commerce explosion](#),” *World Economic Forum*, Jan 31, 2018

China said.¹⁷¹ He also told the World Economic Forum that China “will encourage both inbound and outbound investment and business activities, as we seek greater economic and trade interactions with other countries and work with them toward an open world economy.” With this, the development of this new area fits right in with such market approaches!

Following this is another article from *The Guardian*. It declares that China plans to build “a special economic zone,” or SEZ, called Xiongan New Area, not a “city” as the title of the article falsely claims, with articles saying it “will eventually cover an area nearly three times that of New York.”¹⁷² The Xiongan New Area’s creation led to skyrocketing property prices. Already Xiongan is “attracting a stampede of dealmakers,” with “large-scale real estate development is strictly prohibited” inside the area, but is part of “a state-driven campaign to integrate the economy of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and ease congestion and pollution pressures in the Chinese capital.” However, this is still interconnected to the market, with Chinese regulators supporting “efforts by rental housing companies to convert idle commercial office buildings into rental homes and issue asset-backed securities,” tying into the overall market economy. As other reports noted, the “area will act as an important complement to Beijing, reducing congestion in the capital city as non-capital functions move southward” and said that it is “difficult to imagine that major relocation of Beijing’s non-capital functions will not generate its share of growing pains.” However, it may just turn into yet another ghost town which supports the “legitimate rights and interests of foreign enterprises.” The bourgeoisie will be smiling with glee over these plans, as they will benefit while the Chinese proletariat are displaced!

171 Liu He, “[3 critical battles China is preparing to fight](#),” *World Economic Forum*, Jan 24, 2018.

172 Tom Philips, “[China plans to build new city nearly three times the size of New York](#),” *The Guardian*, Apr 4, 2017; “China’s \$290 Billion Dream to Make Backwater a New Shenzhen,” *Bloomberg News*, Apr 12, 2017; “China’s state council approves Xiongan development plan – Xinhua,” *Reuters*, Apr 20, 2018; Yawen Chen and Ryan Woo, “China unveils fresh measures to boost rental housing, pave way for REITs,” *Reuters*, Apr 25, 2018; Sara Hsu, “China Hopes Xiongan New Area Will Relieve Pressure On Congested Beijing,” *Forbes*, Apr 9, 2017; Scott Cendrowski, “China’s Newly Imagined ‘Green’ City Gets Its First \$19 Billion in Funding,” *Fortune*, Apr 28, 2017; “China Targets 100% Clean Power for Area Near Beijing,” *Bloomberg News*, Apr 23, 2018; Krutika Pathi, “[Is China’s Latest Major Construction Project Destined to Be a Ghost Town?](#),” *City Lab*, May 1, 2017; “[Measures for the Administration on the Establishment of Partnership Business by Foreign Enterprises or Individuals in China](#),” *Xiongan, China*, Dec 17, 2017; “[China to create Xiongan New Area in Hebei](#),” *Xiongan, China*, Apr 1, 2017.

We then move forward to yet another article from *The Guardian* in 2006 about China's supposed "powerhouse vision for 2050."¹⁷³ It declared that this vision is that by 2050, "China will have eradicated poverty, established itself as a world power in science and lifted the average lifespan of its billion-plus citizens to 80 years," ambitious plans as a fear is rising that "Beijing is emerging as a military rival to the US and an environmental menace to the planet." The article goes on to say that "there are still more than 80 million living below the government's poverty line," claims that by 2050, "half the population...will own their own car and be able to afford overseas travel," and notes that the authors of the study "admit the targets will be hard to achieve." Some of the authors "warned of problems emerging along with changing life styles and expectations." The article also said that China "announced plans to boost investment in clean energy and nuclear power along with 14 other areas of scientific research," that "in the military field, it called for increased spending," with the Pentagon singling out "China as the only country with the capability to emerge as a military rival." As MIM (Prisons) noted, rightly, at the current time, China is outgrowing its ability to uphold its non-interventionist line and has more of a need than effort "export finance capital and dump overproduced commodities in foreign markets," a sign it is an imperialist country, adding that "selling stocks, massive profits and giant corporations conquering the world" are not socialist principles by any means, although some think they are!¹⁷⁴ This is buttressed by a recent call by AmCham China for a "level playing field and reciprocal treatment to improve market access in China." China will likely honor such efforts, working to reduce the advantage domestic capitalists hold there today. Furthermore, considering China's position in the world today, it is evident that even if these goals were accomplished by 2050, which is unlikely, the Chinese proletariat will still be suffering. As such, this plan does not "prove" that China is "socialist" but rather that it is trying to ameliorate possible social conflict.

173 Jonathan Watts, "[China's powerhouse vision for 2050](#)," *The Guardian*, Feb 6, 2006.

174 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), "[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#)," *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017; "[Chairman's Call for Action](#)," *AmCham China*, Apr 17, 2018.

The next article is from the horrid liberal journal, *The Atlantic*.¹⁷⁵ They write that “China's growth "model" has shown impressive resilience in recent years,” noting that in January 2009 premier Wen Jiabao told the World Economic Forum “that the West was squarely to blame for the meltdown roiling the entire world.” The article goes onto say that “five years earlier, such a broadside from a Chinese leader would have been unthinkable” with China using its “soft power to reassure its Asian neighbors and expand its influence in regions like Africa and Latin America” from the 1990s into the early 2000s, but until late 2007, “nearly every top Chinese official still lived by Deng Xiaoping's old advice to build China's strength while maintaining a low profile in international affairs.” The global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 changed this, with China surfing “through the downturn virtually unscathed, though Beijing did implement its own large stimulus package, worth roughly \$600 billion” and in 2010 the Chinese were hunting “for distressed Western assets they could buy up on the cheap” at Davos. The article went onto say that “John Williamson, the economist who originally coined the term "Washington Consensus," admitted” in 2012 that “the Beijing Consensus appeared to be gaining ground rapidly, at the expense of the Washington Consensus.” The article goes onto say that “Chinese leaders began to more explicitly promote their authoritarian capitalist model of development” with China offering, the article claimed, “a viable alternative to the leading democracies.” It also says that the China model of development “builds on earlier, state-centered Asian models of development such as in South Korea and Taiwan,” while taking steps “to ensure that the Communist Party remains central to economic and political policy-making,” with a “hybrid form of capitalism.” The article says that “when Beijing wants to increase investments in strategically important nations...it can put pressure on China's major banks, all of which are linked to the state, to boost lending to Chinese companies operating in those nations.” The article goes onto say that China “sees commerce as a means to promote national interests, and not just to empower (and potentially to make wealthy) individuals,”

175 Joshua Kurlantzick, “[Why the 'China Model' Isn't Going Away](#),” *The Atlantic*, Mar 21, 2013.

adding that China is looking to reclaim “its position as a major world power” with “newfound confidence.” Later on, the article noted that “Beijing has become more forceful in dealing with Washington” that China from 2010-2012, “surprised its neighbors by stepping up its demands for large swaths of the South China Sea, other contested waters, and regions along its disputed land borders,” and continues it “increasingly assertive Chinese diplomacy.” However, the article admits that Chinese leadership “recognizes that it cannot challenge American military power, at least not anytime soon,” that China remains “decades from challenging the Pentagon,” adding that “Beijing also has built close political party-to-political party ties with several other developing nations.” The article also said that the “efforts to promote a China model of undemocratic development build on a decade-long effort by Beijing to amass soft power in the developing world,” also noting that “China has set up networks of formal and informal summits with other developing nations...Beijing's model of development [is] more attractive to leaders even in freer nations,” and that as “China has gained a larger presence in nations like Venezuela, Chavez increasingly sent top diplomats and bureaucrats to Beijing.” The article ended by saying that “across Southeast Asia, in fact, China's model has gained considerable acclaim...China's gravitational pull and its soft power have had an influence on democracies...China has seen relative success in its attempt to quietly impart its model of development to other nations.”

With this, it is worth making a number of comments. You can say, with validity, that China’s “drive to export capital” in the form of FDI, “which repatriates profits to China, is a key characteristic of an imperialist country,” while the BRICS has become a group of “imperialist/aspiring imperialist countries,” with MIM (Prisons) writing about the resistance in Africa to China, adding that there is an “irreconcilable contradiction developing within Chinese imperialism with its client nations.”¹⁷⁶ There is more than this. China wants to have a region of influence, even asserted by those who say that Juche Korea is not a socialist country. Furthermore, the state’s ability to “meet economic demands due

¹⁷⁶ Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017; “[Why There Is No Socialist Country Nowadays?](#),” *Servir ao Povo de Todo Coração*, Jan 13, 2016.

to the global recession and its underlying crisis of reproduction” increased with the financial crisis in 2011, with local governments “desperately selling villagers’ collectively-owned land in order to pay off debt for stimulus spending.” During China’s reintegration into the world market in the 1990s, these privatized enterprises on the local level “became the initial vehicle through which Chinese and transnational capital exploited local and migrant peasant-workers—the vehicle of their expropriation often becoming the source of their exploitation”!¹⁷⁷ Add to this what Filipino Communist organizers said in 2014: that “China’s claim over 80% of the South China Sea is like Italy claiming ownership of all lands under the Roman empire. We extend our solidarity with the oppressed Chinese peoples who suffer under a bureaucrat capitalist government.” You can disagree with their assessment, but such a grab over the South China Sea should be undoubtedly condemned. Otherwise, in response to *The Atlantic* article, China is pursuing a nationalist policy with no element of proletarian internationalism.

The article following this is from *The Guardian* in 2011.¹⁷⁸ It declares that “China has leapfrogged Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy,” adding that senior Japanese “political figures have been speaking of China’s performance in glowing terms.” After this is a comment that “China is the world’s largest car market and the biggest energy consumer,” that “Chinese incomes are rising,” that “Japan now exports more goods to China than to any other country.” I’m not sure how this, in any way, shape or form, “proves” revisionist arguments. In fact, it just says that Japanese capitalists would be interested in the Chinese market, and would, by extension, link with Chinese capitalists. That shows the reality of such revisionism, beyond anything else.

The next article is an opinion piece in *The Guardian* by Seumas Milne in 2012.¹⁷⁹ He notes that that European Union has engaged in a “fruitless attempt to convince China to use some of its colossal

177 “[Gleaning the Welfare Fields](#),” *Chuang*, 2017; George P. Moya, “[Philippine Left slams China’s ‘imperialist incursions’](#),” *Rappler*, Apr 22, 2014.

178 Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, “[China overtakes Japan as world’s second-largest economy](#),” *The Guardian*, Feb 14, 2011, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

179 Seumas Milne, “[China’s success challenges a failed economic consensus](#),” *The Guardian*, Jan 17, 2012.

reserves to back the eurozone's bailout fund,” adding that “it's a commonplace that China is the world's emerging economic giant,” adding that, quoting annoying John Ross again, “China has a strong record of absorbing bad loans...and is cushioned from the collapse in western demand.” The article also declares that during the financial crisis “the Chinese government was able to use its ownership and control of the banks and large state companies to increase lending and investment,” while also saying that “China has travelled a vast distance from the socialised economy of the Maoist period and has a huge private sector and large-scale foreign investment” and says that “China's success represents a global opportunity.” It is here that some comments are warranted. The China model, if we want to call it that, is gaining more ascendancy. However, it is not necessarily socialist. As noted in their April 2015 report, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), a professional services network, noted that “SOEs are an influential and growing force globally,” driven by growth among Chinese SOEs, becoming some of the biggest companies in the world, with China “alone accounting for more than 10% of the world’s merchandise exports in 2010.”¹⁸⁰ Later on the report, they summarized Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s remarks on the ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy as a method designed to “help Chinese SOEs compete more effectively in overseas markets as well as to improve their high-end export capability” with measures including “easing of red tape, introduction of market practices, and consolidation of selected SOEs to create larger and more efficient national champions.” This would also be coupled with SOEs being “granted increased decision-making authority over resource allocation, including cross-border mergers and overseas acquisitions.” Saying all this, it is no surprise that PWC has a contact for “government and public services territories” in China. As such, these SOEs are basically for-profit entities, but run by the state, meaning they still run on capitalist principles, without a doubt.

Related to this is an article in *China Daily*, quoting a “leading Australian economist” named James Laurenceson on China itself. The article quotes Laurenceson as saying that China’s economic

¹⁸⁰ PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), “[State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for public value creation?](#),” Apr 2015, accessed Apr 25, 2018, pp 6, 9, 12, 44.

outlook is positive, also quoting him as saying that “China's economy is still growing at a pretty rapid rate and it is on target to double GDP (gross domestic product) by 2020,” adding that five years ago, there was “a lot of talk about free market reforms and letting the market play a more decisive role in allocating resources in the Chinese economy. Overall I think it has gone to plan.”¹⁸¹ He was also quoted as saying that “right now consumer confidence in China is at a multi-year high, so I am not seeing any hard-landing scenario for China's economy. Chinese businesses are pretty positive as well...China is demanding more of Australia's natural resources than ever before, that demand hasn't dried up...we are seeing new opportunities for Australian companies to open up as well.” It also quotes Laurenceson as saying that “the reality is that in many sectors of the economy, e-commerce for example, China is leading the world in those areas, it's not catching up anymore...productivity growth in China is continuing and for the long run that leaves me to feel pretty confident, even though there may be some ups and downs in between.” Taking from this, it means that the Australian bourgeoisie are benefiting from having access to the Chinese market, and the Chinese bourgeoisie benefiting from access to the Australian market. This exchange is rooted in the continuation of “market-oriented economic development” since 1978, with China, since the early 1990s, increasing “global outreach and participation in international organizations.”¹⁸²

Following this is another article in *China Daily*, focusing on growth of the Chinese middle class. It declares that “China's middle class is expanding at an unprecedented pace.”¹⁸³ The article also says that “nearly 400 million people...are considered...middle-class category,” quoting one study, adding later that “the country's new middle class...are able and willing to pay a premium for quality and consider buying discretionary goods,” quoting another study. Beyond this, the article talks about brand loyalty among this middle class, but an attitude toward brands changing from “more blatant status

181 “[China's economic outlook 'very positive' ahead of CPC congress: economist](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from Xinhua), Sept 22, 2017, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

182 CIA, entry for “China” on *The World Factbook*, accessed Apr 17, 2018.

183 He Wei, “[Growth of middle class means major changes for China](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 2, 2017.

projection to more substance-driven.” The article goes on to say that such middle class consumers are “more than ever seeking emotional satisfaction through better taste or higher status.” It also says that these consumers “tend to place health high up the ladder of priorities,” with many of them also setting “aside money in their budgets for sports apparel, workout facilities and organic food.” Such consumers are also, the article remarks, “most earnest to embrace digital wallets” and well-receive “newsfeeds provided by brands via mobile communication platforms,” with some quoted as saying there is a shift of “success from money, power and social status, to the pursuit of well-being and personal realization.” This progress comes at a cost: China had transitioned from what the CIA declares is a “closed, centrally planned system” in the Maoist era, to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role, beginning in 1978, with such “reforms” including “phaseout of collectivized agriculture...gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, growth of the private sector, development of stock markets and a modern banking system, and opening to foreign trade and investment.”¹⁸⁴ Additionally, China has been trying to facilitate “higher-wage job opportunities for the aspiring middle class, including rural migrants and college graduates, while maintaining competitiveness” while at the same time China has become “most rapidly aging countries in the world” thanks to the failed one-child policy, coupled with “deterioration in the environment” and continuing its “Supply-Side Structural Reform agenda, first announced in late 2015.” The “prosperity” and “good times” of the middle class is connected to market approaches, with Zhang Liquan, a macroeconomic researcher of Development Research Center of the State Council saying that “currently, large amounts of private capital cannot find suitable investment channels. As long as the government provides fair opportunities and creates a favorable market environment, financial resources will be able to play a useful role in liberating all levels of social forces.”¹⁸⁵ This “liberation” is of an undeniably capitalist variety, a horrible circumstance for the Chinese proletariat!

184 CIA, entry for “China” on *The World Factbook*, accessed Apr 17, 2018.

185 “[Three big concerns around China’s new urbanization plan](#),” *Qiushi* (reprinted from *People’s Daily*), Jan 6, 2014.

This leads us to an article in *Xinhua*.¹⁸⁶ It declares that “economic restructuring is bearing fruit and leading to stable and quality growth,” adding that “Western provinces and regions such as Tibet, Guizhou, Yunnan, Ningxia, Sichuan and Shaanxi have stayed in the top ten fastest-growing regional economies in China.” It also says that “Apple Inc. is expected to set up a Chinese data center, costing 1 billion dollars, in Guizhou,” going onto say that “though the regional data shows key economic drivers are still strong enough, many warn of uncertainty.” So, this is only partially optimistic. It is evident who this growth will benefit, foreign and domestic capitalists, and other elements of the private sector in China while China’s central bank tries to maintain Chinese capitalism from collapsing on itself by “controlling” financial risk, as written about in other *Xinhua* articles.¹⁸⁷

With this, we move onto another article, this one in *China Daily*. This article asserts that “China's non-manufacturing sector expanded at the fastest pace since June 2014 in September,” quoting NBS senior statistician Zhao Qinghe as saying that “the growth momentum for the non-manufacturing sector has become stronger,” and also noting that “sub-indices rose across the board, including those for sales prices, employees and export orders.”¹⁸⁸ Again, this does not prove the “socialist” character of the economy. In fact, it aligns with another *Qiushi* article, focusing on the Eleventh Five-Year “Plan”, saying that “development of underdeveloped areas should be accelerated by taking advantage of market forces and mechanisms for cooperation, mutual assistance and support” and that by “drawing on market forces, central and western regions took steps to improve their investment climate.”¹⁸⁹ This same article declared that “market forces have become the main driving force behind the balancing of regional development.” Again, the evidence that China is on the capitalist road is abundantly clear.

186 “[China Focus: Economic restructuring leading to quality growth in China](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 8, 2017.

187 “[Economic Watch: Foreign firms ride China's 'new economy'](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 3, 2017; “[Economic Watch: China's private sector regains strength on optimistic economic outlook](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 1, 2017; “[Economic Watch: China strives to reduce financial risk](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 3, 2017.

188 “[China's non-manufacturing sector expands at faster pace](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 30, 2017.

189 Zheng Xinli, “[The Eleventh Five-Year Plan: Turning Crisis into Opportunity and Forging Ahead](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.2 Apr 1, 2011, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

Having addressed this, it is worth countering another article in *China Daily*.¹⁹⁰ This focuses on the “achievements” under Xi: increased GDP growth, higher contribution to world economic growth, higher GDP per capita, higher gross national income per capita, a growing service industry, higher final consumption, and more research and development. It also says his “achievements” include lower energy and water use per GDP, more permanent urban residents, less rural people in poverty, higher grain production, and more railways (and high-speed rail). All of this is a bit superficial, allowing people to throw “facts” at those who disagree. It does not acknowledge that the income gap between urban and rural China is larger than it ever has been in the past, with inequality across China “primarily due to rising income dispersion within both urban and rural China” with declines for the “income share of the bottom 50%” between 1978 and 2015, in rural and urban areas!¹⁹¹ Additionally, it does not account for the continuing air pollution from reliance on coal, producing acid rain, “water shortages, water pollution from untreated wastes,” coastal destruction from “land reclamation, industrial development, and aquaculture,” increased “deforestation and habitat destruction...poor land management” and continued “trade in endangered species.” As was noted earlier, GDP does not take into account environmental destruction, one of its many flaws, as a measure of social “progress.”

With this, we move to a *Xinhua* article, declaring that China is addressing “industrial overcapacity.”¹⁹² It claimed that the “phasing out of sub-standard production capacity will continue, especially steel and iron, coal-mining and coal-fired power plants,” saying that “excess capacity has weighed on China's overall economic performance,” and adding that “while the government scored an initial win, there were a few setbacks and the battle is far from over.” What is next, the Chinese government claims, is running up against waning “enthusiasm for the drive...with rising demand for

190 “[Major economic achievements under Xi’s leadership](#),” *China Daily*, 2016.

191 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, p 29. The later sentence comes from CIA, entry for “China” on *The World Factbook*, but these problems have also been documented in other sources, without a doubt, as revisionists can’t even deny.

192 “[Economic Watch: China determined to push capacity-cut drive](#),” *Xinhua*, May 5, 2017.

steel and coal, difficulty in relocating former employees and digesting the debt,” and noting that “some firms could just halt production temporarily to meet their assigned tasks, instead of seriously eliminating capacity.” The article still says that “the government is well aware of the situation [business has to face] and is committed to allowing the market more say, with the responsibilities of the government and the market more clearly defined” and admitted that “capacity cuts also mean that less taxes are collected by local authorities -- resulting in job losses across the board,” further claiming that “China plans to assist 500,000 workers made redundant during its capacity cuts in steel and coal sectors this year.” So this isn’t something which should be accepted without much thought. It easily fits into efforts to make the Chinese capitalist model more lasting, including to strengthen profit-driven SOEs. It is a model where “China's exchange rate is determined by fiat rather than by market forces” but “capitalist elements were developing, like...in the Soviet Union” after Stalin’s death in 1953, and does not restrict bourgeois rights, rather expanding them in the name of “progress”!¹⁹³

With this addressed, we move onto yet another *Xinhua* article. This article focuses on the “development path” of China.¹⁹⁴ It declares that China “has scored tremendous achievements and is on the right development path toward the future,” further saying that “reform has been a main keyword of China's economic policy for decades, and in recent years it has been assigned even higher priority,” with the CPC even creating the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform, an institution chaired by Xi, “tasked with steering forward China's reform endeavors.” Reforms that are to be considered include further “supply-side structural reform,” shifting the focus from demand to supply, coupled with “corresponding monetary, financial and fiscal reforms” and continuing its “competitiveness.” The article went onto say that “China can continuously infuse new vigor into the

193 Workers Viewpoint Organization, “[Chairman Mao, Live Like Him, Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win!](#),” *Workers Viewpoint*, Vol. 2, No. 9, October 1977, at commemoration of Mao on Sept 10, 1977; CIA, entry for “China” on *The World Factbook*, accessed Apr 17, 2018; “[Economic Watch: China's central SOEs continue efforts to cut overcapacity](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 20, 2017.

194 “[Spotlight: Chinese economy on right development path under CPC leadership](#),” *Xinhua*, Jun 11, 2017.

world economic development, offsetting the headwinds from Washington.” Such a press release on behalf of the revisionists is typical of *Xinhua*. The groups within the CPC which theorized how to continue the horrid reforms, advocated for reforming “state and local taxation systems,” forming a “market supervision law enforcement team...[and] a cultural market law enforcement team,” posed a plan for “deepening reform and opening-up in pilot free trade zones in Guangdong, Tianjin and Fujian,” put forward a document “establishing a mechanism for China's participation in international macro-economic policy coordination to improve international economic governance structure” and put forward a document “on wage reform in state-owned enterprises,” all elements, among others, that benefit the Chinese bourgeoisie and strengthen the Chinese form of capitalism.¹⁹⁵ These themes have also been echoed in previous years.

The next article comes from what some call the unofficial mouthpiece of the US State Department, *Foreign Affairs* by Hu Angang.¹⁹⁶ Since I cannot read the full article without registering for *Foreign Affairs*, which I will not do, I will address the parts which can be read freely and available online. The article begins by saying that “it is clear by now that China’s economy is set to slow in the years to come, although economists disagree about how much and for how long” and some economists “are skeptical about the country’s prospects.” It goes on to say that “China is not nearing the edge of a cliff; it is entering a new stage of development, meaning, for the rest of the world, The rest of the world, China becoming “further integrated into the global economy.” It is here that Angang writes that

195 “[CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions](#),” *Xinhua*, Mar 22, 2018; Zhang Yunbi, “[Leading Group's focus is to deepen reform](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 17, 2017; “[Xi presides over 1st meeting of central committee for deepening overall reform](#),” Mar 28, 2018; “[CPC releases plan on deepening reform of Party and state institutions](#),” *Xinhua*, Mar 21, 2018; “[Xi presides over 1st meeting of central committee for deepening overall reform](#),” *Xinhua*, Mar 29, 2018; “[Committee preparing to deepen reform](#),” *China Daily*, Mar 29, 2018; “[Leading Group's focus is to deepen reform](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 17, 2017; “[Xi's reform methods](#),” *China Daily*, May 27, 2017. The Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform, within the CPC, set up another institution called the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform, which just began meeting this year. The former group, headed by Xi, “was established on Dec 30, 2013” and since then “it has convened 38 meetings and approved more than 300 documents.”

196 Hu Angang, “[Embracing China's "New Normal"](#),” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2015. I also [used Questia](#) to have a longer excerpt of the article itself since [Google Cache](#) and [other sources](#) gave me similar results. [Other](#) summaries of the article are also of no help.

“the Chinese century is not at the beginning of the end; it is at the end of the beginning.” He further declares that “China’s rise has also brought massive benefits to the country’s population, although here there is obviously much more to be done.” Even with this excerpt, you can see a distortion of the reality, apart from accepting that China will be further integrated into the global capitalist system. For one, while the “bottom 50% also benefited enormously from growth” from 1978 to 2015, the “top 1% income share rose from 6% to 14% in China,” which is less than the US, but still unequal. At the same time, the amount of national wealth that is public has decreased: in 1978 “about 70% of national wealth was public and 30% private” while in 2015 this was reversed, with “30% of national wealth is public and 70% private.”¹⁹⁷ This led bourgeois scholars to declare that “China used to be a communist country and is now a mixed economy” although I would say it is on the capitalist road, not with this bourgeois terminology of “mixed economy,” with its own form of capitalism. Furthermore, I’d add that revisionist China has led to a situation where “differences between socialism and capitalism,” are brushed away, which is false since “socialism and capitalism are diametrically opposed to each other,” with advocacy for a “capitalist line,” not a socialist line, just as Mao described them in the past when he fought to keep the revisionists from power.¹⁹⁸

With this we move to yet another article from the revisionist website, *Learning from China*. It says, rightly that “recent discussion in China rightly emphasises [sic] that GDP growth is not the objective of national and social development – economic development is simply the means to achieve other ends of national rejuvenation and human well-being.”¹⁹⁹ The article goes on to say that “the new attempt to ‘bad mouth’ China is to claim that China’s social and environmental situation is negative,” basically saying this is wrong, claiming that the “reality is the exact opposite to such claims” and that

197 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 21, 30, 31.

198 Chin Chih-po, “[Denial of the Difference Between Socialism and Capitalism Is Not Allowed](#)—Repudiating the theme about “white cat, black cat,”” *Peking Review*, #16, April 16, 1976, pp. 18-21.

199 “[Economic Growth and Human Well Being – The Example of China](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

there is positive social development. The article does onto say that “China’s goal is the achievement of a high-income society,” claiming that “China’s growth in the 39 years since the 1978 economic reforms is the fastest sustained economic growth by a major economy in world history,” and after going into what type of data is “right” (and what is “wrong”), still using per capita GDP as a measurement (in comparison with life expectancy)! The article gets worse from here. It claims that “China’s position is better than would be predicted by its level of economic development, i.e. its per capita GDP,” also saying that “China’s social and environmental conditions is clearly positive,” that “China has a significantly higher life expectancy than would be expected from its level of economic development – indicating that the overall effects of social and environmental factors in China are better.” Even worse is the declaration that “China’s social indicators in global comparisons are higher than its economic ones... This naturally does not mean there are not real problems, as with pollution, but that the balance of social benefits and negatives is clearly and strikingly positive in relation to China’s level of economic development.” This is laughable. Why should we trust bourgeois indicators like GDP per capita? The modern conception of GDP was developed by Simon Kuznets in 1934 as part of a report to the US Congress, with predecessors relating to feuding landlords and inter-capitalist warfare.²⁰⁰ Kuznets warned against its use as a measure of social welfare, but it became the primary instrument to measure the economy of a country after the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. As such, with this reality, the argument is utterly flawed. GDP per capita is not much better than other forms of GDP, taking the GDP of a country and “divides it by the number of people in that country,” with claims that a rise in this factor “signals growth in the economy and tends to reflect an increase in productivity.”²⁰¹ However, with China having such a large population, the concept of GDP loses its value!

200 Dianne Coyle, “[Warfare and the Invention of GDP](#),” *The Globalist*, Apr 6, 2014; “[Petty impressive](#),” *The Economist*, Dec 21, 2013; Elizabeth Dickenson, “[GDP: a brief history](#),” *Foreign Policy*, Jan 3, 2011; Simon Kuznets, “[National Income, 1929-1932](#),” see pages 5 to 7, where he posed it, even though he didn’t call it gross domestic product persay.

201 “[Per Capita GDP](#),” *Investopedia*, accessed Apr 15, 2018. An alternate measurement is gross national product (GNP), also called gross national income (GNI), but [some](#) have also questioned this measurement as well. Types of GDP include GDP per capita, GDP (PPP), and nominal GDP (usually just used as GDP for short).

With that finished, we move onto another article from *Learning from China*. This article says that China has had the “greatest economic growth” in all of human history, which seems doubtful considering the so-called “Golden Age of Capitalism” from 1950 to 1970 (1973 at most) with OECD countries experiencing real GDP growth which averaged from 3-5% a year, depending on the decade the growth was occurring and a time of reported “financial stability.”²⁰² It claims that “despite increasing media reporting on China’s economy there is still a fundamental underestimation of the sheer scale of China’s economic growth” (not true), further saying that the “simplest and clearest gauge of the historically unparalleled scale of China’s economic achievement is the number of people directly benefitting...[is measured] as a proportion of the world’s population,” claiming that since “no other economy commencing sustained rapid economic growth approaches the 22% of the world’s population in China in 1978 at the beginning of its economic reform” that “China’s economic achievement” should be lauded, an absurdist and reductionist argument. It further uses GDP as a measurement, despite its fundamental problems, like shortcomings when it comes to social welfare, and seen by more and ore as “an inaccurate and misleading gauge of prosperity.”²⁰³ Why can’t this revisionist writer realize their error in picking GDP as a measurement?

Even worse is an article from *Learning from China*, with bourgeois economist John Ross making a reappearance. It spreads the myth that China is open and socialist, which is wrong because while the country is open, it is not socialist at all.²⁰⁴ Ross then declares that “China’s socialist development strategy is the world’s most effective economic development ‘model’ – far more than any capitalist one...the central point of reference and study for global development strategy should be China

202 “[China is \[has\] the Greatest Economic Growth in Human History](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 25, 2018; Marglin, Stephen A.; Schor, Juliet B, *The Golden Age of Capitalism*, Clarendon Press, p. 1; Skidelsky, Robert (2009), *Keynes: The Return of the Master*. Allen Lane, pp. 116, 126; Wolf, Martin (2009), "3". *Fixing Global Finance*. Yale University Press, p. 31. An adaption of this article is “[Why China’s Achievements Are Even Greater Than Its Economic Ones](#)” so it is not addressed in this publication.

203 Jeroen van den Bergh, “[The virtues of ignoring GDP](#),” *The Broker*, Apr 13, 2010; Joe Gartner, “[The Rise and Fall of the G.D.P.](#),” *New York Times Magazine*, May 16, 2010.

204 John Ross, “[China Grew Fast Because It Was Open & Socialist, Not Closed & Capitalist](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

and its socialist development strategy – not the Washington Consensus or any capitalist model,” further claiming that “the overwhelming success of China’s development strategy in global comparisons was because it was open and socialist ‘with Chinese characteristics’ not closed and capitalist.” This has been partially addressed before, but it is worth addressing it once more. For one, he is forgetting that is a rich history of possible models which are not “the Washington Consensus or any capitalist model” whether this is the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953, Maoist China from 1949 to 1978, or any of the other past socialist countries (not the revisionist ones). The reality of the Chinese model is clear to any who can see the reality and not look through rose-tinted glasses. For one “agricultural land used to account for almost half of total wealth in 1978” but now it “accounts for less than a tenth” while “housing and other domestic capital (buildings, equipment, machinery, patents, etc., used by corporations, public administrations, and households) increased enormously, both in shares and in levels” and net foreign assets became “a significant addition to China’s national wealth since the mid-2000s.”²⁰⁵ Secondly, “private wealth was relatively small in 1978 (about 100% of national income)” and by 2015 it represented “over 450% of national income” while “public wealth...remained roughly stable around 250% of national income,” meaning that the share of public wealth is less a factor than it once was. Its all about the market in China, no matter how much they use the word “socialist.”

In another article in *Learning from China*, revisionist John Ross tried to get the “upper hand” by talking about China’s “wealth.”²⁰⁶ It begins by declaring that “one of the biggest myths about China's economic growth...is that it is primarily due to massive inputs of labour,” saying that “China's very rapid growth is overwhelmingly due to its very high rate of investment and very high rate of productivity growth.” Basically this damns the Chinese proletariat and says, if you use the “right” analysis, that China’s growth is due to market methods, a disgusting comment, as the Chinese

205 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, p 20.

206 John Ross, “[Why China Will Grow Rich Long Before It Grows Old](#),” *Learning from China*, Dec 2013.

proletariat as seen as almost toilet paper by such a revisionist writer. He further claims that the “increase in labour supply played a small role in China’s economic growth...capital investment, not labour supply, is the biggest factor in economic growth both globally and in China.” Even worse than such a capitalist statement, since “growth” in China benefits a bourgeoisie because the “capital investment” comes from this social class. He further claims that “there is no reason why China's economy should slow significantly because China's working age population stopped growing in 2012,” not realizing this could cause a number of problems in society itself! He also uses the faulty GDP measurement, rather than size of the Chinese labor force as a whole, which is available online. He has to admit however that “economic problems are created by China's aging population,” revealing a problem of the Western-inspired and failed one-child policy.” He ends by saying that “provided the correct policies are pursued, China will certainly become rich before it becomes old.” But the question that arises from this is who will become rich? As a recent study pointed out, the top 10% (106 million adults) garners “more than 40% (4 times 10%) of total income” than the bottom 50% (530 million adults) in China itself!²⁰⁷ This is a sign of deep-seated inequality. Any other comments about labor will we will noted in a later section of this article.

John Ross rears his head once more on *Learning from China*.²⁰⁸ He declares that if China achieves supposed “moderate prosperity” by 2012, “China will have overtaken almost every developing country. Its level of economic development will have become higher than several countries in Eastern Europe.” He then recounts that “from 1949 to 1978 China achieved a “‘social miracle’ without precedent in world history...There has never been such a sustained rapid increase in life expectancy in any other major country in human history.” But, that is chucked away, as he devotes more energy to the revisionist effort, declaring that “after the 1978 ‘reform and opening up,’ as is well

207 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, p 27.

208 John Ross, “[What China Achieving ‘Moderate Prosperity’ Means for Itself and the World](#),” *Learning from China*, 2016

known, China's economic growth became the world's highest...The result was the dramatic continuing rise in China's relative position in terms of world economic development.” He further claims that “China's relative position in the world at the beginning of "reform and opening up" was low,” says that by 2016, “due to rapid economic development, China's situation was entirely transformed” and also claims that “from 2017-2020, the final period during which China projects "relative prosperity" to be achieved, economic projections must be made.” He ends by saying that “as China has 19 percent of the world's population, quite literally never in human history has anything approaching such a large proportion of the world's population had its conditions of life improved so rapidly. That will be the astonishing measure of China's success in achieving "moderate prosperity" - it is, without comparison, literally the greatest economic achievement in human history.” Such comments are based on his support of the “success” of these policies. It seems evident that he forgets that “95% of the housing stock is now privately owned, against 50% in 1978,” the public share of domestic capital had declined, and the “ownership of domestic equities (traded and non-traded),” increased from negligible private ownership of about 5% in 1978 to 30% in 2015.²⁰⁹ It is also worth noting that the sharp increase in China’s national wealth-national income ratio can possibly be explained by “high Chinese saving rates...rise of equity and housing prices, above and beyond the rise in consumer prices...rise in relative asset prices can itself be accounted for by a series of factors” which includes a “high demand for housing assets by Chinese households...[and] changes in the legal system that reinforced private property rights: lifting of rent control, changes in the relative power of landlords and tenants, changes in the relative power of shareholder and workers.” While these bourgeois economists don’t say this, the reality is evident: such efforts benefited the Chinese bourgeoisie and dissipated the power of the Chinese proletariat which benefited from what Ross called a “social miracle” in his ignorant class collaborationist approach, with no understanding of Marxism.

209 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 21, 24.

There are two final articles. The first is one that declares that China's economy is growing three times faster than the US.²¹⁰ It begins by talking about publication of US and Chinese GDP figures, saying that there is "much faster growth in China" than in the US, and focusing on varied other topics, such as the reality of US economic growth using available statistics. This follows the fallacy that economic growth means prosperity for all, something which is absurd, especially with a capitalist model in China, which benefits some (the bourgeoisie) more than others (the proletariat).

The second article is a link to the 13th Five-Year Plan, which numbers 219 pages.²¹¹ Some will try to say this a remnant of the government planning in China, but since the economy is now a market economy, not a planned economy, as noted earlier in this publication, it is more of a guide for state action, as it is not part of planned economic structure. Moving apart from the socially democratic pleasantries, the document talks about "major progress" achieved through "economic structural adjustment," says that China will open itself more to the world, and making China part of corporate globalization. It also focuses on "improving" the market economy, notes that "Deng Xioping Theory" is still part of the guiding thought of the Chinese leadership, emphasize further "economic structural reform," grow the country's service sector, improve corporate performance, and strengthen the Chinese military. That's not all. This document declares that China's hard power should be improved, while its soft power should be improved, emphasize the role of state & private enterprises in "innovation," put forward efforts to allow more people to start businesses (clearly capitalist thinking), give capitalists more of a say in scientific development, and strengthen incentives for investors. This document goes onto say that China will work to remain "competitive" within the global capitalist system, develop ways to improve consumption (by the middle class), encourage further investment in China by capitalists, and improving corporate governance of SOEs, all which will benefit the bourgeoisie!

210 John Ross, "[China's Economy is Growing Three Times as Fast as the US](#)," *Learning from China*, 2017.

211 "[The 13th Five Year Plan: For Economic And Social Development Of The People's Republic Of China \(2016-2020\)](#)," Central Compilation and Translation Press, accessed Apr 25, 2018.

China, the environment, and the West

This section of the /r/swcc document only has eight links. But, the environment in relation to China's capitalist model is worth discussing in some length.

The first article comes from *Workers World*.²¹² In it, Deirdre Griswold writes about an agreement between “China and Britain’s Conservative Party government” in which China “will participate in the building of nuclear reactors in England,” with construction specifically by the Chinese SOE, China General Nuclear Power Corp., “giving China a 33.5 percent interest in the plant.” However, he notes this is a problem because “Britain has not built a new nuclear power plant since 1995” even though its “aging nuclear infrastructure contributes almost 20 percent of the country’s electric power.” He adds that as many are trying to find alternatives to fossil fuels, they may see that “nuclear plants produce no carbon dioxide (CO2),” and thinking that “the energy in the atom could be a virtually unlimited source of electric power,” which has been used for many wartime purposes. The article also says that there were “many inherent problems in the first two generations of nuclear plants,” that a major issue with such energy is “what to do with the radioactive waste products.” He adds to this by saying that “the problem of what to do with radioactive waste continues to be a huge barrier to the use of nuclear energy...China gets most of its electric power from coal and has a very serious air-pollution problem. At present, it has 28 nuclear power reactors in operation, 23 under construction, and more about to start construction. Additional reactors are planned.” He ends by asking “what has transformed China, which was a war-torn, impoverished country at the time the U.S. dropped the first atomic bombs, into such a powerhouse for nuclear energy? And are there reasons to believe that its reactors will be safer than those of the past?” Based on China’s record, when it comes to other forms of pollution, the results will likely be negative for the Chinese masses. Already, the Chinese leadership only pledged a cleaner environment because of public outcry in 2013 and 2014, leading to a rash of

212 Deirdre Griswold, “[Global warming, nuclear power and China, Part 1](#),” *Workers World*, Oct 26, 2015.

environmental laws which are still on the books.²¹³ However, the “war” on such pollution is not going as well as revisionists would have you believe. They can declare that China is “now an advocate of cleaning up air, water and soil on a global scale,” citing the regulatory inspection teams in cities, but there are reports that smog is rebounding in the industry heartland of China while the air pollution in North China is getting worse and air quality in Beijing is reaching hazardous levels, which the Chinese regulators blame on the weather!²¹⁴ Additionally, natural gas producers are doing all they can to increase production, tapping more “unconventional gas resources,” since the Chinese government is moving to “ratchet up replacing coal with natural gas, to tackle chronic air pollution in major cities.”

Onto the issue of fracking, the process through which natural gas is extracted from the ground. There has undoubtedly been a focus by the Chinese leadership on increased fracking in China, leading some foreign companies to enter the fray, aiming to “produce 30 billion cubic meters of shale-gas a year” by 2020.²¹⁵ That means more poisoned groundwater, more water shortages, and yes, more pollution, with this supposed “bridge fuel.” Challenges remain ahead in using this method to “fight” pollution, with fracking “sweeping” into China, as one conservative website gloated. Even worse is the

213 Charles Riley, “China pledges to tackle pollution crisis,” *CNN*, Mar 5, 2013; Stephen Vines, “How will China deal with growing anger over pollution?,” *Al Jazeera English* opinion piece, Aug 1, 2014; [“Beijing Air Pollution Exposes China’s Health & Environment Risks,”](#) *Global Sherpa*, Jan 14, 2013; David Pettit, “China’s New Environmental Law and the U.S. Clean Air Act,” *NRDC*, Jul 7, 2014; [Environmental Laws of China](#), accessed Apr 26, 2018.

214 Eric Ng, [“China’s gas producers ready to boost supply for Beijing’s war on air pollution,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Apr 2, 2018; Jan van der Putten, “How China is confronting one of its biggest challenges: pollution,” *eyes on China*, Apr 5, 2018; Reuters, [“Signs of smog rebound in China’s heavy-industry heartland as winter cuts expire,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Apr 13, 2018; Mandy Zuo, [“Beijing air quality returns to hazardous levels as sandstorm, smog engulf city,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Mar 28, 2018; Liu Zhen, [“Beijing meets national air pollutant standard for first time,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Feb 7, 2018; Zhang Pinghui, [“From coal to cars: Beijing moves up a gear in the war against air pollution,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Feb 4, 2018; Reuters, [“Beijing slaps ban on winter construction in bid to improve air quality,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Sept 17, 2017; Mimi Lau, [“China to send over 100 pollution inspection teams to cities around Beijing,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Sept 16, 2017; Reuters, [“Air pollution getting worse in north China even as government tries to crack down,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, May 16, 2017.

215 Jaeah Lee and James West, [“America’s Fracking Boom Comes to China,”](#) *The Atlantic*, Sept 19, 2014; Sara Jloin, [“China’s shale ambition: 23 times the output in 5 years,”](#) *MarketWatch*, Feb 15, 2015; [“Oil companies begin ‘fracking’ in China’s most dangerous earthquake zone,”](#) *RT*, Dec 24, 2013; [“China and fracking,”](#) *SourceWatch*, accessed Apr 26, 2018; David Biello, [“Can Fracking Clean China’s Air and Slow Climate Change?,”](#) *Scientific American*, Jan 27, 2014; Jaeah Lee and James West, [“Deep Inside the Wild World of China’s Fracking Boom,”](#) *Mother Jones*, Sept/Oct 2014; Andrew Follett, [“Fracking Sweeps Into China,”](#) *The Daily Caller*, Apr 18, 2017; [“Sinopec leads China’s shale gas revolution with successful drilling,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Apr 14, 2014; AFP, [“Halliburton in fracking joint venture in China,”](#) *Yahoo! News*, Jul 11, 2014.

plan by Chinese capitalists to “build a petrochemical refining and storage hub along the Ohio River,” endangering all those who live in Appalachia!²¹⁶

We then move onto nuclear power. There is a clear boom in such energy generation and it is a key part of their “anti-pollution” energy transition.²¹⁷ As the World Nuclear Association recounted in their recent statistics, “mainland China has 38 nuclear power reactors in operation, about 20 under construction, and more about to start construction,’ adding that the “impetus for nuclear power in China is increasingly due to air pollution from coal-fired plants,” with much of China’s energy still produced from fossil fuels, while also noting even though China “has become largely self-sufficient in reactor design and construction...[it] is making full use of western technology while adapting and improving it.” Even worse is their declaration that “China’s policy is to ‘go global’ with exporting nuclear technology including heavy components in the supply chain”! They also go onto declare that that “nuclear power has an important role, especially in the coastal areas,” that nuclear plants can be built “close to centres of demand, whereas suitable wind and hydro sites are remote from demand,” while also pointing out that “moves to build nuclear power commenced in 1970 and about 2005 the industry moved into a rapid development phase.” Some, even advocates of nuclear power, note the limitations of this approach, saying that “even if every planned reactor in China was to be built, the country would still rely on burning coal for more than 50 percent of its electric power.”²¹⁸ Major problems include question of storage of radioactive waste, leading to protests in the past, the high cost for “construction of large nuclear power plants,” and seeming dismissal of safety controls during construction!

216 Steve Horn, “[China Is Financing a Petrochemical Hub in Appalachia. Meet its Powerful Backers](#),” *DeSmogBlog*, Feb 6, 2018, accessed Apr 26, 2018.

217 Shannon Tiezzi, “[China’s Coming Nuclear Power Boom](#),” *The Diplomat*, Apr 24, 2015; “[China’s nuclear growth](#),” *Nuclear Engineering International*, Jun 12, 2014; World Nuclear Assn., “[Nuclear Power In China](#),” April 2018.

218 David Biello, “[How Nuclear Power Can Stop Global Warming](#),” *Scientific American*, Dec 12, 2013; Emma Graham-Harrison, “[China warned over ‘insane’ plans for new nuclear power plants](#),” *The Guardian*, May 25, 2015; “[Nation’s increasing role in global nuclear power](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 8, 2013; Brian Hoe, “[Anti-Nuclear Protests in China?](#),” *New Bloom*, Aug 2016; “China Protest Forcing Nuclear Retreat Shows People Power,” *Bloomberg News*, Jul 15, 2013; “[We know about Fukushima: Thousands rally in China over nuclear project fears](#),” *RT*, Aug 6, 2016; Claudia Cheng, “[Protests Against Nuclear Waste Project in China](#),” May 4, 2017; “[Community support: Locals embrace China nuclear project](#),” *Nature*, Feb 11, 2017.

With this addressed, it is worth moving onto the next article in *Workers World*, claiming that China is moving “decisively” on global warming.²¹⁹ Griswold writes that China has become “the factory of the world, producing everything from clothing and digital devices to machine tools, giant construction cranes and merchant ships,” going onto acknowledge that “the tremendous increase in China’s productive capacity came at a great price to the environment.” What he does not not recognize is that this development is completely within the capitalist system. After all, *Qiushi* declared in September 2011 that China needs to “strengthen the system for making innovations in new energy science and technology based on enterprises and guided by market forces that integrates production, education and research,” among other aspects.²²⁰ So, his points in this regard, are faulty. Griswold then touts nuclear power as producing “zero greenhouse gases,” declaring it is a “constant, not intermittent, producer of power around the clock,” going onto talk about alternative energy generation in China, and claiming that “China has made this fourth-generation nuclear reactor a reality.” This requires yet another response. For one, there is always the danger of nuclear accidents, coupled with nuclear waste which lasts 10,000 years, the negative “health and environmental costs,” the continued “threat of nuclear terrorism...[and] the damaging effects from the entire nuclear cycle.”²²¹ Additionally, the “construction of nuclear power plants does emit great amounts of CO₂, as construction instruments and processes...rely on other sources of energy - especially fossil fuels.” Other websites have pointed out that while electricity from nuclear power does not emit CO₂, the “nuclear fuel cycle does release CO₂ during mining, fuel enrichment and plant construction,” showing that it does not have “zero greenhouse gases,” especially since “the immense quantities of cement and steel” in a nuclear power plant comprise a “large quantity of “embedded” greenhouse gases,” more than other industrial projects.

219 Dierdre Griswold, “[China moves decisively on global warming](#),” *Workers World*, Nov 2, 2015.

220 Zhu Yongpeng, “[New Energy Sources: Direction of China’s Energy Industry](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Apr 1, 2010.

221 “[Concerns about Nuclear Power](#),” *dummies*, accessed Apr 26, 2018; “[Nuclear energy](#),” Reaching Critical Will - Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, accessed Apr 26, 2018; “[Nuclear Energy](#),” *Nuclear Age Peace Foundation*, accessed Apr 26, 2018; Peter Bursztyn, “[Nuclear Power and Greenhouse Gases](#),” *Living Green Barrie*, accessed Apr 26, 2018; WISE, “[3 Nuclear power and greenhouse gas emissions](#),” Jan 2, 2005.

Having pushed away his argument, it is worth moving onto his next article, focusing on coal miners in China itself.²²² Griswold begins by noting, rightly, that “particulate air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions have become big problems” in China. This is where he goes into revisionist land, declaring that China “has been building the infrastructure necessary to reduce consumption of fossil fuels while improving energy efficiency,” while saying at the same time that “China is the world’s largest producer of steel and coal.” Isn’t that a contradiction, especially with its “strong” alternative energy production? He goes onto write that “Chinese coal miners used to have the largest casualty rate in the world, with thousands dying in mine accidents every year,” adding that “China is committing very large sums to relocate the affected workers” even while he notes the capitalist nature of China, which he downplays, of course. He adds that “Chinese workers have a very militant tradition, and will fight for their rights” and talks about the situation for coal miners in the US. We should remember what *Qiushi* noted in March 2012: that “we must establish incentive and constraint mechanisms for the rational bearing of costs” when it comes to energy substitution, clearly thinking in market terms!²²³ Griswold doesn’t factor this into his analysis. An article by an anti-communist who uses phrases like “Stalinist bureaucratic collectivism,” Richard Smith, can actually shed some light here, although his anti-communist views cloud some of his analysis. He writes that

Reckless dumping of industrial waste is everywhere in China...environmental regulations are regularly flouted by state-owned and private industries...a rogue economy...is ravaging China's environment...[with the] wanton recklessness of China's profit-driven assault on nature and on the Chinese themselves...the industrial boom [as part of the “reform” in China] rapidly depleted the country's resources, especially lumber, oil and minerals, forcing Beijing to turn outward to feed its voracious engines of growth. The manic and thirsty industrialization boom in China's northern industrial cities drained China's northern fresh aquifers leaving some 600

222 Deirdre Griswold, “[Coal miners in crisis](#),” *Workers World*, Mar 21, 2016.

223 Jin Bei, “[Resource Constraints and China’s Modernization](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.4 No.1, Jan 1, 2012.

cities...facing dire water shortages while severely polluting most remaining reserves. Profit-hungry loggers cut down most of what was left of China's forests...Chinese loggers then turned to plundering Siberia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even New Guinea and parts of Africa...China is now by far the world's largest consumer of marketed primary industrial raw materials...[when China's reform was launched] China's combination of ultra cheap labor plus few-to-no environmental restrictions attracted many of the world's dirtiest and least sustainable industries...most of the world's light-industrial goods are made in China and they are, for the most part, deliberately designed to be unrepairable and mostly unrecyclable...the government has also squandered astounding quantities of resources building entire industries China does not need...the Chinese Communist Party...promoted the car craze to bolster status-seeking middle-class political support. In the 1980s, the[y]...supported a modest consumerism. But after the Tiananmen uprising in the spring of 1989, the government opted for expansive consumerism to placate the middle classes. Hence the car craze, followed by the airline craze, the shopping mall craze, the high-speed train craze, the foreign tourism craze, and so on...Since few Chinese people can afford such prices, the trains often run at half capacity or less...The office vacancy rate in Shenyang is nearly 30 percent, yet three more towers, all bigger than the Chrysler Building in New York City, are under construction, and another 12 are on the drawing boards...there are not just miles of empty apartment blocks but entire "ghost cities"...Bridges collapse regularly...Scientists have compared north China's toxic smog to a "nuclear winter" and the smog is also sharply reducing crop yields...Ironically, China is also a "green technology" leader, the world's largest producer of both windmills and solar panels. Yet in China these account for barely 1 percent of electricity generation...even when power plants are fitted with scrubbers to reduce pollution, operators often don't turn on the scrubbers because these cut into their profits...China's fresh water sources are contaminated by pesticides,

*industrial chemicals, heavy metals and myriad other toxics...In the 1990s and 2000s, in response to growing anti-pollution protests in the cities, the government pushed dirty industries out of the cities and into the countryside and rural towns. This brilliant move resulted in horrific contamination of whole rural regions and the mass production of "cancer villages" where extraordinary numbers of inhabitants are dying from intestinal, liver and other cancers caused by ingesting toxic water and food...Today, fully 190 million Chinese are sick from drinking contaminated water.*²²⁴

Taking this reality into account shows that China has more fundamental problems with pollution and contamination in its society than revisionists would like to admit, with the CPC helping to build up the current capitalist model in China, with the middle class as a buffer between the burgeoning Chinese bourgeoisie and suffering Chinese proletariat.

Then we move to the next article from *Workers World*, focusing on what can be done about rising sea levels.²²⁵ Griswold writes that the “disastrous impact of global warming has been documented and made evident in more destructive storms, the melting of the polar icecaps and glaciers, heat waves and desertification.” He adds that “U.S. governments — both Democratic and Republican — claim to be part of the worldwide push to cut CO2 emissions and save the planet, yet have done very little” but says there is a possibility climate change can be reversed: through Chinese efforts across the world, in varied continents, in “clean” energy. For this, this is a problem because it is too optimistic about China’s role, but it doesn’t recognize that fracking and nuclear power are considered “clean” when both are really dirty, in reality! Hence, it is better to use the term alternative energy than “clean” energy. He ends by declaring that “it is possible to turn back global warming. China has come up with a concrete plan; it has the resources and the will to spearhead such an effort. But other countries need to unite with China for that to happen. Can anything less than a real revolution make the United States

224 Richard Smith, “China's Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse,” *Truthout*, Jun 21, 2015.

225 Deirdre Griswold, “[What can be done about rising sea levels](#),” *Workers World*, Apr 12, 2016.

join the rest of the world in saving the planet?” Such an approach shows that he doesn’t realize the realities within China itself. Not only are there “cancer villages,” as Smith wrote about, but the groundwater in China is more polluted and the soil has even become polluted!²²⁶ As such, we shouldn’t have faith in the Chinese to “solve” the problem of climate catastrophe, as much as we shouldn’t trust the global capitalist class! The change will only come from the proletariat itself!

The next article comes from *Workers World*, yet again.²²⁷ Griswold writes that while the US has a presidential cabinet “that abounds in fellow climate deniers,” it is “instructive to look at what China is doing about climate change,” noting its spending on “renewable energy sources like solar and wind,” claiming that it is “not just an empty promise, a political ploy or a wish list.” That may be true, but the fact is, as he admits, industrialization in China has “brought serious pollution” (which they should have addressed sooner), claiming that China’s overall plan is shutting down “redundant industries...[and] creating new industries.” He ends by saying that “it is possible to reorganize human life and economic activity to be sustainable on this beautiful, unique planet. But to get there, we must pull down capitalism and build socialism.” With this, he is implying that China is socialist, which is incorrect by all measures. There is no doubt that air pollution in China has an economic cost.²²⁸ However, as a joint study by US and Chinese scholars noted, China’s war on pollution could cause more global warming. This is because “China’s strategies for cleaning up air do not necessarily lead to carbon dioxide emissions reductions” since the exhausting of “low-cost opportunities to reduce coal” means that the “continued displacement of coal from China’s energy mix will become more expensive” resulting in Chinese power producers to “stick with end-of-pipe solutions—such as scrubbing pollutants from the exhaust stream of coal power plants—rather than switching to use more renewable energy.” As a result,

226 “60% of China’s underground water ‘not fit for human contact’ – Beijing,” *RT*, Jun 6, 2015; Rachael Bale, “China’s other pollution problem – its soil,” *Reveal*, Oct 15, 2014; Jakob Schiller, “The Brutal Reality of Life in China’s Most Polluted Cities,” *Wired*, May 2015.

227 Deirdre Griswold, “Global warming, Trump and China,” *Workers World*, Jan 11, 2017.

228 Dave Wieczorek, “The Cost of Chinese Air Pollution,” *TuftsNow*, Jan 22, 2015; Coco Liu, “China’s War on Air Pollution May Cause More Global Warming,” *Scientific American*, Mar 2, 2015.

the scholars note, this “slows down China's green transition in energy structure” and says that if the “pollution-scrubbing technologies are running on coal-generated electricity” their use could “increase carbon emissions, even as air quality improves”! Other scholars argued that a carbon price would be better than scrubbing “pollutants and emissions” from coal-fired power plants, saying that this prioritization will “end up locking in a high-carbon energy system.”

This leads us to the next article in *The Independent*.²²⁹ It notes that “smog in Europe and North America could be more than 25 times more lethal than the average air pollution found in Chinese cities,” with the difference because “China is affected by large amounts of natural dust blown by the wind from arid areas, while most pollution in the West comes from industry.” However the article also says that “cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong were likely to suffer from Western-style air pollution.” Such pollution is why the Chinese leadership is requiring “heavy polluting industries...to participate in a compulsory program for environmental liability insurance.”²³⁰ Like always, the market is still a factor, with China becoming the “largest and fastest growing emerging market for environmental technologies,” participating in the global capitalist system yet again! This article in *The Independent* shows that while average air pollution is worse in North America and Europe, China still has its share of pollution, strongest in some of China’s biggest cities! As such, the revisionists should end their cheering for the Chinese capitalist model.

The next article is from the always capitalist mouthpiece, *Forbes*.²³¹ It is declared that “China had a total of 3.6 million jobs in renewable energy last year while the U.S. had 777,000...China is leading the U.S. across the board. The only sector where the U.S. boasts higher employment is biofuels with 283,700 jobs compared to China's 51,000. Elsewhere, Chinese strides in solar energy have led to

229 Ian Johnston, “[European smog could be 27 times more toxic than air pollution in China](#),” *The Independent*, Feb 10, 2017, accessed on Apr 26, 2018.

230 “[China - Environmental Technology](#),” International Trade Administration (ITA), U.S. Department of Commerce, July 25, 2017; Alexander Gordon, “[China Set to Make Environmental Insurance Mandatory](#),” *Aon Risk Services*.

231 Niall McCarthy, “[Renewable Energy Employment: How China And The U.S. Measure Up](#),” *Forbes*, Jun 23, 2017

an impressive 2.6 million direct and indirect jobs compared to approximately 260,100 in the U.S.”

However, this doesn't make China a paragon of virtue. Back in December 2015, environmental conditions in China continued to stoke “worries among the public there about air pollution and whether the situation is likely to improve,” with over two-thirds saying that air pollution and water pollution are major problems, with only 36% believing that “air pollution will improve over the next five years” while, as the poll recounted, “34% of Chinese expect[ed] the situation to worsen and 22% say it will remain the same over that time period.”²³² For Chinese living in Beijing and Shanghai, the results were worse: 53% believed that “air pollution will worsen in the next five years”! These attitudes show deeper problems in China than revisionists will admit. You can talk about China's strides, but China has a capitalist model, meaning that these institutions will be owned by Chinese capitalists and controllers of SOEs, leading to profits for a few, and suffering of the Chinese proletariat!

The final article is from *Bloomberg View*.²³³ Sadly, I cannot read the whole article, only the first paragraph, which says that “as Beijing and more than 20 other cities in northern China have been plunged into, with choking, toxic air and many people afraid to wander outside, observers wonder when China will start making significant progress on this problem...China probably is ahead of the historic pace of the U.S.” This progress has resulted in the EPA having a strong bilateral relationship with “China's national ministries and commissions, provincial and special administrative regions, and other key stakeholders to share expertise and experience.”²³⁴ However, China's war on pollution is currently at a “stalemate” because air pollution rose in parts of northern China, and “China's anti-smog campaign is getting even harder, and efforts to curb “motor vehicles in cities” is leading to efforts that will undoubtedly be unpopular with drivers. So, there is, without a doubt, a long road ahead.

232 George Gao, "[As smog hangs over Beijing, Chinese cite air pollution as major concern](#)," *Pew Research Center*, Dec 10, 2015, accessed Apr 26, 2018.

233 Tyler Cowen, "[How China Beats the U.S. at Clean-Air Progress](#)," *Bloomberg View*, Dec 20, 2016.

234 EPA, "[EPA Collaboration with China](#)," accessed Apr 26, 2018; Muyu Xu and David Stanway, "China environment ministry warns of 'stalemate' in war on smog," *Reuters*, Apr 19, 2018.

China and police brutality

The only link for this section in the /r/swcc document is an article in *Telesur English*, which generally favors Chinese revisionism without question.²³⁵ It declares that “in a surreal twist...high-ranking Chinese government officials rolled out new protocols Monday...confirming citizens right to videotape police making arrests...encouraging it as a safeguard against police abuse.” The article quotes the Chinese Ministry of Public Security as saying that “police should accept public monitoring and get used to implementing the law in front of cameras if members of the public record the actions without hindering law enforcement,” claiming that this “delivers on promises made by Chinese President Xi Jinping” in order to reduce police abuse. Furthermore, the article says that “under the new protocols, police must carry ID on them at all times, while plainclothes officers have to present their identification when approaching civilians,” adding that “while there is no law in China explicitly forbidding citizens from filming law enforcement, individual police officers have in the past prevented people from doing so.” As one would expect, this article acts like progress is being made, but this is doubtful.

The nature of police brutality in China is not known. A mysterious death in fall 2016 was blamed on such brutality, citizens protested and attacked police the same year, along with other forms of uproar.²³⁶ There are also websites saying that China has one of the most brutal police in the world and that house arrest there is a form of brutality. Others recalled that the Chinese admitted torturing a

235 “[China Encourages Civilians to Film Police to Curb Abuses](#),” *TeleSur English*, Aug 29, 2016.

236 Jonathan Kaiman, “A mysterious death in China raises suspicions of police brutality,” *LA Times*, May 10, 2016; Amanda Froelich, “Police Brutality In China Inspires Thousands Of Citizens To Stone ‘Violent Government Thugs’,” *True Activist*, May 17, 2016; Jeff Costello, “China: riots against police brutality,” *libcom.org*, Jun 11, 2007; “Middle Class Uproar Grows in China Case of Alleged Police Brutality,” *AP*, Dec 28, 2016; Ryan, “10 Most Brutal Police Forces on Earth,” *top-criminal-justice-schools.net*, Jan 18, 2012; “15 Countries With The Most Police Brutality,” *The Richest*, accessed Apr 27, 2018; James Palmer, “Forced Disappearances, Brutality, and Communist China’s Politics of Fear,” *Vice*, Apr 28, 2015; Steven Lee Myers, “In China, the Brutality of ‘House Arrest’,” *New York Times*, Nov 25, 2017; John Walsh, “Police Brutality Around The World: Chinese Officers Tortured Man Killed In Custody, Henan Department Says In Rare Admission,” *International Business Times*, Mar 22, 2017; “Police brutality against migrant worker should be turning point,” *China Daily*, Jan 6, 2015; “China to film interrogations of suspects in push to halt police brutality,” *RT*, Feb 15, 2015; “In China, brutality yields confessions of graft,” *AP*, Mar 7, 2014; James Fullerton, *Vice*, “Why Police Brutality Won’t Stop Environmentalists in China,” Apr 12, 2014; Peter Ford, “China’s ‘Para-Police’ Brutality under Scrutiny,” *Christian Science Monitor*, accessed Apr 27, 2018; “China denies police brutality,” *IOL*, Mar 8, 2011; Reuters Staff, “China issues rare rebuke in police brutality case,” *Reuters*, Jun 30, 2016.

man in custody, the brutalities against migrant workers, the measures put in place to supposedly to limit police brutality, the reported connection of graft to police brutality, and brutality aimed against environmentalists, leading to further scrutiny and denials. With this, I'd say the information is disparate and I can't tell if police brutality is still present as a wide measure by the police in China or not, but I'd venture to say it exists within China's capitalist model.

Beyond this, it is worth discussing the nature of China's police. For one, more are using facial recognition technology to "eliminate any blind spots for crimes," using it as a form of identification, using them to "scan train riders and plane passengers for individuals who may be trying to avoid law enforcement or are using fake IDs."²³⁷ Such facial recognition connected to a huge database of the whole population which can be "connected to surveillance camera networks and will use cloud facilities to connect with data storage and processing centres," tying it into the country's surveillance system itself. This also seems like a massive invasion of privacy, although the revisionists don't seem to mind this reality. Even worse, however, are the weapons that the police in China use:

Weapons the Chinese police may be equipped with...batons, handcuffs, tear gas ejectors, and flashlights. Optional items include police knives, guns, and anti-stab vests....most Chinese police officers are not equipped with firearms...[but] since March 2014, many provinces reportedly announced that they would equip their on-duty policemen with guns...Generally, policemen are required to warn persons before using weapons...If they have no time for a warning or a warning would only cause more serious and dangerous consequences, they may open fire without a warning.

This is another problem with revisionist China, showing that brutality is likely, without a doubt.

²³⁷ Beimeng Fu, "Police in China are wearing facial-recognition glasses," *ABC News*, Feb 8, 2018; Mallory Locklear, "Police in China are scanning travelers with facial recognition glasses," *engadget*, Feb 7, 2018; Stephen Chen, "[China to build giant facial recognition database to identify any citizen within seconds](#)," *South China Morning Post*, Oct 13, 2017; James Pomfret and Tine Ge, "China captures arson suspect in karaoke lounge blaze that killed 18," *Reuters*, Apr 23, 2018, accessed Apr 27, 2018; Laney Zhang, "[Police Weapons: China](#)," *Library of Congress*, Sept 2014.

China and capitalist states on human rights

There are only three links for this section in the /r/swcc document, but there is much more information than that to cover this topic adequately.

The first link is an article from *Global Times*.²³⁸ It notes that China's Information Office of the State Council "published a report on the United States' human rights situation," The Human Rights Record of the United States, as they do every year, declaring that it says that the United States poses once again as "the judge of human rights." This is in response to the report from the US State Department on China's "human rights violations." However, both of these reports are propaganda. The former is propaganda to show the superiority of China, the latter is to show the superiority of the US. This year another human rights report was issued. As revisionist Roland Boer declared, it "details abuses of civil rights, systemic racial discrimination, increasing flaws in US-style democracy, and flagrant abuse of human rights in other countries, an underlying theme concerns the right to economic well-being."²³⁹ He goes out on a limb further to claim that this part of the "Chinese Marxist" approach to human rights, which he claims is based in "Chinese tradition," saying this includes has a number of different elements: "Collective and Individual....Sovereignty...Universal and particular...[and] Economic rights." One of the links Boer provides in his first article shows that the Chinese report is "in response to the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 issued by the U.S. State Department on April 20," declaring that their report says that the US's "human rights record remained tarnished and showed continued deterioration" unlike China, supposedly.²⁴⁰ Hence, it serves a clear and undeniable propaganda purpose, in this case to put China in a positive light, despite its capitalist model. You don't have to be a revisionist to criticize the human rights record of the US. It isn't that hard.

People on the "Left" do it all the time. We don't need China to be our savior.

238 "[China issues report on US human rights](#)," *Global Times* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Mar 9, 2017.

239 Roland Boer, "[Report on United States human rights abuses in 2017](#)," *Stalin's Moustache*, Apr 25, 2018; Roland Boer, "[Chinese theory and practice of human rights](#)," *Stalin's Moustache*, Nov 26, 2016.

240 "[China issues report on U.S. human rights](#)," *People's Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*) Apr 25, 2018.

With this, we move onto another link from the /r/swcc document: a summary of China's supposed human rights "progress" in 2014.²⁴¹ It declares that the CPC and Chinese government has pushed forward "the implementation of...build[ing] a moderately prosperous society...driv[ing] the reform in a deeper level...advanc[ing] the law-based governance of China; and...strengthen[ing] Party self-discipline," declaring that "the Chinese people enjoyed practical benefits from the development of the country, and their human rights situation also made new progress." It goes onto say that "the basic rights of the Chinese people became better protected, and China's constitutional principle of "respecting and safeguarding human rights" was implemented in a better way. In 2014, China made steady progress in comprehensively completing the building of a moderately prosperous society," adding that the Chinese government "adopted effective measures to guarantee citizens' access to fair development...stepped up drug-control efforts to protect citizens' personal rights...[improved] mechanisms for people to exercise state power...enhanced judicial justice and openness." The report also declared that "China's ethnic minorities and areas inhabited by ethnic minorities made new developments...the basic national policy of equality between men and women [was further implemented]...a series of measures to protect and improve the well-being of persons with disabilities [were adopted]...the country's major environmental problems [were given a] high priority...[and] China continued to take the initiative in exchanges and cooperation with other countries in the realm of human rights." With this, it isn't a surprise that revisionists are cheering. However, going back to the elements of China's human rights supposed focus, on the "Collective and Individual....Sovereignty... Universal and particular...[and] Economic rights," as Boer declared, there are some problems. For one, China since the seizure of "state apparati, a seizure of the media (as alluded to above) and the imprisonment of high officials in the Maoist camp (the so-called "Gang of Four")" on 1976, following Mao's death, led a number of consequences. For one, "violence...was largely committed by the

241 "[White Paper: Progress in China's Human Rights in 2014](#)," Information Office of the State Council, Jun 11, 2015.

capitalist-roaders” and in the 1978 constitution, the “four measures of democracy guaranteed to the people in the 1975 Constitution” were removed.²⁴² Apart from the different preambles, the following was changed in the 1978 constitution, removing elements of the 1975 Maoist Constitution:

- in Article 2, the power of electors and electoral units to supervise deputies was removed.
- in Article 4, the freedom of all nationalities to “use their written and spoken languages” was reformed to claim that they could “preserve or reform their own customs and ways,” undermining overall socialist culture. It was coupled with an assertion of regional autonomy in “an area where a minority nationality lives in a compact community.”
- in Article 5, talk about “production teams in rural people’s communes” was completely eliminated, and changed to say “rural areas.”
- in Article 6, the power of the state to requisition by purchase, take over for use, or nationalize “other means of production” was eliminated.
- in Article 7, rural people’s commune specificity removed, now talk of a “production brigade.”
- in Article 8, the state can now prohibit anyone from using their means to “disrupt the economic order of society,” i.e. put in place economics against the wishes of the revisionists.
- in Article 10, the state’s dedication to the “principle of grasping revolution, promoting production and other work and requisition against war” along with the development of the socialist economy, social production, and independence, was completely eliminated.
- in Article 11, the requirement for state organizations and state personnel to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, putting proletarian politics in command, combating bureaucracy, maintaining ties with the masses, and participating in collective productive labor was eliminated. Additionally, the section about every organ of the state applying the “principle of efficient and simple administration,” with specific requirements for the leading body of the

²⁴² Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017; [1975 Constitution of China](#); [1978 Constitution of China](#).

state, was eliminated, replaced with new text about development, taking initiative into their own hands, and a supposed guarantee toward protecting the environment.

- in Article 12, the section about the proletariat required to exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, with “culture and education, literature and art, physical education, health work and scientific research” all having to serve proletarian policies, while being combined with productive labor, was eliminated. In its place, was talk about expanding scientific research and “professional contingents” for scientific and technological work!
- in Article 13, the text about the forms of carrying on socialist revolution through four principles (speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big character posters), followed by the state guaranteeing the masses the right to use these forms in a democratic and centralist setting with discipline, freedom, unity of will, personal ease of mind, liveliness, and consolidated leadership of the CPC and the dictatorship of the proletariat was completely eliminated. It was replaced with text talking blandly about developing education, socialist consciousness, and culture, no match for the elimination of these principles!
- in Article 14, the text about the state safeguarding the socialist system, depriving landlords, “rich peasants, reactionary capitalists and other bad elements” political rights, providing them with the opportunity to reform their ways through labor, was eliminated. It was replaced with text claiming the state upholds Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought, that all cultural undertakings must “serve socialism” and bringing about a “flourishing socialist culture.” This is a major sign of the moral corruption of revisionist China.
- in Article 15, the text noted that the Chinese People's Liberation Army and people's militia are the armed forces of workers and peasants, led by the CPC, the armed forces of peoples of all nationalities, while adding that chairman of the CPC commands the armed forces of the country, that the Chinese People's Liberation Army is a fighting, working, and production force, with a

task to “safeguard the achievements of the socialist revolution and socialist construction,” defend the state’s sovereignty from “subversion and aggression by imperialism, social-imperialism and their lackeys.” This was eliminated, replaced with text saying that all organs of the state should maintain contact with the people, and that leading personnel of the state accede to certain requirements, but nothing about the role of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army!

I could go on, but I believe the articles I’ve noted above prove my point.²⁴³ It shows that MIM (Prisons) is right to say that the “anti-democratic trend” in China “has continued over the last forty years,” while also noting that when one embraces the “lines of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi,” who reject the “Maoist line and the Cultural Revolution,” embracing the establishment of the “Shanghai Stock Exchange...in 1990...the anarchy of production under capitalism” and denying that “there are any capitalists in the party to criticize,” the line which “got Deng kicked out of the CCP before Mao died.” Regardless of how many “human rights” China says it follows, whether people declare that “no other country in the world has achievements remotely matching these,” it is a method to defend the revisionists.²⁴⁴ As Mao said about China of the Maoist period, “the present social system of our country is far superior to that of the old days,” adding that “only socialism can save China.” China can be saved from the capitalist model by implementing socialist methods, meaning the abandonment of all market measures and return to a full planned economy. Otherwise, the unique capitalist model of China will further hurt the Chinese proletariat and strengthen the Chinese bourgeoisie, allowing the latter to further gain power while the masses suffer under such a system.

243 The 1975 Constitution includes Articles 16 to 25 within Chapter Two: Structure of the State, Articles 26 to 29 within Chapter Three: The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Article 30 within Chapter Four: The National Flag, The National Emblem and the Capital. The 1978 Constitution has no categories in the version I viewed, only listing Articles 16 to 60, and adding 30 new articles.

244 “[Why China Has Made the World's Greatest Contribution to Increasing Human Rights](#),” *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 27, 2018; Chin Chih-po, “[Denial of the Difference Between Socialism and Capitalism Is Not Allowed](#)—Repudiating the theme about “white cat, black cat,”” *Peking Review*, #16, April 16, 1976, pp. 18-21.

Are China's government and economic system popular?

Those of /r/swcc originally titled this section ““Popularity of government and economic system,” a revisionist twisting of the truth.

The first poll they present declares that “the Chinese (85%)...stand out as particularly satisfied” with the direction of their country, 88% say that their “economy is doing well” while 80% “say things will get better in the coming months.”²⁴⁵ However, we must go beyond the simple analysis in the first chapter of this poll. Later pages note a lower GDP (PPP) in China than elsewhere, and 53% of Chinese saying the government should first address “rising prices” and 26% saying the gap between the rich and poor. While 67% of Chinese say that their economic situation is good, almost a third of them, say the situation is bad, meaning that there are problems within the “market socialist” model. Additionally, while 71% Chinese say that that their personal economic situation will improve, 23% say it will stay the same, 30% of Chinese said they could not afford healthcare, and 52% say that inequality is a major problem in China. Other data from the poll noted that many Chinese say that the gap between the rich and poor has increased in recent years, even though they weirdly didn't ask questions if the economic system favored the wealthy or was unfair, perhaps because those the over 3,000 they interviewed were “disproportionately urban,” leading to problems in their data. Saying all of this, this poll doesn't really support revisionist claims, but rather shows more problems within China than revisionists would admit!

We then move onto the next article, being yet another Pew Research Center poll, but from many years earlier.²⁴⁶ It says that for many Chinese citizens, they rate “many aspects of their own lives favorably, including their family life, their incomes and their jobs.” However, it notes, “levels of personal satisfaction are generally lower than the national measures, and by global standards Chinese contentment with family, income and jobs is not especially high.” The poll goes onto declare that while

²⁴⁵ [“Economies of Emerging Markets Better Rated During Difficult Times,”](#) *Pew Research Center*, May 23, 2013.

²⁴⁶ [“The Chinese Celebrate Their Roaring Economy. As They Struggle With Its Costs,”](#) *Pew Research Center*, Jul 22, 2008.

“most Chinese embrace the free market, there is considerable concern about rising economic inequality in China today.” Such problems in revisionist China are compounded by the fact that 96% of Chinese respondents surveyed described “rising prices as a big problem for the country” and 72% said that “they are a very big problem”! Again, there are undoubted problems with “market socialism” and China’s unique capitalist model. Furthermore, 89% of Chinese respondents said that the gap between rich and poor is “a major problem,” along with saying that corruption among officials, and business leaders, with poorer Chinese and those in western and central provinces giving the government lower grades. Additionally, environmental issues are seen as a top priority, with many citing air and water pollution as problems, with 80% of Chinese say protecting the environment should be a priority even if it “results in slower growth and a potential loss of jobs.” Additionally, 59% say their “traditional way of life” is being lost, along with seeming confidence in the government and in “free markets”! Clearly, the journey of China on the capitalist road has partially corrupted the minds of the Chinese as well. Also, at the same time, they may be making the best of a bad situation.

The final link is about “satisfaction with the country’s direction.”²⁴⁷ It shows that satisfaction in China has been relatively high since 2005, but also notes that only 48% were satisfied in 2002. Hence, this overall satisfaction level makes it clear that the Chinese masses are appeased enough by the current situation that they are satisfied. As one anti-communist, but well-argued, writer put it, “many of China’s millennial generation have lost all hope for change, been seduced by capitalism and consumerism,” adding that while “the Chinese have every right to modernize, industrialize and improve their material standard of living,” the problem is that “capitalism can’t sustainably provide this for the Chinese, the Americans or anyone anymore.”²⁴⁸ With this, we return to what Mao wrote in 1957: “facts have now provided the answer: Only socialism can save China.” This is still true today.

247 “[Satisfaction with Country’s Direction](#),” *Pew Research Center*, data from 2002 to 2014.

248 Richard Smith, “China’s Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse,” *Truthout*, Jun 21, 2015; Mao Tse-Tung, “[On The Correct Handling Of Contradictions Among The People](#),” Feb 27, 1957.

China, “poverty reduction” and growing inequality

This chapter requires efforts to explain the reality of China on the socialist road. Articles in Western publications trumpet “rising life expectancy” and efforts at “lifting people” out of poverty.²⁴⁹ However, they also point out problems: substantial inequalities in health (such as health services) remaining, “growing inequality and huge regional disparities,” continuing poverty in rural areas. They also point out unequal treatment of rural and urban citizens, lack of rights for migrant citizens, disparities in education and social services, especially in rural China, continued low wages, high government debt, and rising income inequality. One site even admits that “the story of how China lifted its hundreds of millions is a particular story of implementing the right policies at the right time in the right place, as the country took advantage of the rise of globalization in a way that wouldn’t be possible today.” This means that the “success” story that revisionists bring out, would not be possible in the climate today! This is an important point.

With this, we move onto the sources that favor Chinese revisionism. In their minds, China has great “social achievements” there has been a “success” of relocating people from impoverished areas to “developed” ones (uprooting them from their homes), praise its “poverty eradication” efforts.²⁵⁰ There are problems with this approach: using private companies to “struggle against” poverty, an “increase in

249 [“Last two decades see rising life expectancy in every province of China but substantial health inequalities remain,”](#) *The Lancet* (reprinted in *ScienceDaily*), Oct 26, 2015; Corina Balsamo, [“China Lifted 23 Million People out of Poverty,”](#) *Borgen Magazine*, Mar 6, 2013; Mark Tran, [“The uncomfortable reality of development,”](#) *The Guardian*, Jul 29, 2011; Associated Press, [“China raises rural poverty line,”](#) *The Guardian*, Nov 30, 2011; John Gittings, [“China’s challenge: fighting rural poverty,”](#) *The Guardian*, Apr 22, 2000; Tania Branigan, [“China pledges to close poverty gap,”](#) *The Guardian*, Mar 5, 2010; Javier C. Hernandez, [“Xi Jinping Vows No Poverty in China by 2020. That Could Be Hard,”](#) *New York Times*, Oct 31, 2017; Rob Schmitz, [“Xi Jinping’s War On Poverty Moves Millions Of Chinese Off The Farm,”](#) *NPR*, Oct 19, 2017; Dylan Matthews, [“In 1990, more than 60% of people in East Asia were in extreme poverty. Now only 3.5% are,”](#) *Vox*, Oct 2, 2016; Zheping Huang and Tripti Lahiri, [“China’s path out of poverty can never be repeated at scale by a country again,”](#) *Quartz*, Sept 21, 2017; Charles Hutzler, [“China will boost spending, try to close income gap,”](#) *Boston.com* (reprinted from *Associated Press*), Mar 6, 2011.

250 [“Why China’s Social Achievements Are Even Greater Than Its Economic Ones,”](#) *Learning from China*, accessed Apr 29, 2018; [“China aims to relocate 3.4m people in 2017 to tackle poverty,”](#) *China Daily Asia* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Feb 11, 2017; Iramsy Peraza Forte, [“China aiming to eradicate poverty by 2020,”](#) *Granma*, Sept 1, 2017; [“After Bringing 800 Million out of Poverty, China Aims to Eradicate It Completely by 2020,”](#) *TeleSur English*, Sept 3, 2017; [“China brings nearly 13 mln people out of poverty in 2017 – Xinhua,”](#) *Channel News Asia*, Feb 2, 2018.

inequality that came with development,” and there is “corruption and malpractice in poverty relief” which the Chinese claim they are addressing. Adding to this is data from the World Bank showing a declining “share of the population living in extreme poverty,” ending in 2013.²⁵¹ However, this doesn’t include all of those who are in poverty, so the revisionists shouldn’t cheer for this, since, as noted earlier in this publication, many millions are in poverty if you use wider measures. Even worse is the use of data of the global Gini coefficient to “prove” China is better off, although the data itself doesn’t say much of anything.²⁵² There are also comments by the World Bank. Of course, the World Bank praises China’s progress, but admits there are still lingering problems: economic slowdown, lack of effective policy coordination among poverty alleviation, and an increase in income inequality.

Then, there’s the *South China Morning Post*, an independent paper, which only has two articles on the subject. The first article, in September 2017, declares that while the world is “in awe of China’s rise for having lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty,” the decades of reform “have actually widened the wealth gap between the rural poor and the rest. As a result, the rump of rural destitution is one of the biggest challenges facing the Communist Party.”²⁵³ The rest of the article just goes onto focus on current efforts. This brings us to the next article, in November 2017.²⁵⁴ It says that “thousands of Christians in an impoverished county in rural southeast China have swapped their posters of Jesus for portraits of President Xi Jinping as part of a local government poverty-relief programme that seeks to “transform believers in religion into believers in the party.” This seems like an eerie way to make individuals into party members and doesn’t sit well with me, especially since some said the villagers were forced to take down their religious posters in exchange for posters of Xi!

251 [“Share of the population living in extreme poverty,”](#) *Our World in Data*, data from 1981 to 2013.

252 [“Global Gin Coefficient with and Without China,”](#) data from 1960 to 2010; [“Gini Index,”](#) *Investopedia*, accessed Apr 29, 2018; Chengwei Huang, [“Ending poverty in China: Lessons for other countries and the challenges still ahead,”](#) *The World Bank*, Oct 14, 2016; Guobao Wu, [“Ending poverty in China: What explains great poverty reduction and a simultaneous increase in inequality in rural areas?,”](#) *The World Bank*, Oct 19, 2016.

253 [“China seeks hardest victory over poverty,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Sept 12, 2017.

254 [“Want to escape poverty? Replace pictures of Jesus with Xi Jinping. Christian villagers urged,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, Nov 14, 2017.

With this, we move onto accounts in official Chinese media, starting with *Xinhua*. These articles are basically press releases for the Chinese government. Some focus on their poverty programs, trying to connect the Maoist period to the Dengist period (utterly disgusting), which are partially market-driven with “asset investments” and supporting “employment and entrepreneurship” for example.²⁵⁵ Others talk about “graduates from universities in Beijing set[ting] off...as volunteers in the country's remote and underdeveloped western regions,” which is a paternalistic tone to it, advocating “apprenticeships, infrastructure and financial support” to “fight” poverty, declaring that “with money comes empowerment” which sounds nice, but almost seems to give capitalists an in, and entrance exams to schools some of which are “low-performing.” Even Xi admitted in March of last year that “the nearer toward the deadline [2020], the more difficult the campaign to eradicate poverty will be” further declaring that “China should improve the management, operation and policy systems for integrated military and civilian development, and build industrial clusters and high-tech industrial bases for this purpose” while others said that “the government should resolutely let go of powers that it should not possess, concentrate on fulfilling its duties and serve enterprises more actively.” This fits right in with their horrid capitalist model, and denouncing of the Maoist era, one article complaining that “nearly forty years ago [about 1967], Yan Jinchang and his fellow farmers in a village in central China's Anhui didn't have full control of the land they farmed on, as the implementation of collective system at that time, limiting their economic rewards and living standard” but that under the “reform” they supposedly “prospered.”²⁵⁶ Another disgusting element of current China.

From there we get to three articles in the *Global Times*. The first declares that premature deaths were limited by China's policies, but admits that “...pollution levels associated with migration are still

255 “China's Progress in Poverty Reduction and Human Rights,” *Xinhua*, pages [1](#), [2](#), [3](#), [4](#), [5](#), [6](#); “[Chinese graduate volunteers go west](#),” *Xinhua*, Jul 22, 2017; “[Guizhou: Crafting a way out of poverty](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 29, 2017; “[Irrigation projects help relieve poverty in China's Anhui](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 22, 2017; “[Across China: Poverty fight goes on at 'stone gate'](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 1, 2017; “[President Xi calls for lasting effects of poverty relief](#),” *Xinhua*, Mar 8, 2017; “[China to strengthen social support in poverty alleviation](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 18, 2017.

256 “[China Focus: China fights for final victory over poverty](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 13, 2017.

on the rise in megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, which are experiencing massive immigrations that increase local emissions.”²⁵⁷ Hence, it isn’t something with wholly positive effects. The second article goes onto “achievements” of China’s policies, but provides no specifics otherwise, so its relatively vapid. The third and final article talks about villages benefiting from such policies, supposedly, but admits the growth of “small-scale businesses” in rural areas, which are, under China’s capitalist model, petty bourgeoisie.²⁵⁸ Of course they, or their revisionist friends in the West won’t admit this obvious reality, of course.

Following this are the varied articles in *China Daily*. Focusing on similar topics as other Chinese state media outlets, articles in this publication note that Xi declares there should be the “use of market-based methods to protect the environment” (a worrying concept), that Xi gained his “political education” in the Dengist period while praising the anti-commune “household responsibility system,” market approaches pushed in rural areas, and focus on other measures.²⁵⁹ Other articles noted tourism is becoming a money source for some villagers, partnership with certain companies and property developers, pushing to “incubate rural entrepreneurship and attract talent” (benefiting the bourgeoisie), and saying that China’s poverty line is below the international level by about \$288 a year! China is undercounting those in poverty, showing their numbers are not the reality. Even more favorable articles note persistence of poverty in China’s rural areas, with not even half of rural households having access to purified water in 2016 and only 31% who had access to sanitary toilets! Even if you trusted Xi’s

257 [“Urbanization in China prevents 450,000 premature deaths since 1980: study,”](#) *Global Times* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jul 20, 2017; [“China’s poverty relief achievements: 2012-16,”](#) *Global Times*, Jul 31, 2017.

258 Chen Qingqing, [“Gansu villages benefit from poverty alleviation policies since 18th CPC Congress,”](#) *Global Times*, Oct 18, 2017.

259 [“Xi’s life experiences bolster poverty fight,”](#) *China Daily*, Feb 27, 2017; [“Western China leads fight against poverty,”](#) *China Daily*, Sept 13, 2017; [“China moves to improve use of anti-poverty funds,”](#) *China Daily*, Sept 19, 2017; [“Commentary: Eliminating poverty, the Chinese way,”](#) *China Daily*, Sept 3, 2017; [“Charting China’s anti-poverty fight,”](#) *China Daily*, 2017; Xu Wei, [“Xi urges stepped-up efforts to eradicate poverty by 2020,”](#) *China Daily*, Feb 23, 2017; [“Xi footprints on road to prosperity for all,”](#) *China Daily*, 2017; Ma Chi, [“Infographic: China’s war on poverty,”](#) *China Daily*, Dec 5, 2016; [“Xi’s idea of 20 years ago changing farmers’ lives,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 3, 2017; Chen Mengwei, [“Investment helps 10 million people rise from poverty,”](#) *China Daily*, Dec 21, 2016; China SCIO, [“5 years on Poverty reduction in China,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 10, 2017; [“Twenty-eight counties lifted out of poverty,”](#) *China Daily*, Nov 7, 2017; [“Winning the battle against poverty by 2020,”](#) 19th CPC Congress, *China Daily*, 2017.

report, he says that “socialist modernization” will not happen until 2035 and China will not be a “great modern socialist county” until 2050. However, since China is not socialist, these goals just mean that the deepening connection of China to the global capitalist system will continue. Even looking at the report of the 19th CPC Congress, it is clear there are still millions upon millions in poverty in China, quoting capitalist Bill Gates to justify China’s efforts! Compounding this horribleness are the occasional slams at China’s Maoist period.²⁶⁰

Finally we move onto a host of other Chinese government or related sites. Some of these focuses on poverty levels in China’s rural areas (making you question what their standard is), and others talk about the disparity between the capitalist class and working class while noting that “not all Chinese citizens have been able to profit from the fruits of economic growth.”²⁶¹ Apart from this, some article claim that “victory” is at hand at fighting poverty, while others focus on China’s “progress.”

Revisionists undoubtedly feel they have the upper hand when it comes to China’s programs relating to poverty. However, they are missing the reality: the country is no longer socialist. After all, capitalists gloated they could be part of the CCP, since 2001 falsely claiming that it would “positive for the private economy’s growth,” with one such capitalist declaring that “my property, even my life, belongs to the Party. This is the quality a Communist must have,” although such capitalists are really out for consolidating their power in China.²⁶² Additionally, looking at varied results in official Chinese media showed that China has moved away from Marxism-Leninism and abandoned the proletariat. Of

260 Wang Hao, “[How President Xi helped impoverished families](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 3, 2017. This article says “in 1972, Guyuan was recognized by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization as one of the places most “unfit for human habitation” on Earth. It was the first area covered by a resettlement program established by the government in the early 1980s.” Yet another way to discredit past policies.

261 “[Poverty levels in China’s rural areas according to the current rural poverty standard](#),” data from 1978 to 2015; Verena Menzel, “[A Change in Mentality – China Explores New Paths to Poverty Eradication](#),” *China Today*, May 5, 2017; Kimeng Hilton Ndukong, “[China set to lift remaining 40 million people out of poverty by 2020](#),” *People’s Daily*, Oct 9, 2017; Information Office of the State Council of China, “[China’s Progress in Poverty Reduction and Human Rights](#),” Oct 17, 2016; Information Office of the State Council of China, “[New Progress in Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China](#),” Nov 16, 2011.

262 “[Entrepreneurs’ presence grows at CPC congress](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Nov 12, 2012; Chang Gang, “[Party eligibility widens](#),” *China Daily*, Jul 19, 2001.

the 81 articles of *China Daily* that mentioned the word proletariat, 39 of them used the word in a historical context, 15 of them used quoted the word as lip-service in official documents or names of organizations, 16 of them only briefly mentioned the word, two of them used it in quotation marks (like it doesn't exist), and two of them seemed to say that the proletariat was separate from the working class, rather than being one and the same!²⁶³ Worst of all, there was an article in *China Daily* declaring that “the CPC has turned many "proletariat" into property-owning and car-owning middle class”! This could explain, as noted in an earlier chapter, support for the Chinese government as noted in recent Pew Research Center polls. There was even an art exhibition in Shanghai of contemporary art, by more than 40 artists, titled “Bourgeoisified Proletariat” which was meant to pull in investors! These are not good signs. Moving onto *Global Times*, since *Xinhua* does not seem to have a good search feature on their website or can be easily searched online, there were 47 items which mention the word “proletariat.”²⁶⁴ Of these results, 32 of them were historical in nature, 11 of of them were brief mentions, and 4 were within names of groups or media. This, again, was not promising. You could say that *Qiushi* is more promising, but many mentions of the word are in a historical context.²⁶⁵

This should be no surprise. As one anti-communist writer, and progressive, worried about the effects of capitalism, put it, in China, “opportunities for getting rich quick have grown as fast as the economy...chances of getting caught are miniscule and for most corruption cases the consequences are not nearly as dire...corruption rots the whole society from the top down.”²⁶⁶

263 Used search function on website of *China Daily* on Apr 29, 2018, starting from [this page](#). Related pages showed 13 results for the term under the tab “blogs,” 75 results under the tab “comments,” and 37 results under the term “photos.” For the next sentence see: John Wong, “[New challenges ahead for Party](#),” *China Daily*, Jun 25, 2011; Mu Qian, “[From Masses to Classes](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 15, 2009. The same article, reprinted [here](#), declared that “In this age of market driven globalized economic growth and rising economic affluence everywhere, the term “Communist Party” seems to be an anachronism. The classical definition of “communism” based on the notion of proletariat dictatorship and abolition of private property ownership sounds particularly unrealistic and irrelevant to the present highly materialistic generation, both in and out of China.” This shows a fundamental problem in revisionist China itself! Of course the revisionists will deny this, but anyone with sense knows its true.

264 Used search function on website of *Global Times* on Apr 29, 2018, starting from [this page](#). It says 43 items on the first page, but search results pulled up 47 items.

265 [Search for the word “proletariat”](#) on *Qiushi*, via the DuckDuckGo search engine on Apr 29, 2018.

266 Richard Smith, “China's Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse,” *Truthout*, Jun 21, 2015.

The Chinese proletariat held hostage under “market socialism”

This chapter begins with quoting some laws of China itself. The first is a labor contract law.²⁶⁷ It says it is applicable in “enterprises, self-employed economic organizations and private non-enterprise units” within China and seems to put in place labor rights. However, such labor contracts will consist of “fixed-term labor contracts, open-ended labor contracts and labor contracts that expire upon completion of given jobs,” a worrying thought. Even with some positive elements, the enforcement of this law, which went into effect in January 2008 is spotty. Its enforcement “varies substantially across cities...less progress has been made in increasing social insurance coverage,” is not totally clear, and moves China’s “labor market in the direction that many European countries have gone” (which is why it was welcomed by the European Chamber of Commerce).²⁶⁸ One academic study said that while “China’s labor regulations have become very strict relative to those of other countries,” and says that workers know they can have labor contracts, saying that while “the government has made a serious effort to implement the new Law,” pointing out that “employers and employees may have incentives to forego social insurance coverage, because participation in most schemes requires contributions by both sides that are a large share of wages.” They note later in the article, seeming to accept the positivity of the law’s enforcement, “enforcement of the new Law has produced more modest success in expanding social insurance coverage, as many migrant workers who have labor contracts remain uncovered by the major social insurance programs.” This is troubling, to say the least!

With this, we move to the Library of Congress’s summary of the regulations used to implement the labor contract law mentioned in the previous paragraph.²⁶⁹ This summary stated that the labor

267 [“Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China,”](#) Jun 29, 2007.

268 Jude Blanchette, “Key issue for China’s new labor law: enforcement,” *Christian Science Monitor*, Jul 2, 2007; Mary Gallagher, John Giles, Albert Park, Meiyan Wang, [“China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: Implementation and implications for China’s workers,”](#) Feb 17, 2014, accessed [abstract](#) and full article. hilariously, this was the [same article](#) that revisionists cited to justify their arguments, although they used a different link.

269 Laney Zhang, [“China: Implementation Regulations of Labor Contract Law Published,”](#) Law Library of Congress (part of Library of Congress), last updated Oct 28, 2008.

contract law (LCL) was “said to be the cause of some companies going out of business and some foreign-invested companies leaving China for other countries less protective of their workers, such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia,” and with this, labor activists were concerned that Implementation Regulations, to enforce and clarify it, to implement the law “would narrow the application of the LCL to the benefit of employers, through either the stipulation of new contractual conditions or a new emphasis.” This summary went on to say that in response to the LCL, employers engaged in a “string of staff-sacking scandals,” trying to push “thousands of employees to resign” so they then could “rehire them with new contracts in order to circumvent the LCL requirements.” Furthermore, the regulations lay out “14 conditions under which an employer may terminate a labor contract, including a non-fixed-term contract” with conditions include “an employee's incompetence and serious breaches of the employer's policies and rules,” connecting to a “re-emphasis on the employers' rights to terminate contracts.” The summary goes on to say that these new regulations “further stipulate that the ten years of continuous service by an employee is to be calculated as of the hiring date, not the date on which a formal contract was signed” and seem to take aim at “company ploy[s]” but also “specify five circumstances under which an employee must compensate the employer when a contract with an agreed service term is terminated”! The summary goes on to say that employers are now defined as “partnerships such as accounting firms and law firms,” gives a precise calculation for a “worker who has illegally not been given a formal contract” but also said that the regulations are “considered not to have resolved many of the more ambiguous provisions in the LCL.” So, the LCL, “clarified” by the regulations, is not as strong for the proletariat as revisionists would claim.

With this, we can move on to varied media on the subject of labor in China. The first of these notes that while average manufacturing wages in India are relatively stagnant, from 2004 to 2013, they have substantially risen in China, the same shown in another chart, but with data from 1981 to 2015.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ “[Average annual manufacturing wages in China are current 5x that of India](#),” data includes years 2004 to 2013; “[China average year yearly wages in manufacturing](#),” data includes years 1981 to 2015.

There is no analysis in either of these charts, but it must be observed, minimally, that since it is an average wage, it is not showing the differing wages in each sector of the economy, as it is not mentioned what sectors of the economy are included under “manufacturing.” This is especially the case as it can include any “large scale production” if we go by the definition in *BusinessDictionary*. For China, however, it seems this is wide since “the range of Chinese goods includes iron, steel, aluminum, textiles, cement, chemicals, toys, electronics, rail cars, ships, aircraft and many other products...China is a world leader in many types of goods...products are frequently churned out for government use or are immediately put on boats and shipped to foreign consumers.”²⁷¹ As such, it seems unlikely that the wages are the same in every part of the manufacturing industry, especially since “China's manufacturing industry has experienced internal growth and has become a world leader in manufacturing export since the marketization reform and China's entry to WTO” and the Chinese labor force is “undergoing a structural transformation” as a Deloitte report in November 2011 noted. This is important considering a 2004 Gallup poll: most Chinese respondents say they own their homes, while rental is high in Beijing (40%) and Shanghai (18%), while it is lower in urban areas (14%).²⁷² Owning a home does not mean that a country is socialist, rather it means they are becoming more bourgeois!

There are a few other scattered media to address. The first of these is an article by Caroline Heuer on China's labor law in 2005.²⁷³ She writes that the Chinese market economy has evolved, accompanied by a “change in property rights,” with limited union activities until at least 2005 (not a good sign). Importantly, she notes that foreign direct investment (read capital) “is one of the most important engines of China's economic growth,” meaning that attracting and guaranteeing “necessary stability for foreign investors” is one of the major interests “in Chinese politics,” i.e. of the Chinese

271 Sean Ross, “[The 3 Industries Driving China's Economy](#),” *Investopedia*, Sept 15, 2015; Deloitte, “[Where is China's manufacturing industry going?](#)” (32 page pdf), Nov 2011.

272 “[Do you own or rent your home?](#),” Gallup, Mar 2005.

273 Caroline Heuer, “[China's Labour Law: An Effective Instrument of Workers' Representation?](#),” *China Analysis* 45, May 2005, varied pages of this 29-page PDF are used.

government itself, with over 60% of these investors from Asian countries, and only 21% of North America and Europe. The article goes on to say that with “economic success and growth” the market reforms were deemed more necessary, including “reforms” of SOEs, acceptance of private business, change in ownership of enterprises, introduction of the labor contract system in 1986 which ended the “guarantee of lifelong workplace,” and a withdrawal of formerly guaranteed social services, which some call “smashing the iron rice bowl.” Coupled with this, the study continues, was the state withdrawing from economic involvement, promoting outright capitalist development, and differentiating between the “interests of labour and management,” broadly enlarging the power of management, while new competition led to bankruptcies, leading to large numbers of unemployed workers! This article adds that the “Rapid economic development” in China is “mainly concentrated in the coastal regions,” with Western provinces lagging behind the “rampant economic take-off in the East,” while also noting that in agricultural regions, “disguised unemployment” is frequent, and that “disputes of workers have increased eightfold between 1994 and 2001.” No thanks to the revisionists for this development, of course. Furthermore, the gap between the urban and rural grew, while the CPC needs “an active...[or] at least...passive...support from the population” in order to prevent “massive public unrest.” As for the labor law in 1994, while it regulates issues “such as wages, working hours and affirms non-discrimination in the workplace,” in reality, as the article notes, “most of the companies still seem to follow their own guidelines.” Even with revisions in 2001, and growing power of the CPC-friendly union, All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), union activities vary between sectors, and the “complete enforcement of the articles in the law” seems to not be happening. Additionally, there is no uniformity of contracts across Chinese society, the article notes. Additionally, in what can be said to be another barb at revisionists, the study says that in 1982, the rights of the proletariat to strike was eliminated from the Chinese Constitution, claiming that because of SOEs it was not needed, and to this day workers “still do not have the right to strike”! The article paints an

unfortunate picture for the Chinese proletariat: while the labor law they focus on, last revised in 2001, prescribes similar labor conditions as those in Western Europe while allowing some kinds of worker participation through trade unions, certain governments “may tend to ignore certain laws in order to attract more investments.” At the same time, the labor movement is “comparatively small and uncoordinated” and unions do not have that much power. While the article concludes that “unions play an important role in almost every country’s political landscape,” it notes that the “Chinese framework seems to hinder the implementation of most of the articles” of the trade union law. They also point out that China’s economic development is “strongly bases on foreign direct investment,” which was attracted to China for its tax incentives, low labor costs, and huge potential market, but says this will not be hampered due to “high labour costs or strict rules.” With this, it seems this article pokes a hole more in revisionist argumentation than supporting it.

As such, we can move onto the next link from karlmarx.net.²⁷⁴ Its an article by Heiko Khoo, another revisionist. He begins by saying that “China’s rise in the world economy was produced by changes in work and the working class...there are two main categories of urban workers...traditional working class predominantly employed in state owned units, and migrant workers generally employed by the private sector or in enterprises of hybrid ownership” but he focuses on the migrant workers. After this, he writes about the ACFTU, formed in 1945, but became important in the Maoist period, and notes that the “the right to strike was eventually removed from the constitution in 1982 following the strikes in Poland led by Solidarity,” adding that the ACFTU “straddles the division of interests between capital, labour and the state.” Khoo writes that there is also a “division between the traditional and migrant urban workforce” with migrant workers predominating “in private sector urban employment” and market relations generating “new and wealthy social classes,” with capitalists cultivating “intimate connections with party and state power.” After 1978, he continues, there was the “strengthening of the

274 Heiko Khoo, “[Labour Relations in Urban China](#),” *karlmarx.net*, Nov 6, 2010.

private sector and the relaxation of central planning” and while “employment in urban workplaces grants access to basic level social services,” migrant workers “rarely enjoy full access to these services”! Furthermore, he writes, many of the migrant workers in the city “want to make the city their permanent home” and are more assertive, with those migrants whom are employed in manufacturing, “housed in mass dormitories,” with potential for organization but also for exploitation. The article goes onto say there was strong “resistance to privatisation and restructuring of state owned enterprises...in the late 1990s” with a concession to the proletariat, when reforming SOEs was “increasing lip service paid to the democratic management rights of the workers as defined in the constitution.” The article then says that there is “mounting worker discontent,” especially among migrant workers, some of whom are seen as a “serious threat to social stability,” with protests focusing on “rights specified in the law,” and there seems to be, he writes, “the development of a national workers’ consciousness.” He ends by writing that “workers’ discontent in state-owned and formerly state-owned enterprises often adopts workers’ democracy as its channel for expression through the staff and workers’ representative congress...It seems certain that the issue of the right to strike, democratic control of the unions, and workers’ representation will be rekindled soon, as these questions appear to be hardwired into contemporary Chinese labour relations.” This, however, does not, again, mean the state is socialist. It means the Chinese proletariat is becoming more energized, but that’s it.

The final article in scattered media is from *Workers World*.²⁷⁵ Griswold, in this article, writes that “according to all accounts, factory wages in China...have more than tripled in the last decade” and says that “inflation in China is low,” with reports in bourgeois media on the subject “directed at U.S. investors, cautioning them that if they want to do business exploiting workers in China, it’s going to cost them more than in the past.” The article goes onto declare that “Chinese wages have not zigzagged — they have risen at a very steady pace,” adding that there is a “struggle of the Chinese workers for a

275 Deidre Griswold, “[China, rising wages and worker militancy](#),” *Workers World*, Jul 21, 2015.

better life,” noting that “worker actions have grown tremendously” with workers gaining more power. However, Griswold rightly noted that “the rapidly growing working class has many grievances and is not passive...[since] in the late 1970s...China has opened up to capitalist ownership,” adding that supposedly “in order to modernize,” the CPC allowed “many features of capitalism” into China itself, yet he declares that “to call China a capitalist country is wrong,” although this denial is a weak point to say the least. Furthermore, he falsely claims that “long-term socialist planning is carried out” when in reality the remaining “plans” are actually just government strategy documents, nothing less, nothing more. This brings us to what was written in *Qiushi* in 2010: “large numbers of workers are forming an employee-employer relationship at the workplaces where they are hired as China reforms its economic system and undergoes rapid industrialization and urbanization...employment is becoming increasingly subject to market forces. For this reason the impact of labor relations on economic development and social stability is steadily growing, making labor relations a fundamental part of social relations in China.”²⁷⁶ This is not something anyone should applaud, but should cringe at the horrible effect that such a reality will have on the Chinese proletariat!

With this, we can move onto Chinese state media like *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, and varied other sources. The first article is from *Xinhua*.²⁷⁷ It declares that “China awards model workers, urges stronger labor unions” but gives no more specifics, which doesn’t help anyone with this analysis. The second one comes from *China Daily*. Focusing on a wage hike for migrant laborers, it quotes an official in Guangdong, Ou Zhenzhi, as saying that “the rise in minimum salaries” will help make Guangdong a “more appealing destination for migrant workers” from across China, while a professor at Sun Yat-sen University, Lin Jiang, is quoted as saying that “many employers will also have to increase their monthly salaries of their senior executives.”²⁷⁸ Additionally, the article summarizes the comments of a

276 Yang Zhiming, “[Developing Harmonious Labor Relations While Dealing with the International Financial Crisis](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.2 No.3, Jul 1, 2010.

277 “[China awards model workers, urges stronger labor unions](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 28, 2015.

278 Zhang Caixiong, “[Wage hike to benefit migrant laborers](#),” *China Daily*, Mar 3, 2011.

capitalist who “runs a paperboard factory in Foshan’s Nanhai district,” saying that such an increase in minimum wages will not only attract more migrant workers to the Guangdong area but it will help employers “recruit more workers in the future.” Finally, a migrant worker, Chen Xingwhen, is quoted, saying that “the higher pay will benefit the migrant workers in the province and encourage them to stay in Guangdong.” With this, it is less likely that “exploiters could take advantage of low-wage migrant labor flooding in from the rural interior” as Fred Goldstein once wrote in *Workers World*.²⁷⁹ However, they are still more exploited than other workers, experiencing social problems as they make a “living far from their families.” Just last year, tens of thousands of migrant workers were evicted from their homes, which the government claimed were “unsafe and overcrowded,” leaving some homeless and unable to afford new housing, moving back to their original villages.²⁸⁰ Such evictions were criticized openly by “more than 100 prominent Chinese intellectuals,” saying that “in our view, this is a vicious incident that breaks the law and tramples on human rights and should be resolutely stopped and rectified.” Luckily, the migrants are standing up for themselves and strengthening the labor movement,

279 Fred Goldstein, “[The struggle in China: Capitalist crisis versus planning](#),” *Worker’s World*, Mar 27, 2012; Shannon Tiezzi, “Report: China’s 1 Percent Owns 1/3 of Wealth,” *The Diplomat*, Jan 15, 2016; Sun Tingting, “I Am Sun Tingting, I Want to Speak Out,” within “[Locked Up for Reading Books: Voices from the November 15th Incident](#),” *Chuang* journal, Jan 18, 2018.

280 Matt Rivers and Serenitie Wang, “Beijing forces migrant workers from their homes in ‘savage’ demolitions,” CNN, Dec 9, 2017; Benjamin Haas, “China: ‘ruthless’ campaign to evict Beijing’s migrant workers condemned,” *The Guardian*, Nov 26, 2017; Didi Tang, “China’s 168 million migrant workers are discovering their labor rights,” *Business Insider* (reprinted from *Associated Press*), Apr 26, 2015; Tania Branigan, “Millions of Chinese rural migrants denied education for their children,” *The Guardian*, Mar 14, 2010; “[Sweatshops in China](#),” *War on Want*, accessed Apr 30, 2018; David McKenzie and Serena Dong, “China to migrant workers: Take your kids with you,” *CNN*, Feb 16, 2016; [Daniel Fu](#) Keung Wong, Chang Ying Li, and He Xue Song, “[Rural migrant workers in urban China: living a marginalised life](#),” *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Dec 12 2006; Xiaochu Hu, “China’s Young Rural-to-Urban Migrants: In Search of Fortune, Happiness, and Independence,” *Migration Policy Institute*, Jan 4, 2012; Quartz Staff, “The end of China’s hated hukou system is less ground-breaking than it seems,” *Quartz*, Jul 31, 2014; Audrey Jiajia Li, “[Beijing’s cruel eviction of its migrant workers is a stain on China’s urbanisation drive](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Nov 29, 2017; Therese Hesketh, Ye Xue Jun, Li Lu, and Wang Hong Mei, “[Health Status and Access to Health Care of Migrant Workers in China](#),” *Public Health Rep.* 2008 Mar-Apr; 123(2): 189–197; “Migrant Workers in Shanghai,” *The Borgen Project*, Aug 18, 2014; Cara Wallis, “[Hukou Reform and China’s Migrant Workers](#),” *China Policy Institute: Analysis*, Oct 10, 2016; James Pomfret and Kelvin Soh, “Special Report: China’s new migrant workers pushing the line,” *Reuters*, Jul 5, 2010; “The Plight of Chinese Migrant Workers,” *The Borgen Project*, Aug 13, 2015; Zhang Lulu, “[Documenting lives of Chinese female migrant workers](#),” *China.org.cn*, Mar 6, 2018; “[Beijing sees fewer native migrant workers in 2017: report](#),” *Xinhua*, Mar 19, 2018; Meiyan Wang and Fang Cai, “[Migrant workers key driver of Chinese consumption](#),” *East Asia Forum*, Dec 6, 2015; Michelle Chen, “[A Migrant Worker’s Death Sheds Light on China’s Labor Underground](#),” *The Nation*, Jan 2, 2015.

a positive sign since they have less rights than other workers despite the key role they have in driving Chinese consumption and are mainly part of the service sector.

With this, we can move onto four more articles in *China Daily*. The first of these says that the ACFTU “has helped more than 5 million migrant workers get unpaid wages totaling more than 30 billion yuan (\$4.5 billion) in the past five years.”²⁸¹ Sure, this is laudable, but it doesn’t change the reality of China one bit! The second article isn’t much different. It said that China issued a guideline “on improving work safety” and said that “China will not sacrifice safety for development.”²⁸² However, this does not change the fact that China is on the capitalist road and is not one ounce socialist. The next article was related to the previous one: it said that Chinese lawmakers are considering “imposing fines up to 5 million yuan (\$810,000) on enterprises involved in serious work safety accidents,” tabling the bill in question, or putting it off for future discussion.²⁸³ The final article focuses on boosting employment and making “further efforts to coordinate pensions across provincial regions to help cover more people.” In the article, Yin Weimin, minister of human resources and social security, was quoted as saying “We will continue the strategy to prioritize employment, especially to integrate with macroeconomic, industrial and financial policies, to create more jobs...we will provide high-quality services in employment, especially in internet-based services, to provide help to everyone who wants to find a job.”²⁸⁴ Taking this quote, rather than the summaries of his statements by *China Daily*, it is clear that China is taking a business-friendly approach, detestable to say the least.

Adding to this, we can move onto other Chinese state media. In September 2017, *Xinhua* reported that “local authorities in 18 provinces and municipalities had made progress in workplace

281 Hou Liqiang, “[Federation helps 5 million migrants recoup unpaid wages](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 25, 2017.

282 “[China issues guideline to improve work safety](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Dec 19, 2016.

283 “[China mulls higher fines to ensure work safety](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Aug 25, 2014. Dictionary.com defines “tabled” as a parliamentary procedure meaning, in the U.S. context, “to lay aside (a proposal, resolution, etc.) for future discussion, usually with a view to postponing or shelving the matter indefinitely.” In the British context, it means “to present (a proposal, resolution, etc.) for discussion,” a similar definition.

284 Hu Yongqi, “[Nation to reduce disparity in pensions, expand jobs](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 23, 2017.

safety,” adding that “despite regular demands for more focus on work safety, frequent tragedies still occur” due to a “lack of safety awareness, poor regulation and lax implementation of safety measures.”²⁸⁵ The other parts of the article just mean to buttress the Chinese efforts, of course. Even with a reduction in accidents, undeniably they still occur, with such an incentive for less safety under China’s capitalist model! Other articles talked about unions in China. One of these was from *People’s Daily*. It said that “Wal-Mart saw its first trade union in China established...in Quanzhou, southeastern Fujian Province” adding this was due to an effort from the ACFTU, going onto say that note that only “enterprises or institutions with 25 employees and above should establish trade unions,” implying that those beneath this number are not required to create such unions!²⁸⁶ Another article in *People’s Daily*, declared that “China’s workplace safety record has improved in recent years.” However, the article admitted that “problems remain in high-risk industries and many enterprises lack adequate safety capability.”²⁸⁷ Other articles in Chinese state media had similar stories. Some said that “labor cost in China will continue on the rise” with rising worker wages in 2011 and others focused on China’s labor contract law in 2008 while admitting it was not a “universal remedy.”²⁸⁸ There were also articles talking about rising wages, in 2015, in “south China’s Guangdong province,” except in Shenzhen, adding that “the continued interest of multinational companies in the Chinese market...will inject much vitality in the country’s job market and propel growth of employees’ salaries,” showing that the foreign bourgeoisie will benefit undoubtedly. Additionally, state media also reported rising wages in parts of China in 2016, a new workplace safety law in 2014, and the stimulus package in 2012 by the Chinese government. All “nice” measures, but it doesn’t change the class nature of the Chinese state.

285 “[China makes progress in workplace safety](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 1, 2017.

286 “[Wal-Mart establishes first trade union in China](#),” *People’s Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jul 29, 2006.

287 “[China Focus: China’s workplace safety improves](#),” *People’s Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Dec 23, 2014.

288 “[China Targets at Annualized Wage Rise of 15Pct](#),” *Caijing Magazine*, Apr 19, 2011; “[New labor contract law changes employment landscape](#),” *Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia*, Jan 2, 2008; “[Guangdong to raise minimum wage by 19%](#),” *Caijing Magazine*, Feb 27, 2015; “[Latest minimum wage standard in China released](#),” *CRI*, Dec 14, 2016; “[China’s workplace safety law to take effect](#),” *State Council of the People’s Republic of China*, Dec 1, 2014; “[China’s measures on improving people’s livelihood](#),” *Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China*, May 21, 2012, accessed May 1, 2018.

Finally, we get to the Western media accounts. On one hand, they talk about rising wages in China's manufacturing sector, in Beijing itself, labor protests in China, Chinese government efforts to "tackle" poverty, the efforts to create unions within Wal-Mart's China stores, with the sanction of the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, labor laws in China, strong worker actions, and a supposed decline in inequality (although it is still too high), along with varied other efforts.²⁸⁹ On the other hand, some talked about "rising inflationary pressure...growing concern over China's widening wealth gap" considering the continuing strong gap between the rich and poor, and workers still do not have the right to strike (eliminated in 1982)! This is while Chinese workers are some of the hardest working in the world, but that isn't something to necessarily cheer about. One article, in *Financial Times*, quoted Yu Yongding, a former adviser to China's central bank, as saying that "while China's living standards have dramatically risen over the past 30 years, the gap between rich and poor has sharply widened. With the contrast between the opulent lifestyles of the rich and the slow improvement of basic living conditions for the poor fomenting social tension, a serious backlash is brewing." This is the primary reason for such wage hikes: to maintain social order and appease the Chinese proletariat, resulting in popular movements that "work within the system rather than topple it, and treat the Communist Party as legitimate," serving as a "sort of release valve for popular anger."

289 "[Chinese wages now higher than in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico](#)," *Financial Times*, could not access whole article, could only read snippets like ones [here](#) and [here](#); Jamil Anderlini and Rahul Jacob, "[Beijing city to raise minimum wage 21%](#)," *Financial Times*, Dec 28, 2010; "[A tightening grip](#)," *The Economist*, Mar 12, 2015; Max Fisher, "[How China Stays Stable Despite 500 Protests Every Day](#)," *The Atlantic*, Jan 5, 2012; Elizabeth Stuart, "[China has almost wiped out urban poverty. Now it must tackle inequality](#)," *The Guardian*, Aug 19, 2015; Steve Wiggins and Sharada Keats, "[Rural wages in Asia](#)," *Overseas Development Institute (ODI)*, Oct 2014, not Western media, but related to it; Brendan Smith, Tim Costello, and Jeremy Brecher, "[Labor Rights in China](#)," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Dec 19, 2006; "[China's president encouraged Wal-Mart union](#)," *NBC News* (reprinting from *Associated Press*), Aug 18, 2006; Joe McDonald, "[Wal-Mart to Help Create Chinese Unions](#)," *Washington Post* (reprinting from *Associated Press*), Aug 10, 2006; Joseph Kahn and David Barboza, "[China Passes a Sweeping Labor Law](#)," *New York Times*, Jun 30, 2007; "[New labor law introduced in China](#)," *New York Times*, Jan 1, 2008; "[US boss Chip Starnes released from China factory](#)," *BBC News*, Jun 27, 2013; Dan Kopf, "[China's extreme income inequality finally appears to be falling](#)," *Quartz*, Mar 21, 2017; Tyler Prochazha, "[China's minimum income guarantee you've never heard of](#)," *Basic Income Earth Network*, May 16, 2016, not Western media but related; Tom Phillips, "[How hard does China work?](#)," *The Guardian*, Oct 6, 2015; "[The end of cheap China](#)," *The Economist*, Mar 10, 2012; Thomas Fuller, "[Sweatshop snoops' take on China factories](#)," *New York Times*, Sept 15, 2006; Alan Taylor, "[Images of China's Steel Industry](#)," *The Atlantic*, Jan 4, 2017; Tania Branigan, "[Chinese state steel workers beat private firm boss to death](#)," *The Guardian*, Jul 26, 2009.

The revisionist Roland Boer declares that China is not a “capitalist economy because it has markets” but declares that markets can exist under socialism, claiming that “planned economy is one phase of the wider reality of a socialist market economy.”²⁹⁰ He also declares that markets are not capitalist, and that there can be “socialist markets,” not realizing that markets and capitalism are interconnected. For China, he declares that “this is neither a capitalist market economy nor a ‘distorted’ version thereof...it is a socialist market economy, albeit one that has to survive and indeed engage with a capitalist market economy elsewhere.” However, the latter is a faulty analysis, although he admits, in some sense, that it is integrated into the global capitalist economy. This reality should be easy for any to see. For one, Chinese projects overseas continue to grow, as does direct investment, with Chinese investors, in January and February 2018, alone, “non-financial direct investment in 1,429 overseas enterprises of 135 countries and regions”!²⁹¹ This aligns with how Karl Marx defines capital. In one of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, he writes about how capital is the power to command labor, and stored-up labor, with examples including bonds and stock, the latter only when it “yields its owner a revenue or profit.”²⁹² Additionally, such projects connect with his argument that competition between capitalists increased accumulation of capital, leading to the “concentration of capital in few hands” as has happened in China. Such accumulation has been noted by well-meaning bourgeois scholars, who write that the top 0.001% in China, “the 10,653 richest adults,” own 5.8% of total wealth, “as much as the bottom 50%—the 531 million poorest adults”!²⁹³ That is not a sign of socialism, something that can save China, unlike the current capitalist model!

290 Roland Boer, “[A Marxist Trap? The Danger of Economics Imperialism, or, How to Understand a Socialist Market Economy](#),” *Stalin’s Moustache*, Apr 28, 2018; Roland Boer, “[Socialist market economy](#),” *Stalin’s Moustache*, Jun 20, 2017.

291 “[Brief Statistics on China’s Contracted Projects Overseas in January-February 2018](#),” *Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China*, Mar 26, 2018; “[Brief Statistics on China’s Non-Financial Direct Investment Overseas in January-February 2018](#),” *Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China*, Mar 26, 2018.

292 Karl Marx, “Profit of Capital” (part of First Manuscript), *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, *Early Writings* (ed. Quentin Hoare, New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp 295, 300.

293 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 32.

China and its healthcare system

There are many articles about China and its healthcare system. Western media accounts talk effort by China to have “universal healthcare” by 2020, the specifics which are not defined, declining suicide rates in China from the 1990s, and other efforts.²⁹⁴ The Chinese state media, on the other hand, is more propagandistic, in that they unabashedly support the efforts of the Chinese government, as one would expect. This includes a white paper on public health in China, nonprofit hospitals in China (but does not call them proletarian hospitals or something of that nature, showing the class nature of the state in supporting the bourgeoisie once again), HIV/AIDs treatment, the supposedly low murder rate in China, small improvement in life expectancy, and approving an Ebola vaccine.²⁹⁵ With this, we can move onto the scattered other media on the subject, linked by the /r/swcc folks. One of these articles was the continued revisionist defender in Latin America, *TeleSur English*, with an article noting a document of the Chinese government saying that health is a “basic human right.”²⁹⁶ Another was from the *South China Morning Post*. It said that a Guangzhou Fuda Cancer Hospital, largely not known to local residents, “has received over 30,000 overseas patients, many with advanced cancers,” raising questions of who China’s healthcare system serves! More critical was an article in *Health Policy*, with a timeline noting that a healthcare insurance system was set up under the Maoist period, becoming the Cooperative Medical Scheme on the rural level, “implemented in over 90% of villages, covering the vast majority of rural population” but collapsing in the 1980s, undoubtedly because of revisionist

294 Laura Robertson, “[China to Have Universal Healthcare by 2020](#),” *Christian Broadcasting Network*, Apr 6, 2009; “[Back from the edge](#),” *The Economist*, Jun 28, 2014; Austin Ramzy, “[China's New Healthcare Could Cover Millions More](#),” *Time*, Apr 9, 2009.

295 “[Development of China's Public Health as an Essential Element of Human Rights](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 30, 2017; Wang Xiaodong, “[Public hospitals to become nonprofit by 2020, State Council says](#),” *China Daily*, Jul 27, 2017; “[Over 600,000 Chinese with HIV/AIDS receive antiretroviral treatment](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 28, 2017; “[China has one of the lowest murder rates in the world](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *People's Daily*), Sept 22, 2017; “[Chinese life expectancy up to more than 76 years](#),” *China Daily*, Jul 27, 2017; “[Chinese average life expectancy increases by 8.6 years in 35 years](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 29, 2017; “[China approves Ebola vaccine](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Oct 20, 2017.

296 “[China Says Healthcare Access is a 'Basic Human Right'](#),” *TeleSur English*, Sept 29, 2017; Alice Yan, “[How an obscure Chinese hospital became a beacon of hope for foreign cancer patients](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Oct 2, 2017;

efforts.²⁹⁷ After years, “universal coverage” was not “achieved in China” with more than 95% of the population insured, until 2011, leaving many years of pain and suffering, from the 1980s to that point! Even worse is the fact that the current insurance system in China, as noted by the article has no government subsidies for urban employees and small subsidies by the government for others, while general outpatient care for urban children, students, unemployed, disabled and rural residents is not covered by all of China’s cities! Additionally, the Chinese “central government has not yet defined clearly the role for private insurance to play in China’s health financing system” leading to possible inequalities in care, and China now shares “some common challenges with other countries with universal health insurance coverage, such as quality improvement and cost control.”

Luckily, UNESCO was a bit more critical than the accounts which have been previously mentioned.²⁹⁸ They note that since the late 1970s, with the supposed “spectacular” economic growth, China has “experienced one of the fastest increases in income and wealth inequality in the world” during the same period, moving away from what is accurately described as “an egalitarian society with a planned economy and low income inequality.” They also write that not only did, after the 1970s, wage and income inequality increase, especially in SOEs, but with decreasing employment in the state sector, “employment in private enterprises and joint-venture firms increased very rapidly, as did self-employment,” leading private-sector employment to exceed employment in the state sector by 2000. Additionally, the article notes, the rural-urban income gap grew, income inequality increased in rural China, with a reduction in inequality due to a rise in wages, along with a shift in social policy, including raising the amount of consumption, and sharing economic gains, which may sound socialist to some, but still works within their horrid capitalist model as the bourgeoisie will keep their wealth.

297 Hao Yu, “[Universal health insurance coverage for 1.3 billion people: What accounts for China’s success?](#),” *Health Policy*, Vol. 119, Issue 9, September 2015, Pages 1145-1152, link to “Table 1. Milestones in the evolution of China’s Health Care Financing Systems, 1949–2011.” Also used “Table 2. Summary of China’s Three Public Insurance Programs, 2011” above.

298 Li Shi, “[Recent changes in income inequality in China](#),” UNESCO, 2017, accessed May 1, 2018.

China and its infrastructure

There are varied articles about China and its infrastructure. The /r/swcc document only lists one article in Western media, from *Bloomberg* news.²⁹⁹ This article declares that “China spends more on economic infrastructure annually than North America and Western Europe combined,” quoting a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, which also says that “at current rates of investment, China, Japan, and Australia are likely to exceed their needs between now and 2030.” So, this isn’t be praised as something we can all stand around and cheer about. With this, its worth looking at the full report itself. It does note what *Bloomberg* reported, it also says that China is engaging in “overinvestment,” with Qatar engaging in widespread annual infrastructure spending as well, if measured as a percentage of GDP, with just about 51% of the population without internet access when the report was written.³⁰⁰

Of course, more of a part of the /r/swcc document are the varied links from Chinese state media. They note that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a loan to improve “infrastructure and living environment in a prefecture of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region,” a new high-speed railway in China, a huge water transfer project in China, efforts to improve internet access, a new canal in China, among other infrastructure such as highways.³⁰¹ Such infrastructure does not mean the state is socialist, but is instead a society of law and order, stopping social conflict over their capitalist model.

299 Peter Coy, “[China Spends More on Infrastructure Than the U.S. and Europe Combined](#),” *Bloomberg*, Jun 15, 2016.

300 McKinsey Global Institute, “[Bridging global infrastructure gaps](#),” Jun 2016, pp 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18.

301 “[ADB approves 150 mln USD loan to improve infrastructure in Xinjiang](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 2, 2017; Luo Wangshu, “[China's high-speed railway changes civil aviation industry](#),” *People's Daily*, Sept 10, 2017; Lao Wangshu, “[High-speed rail trips get easier as network expands](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 11, 2017; “[Biggest water transfer project ever benefits 100 million in China](#),” *People's Daily*, Jun 12, 2017; “[China to improve Internet speed, cut fees](#),” *Xinhua*, May 14, 2015; “[High-speed railway linking Guiyang, Guangzhou starts operating](#),” *China Daily*, Dec 16, 2014; “[China's new grand canal brings water to arid north](#),” *People's Daily*, Dec 16, 2014, they act like there is false continuity from Mao to the present: “The project was conceived by late Chinese leader Mao Zedong in 1952 but only approved by the State Council in December 2002, after nearly half a century of debate”; “[China Focus: Beijing-Shanghai railway speed rises to 350 kph](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 21, 2017; “[Scenery of high-speed rail networks in south China's Guangxi](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 25, 2017; “[Modern manufacturing, transport help six Chinese provinces develop fast](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 26, 2017; “[Lanzhou-Chongqing railway to open to traffic on Sept. 29](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 28, 2017; Tan Yingzi and Ma Chi, “[New rail line connects northwest, southwest China](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 29, 2017; “[Xinjiang to make record-high investments in transportation infrastructure](#),” *China Daily*, Mar 15, 2017; “[Amazing China - Mega Projects 1](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 11, 2017; “[Amazing China - Mega Projects 2](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 11, 2017; “[Highways improve transportation in SW China's Tibet](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 14, 2017; “[Farewell, wooden railway ties in Zhengzhou Railway Station](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 13, 2017; “Reinforcement project of Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge completed,” *China Daily*, Nov 13, 2017.

Other Chinese state programs

There are a host of other Chinese state programs which Western revisionists get giddy about. One of these is the social security system in the country. However, the link provided in the /r/swcc, from the *China Labor Bulletin*, notes that “despite government attempts to increase pension and other social insurance coverage, the majority of workers still lack an effective social welfare safety net, and, as the workforce gets older, strikes and protests over the failure of employers to pay social insurance have now become a regular occurrence across China.”³⁰² The bulletin goes onto say that “in general, as with nearly all labour legislation in China, enforcement of the *Social Insurance Law*, even its most basic provisions, has been very lax, and the majority of workers are still denied the social security benefits they are legally entitled to.” This shows that the revisionist arguments on this topic are faulty, at best, dishonest, at worst. Next is an article from *China Daily* declaring that “China now has the world's largest higher education system,” with 37 million students.³⁰³ However, there are urban-rural disparities in education, and “college education are not compulsory and free in China”! So much for the revisionist claims of socialism!

State media blabbers on this subject. Articles talk about China’s pension system, which the *China Labor Bulletin*, previously quoted, noted was flawed, China’s manned space program, China’s “scientific achievements” and a new program for organ donation.³⁰⁴ Topping this is an article in *Qiushi* declaring China’s “progress” in fighting natural disasters, in which they say that “...China has committed to a model in which the government takes the lead [in disaster relief], the various sectors of society are encouraged to participate, and the role of market mechanisms is brought into play...China

302 “[China’s social security system](#),” *China’s Labor Bulletin*, accessed May 1, 2018.

303 Zhao Xinying, “[China has world's largest higher education system](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 28, 2017; Shannon Tiezzi, “Report: China’s 1 Percent Owns 1/3 of Wealth,” *The Diplomat*, Jan 15, 2016; “[China Education](#),” *China Education Center, Ltd*, last updated 2017.

304 “[China unveils unified pension system](#),” *Caijiang* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Jan 15, 2015; “[Milestones of the country's manned space program](#),” *China Daily*, Jun 28, 2017; “[China’s latest scientific achievements](#),” *China Daily*, 2017; Yuan Quan and Gao Bei, “[Organ donation program moves into overdrive](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 14, 2017; Li Liguang, “[China’s Progress in Coping with Major Natural Disasters](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Oct 1, 2013.

has also made efforts to introduce market mechanisms into disaster reduction and relief efforts.” That sounds undeniably capitalistic, although revisionists will deny this, of course.

We then get to Western and other media. Articles say that China will pay US teachers to be instructors for online classes, China supposedly testing an electromagnetic drive in space, China speeding ahead of US in “quantum communications and computing,” supercomputers in China, and China’s efforts to contact extraterrestrials.³⁰⁵ Other articles say that China’s urban population is exceeding those in rural areas, although such “rapid modernisation and demand for improved living standards is piling extra pressure on society and the already blighted environment,” and that China’s anthem protests are not progressive because they oppose China’s anthem (and support bourgeois democracy). Other articles shared by /r/swcc include a letter by one individual, apparently a somewhat prominent lawyer in New York state, claiming that prisons in China emphasize rehabilitation, but this questionable as this letter was written in 1989 and it is absurd to say that conditions have remained the same in China’s prisons since then! Following this are two images. One of them shows rising Chinese employment from 1952 to 2010 and another shows a growing share, from 1990 to 2013, of Chinese workers in “industry” and “Services,” both of which are undefined terms.³⁰⁶ In sum, these images can’t really be analyzed, as their context, in terms of the publication and source, cannot be determined, and neither cites any sources for their numbers whatsoever! Most laughable, however, is the website called “In Praise of China,” a haven for revisionists, by Godfree Roberts. It makes the typical revisionist arguments, as anyone would expect, acting like everything you hear about China is wrong (not true).

305 [“If the U.S. Won't Pay Its Teachers, China Will,”](#) *Bloomberg News*, Dec 19, 2016; Fiona MacDonald, [“China Claims It's Already Started Testing an EM Drive in Space,”](#) *ScienceAlert*, Dec 22, 2016; Tim Johnson, [“China speeds ahead of U.S. as quantum race escalates, worrying scientists,”](#) *McClatchy News*, Oct 23, 2017; [“China dominates top supercomputers list,”](#) *BBC News*, Nov 13, 2017; [“What Happens If China Makes First Contact?,”](#) *The Atlantic*, Dec 2017; Michael Sheetz, [“Air Force general says China is advancing in space five times as fast as the US,”](#) *CNBC*, Nov 10, 2017; Peter Simpson, [“China's urban population exceeds rural for first time ever,”](#) *The Telegraph*, Jan 17, 2012; Ajit Singh, [“Unlike 'Take a Knee' Movement, China's Anthem Protests Not Progressive,”](#) *TeleSur English*, Nov 12, 2017; Sidney Z. Searles, [“Chinese Prison Emphasizes Rehabilitation,”](#) *New York Times*, Jan 3, 1989; [“Sidney Z. Searles — R.I.P.,”](#) *Gideon's Trumpet*, Dec 20, 2007.

306 [“Chinese employment, by industry,”](#) data comprises years 1952 to 2010; [“China employment by Type 1990 to 2013,”](#) data comprises years 1990 to 2013.

The /r/swcc folks then move onto China's social credit system. I'll start here with a *Business Insider* article I found on my own.³⁰⁷ It says "like private credit scores, a person's social score can move up and down depending on their behaviour" with secret methodology, with certain infractions including "bad driving, smoking in non-smoking zones, buying too many video games and posting fake news online" with some people already pushed with restricted travel, and some even banned from management jobs in big banks and state-owned firms, with one Chinese entrepreneur (read small capitalist) quoted as praising the system as keeping order by keeping people's behavior positive. That leads us to the policy itself.³⁰⁸ This system is an important part of the country's market economy and social governance system, with the idea of creating a "sincerity culture, and carrying forward sincerity and traditional virtues." Furthermore, the policy says this is needed to forge a "desirable credit environment, raising the overall competitiveness of the country" with the creation of a financial credit information database for "small and micro-enterprises." The policy further said that such a system was necessary because of the expanding "credit services market," the fact that the "modern market economic is a credit economy," requiring rectifying and standardizing the order of the market economy, and the affects of becoming one with the global capitalist system. The policy further declares that it is about "economic and social order," fostering development of the "economic and social order," encouraging "market subjects" (Chinese citizens) to "utilize basic credit information and third-party credit evaluation results, and make them into an important basis for inspecting the credentials of and evaluating bidders, deciding on contracts and signing contracts." It also says that construction of credit is connected to a reinforcement of "intellectual property rights" or rights of corporations and capitalists to control their products and information! It goes on to say this will stop anonymity online, have "online credit black list systems" for those with bad "social credit," and strengthen the country's systems of law

307 Alexandra Ma, "China has started ranking citizens with a creepy 'social credit' system — here's what you can do wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish you," *Business Insider*, Apr 8, 2018.

308 "Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)," *China Copyright and Media* blog, last updated Apr 15, 2015, first published Jun 14, 2014.

and order! This is worrisome, to say the least. After all, as some media has pointed out, “China’s credit-fueled investment and export-led development model” will likely be the primary driver “of the sharp increase in income inequality over the last three decades”!³⁰⁹ Others argued that in China there are the outlines of a system “to promote investment in big business, the extraction of profit from industry” which can still “still create financial bubbles or over-extension of credit” while it also, “in key ways...serves the interests of productive accumulation.”

This addressed, there is another article worth addressing. It by bourgeois scholar Sebastian Heilmann.³¹⁰ He writes that decentralized experimentation came out of the Dengist “economic transformation,” shaping policies of “rural decollectivization, foreign economic opening, the promotion of private business, state-sector restructuring and stock market regulation,” with a focus on policy instruments rather than policy objectives, but that the “methodology and terminology of policy experimentation used by contemporary Chinese policy-makers date from the revolutionary experience of the CCP” in that there was “local policy experimentation” during the pre-revolutionary (before 1928-1949) and Maoist periods. Heilmann adds that “in 1950, CCP directives instructed top cadres to take the lead personally in implementing land reform experiments,” with the 1953–56 land reform in North Vietnam even “designed by a team of experienced Chinese cadres”! Such efforts in the 1950s were designed to “contribute to cooperativization, plan fulfillment and overall technical and organizational innovation,” with ideological strengthening by the early 1960s, with “experimental programs” throughout the 1950s and 1960s. By the post-Mao, Dengist period, the Chinese leadership, led by Deng, impatiently pushed for “rapid economic growth,” refining the objective of policymaking from a “utopian qualitative goal” like completing socialist transformation to a “worldly quantitative goal” like the goal of raising China’s GDP between two different points of time. This goes beyond any

309 Hazrat Hassan, “The gap between China’s rich and poor is growing,” *Foreign Policy News*, May 17, 2016; “[Costas Lapavistas: Money, money, money](#),” *Historical Materialism*, accessed May 1, 2018.

310 Sebastian Heilmann, “[From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process](#),” *China Analysis* 58, Mar 2008, pp 1,3, 4, 10-11, 13-14, 25-26, 27, 28.

similarities in certain strategy in the Dengist and Maoist eras, especially since in the Dengist era no work teams have been used, and formal legislation or regulation would be enacted, all differences from the Maoist era, for the worse, when it comes to the Chinese proletariat!

With this, we get to the final link provided by /r/swcc, a study by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on a declining share of agricultural employment in China.³¹¹ They begin in the abstract by talking about the drastic drop in the agricultural employment in China from 1962 (82%) to 2013 (31%), saying this is part of China's aspirations, and that China's "employment share will reach 5%, the share observed in today's rich economies, by 2042–2048." Later on, in the report, it noted that employment in agriculture continued to decline, but employment in services and industry is rising, connected to the planned reforms put forward by the CPC, including "increasing the role of markets in resource allocation, modernizing the tax system, relaxing and eventually eliminating the hukou system, and creating an open-door policy." They also note that between 1962 to 1975, Chinese working in agriculture dropped 15%, but in the Dengist period it fell to about 50% in 2000, and then 29% between then and 2013! Other measures show that while the agricultural sector was declining as part of the GDP (from 40% to 30%) during the Maoist period, the industrial sector was rising to almost 50% by 1978, showing that China was not in "shambles" when the Dengist period began in full force, after taking power in what could be described as a coup, two years earlier, in 1976. All of the ADB's estimates say that the agricultural employment share will become 5% sometime in the 2040s. The results will be horrible for the Chinese proletariat, as the ADB adds that "with the enhanced role of markets in resource allocation, financial markets stand to become more competitive and efficient investment decisions will alter the composition of sectoral employment in the process." If this occurs, any effort to return to collectivization in China will be a waste, as few will be in agriculture anymore!

311 Jesus Felipe, Connie Dacuycuy, and Matteo Lanzafame, "[The Declining Share of Agricultural Employment in the People's Republic of China: How Fast?](#)," *Asian Development Bank*, Working Paper No. 419, Nov 2014, pp 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, to name the pages used above.

Communist Party of China and ideology

This section of the /r/swcc was populated with links. The first was for *Qiushi*, with a reported circulation of a little over a million individuals as of September 2011. This journal is purely Dengist, without question. This is evidently the case not only because was “founded on July 1, 1988,” replacing the *Hongqi* (Red Flag), “published from 1958 to 1988,” the characters of which were “written by Chairman Mao Zedong,” but that the Chinese characters for *Qiushi* “are in the handwriting of Deng Xiaoping and have become a striking logo of the magazine”!³¹² This shows that *Qiushi*’s mission, to “publicize the governing philosophy of the CPC...provide...readers with timely, accurate and authoritative articles translating and explaining what is happening in China and why...[and] give...large space to theoretical analysis and review of China’s progress,” is corrupted by the fact it is a Dengist journal. Considering that “about 60 percent of the articles are written by the Party and state leaders and senior officials at the ministerial or provincial level,” and that it has a “large readership consisting of Party, government and military leaders at various levels,” along with varied other affiliates like Red Flag Press, *Red Flag Manuscript*, *Hongqi Pictorial*, *Insight China*, and the *Qiushi* Film & TV Center, this allows revisionism to flourish on this website. Just take the latest issue of *Qiushi*. There’s the address by Xi to the 19th National Congress in which he embraced falsely conceived and named “market socialism” (also given the false moniker “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) but praised, in the last five years, the steady improvement of “new institutions of the open economy,” declaring that “China now leads the world in trade, outbound investment, and foreign exchange reserves.”³¹³ In this speech, he also said that “we have taken comprehensive steps to deepen reform swiftly but steadily, and worked with resolve to remove institutional barriers in all areas” while also declaring that “China’s cultural soft power and the international influence of Chinese culture have increased significantly.” A

312 “[About the Qiushi Journal](#),” *Qiushi*, Sept 9, 2011.

313 Xi Jinping, “[Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No.34, originally printed in *Xinhua* on Oct 27, 2017.

victory for the Chinese leadership, indeed. He also told them about “improved living standards,” so-called “ecological civilization,” building a “powerful military with Chinese characteristics,” maintained China’s sovereignty, worked to create “a favorable external environment for China’s development,” while he admitted that “China’s ability to innovate needs to be stronger, the real economy awaits improvement, and we have a long way to go in protecting the environment.” Hmm, so how much progress has there really been on the environment? He later explains that China can now serve as a model for “other developing countries,” adding that China needs to “continue to reform and open up, be self-reliant, hardworking, and enterprising.” Seems like this will all benefit the capitalist model, while he uses Marxist rhetoric throughout, trying to act like there is a continuity from 1949 to present in China, even though anyone with sense knows there isn’t. After all, he later says that China “will inspire and protect entrepreneurship, and encourage more entities to make innovations and start businesses...[we will] improve the system for separating the ownership rights, contract rights, and management rights for contracted rural land...the current round of contracts will be extended for another 30 years upon expiration. We will press ahead with reform of the rural collective property rights system, safeguard the property rights and interests of rural people, and strengthen the collective economy,” capitalist statements without question. The same can be said where he adds that “in our economic reforms, we must concentrate on improving the property rights system and ensuring the market-based allocation of factors of production, so that property rights act as effective incentives. We should ensure free flows of factors, flexible prices, fair and orderly competition, and that business survival is determined by competition...We will further reform of state-owned enterprises, develop mixed-ownership economic entities, and turn Chinese enterprises into world-class, globally competitive firms...China will not close its door to the world; we will only become more and more open.”

The other links are similar. One is an article by Li Zhanshu saying that “China’s development is increasingly integrated, interrelated, and interactive with the outside world, and China is moving closer

to center stage,” also focusing on strengthening the CPC and using nationalist sentiment.³¹⁴ Another was an article by Yang Jiechi saying that Chinese diplomacy, including the Belt and Road Initiative, “serves to foster a favorable external environment for China’s reform, development and stability, making great new contributions to global peace and development,” but also seems to indicate the capitalist class is growing in strength with support for “interests” and rights of China:

[in the past five years] we have safeguarded China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests and protected our legitimate rights and interests abroad. Over the past five years, with a firm commitment to national sovereignty and security as the number one priority, we have resolutely safeguarded our sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests. We have done this by drawing red lines on issues concerning China’s core interests, including those related to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and working to ensure that these lines are not crossed...we have formed and improved a system for protecting the interests of Chinese nationals and enterprises abroad, providing effective protection for their legitimate rights and interests...we must be more mindful of latent dangers and consider worst-case scenarios, with a view to effectively forestalling and fending off major risks and challenges that arise in the international arena, and safeguarding our country’s sovereignty, national security, and development interests with firm resolve.

Other parts of the most recent edition of *Qiushi* focused on celebrating the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi embracing Hong Kong while admitting that “Hong Kong’s previous capitalist system and way of life have stayed the same, and its laws have remained basically unchanged.”³¹⁵

314 Li Zhanshu, “[Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Has Entered a New Era: A Comprehensive Analysis](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No.34; Yang Jiechi, “[The 19th CPC National Congress and China’s Major Country Diplomacy in the New Era](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No.34.

315 Wang Qishan, “[Starting a New Era and Stepping Out on a New Journey](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No.34; Xi Jinping, “[Address at the Meeting Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong’s Return to the Motherland and the Inaugural Ceremony of the Fifth-Term Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region](#),” Oct-Dec 2017, Vol.9, No.4, Issue No.33.

Following this is a link to the most recent constitution of the CPC, which uses all sorts of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, yet it admits that “...the principal contradiction in Chinese society is that between the ever-growing needs of the people for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development...a certain amount of class struggle will continue to exist for a long time to come, and under certain circumstances may even grow more pronounced” while also saying that the CPC must “encourage some areas and some people to become well-off first”!³¹⁶ This belays their other messages, which revisionists would cheer over, since the CPC is dedicated toward “encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of the non-public sector” and giving play “to the decisive role of market forces in resource allocation and ensure the government plays its role better, and establish a sound system for macroeconomic regulation.” Even worse is the “Communist Party of China in Brief” published in 2006. They admit that “from 1921 to 1949, the CPC led the Chinese people in their arduous armed struggle and finally succeeded in overthrowing the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC),” and that the CPC, after the PRC was founded, “led the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in defending the independence and security of the country, successfully completing the transition from new democratic revolution to socialist revolution, carrying out systematic large-scale socialist construction, and achieving economic and cultural progress unparalleled in Chinese history,” they then praise the Dengist period, declaring it to be “the biggest change in the history of New China,” carrying out the “reform and opening-up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping” with “remarkable success.”³¹⁷ And the membership is open toward capitalists, as they can be part of “any advanced element of other social strata” along with any “Chinese worker, farmer, member of the armed forces, [or] intellectual.”

With this, we get to the National Congress of the CPC, which is a bit elitist, as “a large

316 “[Constitution of the Communist Party of China](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No. 34.

317 “[Communist Party of China in Brief](#),” *Communist Party of China*, Jun 18, 2006.

proportion of the delegates are model Party members who have made outstanding contributions to economics, science and technology, national defense, politics and law, education, public relations, public health, culture, and sports.”³¹⁸ Also, there is undeniably strong revisionism within the CPC.

The latter section connects to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the legislature of China and “highest level of state power,” with deputies elected through “democratic elections,” as an FAQ for the legislature declares. This same document says that “the Presidium of the National People’s Congress may introduce a bill to the National People’s Congress for due consideration during its current session,” while adding that the Chinese army, officially called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), “elects its own deputies to the National People’s Congress by a system of electoral servicemen congresses,” along with a number of other specifics.³¹⁹ Related to the NPC is the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). It is defined as a “united front organization with wide ranging representation. It is an important organ of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC,” a bit like the similar united front organizations in Juche Korea or Syria, to give some examples. This doesn’t change the central role of the CPC however. Connected to this is the concept of the “Chinese Dream,” a nationalist conception declaring that “China must continue to follow the Chinese way of development, elevate the Chinese spirit, and boost national cohesion” and to bring “peace, development, cooperation and prosperity for all, benefiting not only the Chinese people but also the people of the rest of the world,” which is laughable considering the harm China has done to world peace in the past!³²⁰

Related to this is talk about China’s political system, also using links from official Chinese

318 [Communist Party of China Q&A](#), Jun 23, 2006.

319 [NPC FAQs](#) (page 1), accessed May 1, 2018; [NPC FAQs](#) (page 2), accessed May 1, 2018; “[CPPCC FAQs](#),” accessed May 1, 2018; “[The National People’s Congress](#),” *People’s Daily*, accessed May 1, 2018; “[The National People’s Congress](#),” *Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China*, accessed May 1, 2018.

320 “[The Chinese Dream](#),” *China.org.cn*, Nov 18, 2014. Other concepts include: “[The System of People’s Congresses](#)”; “[Multiparty Cooperation and Political Consultation Under the Leadership of the Communist Party of China](#)”; “[The Two Centennial Goals](#)”; “[The New Normal of China’s Economy](#)”; “[Five Concepts for Development](#)”; “[Strategy of Innovation-driven Development](#)”; “[Made in China 2025](#)”; “[A New Model of International Relations](#)”; “[Community with a Shared Future](#)”; “[The Belt and Road Initiative](#)”

sources, which the /r/swcc folks used. Some gave overviews of China's political, legislative, and judicial systems as a whole, others were white papers of the Chinese State Council, talked about the structure of the state and reprinted the Constitution of China, which was discussed in the previous part of this publication in some detail.³²¹ Others included a white paper on "China's Political Party System" or reprinted the constitution of the CPC in 2013.

With this, we can move onto a concept called the "Three Represents."³²² This term was first posed by Jiang Zemin "during his inspection tour of Guangdong Province in February 2000," emphasized in May and October the same year, July of the next year, and May of the year following that, 2002. The term represents the "development trend of China's advanced productive forces," meaning that the "Party's basic nature determines that it must represent the development trend of China's advanced productive forces...the forces that ultimately determine how human society develops." It also means that "China must vigorously develop its productive forces and improve its economy so that it can gain greater initiative and a more favorable position in future competition in science and technology." Secondly the term represents "the orientation of China's advanced culture" meaning that society has to be oriented to the principles of falsely named and conceived "market socialism" with balanced "economic, political and cultural development is balanced and a good job is done in both material and spiritual civilization," meaning that citizens should be educated to "have lofty ideals, moral integrity, good education and a strong sense of discipline," along with varied Marxist rhetoric. The final component is "representing the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people" meaning that the CPC "must emphasize working for the interests of the

321 China Internet Information Center, "[China's Political System](#)," accessed May 1, 2018; "[Building of Political Democracy in China](#)," Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Oct 2005; China Internet Information Center, "[The Legislative System of China](#)," accessed May 1, 2018; "[Judicial system](#)," *gov.cn*, Aug 2005; China Internet Information Center, "[Structure of the State](#)," accessed May 1, 2018; "[Constitution of the People's Republic of China](#)," Full text after amendment on March 14, 2004; "[China's Political Party System](#)," Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Nov 15, 2007, Beijing; "[Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China](#)," Mar 29, 2013.

322 "[Three Represents](#)," *The 17th CPC National Congress*, Sept 29, 2007.

people more than ever before” and maintain “close ties with the masses,” and engage in other ideological work. As such, as “the unity of the Three Represents is a unity not only in theoretical logic but also in practice...the important thought of Three Represents is developing and advancing.” This seems to easily fit with China’s capitalist model, as the productive forces can easily be defined as capitalist enterprises, which are said to have “played a significant part in the long-term rapid development of the Chinese economy,” and “diverse market entities” such as SOEs, since, to quote from a recent Chinese government press release, “the government has been unwavering in its support of the private sector since its reform and opening up 40 years ago, and has promised more efforts to improve the business environment, maintain stable policy expectations, and protect their rights and interests.”³²³ As such, the Chinese capitalist model is booming more than ever.

The next concept is the idea of “Harmonious Society.” In the page explaining this concept it is declared that “...some drawbacks of the planned economy still remain and the market economy is neither mature nor complete. Our society has many contradictions and uncertain factors in it, such as huge gaps in income, increasingly serious problems facing rural areas, farmers and agriculture, the drainage of farmland, heavy pressure in the workplace and an incomplete social security system.”³²⁴ This term broadly means, they declare, that people will be put first and “all social activities beneficial to people's subsistence, enjoyment and development...the political environment [will be]...stable, the economy [will be]...prosperous, people [will] live in peace and work in comfort and social welfare” will improve. That may sound nice, however, it says that “people's living standards should increase gradually,” and that in such a society “people at all levels respect each other”! What about the Chinese capitalist class? Are the Chinese proletariat just supposed to surrender to them? Even worse is the evident element of competition, a capitalist trait, within this concept: “a harmonious society should see

323 “[Private sector significant to Chinese economy: NBS](#),” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, *Xinhua*, Apr 15, 2018.

324 “[Harmonious society](#),” *The 17th CPC National Congress*, Sept 29, 2007.

honest, friendly and harmonious relationships and just, fair and open competition between social members, regions and departments...competition will optimize the distribution of resources, foster technological progress, develop social productivity and raise overall national strength.” The description of this concept goes onto declare that “we can get rid of social unrest and the destruction of natural resources that generally occurs in developing nations” and that “a harmonious society should also see great improvements in morals and education...a harmonious society is a society with the rule of law, where there is ordered market competition, strict market management and standard market behaviour.” Before they get there, the Chinese admit that “building a harmonious society is a long and gradual process,” saying that they need to “maintain sustainable and rapid economic development...uphold the principle of governing the country by law...increase employment opportunities, alleviate employment pressures and gradually establish a perfect social security system...raise the income of low-wage earners and increase the size of the middle classes...[and] narrow the gap between income and living standards” in order to “avoid polarization and social contradictions.” Basically, they don’t want the masses realize that the Chinese capitalist model is flourishing. After all, there isn’t supposed to be class conflict in such a society since “all people should co-exist harmoniously, love and help each other, encourage each other and make an effort to contribute to the building of a harmonious society” which seems laughable considering the current state of China and the trajectory it is on as it continues to stay on the capitalist road without question.

Before moving onto the gaggle of articles on varied subjects, it would be best to analyze articles on differing subjects. Two of the articles within the /r/swcc document relate to the size of the CPC. The first of these, in 2016, says the CPC is almost 89 million members, a 1.1% increase from the previous year, with most members, it admits, “were recruited between 1979, when China started reform and opening up, and 2012,” meaning they were recruited during the Dengist period, making it no surprise that falsely conceived and named “market socialism” is still pushed by the CPC as a whole! The article

also notes that while many state enterprises “have resident Party organs,” they are only present in “half of all private enterprises and 41 percent of social organizations,” within which they do not “interfere in commercial operations but will watch for malpractice and pass on central instructions.”³²⁵ Hence, as I’ve said before, the CPC is complicit in the exploitation of the Chinese proletariat! The second article is similar. It states that the membership of the CPC rose less than 1 percent from the previous year, for a total of about 90 million members.³²⁶ That still, for the over 1 billion in China itself, is a small number, showing that the CPC is a small group comparably to the entire population! This raises questions of how representative the organization is, on the whole. Additionally, the size of the CPC does not indicate that the Chinese state is “socialist,” but shows its continuing influence. The same can be said for the “People’s Congresses” in China. Considering the composition of the CPC, in that the members were broadly recruited after 1979, this means that these congresses become a beacon and festering ground for revisionism!³²⁷ This is further reinforced by the 100 billionaires within the Chinese parliament, among the body’s 2,980 members whom serve a five year term, according to the website of the inter-parliamentary union, showing the direct influence of capitalists in this legislature and making it clear, once again, that the state is not socialist, because if it was, then such individuals would not be allowed to hold and maintain office! That is something the revisionists don’t want to confront. More recent information says that 213 capitalists, on China’s rich list, are legislators, that three are delegates to the 19th Party Congress and nine are “vice chairmen of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce,” showing their influence.³²⁸

325 “[China Focus: CPC has nearly 89 mln members](#),” *Xinhua*, Jun 30, 2016.

326 “[CPC has nearly 89.5 mln members](#),” *Xinhua*, Jun 30, 2017.

327 “[Local People’s Congresses and Governments](#),” *China.org.cn*, Jul 2011; “[People’s Congress System](#),” *China.org.cn*, Nov 2012; Sophia Yan, “[China’s parliament has about 100 billionaires, according to data from the Hurun Report](#),” *CNBC*, Mar 2, 2017. The *CNBC* article also says that “the richest 209 parliament delegates are each worth more than 2 billion yuan (\$300 million) – their combined wealth is equivalent to the annual GDPs of Belgium and Sweden.” The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s website can be accessed [here](#). The Chinese parliament has the statutory requirement of 3,000 members, but is currently 2,980. This means that about 3.5% of the legislature are such capitalists. This is not including, of course, the legislators who are millionaires. Other articles [say it is 150 billionaires](#), rather than 100.

328 “[Hurun Report Releases China Rich List 2017 in Association with 36G](#),” Oct 12, 2017.

With this, we move onto the 1981 CPC resolution on “historical questions.”³²⁹ It begins with an overview of China’s history, specifically its struggle for liberation and victory of the Chinese revolution, followed by a summary of the years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, focusing on accomplishments and socialist industrialization. It is then that this resolution declares that in 1958 “the Great Leap Forward and the movement for rural people’s communes were initiated without careful investigation and study and without prior experimentation” which seems strange as such an effort would undoubtedly have been initiated only after careful thought and planning. So, this is a troubling statement. They add to this, complaining about ““Left” errors in the principles guiding economic work” during the 1960s, and outwardly condemn the cultural revolution, lasting “from May 1966 to October 1976,” declaring that it “was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People’s Republic,” invalidating all progress made during that period! Showing their true colors, after saying that the effort “proved that Comrade Mao Zedong’s principal theses for initiating this revolution conformed neither to Marxism, Leninism nor to Chinese reality,” they grumble that “the “cultural revolution” was defined as a struggle against the revisionist line or the capitalist road. There were no grounds at all for this definition. It led to the confusing of right and wrong...Many things denounced as revisionist or capitalist during the “cultural revolution” were actually Marxist and socialist principles.” Of course the revisionists would say something so monstrous! It is not surprise. The statement goes onto declare that “chief responsibility for the...“cultural revolution”...does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong” and declares it was good that such Maoists were overthrown:

The victory won in overthrowing the counterrevolutionary Jiang Qing clique in October 1976 saved the Party and the revolution from disaster and enabled our country to enter a new

³²⁹ Communist Party of China, “[Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People’s Republic of China](#),” adopted Jun 27, 1981

historical period of development...The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978 marked a crucial turning point of far-reaching significance in the history of our Party since the birth of the People's Republic. It put an end to the situation in which the Party had been advancing haltingly in its work since October 1976 and began to correct conscientiously and comprehensively the "Left" errors of the "cultural revolution" and earlier...It firmly discarded the slogan "Take class struggle as the key link," which had become unsuitable in a socialist society, and made the strategic decision to shift the focus of work to socialist modernization...Reforms in the system of economic management, including extension of the decision-making powers of enterprises, restoration of the workers' congresses, strengthening of democratic management of enterprises and transference of financial management responsibilities to the various levels, have gradually been carried out in conjunction with economic readjustment...It is necessary to have planned economy and at the same time give play to the supplementary, regulatory role of the market on the basis of public ownership. We must strive to promote commodity production and exchange on a socialist basis.

They do later try to hold up Mao Zedong Thought, but the damage is done: the revisionists in the CPC are against the efforts of the Maoist era, such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, while they move forward with market measures! Utterly disgusting. This is undeniably different from Liu Shao-chi's 1956 report in which he said that "China has become a great independent and sovereign country...the bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie...has been eliminated as a class on the mainland of China" and calling for further socialist modernization which would later be manifested in the Great Leap Forward or the CPC's defense of Stalin in 1963.³³⁰ The party was undeniably different in 1981 than it was in 1963, sadly for the Chinese proletariat.

³³⁰ Liu Shao-chi, "[The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China](#)," Sept 15, 1956; Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*) and *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*), "[On The Question Of Stalin: Second Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU](#)," Sept 13, 1963.

Fast forward to Hu Jintao, who was the leader of China from 2002 to 2012.³³¹ The folks of /r/swcc chose three of his speeches, of course, to show his relevance. The first of these speeches is Hu's report at 17th Party Congress in September 2011. In this speech, he says that China needs to "follow the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents," the latter of which we have described previously.³³² At the same time, as he continued to use Marxist rhetoric, he declares, basically, that capitalism in China has been strengthened in the last five years:

...Major breakthroughs were made in reform and opening up. Comprehensive reforms in rural areas gradually deepened; agricultural tax, livestock tax and taxes on special agricultural products were rescinded throughout the country; and policies were constantly strengthened to support and benefit agriculture, rural areas and farmers. Significant headway was made in reform of the state assets management system, state-owned enterprises, banking, public finance, taxation, investment, pricing, and the system for managing science and technology. The non-public sector of the economy grew stronger. A sound market system was being put in place, macroeconomic regulation continued to improve, and transformation of government functions was accelerated. The total volume of imports and exports increased sharply. Solid steps were taken in implementing the "go global" strategy

Later on, in this speech, he declared that "we must never forget that the great cause of reform and opening up was conducted on a foundation laid" by the "central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core," which is laughable, and basically says that the "second generation of central collective leadership" led by Deng, "saved" China and "repudiated the erroneous theory and practice of "taking class struggle as the key link."" He later declared that China will "improve the basic economic system and the modern market system," talked about the state sector but also said that China

331 After Mao, was Hua Guofeng (1976-1978), then was Deng Xiaoping from 1978 to 1989. Following this was Ziang Zemin, from 1989 to 2002. After Jintao was Xi Jinping, who has been the leader from 2012 to present.

332 Hu Jintao, "[Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress](#)," Qiushi, Sept 30, 2011.

needs to “unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public sector, ensure equal protection of property rights, and create a new situation in which all economic sectors compete on an equal footing and reinforce each other,” adding that we will “introduce the corporate and shareholding systems in state-owned enterprises...promote equitable market access...develop the economic sector of mixed ownership based on the modern system of property rights...accelerate the formation of a modern market system...[and] accelerate the growth of Chinese multinational corporations and Chinese brand names in the world market.” These are all worrying, to say the least.

Before moving onto Hu’s other two speeches, it is worth looking into what he means by the “taking class struggle as the key link.” It goes back to a statement by Mao Zedong: “never forget classes; never forget class struggle. Class struggle is the key link, everything else hinges on it” which reflects, as one group put it, “the historical and objective nature of socialism” and gives “the outlook that the working class has to have to move forward,” endorsed by the CPC in the autumn of 1962.³³³ This same group also said that the idea of class struggle as the key link means that “everything else hinges on the class struggle, that the class struggle must be taken up within and guide everything in society. It runs through all the movements, and ultimately guides the development of all the contradictions in society,” which some said the Gang of Four did not do, by negating “the need for the working class to wage the class struggle on all fronts.” The idea of “class struggle as the key link” was also expressed by Canadian and Norweigan communists while others said that “Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party have...recognized the necessity of initiating policies throughout the country that are aimed at restricting bourgeois right and creating the ideological and material conditions for communist society.”³³⁴ With this, perhaps it is best to quote from the *Peking Review* itself on the

333 Revolutionary Workers’ Headquarters, “[Red Papers 8: China Advances on the Socialist Road: The Gang of Four, Revolution in the US, and the Split in the Revolutionary Communist Party](#),” likely 1977.

334 Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), “[Two points to remember about class struggle and the class nature of the state – Make the rich pay! The only revolutionary path](#),” *People’s Canada Daily News*, Volume 6, Number 38, dated March 30, 1976; Eileen Klehr, “[China’s Continuing Cultural Revolution: Taking Class Struggle as the Key Link](#),” *Class Struggle*, Nos. 4-5, Spring/Summer 1976; “[‘Situation is Excellent’: China’s People’s Congress denounces ‘gang of](#)

subject. They write that the “capitalist-reader who refuses to mend his ways,” reportedly referring to Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping), denies the “existence of classes, class contradictions and class struggle in socialist society, oppose[s] taking class struggle as the key link and run[s] counter to the basic line formulated by Chairman Mao for our Party.”³³⁵ They further write that while the Chinese “have won great victories in socialist revolution in the past 20 years and more but class struggle has not died out. Members of the defeated class are still around, this class still exists and is still struggling and dreaming of a comeback,” adding that “people like the capitalist-roader in the Party [Deng] who has refused to mend his ways do not really want to abolish class struggle. What they are really after is to extinguish the struggle waged by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and fight the proletariat on behalf of the bourgeoisie...Their revisionist line is in fact detrimental to stability and unity and socialist production.” Another article adds that the essence of removing the idea of class struggle as the key link is connected with a programme aiming to restore capitalism, while Mao said that the dictatorship of the proletariat should be strengthened and revisionism combated, adding that capitalist roaders like Deng aid to “negate taking class struggle as the key link and tamper with the Party’s basic line.”³³⁶ Other articles noted Mao directly criticizing Deng, saying that he “does not grasp class struggle; he has never referred to this key link” and criticized his “theme of ‘white, cat, black cat,’ making no distinction

[four’](#),” *The Call*, Vol. 5, No. 33, December 20, 1976; Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), “[What are the issues involved in class struggle in China?](#),” *People’s Canada Daily News*, Vol 6, No. 114, November 18, 1976; “[Revolution and Production in China](#),” *The Call*, Vol. 5, No. 31, December 6, 1976; David Crook, “[The Masses Make History](#),” *Class Struggle*, No. 6, Winter 1976-77; “[A Communist View: Building Class Struggle Trade Unions](#),” likely 1976 or 1977; Workers’ Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) of Norway, “[CPC and People Continue Mao’s Revolutionary Line](#),” *Class Struggle*, International Bulletin of the Workers’ Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) of Norway, No. 10, June 16-October 16, 1977; “[World communists support Chairman Hua Kuo-feng](#),” *The Call*, Vol. 6, No. 3, January 24, 1977; Revolutionary Communist League (M-L-M), “[Editorial: RCL’s Position on the Gang of Four \(Part 1\)](#),” *Unity and Struggle*, Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1978. The quote from Mao is “What ‘taking the three directives as the key link’! Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link and everything else hinges on it” as noted in varied *Peking Review* articles.

335 Chih Heng, “[From Bourgeois Democrats to Capitalist-Roaders](#),” *Peking Review*, #13, Mar 26, 1976, pp. 6-8, 20.

336 “Criticism of “[Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link](#),”” *Peking Review*, #14, April 2, 1976, pp. 6-8; “[Beat Back the Right Deviationist Attempt to Reverse](#),” *Renmin Ribao* editorial of March 28, 1976, is reprinted from *Peking Review*, #14, April 2, 1976, pp. 4-5; Peking University, “[Criticizing the Programme for Capitalist Restoration](#),” *Peking Review*, #13, March 26, 1976, pp. 9-11; Editorial Departments of “Renmin Ribao,” “Hongqi” and “Jiefangjun Bao,” “[The Great Cultural Revolution Will Shine For Ever](#),” *Peking Review*, Vol. 19, #21, May 21, 1976, pp. 6-10; “Tsinghua University, “[Criticizing the Unrepentant Capitalist-Roader](#),” *Peking Review*, #14, April 2, 1976, pp. 9-10.

between imperialism and Marxism.” Other articles have a similar theme, saying that removing this concept is a step toward restoration of capitalism and negates class struggle, some directly naming Deng himself (calling him Teng Hsiao-ping based on the Wade-Giles Romanization system used for Mandarin Chinese) and others just calling him the “unrepentant capitalist-roader.” As such, Hu saying that the revisionists “repudiated the erroneous theory and practice of “taking class struggle as the key link,”” shows that the CPC has abandoned the proletariat and allied itself with the bourgeoisie, which has undoubtedly made a comeback!

With this addressed, we can effectively move onto two of Hu’s other speeches. The first is to the national congress of the CPC in November 2012.³³⁷ Within the speech, taking away his Marxist rhetoric, Hu engaged in continued support for Chinese nationalism while, not surprisingly, praising the further opening of China to the market:

...Major progress has been registered in reform and opening up. China's overall rural reform, the reform in tenure of collective forests and the reform of state-owned enterprises have been deepened, and the non-public sector of the economy has registered sound growth. The country's modern market system and macro-regulatory system have been steadily improved, and its reform of finance and taxation, banking, prices, science and technology, education, social security, medicine and public health, and public institutions has progressed steadily. China's open economy has reached a new level, and its import and export volume now ranks second in the world...We have staunchly protected China's interests and the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas...We should fire all types of market participants with new vigor for development, increase motivation for pursuing innovation-driven development, establish a new system for developing modern industries, and create new favorable conditions for developing the open economy...Deepening reform is crucial for

³³⁷ [“Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress,”](#) Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, Nov 27, 2012.

accelerating the change of the growth model. The underlying issue we face in economic structural reform is how to strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the market, and we should follow more closely the rules of the market and better play the role of the government. We should unwaveringly consolidate and develop the public sector of the economy; allow public ownership to take diverse forms; deepen reform of state-owned enterprises; improve the mechanisms for managing all types of state assets...we must unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public sector, and ensure that economic entities under all forms of ownership have equal access to factors of production in accordance with the law, compete on a level playing field and are protected by the law as equals. We should improve the modern market system and strengthen institutional procedures for setting macro-regulation targets and employing policy tools...We must strive to remove major structural barriers to sustained and sound economic development, with a focus on improving the demand mix and the industrial structure, promoting balanced development between regions and advancing urbanization...In response to new developments in economic globalization, we must implement a more proactive opening up strategy and improve the open economy so that it promotes mutual benefit and is diversified, balanced, secure and efficient...The strength and international competitiveness of Chinese culture are an important indicator of China's power and prosperity and the renewal of the Chinese nation. We should promote rapid development and all-around flourishing of the cultural industry...China will unwaveringly follow a win-win strategy of opening up and promote robust, sustainable and balanced growth of the global economy through increased cooperation.

Again, a clear indication that China is on the capitalist road without question. At a meeting commemorating the 90th anniversary of the CPC, in July 2011, Hu gave another speech. He said that the CPC “embarked on the path of reform and opening up with tremendous political and theoretical

courage and courage in practice,” further praising the establishment of “a socialist market economy and constantly improved it, made China fully open, and made world-renowned progress in the socialist modernization drive.”³³⁸ Such mentions of socialism can be justifiably laughed at. What he is talking about is capitalistic development without question.

At this point, we can first address the idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which is not socialism and is revisionist, along with being capitalistic, as I’ve noted in this publication and the previous one. This idea was posed by Deng in 1978, falsely declaring that a “new road of socialist construction” can be built by “utilizing capitalism...accelerating...modernization of China through utilizing foreign investment...building the frontlines and windows of opening to the outside world through establishing special economic zones...[and] starting a successful mode of utilizing capitalism” among other horrid elements!³³⁹ Before moving to the Chinese state media, it is worth noting a Western source on this topic, an article in *Boing Boing*. This article says that two “economists from Sichuan University propose a model for an efficient planned economy that uses a hybrid of managed, two-sided “platform” markets (modeled on Ebay, Alibaba and various app stores) and central planning informed by machine learning and big data to fairly and efficiently regulate production in a system in which all substantial assets are owned by the state.”³⁴⁰ It goes onto say that this somewhat “echoes the arguments raised by western left-wing thinkers in defense of high-tech planned systems, such as Peter Frase in “Four Futures” and Paul Mason in “Postcapitalism,” adding that “ubiquitous surveillance of participants in this planned economy would be a necessity.” This study is clearly nothing to celebrate as it is drowning in capitalist principles as it based on capitalist “efficiency” of corporations will exploit the proletariat of China and the world as a whole.

338 Hu Jintao, “[Speech At A Meeting Commemorating The 90th Anniversary Of The Founding Of The Communist Party Of China](#),” *Xinhua*, Jul 1, 2011. This was also reprinted in [China.org.cn](#) and by the CPUSA, of course.

339 Professor Liu Jianwu, “[What is Socialism with Chinese Characteristics?](#),” Hunan University of Science and Technology, 6 page PDF

340 Cory Doctrow, “[Chinese economists say Big Data can replace markets in planned economies](#),” *Boing Boing*, Sept 14, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018.

To finish out this discussion of Deng's brainchild, "socialism with Chinese characteristics," are five articles from Chinese state (and party) media. The first of these is from *Qiushi*. Of course, it is a speech by Xi.³⁴¹ He gives an overview of Chinese history, claims that Deng's brainchild is an achievement of the Chinese people (it is not), and asks the entire Party to "thoroughly study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development." Considering the amount of revisionism here, it will drown out any good from Mao's thoughts or Marxism-Leninism. Absurdly he declares that "reform and opening up...[is] the most salient aspiration of the CPC in a new period of history" but that it "must stay on the right course, neither going back down the rigid, closed-door path of the past, nor embarking on the erroneous path of changing our political direction" and continuing to "orient reform towards the socialist market economy." In other words, China will remain on the capitalist road, there will be no reversal.

The second article in Chinese media is from *China Daily*. It says that "President Xi Jinping's speech at a high-level workshop" of the CPC has inspired the "nation's confidence" in advancing Deng's brainchild, saying it should be ramped up, with further opening and other Chinese methods.³⁴² Again, this is a worrying sign. Following this is an article from *Xinhua*. It says that Deng's brainchild can share ideas to the world.³⁴³ Other than some supposedly social welfarist views, it says the idea of a strong ruling party, pooling resources, supposed democracy, ability to reform, an innovative market economy, maintaining social stability, win-win and sharing, following their own path, and cultural roots, are ideas that can be shared with the world. None of that sounds remotely socialist to me. After this is another two articles from *Xinhua*. The first is a photo of the "the scenery of Yeping Revolutionary Site in Ruijin City, east China's Jiangxi Province...the 'red capital' and a cradle of the

341 Xi Jinping, "[Speech at a Ceremony Marking the 95th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China](#)," *Qiushi*, Oct-Dec 2016, Vol.8, No.4, Issue No.29.

342 "[Xi's speech inspires confidence in socialism with Chinese characteristics](#)," *China Daily*, Jul 30, 2017.

343 "[China Focus: Socialism with Chinese characteristics: 10 ideas to share with world](#)," *Xinhua*, Oct 8, 2017, also see [page 2](#) as well.

Chinese revolution” since it was wear the “Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, was founded in Ruijin in 1931,” the forerunner to the People’s Republic of China.³⁴⁴ The second was about a top legislator, Zhang Dejiang, calling for “efforts to improve the socialist legal system,” ensuring every piece of “legislation is in compliance with constitutional spirit...[and] in strict accordance with the law.” Such a call for law and order doesn’t sound socialist, but rather just another effort to maintain the state’s legitimacy!

There are two more groups of links left addressing, before moving onto other topics. The first are speeches and works about and by Deng himself. The first declares that Deng “created a new historical period of reform and opening up...Mr. Deng thoroughly demonstrated a strategist’s strategic thinking, judgment, design and decision.”³⁴⁵ Other links from the same website, noted on the document assembled by /r/swcc mods, were similar. This includes Vol I and Vol II of Jiang Zemin’s “selected words” and Deng’s works.³⁴⁶ The first of these works is in May 31, 1980 on rural policy. In this speech he endorses changed farming practices, weakening collectivization (although he claims it won’t):

*...Now that **more flexible policies** have been introduced in the rural areas, the practice of fixing farm output quotas on a household basis has been adopted in some localities where it is suitable. It has proved quite effective and changed things rapidly for the better...Where farm output quotas are fixed by household, the production teams still constitute the main economic units...It is certain that as long as production expands, division of labour increases and the commodity economy develops, lower forms of collectivization in the countryside will develop into higher forms and the collective economy will acquire a firmer basis. The key task is to*

344 “[Aerial view of China's "red capital" Ruijin](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 2, 2017; “[Top legislator stresses socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 6, 2017.

345 Li Hongfeng, “[How Does Deng Xiaoping Create a New Historical Period?](#),” *TheoryChina*, Oct 21, 2016. This article also snarled that “The “cultural revolution” resulted in a ten-year-old turmoil and brought about severe calamities, incurring great costs to our Party, country and nation. The “left” wrongdoings can’t be continued and it is a must to correct those mistakes.” This is another common revisionist lie.

346 “Selected Works Of Jiang Zemin,” [Vol I](#), and [Vol II](#); Deng, “[On Questions of Rural Policy](#),” May 31, 1980. There’s also [a dead link](#) to a document on Google Drive.

*expand the productive forces and thereby create conditions for the further development of collectivization...Some comrades say that the pace of socialist transformation had been too rapid. I think there is some ground for this view...If the transformation had advanced step by step, with a period of consolidation followed by further development, the result might have been better...the main problem in rural work is still that **people's thinking is not sufficiently emancipated**. This problem manifests itself not only in the matter of determining the organizational forms of collectivization...We must not propagate one method and require all localities to adopt it. In publicizing typical examples, we must explain how and under what conditions people in these localities achieved success.*

Yet, such claims of not having one method overall was not followed, as there was a plan: decollectivization. If we accept his logic, it means that China has no unified plan! That is dangerous for the development of a country and undoubtedly weakens existing socialist modernization.

The next link is from a speech Deng gave in 1984, praising China's current "progress." After cheering the "defeat of the Gang of Four and the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the Party's Eleventh Central Committee," he declared that

Capitalism can only enrich less than 10 per cent of the Chinese population; it can never enrich the remaining more than 90 per cent. But if we adhere to socialism and apply the principle of distribution to each according to his work, there will not be excessive disparities in wealth. Consequently, no polarization will occur as our productive forces become developed over the next 20 to 30 years...We are suggesting that we should develop rapidly, but not too rapidly because that would be unrealistic. To do this, we have to invigorate the domestic economy and open to the outside world.

He follows this by saying that "no matter how successful our work is in the cities, it won't mean much without a stable base in the countryside," meaning that the market reforms began in the rural

areas at the “end of 1978, and after a few years it has produced the desired results,” in his words, declaring further that “we shall continue the reform at home and open still wider to the outside world.”³⁴⁷ He later claims that “foreign investment and advanced techniques” will not undermine socialism and is only a “slight risk,” understating the problems! As anti-revisionists pointed out in 1977, “it is necessary to fight the bourgeoisie tooth and nail on every front, to concede no sphere to them.”³⁴⁸ Clearly Deng does not have that view, willing to concede a sphere to them!

There are three more speeches of Deng worth addressing here. The first is his opening speech to the CPC in September 1982.³⁴⁹ He also posed idea of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” also said that China “unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and increase our exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit” and gave over bland statements. Next is a speech Deng made in 1992. In the speech he endorsed special economic zones, he claimed that the ““cultural revolution” was a civil war,” which obscures its role in the Maoist period. It was then he declared that market “reform” should move full-speed ahead, along with making typical arguments of revisionists (there is socialism in China and markets exist under socialism), and endorsing decollectivization as a “success”:

We should be bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the outside and have the courage to experiment. We must not act like women with bound feet. Once we are sure that something should be done, we should dare to experiment and break a new path...It will probably take another thirty years for us to develop a more mature and well-defined system in every field...Our plan is as follows: where conditions permit, some areas may develop faster

347 Deng Xiaoping, “[Build Socialism With Chinese Characteristics](#),” excerpt from a talk with the Japanese delegation to the second session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-Governmental Persons, Jun 30, 1984.

348 Revolutionary Workers’ Headquarters, “[Red Papers 8: China Advances on the Socialist Road: The Gang of Four, Revolution in the US, and the Split in the Revolutionary Communist Party](#),” likely 1977.

349 Deng Xiaoping, “[Opening Speech At The Twelfth National Congress Of The Communist Party Of China](#),” Sept 1, 1982; Deng Xiaoping, “[Excerpts From Talks Given In Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai](#),” January 18 – February 21, 1992, accessed May 2018.

than others; those that develop faster can help promote the progress of those that lag behind, until all become prosperous. If the rich keep getting richer and the poor poorer, polarization will emerge...The difference was not only over the special economic zones but also over the bigger issues, such as the rural reform that introduced the household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output and abolished the system of people's communes. Initially, in the country as a whole, only one third of the provinces launched the reform. By the second year, however, more than two thirds of them had done so, and the third year almost all the rest joined in...if we are to seize opportunities to promote China's all-round development, it is crucial to expand the economy...Since China opened its doors to the outside world, decadent things have come in along with the others, and evils such as drug abuse, prostitution and economic crimes have emerged in some areas.

Finally, there is the interview he gave in 1985 with Henry Grunwald, then the managing editor of *Time* magazine, Donald McHenry, Professor at the Institute of Diplomacy of Georgetown University and former U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Karsten Prager, then Editor of the international edition of *Time* magazine.³⁵⁰ In this interview he admitted problems with “graft and corruption and abuse of power,” and also declared to Grunwald that “there is no fundamental contradiction between socialism and a market economy” but then threw Maoist efforts under the bus: “we used to have a planned economy, but our experience over the years has proved that having a totally planned economy hampers the development of the productive forces to a certain extent.” He also grumbled that “the experience we have gained over the years shows that with the former economic structure we cannot develop the productive forces” and smiled with glee that “we have been drawing on some useful capitalist methods,” and claimed that the “policies of using foreign funds and allowing the private sector to expand will not weaken the predominant position of the public sector, which is a

350 Deng Xiaoping, “[There Is No Fundamental Contradiction Between Socialism and a Market Economy](#),” Oct 23, 1985.

basic feature of the economy.” He also declared, proudly, that “we are also employing some capitalist methods — but only as methods of accelerating the growth of the productive forces. It is true that some negative things have appeared in the process, but what is more important is the gratifying progress we have been able to achieve by initiating these reforms and following this road.” In response to McHenry, Deng declared that he is confident that the process of reform will continue, with new “changes.” Finally, in reply to Prager, Deng said that after his death, “I hope they will never give me too much prominence. What I have done represents the aspirations of the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists...Before the “cultural revolution” I was also one of the principal leaders of the Party, so I should also be held responsible for some of the mistakes made then. After all, no man on earth is without fault.” With that, we should undoubtedly hold Deng accountable for the dismantling of the wonders of the Maoist era, as he is definitely a person with fault.

With this, we move to a set of links about Xi and the governance of China. There were some that focused on a 486 page book on Xi and the governance of China (*Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*), released by the CPC, gave an overview of China’s “new leadership” in 2013, talked about the writings of Xi were popular at a book fair in 2017, and highlighted a speech Xi gave to the high-level individuals in the CPC.³⁵¹ Others focused on how some factory workers were apparently still “inspired” by Xi, a sign of continued nationalist sentiment, and efforts by Xi to deepen “reforms,” meaning continued market measures and undeniably more capitalism! Non-Western media talked about Xi’s speech at the opening of the CPC congress in 2017 and how Cambodian readers “fell in love” with Xi’s book, which was mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, Western media talked about Xi’s rise to

³⁵¹ Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*, 2014; “China’s new leadership: Ordinary lives and extraordinary dreams,” *China Central Television*, 2013; “Writings of Xi popular at book fair,” *China Daily*, Aug 26, 2017; “Highlights from Xi’s speech at a high-level workshop,” *China Daily*, Aug 25, 2017; Wu Yong, “Xi’s visit still inspires Shenyang factory workers,” *China Daily*, Sept 22, 2017; An Baijie, “Reforms crucial for the Chinese Dream,” *People’s Daily*, May 2, 2017; “Understanding China: Does Xi Jinping’s Speech Signify a New Era?,” *Sputnik*, Oct 19, 2017; “How Xi Jinping Went From Feeding Pigs to Ruling China,” *Bloomberg*, Oct 6, 2017; “Cambodian Readers Fall In-love With Xi Jinping’s Book,” *News Ghana*, Sept 21, 2017; “Xi Jinping: No Reformer After All,” *CNBC* (reprinted from *Reuters*), Jan 28, 2013; “Housing Should Be for Living In, Not for Speculation, Xi Says,” *Bloomberg*, Oct 18, 2017; Chris Buckley, “After Toiling in Rural China, Protégé of Xi Jinping Joins Party’s Top Tiers,” *New York Times*, Sept 12, 2017.

power in China and that Xi is not a “reformer” but is rather dedicated to strengthening the grip of the CPC in China itself, not implementing any “political reform.” Other articles noted Xi’s statement that housing is for living in, not speculation, renewing his “call to ensure housing market stability and pledged that authorities will help meet demand by adding more supply of homes” and protege of Xi joining the top tiers of China’s governing structure. None of these developments is a surprise and all fit within the capitalist model of China without doubt. After all, we can’t forget that Xi’s father, Xi Zhongzun, a propagandist, was purged during the Cultural Revolution, and Xi was affected by the effort by living in a cave house within a hillside for seven years, starting in 1969, was allowed to return to Beijing in 1975 to study chemical engineering, but rose quickly through the party ranks, becoming leader of Shanghai in 2007, later coining the term “Chinese Dream.”

It is with this we get to a set of links focusing on what I’ll call, accurately, lip-service to Marxism by the Chinese leadership and CPC. In January 2015, *Time* magazine reported that Chinese universities were directed by the CPC to study and propagate Marxism, cultivate and promote “the core values of socialism” and provide the “intelligence and talent for the realization of the China dream.”³⁵² Clearly the last point is undeniably nationalistic, while the others may be seen by some as “socialist” but are really about maintaining up the CPC’s influence and pull in China, in this case among students. Over a year later, in December 2016, *The Guardian* reported Xi’s speech saying that Chinese authorities must have more ideological controls, saying that “higher education...must adhere to correct political orientation,” with universities turned into “strongholds that adhere to party leadership” and have appealing political education, with CPC members having more connection with universities themselves.³⁵³ Reading the *Xinhua* summary of Xi’s speech, it is clear this more a nationalistic effort than anything else. In October 2017, *Reuters* had one of the most strange titles of an article on China

352 Hannah Beech, “[What's the Priority for Chinese Colleges? 'Studying and Propagating Marxism'](#),” *Time*, Jan 20, 2015.

353 Tom Philips, “[China universities must become Communist party 'strongholds', says Xi Jinping](#),” *The Guardian*, Dec 9, 2016; “[Xi calls for strengthened ideological work in colleges](#),” *Xinhua*, Dec 9, 2016.

I've seen: "China's neo-Maoists welcome Xi's new era, but say he is not the new Mao."³⁵⁴ They begin by claiming that "a fringe group of hard-line conservatives who long for the way things were under communist China's founding leader, Mao Zedong, have welcomed President Xi Jinping's "new era" of socialism and its renewed emphasis on equality." The article goes on to quote Song Yangbiao, who it claims is a "Beijing-based neo-Maoist freelance journalist" but even other Western news organizations can't agree what he is, calling him a leftist journalist for *The Time Weekly* and supporter of Bo Xilai, making it clear he is critical of the current government and its path.³⁵⁵ He is quoted as saying that Xi and Mao's "similarity is that they both want to rejuvenate the Chinese nation, they both want an independent, powerful, new China. Chairman Mao freed the Chinese people from the oppression of the West, while Xi Jinping has dedicated himself to giving new China a greater voice on the global stage," but adds that "Chairman Mao's authority was built from a long and arduous struggle. Xi's power came from the bureaucracy in a time of peace. The history is totally different." So, *Reuters* is confusing itself! They also quote a blogger, Sima Nan saying that "accepting Xi as a powerful leader, accepting him as the most powerful leader since Mao, is a necessary trait of Xi's new era" and note that there are "neo-Maoists" but never quote any others, as these individuals could be Maoists, not "neo-Maoists"! Then, in late November 2017, "more than 100 of the nation's top filmmakers, actors and pop stars" gathered to study and "implement the spirit of the 19th Communist Party of China's National Congress," which might seem socialist or communist to some who don't know better, but is really about Chinese nationalism, and about promoting Chinese culture.³⁵⁶

354 Christian Shepard, "[China's neo-Maoists welcome Xi's new era, but say he is not the new Mao](#)," *Reuters*, Oct 27, 2017.

355 Keira Lu Huang, "'Tiger' in China: Former deputy environmental protection minister accused of corruption," *South China Morning Post*, Jul 31, 2015; "Bo Xilai, fallen Chinese political star, to go on trial Thursday," *AP*, Aug 18, 2013; "Prominent Bo Xilai supporter detained ahead of trial," *Reuters*, Aug 7, 2013; "Maoists push back against modernizing China," *Business Insider*, Sept 7, 2016. The *Business Insider* quotes Song as saying "the party does not attach importance to Mao. Was there corruption in Mao's time? Of course not. Could the ordinary people not get medical treatment in Mao's time? No" while noting another individual it calls a "neo-Maoist": Wang Shiji.

356 Simon Denyer and Luna Lin, "[China sends its top actors and directors back to socialism school](#)," *Washington Post*, Dec 1, 2017; Deng Xiaoci, "[Chinese movie industry must reflect the country's socialist core values: expert](#)," *Global Times*, Nov 30, 2017.

There are a number of other articles in Western media on this subject. One of them quotes a high-level CPC official, Chen Xi, saying that “some don’t believe in Marx and Lenin but believe in ghosts and gods; they don’t believe in ideals but believe in sorcery; they don’t respect the people but do respect masters,” saying it part of efforts to promote party symbols.³⁵⁷ If religion is being suppressed and the CPC is being put above that, it isn’t right especially under revisionist China at the present. Others talk about how China is funding a statue of Marx to sit near his birthplace, a “communist strategist” pushing forward the rise of China, and claiming that Marx and Mao guide the Chinese stock market, which was undeniably just another ideological effort but with no connection to actual ideas of Marx or Mao! There were also articles declaring the CPC is trying to strengthen its ideological hold with “re-education” meant to maintain the party’s integrity and conformity, changes in textbooks to cultivate support for the CPC, and Xi’s declaration that Marxism should be studied, but so should “contemporary capitalism.” All these stories show continuing Chinese nationalism supported by the state but nothing that promotes socialism or socialist ideals one bit!

Before getting to Chinese media, there are a number of articles in foreign, but non-Western, media about such lip-service to Marxism. In September 2017, “more governmental support will be poured into developing dramas espousing nationalist and socialist values,” again showing that this is about Chinese nationalism, nothing else, and the same month, “schools in China have begun incorporating the country’s Core Socialist Values — an official interpretation of Chinese socialism — in their daily lesson plans and activities.”³⁵⁸ However, the latter from the bastion of Chinese revisionism

357 Tom Phillips, “[Believe in socialism not sorcery, China tells party members](#),” *The Guardian*, Nov 16, 2017; Melissa Eddy, “[Statue of Marx, Funded by China, Will Stand in German City of His Birth](#),” *New York Times*, Mar 13, 2017; Jane Perlez, “[Behind the Scenes, Communist Strategist Presses China’s Rise](#),” *New York Times*, Nov 13, 2017; Yifan Xie, “[Meet the New Stock Market Regulators: Marx and Mao](#),” *AP*, Oct 13, 2017; Maxwell Barna, “[China Will Re-Educate Government Officials to Remind Them That Communism Is Awesome](#),” *VICE*, Jul 24, 2014; Charlotte Gao, “[New Chinese Textbooks: Now With More 'Socialist Core Values'](#),” *The Diplomat*, Sept 5, 2017; Reuters Staff, “[China's Xi says study capitalism, but Marxism remains top](#),” *Reuters*, Sept 29, 2017. There was also [a dead link](#).

358 Pang-Chieh Ho, “[Chinese TV to promote more socialist values, distribute less foreign content](#),” *supchina*, Sept 8, 2017; “[China to Teach 'Core Socialist Values' in Schools](#),” *TeleSur English*, Sept 15, 2017; Liu Caiyu, “[China pushes core socialist values knowledge in primary, middle schools](#),” *Global Times*, Sept 4, 2017.

in Latin America, *TeleSur English*, which gives few specifics. The original article in *Global Times*, which they refer to, but do not link to, makes it clear this is about social stability, not learning Marxism: “learning the core values can make the younger generation better understand their responsibilities. It is a moral impetus to make students become better people,” as Li Shenghui, a middle school math teacher in Guangzong, North China's Hebei Province, told the *Global Times*. There are a couple of other articles in such media.³⁵⁹ Two of these are in Indian media. One is an article in *The Hindu*, quoting Xi, saying that “China should adhere to its basic socialist economic system while strengthening and developing both public and non-public sectors of the world’s second largest economy,” further saying that China will “strengthen and develop the public sector and also unswervingly encourage, support and guide the development of the non-public sector...the country remains committed to creating a favourable environment for the non-public sector.” Of course, this is not a socialist ideal, but mirrors ideas of the West during the “Golden Age of Capitalism” with broad public investment and the “public sector” is not really public, but rather a state sector, as it consists of state-owned and controlled enterprises, which operate on a profit motive. The same applies to China hosting the 2nd World Congress on Marxism, with the last one also held in China. This does not mean that China is socialist but it is rather a way to promote China’s capitalist model, acting like it has Marxist elements! By the logic that China is “socialist” because this meeting was held there, then Russia, Vietnam, Turkey, Ecuador, Portugal, Lebanon, Greece, South Africa, India, Brazil, Belarus, would be socialist, as those are the countries have hosted the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties in past years!³⁶⁰ As such, a belief would be utterly absurd and with this, just because China has hosted two

359 “[China should stick to its basic socialist economic system: Xi Jinping](#),” *The Hindu*, Mar 4, 2016; “[China to hold world conference on Marxism in May. 300 researchers to attend](#),” *The Indian Express*, Oct 23, 2017; “[2nd World Congress on Marxism to be held in Beijing](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 22, 2017; “[First World Congress on Marxism held in Beijing](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 10, 2015.

360 “[Communist parties’ meeting concludes in Hanoi](#),” *VietnamPlus*, Oct 30, 2016; “[19th IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; CPUSA, “[CPUSA Statement to 17th International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties](#),” Nov 11, 2015; PCE, “[Joint Press Statement Of The Communist Party Of Ecuador About The XVI International Meeting Of Communists And Workers’ Parties Guayaquil – Ecuador](#),” November 2014; KKE, “[On the 15th International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Lisbon](#),” Dec 12, 2013; Communist Party of Britain, “[Lebanon: Welcomes world communist](#)

conferences on Marxism in 2017 and 2016 does not make China socialist!

There are two more links in non-Western media worth reviewing. The first is an article in *Sputnik*, saying that the settlement of “Huaxi, located in the Jiangsu Province of China,” founded in 1961, has all villagers living “in their own residences, with each household owning at least one car; education and healthcare in the village are both free...[and] the only village in the world that sports a skyscraper,” along with “privileges like ownership of the company stock.”³⁶¹ But, if you think this socialist, consider who is left out: “migrant workers and residents of the neighboring villages that were absorbed into Huaxi” whom are reportedly “paid better wages than elsewhere in the country but do not have access to those perks” that villagers of Huaxi have! This seems utterly cruel. Finally, there is an article by run-of-the-mill revisionist Ajit Singh in *TeleSur English*. He enthusiastically embraces the Chinese revisionists but still has to admit there are “capitalist elements” in China, along with market reforms allowing “for a sphere of capitalist development” and “capitalists exist[ing] in China today,” although he thinks the state has the real power, not the capitalists, and that China is socialist, both of which is are claims distorting the reality.

With this, we can move onto Chinese media itself! The *South China Morning Post*, which is not state media, reported that in January 2015, the State Council and the General Office of the Communist Party's Central Committee issued a directive saying that universities should "equip teachers and

[movement](#),” Jan 3, 2013; “[14 International Meeting of Communist & Workers](#),” November 2012; South African Communist Party, “[13th International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties](#),” Dec 11, 2011; ANC, “[Address by President Jacob Zuma to the 12th International meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties](#),” Dec 3, 2010; “[11 IMCWP, Press Communiqué](#),” Dec 6, 2009; “[10 IMCWP, Press Release by CP of Brazil](#),” Nov 2008; “[Int. Meeting 2007, Minsk, Press Release by CP of Belarus](#),” Nov 2007; “[\[2006\] 8 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2005\] 7 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2004\] 6 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2003\] 5 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2002\] 4 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2001\] 3 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[2000\] 2 IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018; “[\[1999\] 1st IMCWP](#),” accessed May 3, 2018. The meeting was held in Russia in 2017, Vietnam in 2016, Turkey in 2015, Ecuador in 2014, Portugal in 2013, Lebanon in 2012, Greece in 2011, South Africa in 2010, India in 2009, Brazil in 2008, Belarus in 2007, Portugal in 2006, Greece in 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, and 1999. This group is different from the stoutly [anti-revisionist CIPOML](#) or International Conference of Marxist–Leninist Parties and Organisations and [the defunct](#) International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations.

361 “[Socialist Paradise: A Tour of China's 'Number One Village Under The Sky'](#),” *Sputnik*, Sept 16, 2017; Ajit Singh, “A New Era for Socialist China,” *TeleSur English*, Oct 24, 2017.

students with 'socialism with Chinese characters'" and become bases for "learning, researching and disseminating" Marxism, adding that "colleges would be assessed on their use of set textbooks on Marxism."³⁶² However, this is fundamentally a nationalist move, and a move to strengthen the standing of the CPC, along with its revisionist and Dengist strategy, since the so-called "core socialist values" including "prosperity, democracy and social harmony," with the latter basically meaning the non-existence of class struggle! Another article, in July 2013, claimed that Xi was endorsing "Maoist indoctrination" because he said that "as this year will mark Chairman Mao's 120th birthday, we must turn Chairman Mao's old residence into a base for patriotism and revolutionary education, in particular to make it play a greater role in the education of the younger generation."³⁶³ However, such "indoctrination" is questionable as he may have been trying to appease the masses, and certain factions in the CPC, as just two days later, he called on business leaders and local government to "spare no effort to seize the chance to deepen reform in important areas" and said that "reform and opening up have proved to be the source of China's development and progress in modern times. And there is no future if we stop going on or go backwards." This, again, is just a sign of Xi knowing how to play Chinese politics, but not that he is a dedicated socialist or revolutionary! In 2016, there was more Marxist lip-service.³⁶⁴ It was about how Xi, at a Beijing seminar, "with leading academics in philosophy and the social sciences," called for "development of a system of philosophy and social sciences "with Chinese characteristics that incorporates the country's socialist practices,"" adding that they should develop "21st century Marxism with Chinese characteristics" and declaring that "Marxism...does not end the truth, but opens the door and paves the way to reach the truth." Some may be cheering, but considering that the country is still on the capitalist road, this is purely an ideological

362 Li Jing, "[Communist Party orders a course of Marxism for China's universities](#)," *South China Morning Post*, Jan 20, 2015, accessed May 2, 2018.

363 Cary Juang, "[Xi calls for Maoist indoctrination for the younger generation](#)," *South China Morning Post*, Jul 25, 2013.

364 Cary Juang, "[Academics must remake Marxism for 21st century, says China's President Xi Jinping](#)," *South China Morning Post*, May 18, 2016.

reassurance which supports revisionism, nothing more, nothing less. With this, we get to the final article in the *South China Morning Post*.³⁶⁵ It says that the CPC “must centre on what we are doing now, listen to the people, respond to real needs...combine the basic Marxist theories with China’s specific reality in a better way...use the latest achievements of the Sinicisation of Marxism to equip our minds, consolidate our hearts and soul.” While some may say this “all” Marxism is about, the fact is he also said that contemporary capitalism should be studied: “these views help us to correctly understand the development and fate of capitalism, and accurately grasp the new changes and characteristics of contemporary capitalism.” Such a mix is worrisome and means that the study of Marxism he wants will benefit China’s path on the capitalist road, a horrifying sight to behold!

Having analyzed four articles from the *South China Morning Post*, it is important to move onto China’s state media. The first of these articles is from *People’s Daily* in November 2015.³⁶⁶ It notes that Xi, presiding over a group study session of the CPC’s Central Committee, called for “new advances in Marxist economic philosophy by turning practices and experiences in China’s economic development into economic theories.” It also notes that Xi called for a “study of Marxist political economy could help conduct economic analysis in a scientific way, improve the capability of managing a socialist market economy, and better answer problems of economic development.” At the same time, he stands against Marx by declaring that the CPC has “enriched” Marxist ideas since the beginning of the Dengist period including acknowledging “the market’s “decisive” role in allocating resources, the “new normal” theory and its development.” He then declared that the state sector (which he calls the “public sector”) should be consolidated and developed, but also the “non-public sector” should be encouraged supported, and guided. This does not, one bit, stand against China being on the capitalist road! In fact, it entrenches and defends China’s current position! Related to this is what Heiko Khoo wrote in 2016

365 Viola Zhou, “[Xi Jinping tells Communist Party to keep innovating and contributing to Marxism](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 29, 2017.

366 “[Xi stresses development of Marxist economic philosophy](#),” *People’s Daily*, Nov 25, 2015.

on *China.org.cn*.³⁶⁷ In his opinion piece, Khoo talked about Xi Jinping's "recent speech on the methodology of Karl Marx," claiming that "according to the dominant socio-economic and political theories in the world...the adoption of reform and opening in China, is a refutation of Marxism." He went onto say that "despite representing a minority trend, Marxism has displayed its academic and political vitality in recent years...China's basic economic structure is at the core of its success" and declared that "the driving force of capitalism -- the pursuit of profit -- does not dominate China's economy" but said that the state is at the center, not realizing that its SOEs are guided by profit as well! He further declared that "Xi Jinping's emphasis on encouraging scientific thought rooted in Marxism can help to stimulate thinking and experimentation designed to facilitate the creation of the communist society that the CPC constitution sets as its objective." Such an opinion piece undoubtedly makes revisionists cheer. While this is the case, the fact is that the "reform and opening in China" does not refute Marxist ideas as much as it is due to concentrated embrace of capitalist principles!

Global Times has a number of articles on this topic. One article celebrates efforts in Higher education to turn "top students into young Marxists," citing the example of Changchun Normal University in Northeast China's Jilin Province, noting that 4,000 individuals are members of Marxist societies, out of the university of around 20,000 undergraduates.³⁶⁸ Reading further, it is clear this is an elite effort: "the opportunity to join this prestigious project is only given to the crème de la crème" and that "Young Marxists can access resources that most ordinary college students can only dream of" including having special mentors, who "will give personal guidance to the students regarding their academic, mental and career growth" and assigning them internships. Furthermore, these individuals accept the revisionist path of China, to quote from Guo Yingchun, then a sophomore at the university's school of communication, "China also has capital, so is it bad or not? We concluded that Marx isn't

367 Heiko Khoo, "[Examining Xi Jinping's speech on the method of Karl Marx](#)," *China.org.cn*, Jun 27, 2016.

368 Zhang Wu, "[China pushes forward Marxist training on campus, attracts 1 million students](#)," *Global Times*, Jun 16, 2016, accessed May 4, 2018.

against capital, but capitalism.” This leaves it open for China to pursue capitalistic methods! Considering the perks, it is questionable how many are actually Marxist, as some on the university’s online forum say “it’s a great platform to access the university’s best teachers and resources” and is part of a “nationwide project by the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) started in 2007” in order to “raise the university elites’ knowledge of the Party and strengthen their commitment to following China’s socialist path under the leadership of the CPC.” Considering it is aimed at an elite, not at the masses, this makes it clear that such ideological education, as you could call it, is almost class-based. Additionally, the *Global Times* admits that “Marxist” classes in China, for the mass of students, are “notoriously boring,” adding that “many students attend the classes only because the teacher may call the roster, and it is no secret that many use the class to do homework from other courses.”

The next article isn’t much different. It says that “Chinese education authorities have unveiled some standards for the study of Marxism at university...with specific requirements for school facilities, faculty and courses.”³⁶⁹ It further claims that “China is making a greater effort to strengthen Marxist education and ideological work in universities,” calling for “mid-to-small Marxism classes of no more than 100 students each.” While some may be cheering, this is actually an attempt to maintain the influence and control of the CPC in China itself as these educational standards “call for full-time teachers at these schools to be Party members at least in principle” and that “students and teachers...organize Party activities for at least half a day every month.” The same can be said for the praising of “Marxist education at [the] six top universities...in China” which makes it clear the effort is about Chinese nationalism and maintaining party dominance.³⁷⁰ It can also be said for efforts to give Chinese journalists “Marxist” training, connected to “consensus and safeguard[ing] social stability” in

369 Qu Qiuyan, “[China has new standards on Marxist schools for ideological understanding](#),” *Global Times*, Sept 28, 2017.

370 Liu Caiyu and Cao Siqi, “[Six top colleges boost Marxist education](#),” *Global Times*, Sept 21, 2017; Wen Ya, “[Learning the news](#),” *Global Times*, Dec 17, 2013. As Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons) [said](#), summarizing a *Wall Street Journal* article, “while supporters of Xi Jinping have celebrated his recent call for more Marxism in schools...this is not in the spirit of Mao” because there is no criticism of party leadership or China’s political system!

Chinese society as a whole as Wang Yukai, professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, said. This brings us to other Chinese state media.

The same can be said of the articles from *Xinhua*. One talks about Xi's declaration that "China's development is standing at a new historical starting point, and socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new development stage" when talking to a CPC "workshop for provincial and ministerial officials."³⁷¹ Again, this may lead to favorable reception from some individuals, however, he also made it clear he was not deviating from the path since "the launch of reform and opening up nearly 40 years ago," praising the "achievements" since then, and striking a Chinese nationalist tone, making China a "model" for other countries. The latter was evident when he declared that the Chinese model "has expanded the pathway to modernization for developing countries, thus providing Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to problems facing mankind." This is undeniably nationalistic! A similar tone is struck when Xi called for "a profound understanding of Marxism and vigorous promotion of the sinicization of Marxism" to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.³⁷² He added that "the Chinese people are more qualified and capable of revealing the historical experience and rules of development existent in the process," also calling for "Party members to study contemporary capitalism, its essence and patterns." This makes it clear that such a statement is nationalistic and also meant to maintain ideological hegemony, as you could call it, of the CPC. Finally, there is an article in which Xi, talking to a CPC "workshop for provincial and ministerial officials," embracing the Dengist concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and declaring that Party members should "put forward new thoughts, strategies and measures on the basis of the stages and features of China's development."³⁷³ Apart from some of his other rhetoric, Xi also struck a nationalistic tone, talking about the "Chinese nation" and continuing market "reforms"!

371 "[Xi says socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered new development stage](#)," *Xinhua*, Jul 27, 2017.

372 "[Xi calls for profound understanding of Marxism](#)," *Xinhua*, Sept 29, 2017.

373 "[China Focus: To revive China, Xi holds high banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics](#)," *Xinhua*, Jul 28, 2017.

With this, we get the final set of Chinese state media articles from *China Daily*. The first of these declares that the CPC has “launched a year-long campaign to instill the values it wants in its 88 million members...[which] will focus on the study of the Party Constitution and rules, as well as remarks made by General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee Xi Jinping,” aiming to purportedly target “Party members with wavering confidence in communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as those who are advocating the Western value, violating Party rules, working inefficiently or behaving unethically.”³⁷⁴ Again, some may praise this, but this is just an attempt to keep ideological unity, as the article summarizes the CPC Central Committee as saying that “Party members should always think and act in conformity with the CPC Central Committee's policies and guidelines.” There will be no efforts to buck the revisionist wave of destruction. The same can be said about the purposed amendment to the CPC party constitution to highlight its supposed ideological efforts.³⁷⁵ There is also an article about teachers at CPC schools learning life-lessons, apparently, making it clear this is about personal advancement and fulfillment, nothing else. Last but not least is an article in which Xi declared, to the 43rd group study session of the members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, that “relentless efforts should be made to adapt Marxism to China, to the era and to the public,” adding that “the CPC should make sure its theories keep up with the times.”³⁷⁶ Again, this is couched in the fact that all those expressing such viewpoints embrace the revisionist path of China, as Xi praised the “remarkable changes following its reform and opening-up” and added that Party officials should study works posed by the revisionists themselves, such as “Deng Xiaoping Theory, The Thought of Three Represents and the Scientific Outlook on Development...[and] new ideas, thoughts and strategies regarding governance by the CPC Central Committee,” outweighing Marxist classics and Mao’s ideas, showing where the CPC really stands.

374 “[CPC to drill members in self-discipline, socialist values](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Feb 29, 2016.

375 “[CPC to amend party constitution](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 18, 2017; Hou Liqiang, “[Party School teachers learning lessons in life](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 13, 2017.

376 Zhang Yunbi, “[Adapting Marxism called crucial](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 30, 2017.

Such ideological corruption of Marxism, which the Chinese leadership and CPC is participating in should be no surprise. Falsely named and conceived “market socialism” is the name of the game, meaning capitalistic methods and results, which they try to cover and hide using a flurry of Marxist terminology, deceiving Western leftists who don’t know better. In 1979, Deng called for exploiting “abundant natural resources” within China’s “vast territory and abundant energy and mineral resources, including almost all the ferrous, nonferrous and rare metals,” reportedly “emancipate our minds and restore the good social conduct that prevailed for a long time,” meaning to reject the ideals posed in the Maoist period, and open “to the outside world.”³⁷⁷ In the same interview that year, he called for China to “inherit the advanced methods of operation, management, and scientific development from advanced capitalist countries” in order to have “productive” organization and “enterprise management.” At the same time, he also called for market economy through the form of foreign investment, incorrectly claiming that “the bourgeoisie no longer exist in China” and admitted that the so-called “socialist market economy” is fundamentally “similar to a capitalist one in method,” even though he thinks that state ownership automatically means socialism, which it certainly does not! Other articles declare that China has a unique model, claiming it is socialist, praising market “reforms,” in their words, declaring they developed “productive forces” and gave China “achievements” which need to be preserved through stability and prevention of risks, as Xi called for in September 2017.³⁷⁸ Others expressed annoyance with Western interpretations and held a nationalist tone, one declaring that “in December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC was held, marking the beginning of China's reform and opening-up...After the session, the outdated planned economy

377 Deng Xiaoping, “[We can develop a market economy under socialism](#),” Nov 26, 1979, excerpt from a talk with Frank B. Gibney, Vice-Chairman of the Compilation Committee of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. of the United States, Paul T. K. Lin, Director of the Institute of East Asia at McGill University of Canada, and others.

378 Rabi Sankar Bosu, “[Socialism brings China prosperity](#),” *China.org.cn*, Sept 21, 2017; Ye Xiaowen, “[Why the CPC can develop productive forces](#),” *People’s Daily*, Jun 29, 2011; Earl Bousquet, “[Poverty, prosperity cannot co-exist under socialism](#),” *China.org.cn*, Sept 17, 2017; Han Zu, “[Socialism core of China success story](#),” *Global Times*, Sept 27, 2017; “[China Focus: Xi stresses prevention, control of major risks](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 20, 2017; “[Backgrounder: China’s achievements under leadership of CPC in past 10 years](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 17, 2013.

gradually subsided in China, to be replaced by a socialist market economy,” a horrid development! This is connected to efforts to “reinforce their loyalty to the Party, and improve and strengthen the spirit of cadres to ensure good governance,” yet another effort to main the CPC’s influence and power, and the “richest village” in China, Huaxi, which had “everything from a theme park, helicopter taxis, rows of expensive villas and everything that a village is not made of,” undoubtedly leading to a concentration of privilege that cannot be shared, since “once a family moves in, they are given a car and villa by the authority. However, your belongings will no more be yours once you leave the village”!³⁷⁹ This is a horrid injustice and is not one bit socialist.

Apart from what has been mentioned in this chapter already, there has been a number of other actions by the Chinese leadership and Chinese state. This includes Chinese textbooks teaching somewhat unpopular sex education, China pursuing a path which is not “Western liberal democracy,” China’s reported “development achievements” over the years, the CPC’s “plans” (actually strategies) of the future, continued “reforms,” and copying Maoist tactics of the “mass line” to implement a cut in billions of public spending!³⁸⁰ In their statement to the 11th International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, in November 2009, the CPC claimed that China was socialist, as revisionists often do, of course, but admitted that “in the way of exploration, the CPC as the ruling party must learn from all the excellent achievements of human civilization including means and management systems which can reflect the laws governing modern social production such as the capitalist market economic system”! This is disgusting, to say the least! There are a number of other actions by the Chinese state and leadership. This included anti-corruption efforts within the CPC but also admitted the corruption

379 Luo Wangshu, “‘[Revolution's cradle' nurtures new talents](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 13, 2017; “[Huaxi: China's Richest Village Has Everything From Five-Star Hotels to Helicopter Taxis](#),” *India.com*, Sept 21, 2017.

380 Echo Huang, “[A Chinese textbook is finally teaching proper sex ed, but some parents are having none of it](#),” *Quartz*, Mar 6, 2017; Thomas Hon Wing Polin, “[The best form of government is the one that serves its people](#),” *Global Times*, Jul 26, 2017; “[China Focus: Exhibition shows China's recent development achievements](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 30, 2017; “[Spotlight: China continues to flourish under CPC governance](#),” *Xinhua*, Aug 13, 2017; “[11 IMCWP, Intervention by CP of China](#),” Nov 23, 2009; An Baijie, “[Reforms crucial for the Chinese Dream](#),” *People's Daily*, May 2, 2017; “[CPC Launches Mass Line Campaign](#),” 2014; “[Mass Line](#),” 2013; “[China's 'Mass Line' Austerity Campaign a Success, Says President Xi Jinping](#),” *AFP*, Oct 9, 2014; “[CPC Launches Mass Line Campaign](#),” *People's Daily*.

inherent within the organization which is likely more widespread than what they found: “the CPC has removed more than 40,000 Party leaders and cadres from part-time “jobs” in enterprises...graft cases of over 17,000 low-level officials had been handled over the past year, mainly in land grabs, demolitions and fund management related to agriculture, rural area and farmers.”³⁸¹ This is troubling, to say the least. Revisionists declare they helped China avoid “collapse after 1989,” they are giddy to report, of course, while their sympathizers, like the Chief Minister of Punjab Province in Pakistan, Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif, praising the CPC as a “miracle” which has made China “great” as a “global powerhouse...an economic super power...a formidable military power.” Such praise for Chinese nationalism is not much of a surprise! Other actions including the CPC organizing “blind dates” aimed at the “100 million single citizens of marriageable age” in China, with questionable results and unsurprising anger from Chinese women, Xi’s birthplace transformed into a tourist attraction, having “trial spots” to experiment with market “reforms,” and purportedly stopping a coup against Xi.³⁸² Chinese state media also reported that the CPC was engaging in a new ideological offensive to back up its revisionist theorizing and claims they are “people-centered,” connecting to a strong push for Chinese nationalism, claiming they are “solving” the problem in rural areas, strengthened “party-building” to enhance their “awareness of identity,” and proposals of the 13th Five-Year “Plan.” There

381 “[CPC improves overall quality of Party officials](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 17, 2017; Heiko Khoo, “[After the Third Plenum - A look into the future](#),” *China.org.cn*, Nov 17, 2013; Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif, “The miracle called Communist Party of China,” *People’s Daily*, Jul 11, 2016, pages 1 and 2; Nicholas Krapels, “[It’s Open Season on Corrupt Officials in China](#),” *VICE*, Apr 9, 2014; “[China punishes 210,000 officials for corruption](#),” *Al Jazeera*, Jul 20, 2017. As *VICE* posited in 2014, “Xi might actually believe that his [anti-corruption] campaign is necessary for China to eliminate waste and maintain its economic growth” while *Al Jazeera* wrote that “Chinese authorities have punished more than 210,000 officials for corruption in the first half of 2017,” showing deep-seated corruption without a doubt.

382 Shailaja Neelakantan, “[Worried about 100 million unmarried citizens, China's Communist Party now pushes ‘organised blind dates’](#),” *Times of India*, Sept 19, 2017; Chris Buckley, “[Chinese Village Where Xi Jinping Fleed Is Now a Monument to His Power](#),” *New York Times*, Oct 8, 2017; Paul Denlinger, “[Understanding Trial Spots](#),” *echinacities.com*, Oct 27, 2006; Wendy Wu and Choi Chi-yuk, “[Coup plotters foiled: Xi Jinping fended off threat to ‘save Communist Party’](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Oct 19, 2017; “[New Thought charts path to future](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 21, 2017; Zhang Zhouxiang, “[Proof that Party puts people first](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 14, 2017; Zhao Lei, “[Party fulfills promises to the people](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 13, 2017; Cao Yin, “[Retracing a revolutionary generation's footsteps](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 12, 2017; Luo Wangshu, “[The experience was very impressive and profound](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 13, 2017; Liu Hui, “[Rural CPC member's contribution is family tradition](#),” Sept 21, 2017; Xu Ming, “[Party-building strengthened to welcome 19th CPC National Congress](#),” *Global Times*, Oct 3, 2017; “[Highlights of proposals for China's 13th Five-Year Plan](#),” *China.org.cn*, Feb 25, 2016.

were a few more events or actions were noted in Chinese state media. These include general “growth and development,” “grassroots delegates” attending the national CPC congress, exhibits from Russia focusing on the Great October Socialist Revolution visiting China, “patriotic education” in China to strengthen Chinese nationalism, strict guidelines for “party governance” on the grassroots level, and “achievements” of China’s society, to summarize such articles.³⁸³

This brings us to the closing thoughts of this chapter. The revisionists may think they have upper hand when it comes to ideological justifications for their beliefs, such as the conception of China as “socialist.” However, capital is everywhere in China. The “private wealth-national income ratio in China is now close to Western levels: 450-500% in China in 2015, vs. 500% in the United States and 550-600% in Britain and France” with the only difference being that “public wealth has become very small—or even negative, with public debt exceeding public assets—in Western countries, while it has remained substantial in China”!³⁸⁴ Additionally, the public share of national wealth in China “declined from 70% to 30% in China between 1978 and 2015, while it rose from 30% to 60% in Norway.” On the topic of private wealth, there has been “strong positive capital gains for non-financial assets—mainly housing—and no gains for financial wealth,” along with “strong capital gains for public [state] financial assets and smaller gains for public [state] non-financial wealth” because of “government-owned equities.” This can be linked, bourgeois analysts write, to SOEs embracing the market since 2003 reforms “and the unprecedented wave of initial public offerings of SOEs that started in 2006.” This means an embrace of capitalism which the bourgeois analysts even admit, only saying the country is not fully capitalist because of state ownership in the economy, which, yes, runs on profit principle.

383 Raimundo Urrechaga, “[Interview: CPC crucial for China's development, says Cuban academician](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 30, 2017; “[More grassroots delegates to attend CPC national congress](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Sept 13, 2017; “[Exhibits from Russia mark centenary of October Revolution](#),” *Xinhua*, Nov 7, 2017; “[Government leads in patriotic education](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 2, 2017; “[Senior CPC official stresses strict Party governance at grassroots](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 5, 2017; “[Xinhua Insight: China's "all-round well-off society" an inspiration for whole world](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 3, 2017, accessed May 4, 2018.

384 Thomas Piketty, Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman, “[Capital Accumulation, Private Property and Rising Inequality in China, 1978-2015](#),” June 25, 2017, WID.world Working Paper Series No. 2017/6, pp 21, 23, 25. All the quotes listed in this paragraph come from these pages.

China and the 19th CPC Congress

Like anything else, the 19th CPC National Congress, in October 2017, excited the revisionists. I still remember one moderator on /r/swcc who had the tagline expressing this sentiment. Chinese state media extensively covered this event, describing how Chinese leaders are elected to the Congress, there are more workers and women (along with “professional technical personnel” which seems like a middle-class position), declaring that CPC committees in “many cities are studying the books of Chairman Mao Zedong” but seeming to focus on books he wrote before 1949 and is coupled with revisionism as the book *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, will also be studied.³⁸⁵ Other articles talks about new “insights” given into China’s governance, the “enchantment” of the world in the CPC Congress, with defenders claiming it shows the “real China,” and Xi’s 66-page report to the CPC Congress itself which undoubtedly had a nationalist tone. Some foreign, non-Chinese media were favorable and others were not. *TeleSur English* defended the Chinese revisionists, of course, basically parroting an article from *Xinhua*, while *The Guardian* had photographs of the Congress and *Quartz* summarized Xi’s speech as setting economic goals, putting his stamp on CPC guidance, and posing China’s political system as a model for the world, a nationalist sentiment.³⁸⁶

385 [“China Focus: How Chinese leaders are elected to Party congress,”](#) *Xinhua*, Oct 1, 2017; [“China Focus: 19th CPC National Congress delegates feature more workers, women,”](#) *Xinhua*, Sept 30, 2017; Zhao Yusha, [“Party committees study Mao’s books ahead of 19th congress,”](#) *Global Times*, Sept 20, 2017; [“As key Party National Congress approaches, learn how delegates are chosen across China,”](#) *Global Times*, Jun 18, 2017; Xu Ming, [“Party-building strengthened to welcome 19th CPC National Congress,”](#) *Global Times*, Jul 12, 2017; George N. Tzogopoulos, [“Party Congress offers insights into China governance,”](#) *Global Times*, Oct 3, 2017; [“19th CPC National Congress: Snapshot of delegates,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 12, 2017; Kou Jie and Liu Ning, [“CPC to set agenda all the way to 2049: Kuhn on Party’s 19th National Congress,”](#) *People’s Daily*, Sept 28, 2017; [“China Focus: 19th CPC National Congress to feature more grassroots delegates,”](#) *Xinhua*, Oct 12, 2017; Weng Jianfren, [“How CPC elects delegates to National Congress?,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 13, 2017; [“The 19th CPC National Congress,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 2017; [“The 19th CPC National Congress,”](#) *Xinhua*, Oct 2017; [“The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China Press Center,”](#) *People’s Daily*, Oct 2017; [“The 19th CPC National Congress News Desk,”](#) *Global Times*, Oct 2017; Siva Sankar, [“Why the world is enchanted with CPC Congress,”](#) *China Daily*, Oct 21, 2017; Xi Jinping, [“Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,”](#) Oct 18, 2017.

386 [“China Communist Party Committees Study Mao’s Seminal Works to Prepare for Party Congress,”](#) *TeleSur English*, Sept 21, 2017; Matt Fidler, [“China’s 19th Communist party congress – in pictures,”](#) *The Guardian*, Oct 18, 2017; Zheping Huang, [“Your five-minute summary of Xi Jinping’s three-hour Communist Party congress speech,”](#) *Quartz*, Oct 18, 2017, accessed May 4, 2018.

Supposed “anti-imperialism and solidarity” of China

This section only has two links. The first is a *New York Times* article from 2013. It notes a secret memo approved by Xi saying that perils like “Western constitutional democracy...Western-inspired notions of media independence and civic participation, ardently pro-market “neo-liberalism,” and “nihilist” criticisms of the party’s traumatic past” should be avoided, while promoting “universal values” of human rights. The *Times* also says this is an incident of increasing political control, claiming that “Mr. Xi has signaled a shift to a more conservative, traditional leftist stance” while it also says that Xi has admitted that “more market-driven momentum that can come only from a relaxation of state influence.” It also says “party-run periodicals” have “invoked Maoist talk of class war.”³⁸⁷ Still, this seems more like a way to sure up power in China than anything else, than a “noble” stand. Then we get to an article in *China Daily*.³⁸⁸ It quotes Xi as calling Fidel Castro of Cuba “a great figure of our times,” and saying that “in the name of the CPC, the Chinese government and people, and in my own name, I express my deepest condolences on the death of Comrade Fidel Castro and sincerest sympathy to his family” and adding that “the death of Fidel Castro has made the Chinese people lose a close comrade and sincere friend. His glorious image and great achievements will go down in history. The great Comrade Fidel Castro will be forever remembered.” However, such words do not make someone socialist, automatically. Many African leaders and those across the world sent such positive messages. This brings us to a comment by MIM (Prisons), that time is on the side of the proletariat because as long as China continued the “socialist” charade, “the United States will feel more pressure to make concessions to the oppressed and hold back its own imperialist arrogance” while those who think that China is socialist, continue to discredit socialism “especially as this “socialist” country becomes more aggressive in international affairs,” a valid point worth remembering.³⁸⁹

387 Chris Buckley, “[China Takes Aim at Western Ideas](#),” *New York Times*, Aug 19, 2013

388 “[History, people to remember Castro: Chinese president](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from Xinhua), Nov 27, 2016.

389 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

Gender and the LGBTQ+ community in China

There are many stories about gender in China itself. Just recently, China's Sina Weibo removed comics and videos which had “pornographic implications, promoting bloody violence or related to homosexuality,” triggering a “public uproar,” to which *Global Times* commented by saying that “...homosexuality is regarded as at odds with China's traditional values. Many Chinese still hold traditional views on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) people. This reflects differences between Chinese and Western social traditions...The massive outcry over Sina's policy is a sign of China's growing acceptance of the gay community.”³⁹⁰ It added that “Sina backtracked on the ban Monday following the online backlash...China's social media...better supply a forum for discussing these kinds of social issues that expand the boundaries of society's knowledge and awareness. We're confident that China will be more open in this regard.” This is coupled with a set of other articles in Chinese state media. One declared that “raising social awareness” of sexual harassment on public transportation can “play a vital role in stemming the problem,” with apparent efforts by the government to restrain sexual harassment, but no law “specifically targeting sexual harassment, and clearly defin[ing] harassment” currently exists in China.³⁹¹ Another article followed the previous one, declaring that the Chinese public “called for harsher punishment for those found guilty of sexual harassment” as “a person who molests another person or intentionally exposes their body in public shall be detained for at least five but no more than ten days” under Article 44 of the law on public security administration, while “Article 237 of the criminal law states that those who act indecently or threaten woman with

390 Liu Lulu, “[Chinese society learning to accept LGBT community](#),” *Global Times*, Apr 16, 2018. This is related to a branch of the Communist Youth League [speaking out](#) for gay rights in 2017 while Chinese regulators listed homosexuality as “abnormal sexual behavior,” sparking outrage. There has also been an “LGBT movement in mainland China” which [some](#) in *Solidarity* argue “is learning and moving forward.” This is not connected to the Chinese state.

391 Zhao Yusha, “[Raising social awareness key to curbing improper behavior against woman in public: experts](#),” *Global Times*, Jul 23, 2017; “[Public calls for harsher sexual harassment penalties](#),” *China Daily* (reprinted from *Xinhua*), Aug 23, 2017; Information Office of the State Council, “[Gender Equality and Women's Development in China](#),” Sept 2015 which was also reprinted on [theorychina.org](#); Li Qian, “[Chinese government goes to great lengths to help Muslims go on the hajj](#),” *Global Times*, Aug 14, 2017; Ruiqi Zhang, “Special project promotes employment of rural women,” *People's Daily*, Aug 20, 2015, pages [1](#), [2](#), and [3](#).

violence or coercion shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of up to five years” which some argued was not specific enough on the problem of harassment. Other articles reprinted a 2015 white paper titled “Gender Equality and Women's Development in China,” declared that the Chinese government has gone to great lengths to help Chinese Muslims complete the hajj, and the women’s federation of Gu’an county developing a “new opportunity for women’s employment and improved their abilities to get rich by setting up a startup,” providing “more than 3, 000 rural women in the whole county.” All of these conceptions easily fit under China’s unique capitalist model, without question. It doesn’t make China “socialist” as revisionists would claim.

Other media had articles on this subject. *The Diplomat* thundered that “China has a 20-year history of engaging on women’s issues...China has integrated gender-related Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into its national development strategies. China also listed women empowerment as a key policy issue for its G20 presidency later this year.”³⁹² They said this the case because while “traditional Chinese social values discourage women’s participation in politics, particularly as relates to external affairs,” China is “taking leading role on gender equality and women’s empowerment” since it could possibly “increase the visibility of China’s leadership and benefit...Xi’s ambitious foreign policy agenda,” increasing China’s influence. It also says that “China will undoubtedly be an active leader for designing international governance focused on women’s empowerment.” Yet another nationalist goal. On a similar topic, *Asia Times* reported efforts toward male-female “gender equality,” while others talked about efforts to close the “gender gap” in China’s programming schools.³⁹³ Additionally, the *Times of India* said that China banned Islamophobic words online. None of these efforts, however, are socialist, just efforts to maintain stability within China itself.

392 Zhibo Qiu, “[Why China Is So Interested in Gender Equality](#),” *The Diplomat*, Mar 10, 2016; [Shanghaiist](#) had an article but it cannot be currently be accessed. The same is the case for [a New York Times article](#).

393 Grace Shao, “[Chinese women push ahead in gender equality](#),” *Asia Times*, Apr 2, 2016; Zhuang Pinghui, “[Closing China’s gender gap: the Beijing school that’s teaching girls to code for free](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Aug 5, 2017; “[China bans use of anti-Islam words on social media](#),” *Times of India*, Sept 21, 2017.

China's supposed "caring" about the environment

Chinese state media has written about this subject time and time again. In 2015, *People's Daily* declared that there are growing numbers of "green" mines that engage in environmental protection, but had to admit that "the majority of China's mineral resources are extracted by small and lean mines, which produce massive pollutants and use out-of-date machinery."³⁹⁴ The same year, another *People's Daily* article said that "Chinese police arrested around 8,500 suspects in more than 4,500 environment-related criminal cases in 2014, as the country waged war against pollution...Close to 3,400 companies and 3,700 construction sites were also found to have violated environment laws and more than 3,100 workshops were closed following air quality inspections." Even with this effort there is no doubt that environmental polluters are still out there! The following year, Xi called for "ecological civilization" in China, saying there should be "green development," with boosted "wetland preservation and restoration," greener and more sustainable farming, along with other conservation efforts.³⁹⁵ However, this same media admitted that China had "over the past five years [since 2012] experienced heavy pollution of water and air, similar to what the United Kingdom and the United States experienced decades ago," adding that "the ongoing smog has blanketed more than 700,000 square kilometers of land in China...industrialization has consumed an extremely large amount of water, including that extracted from underground," leading to accelerated environmental efforts. As such, there are still continuing environmental issues in China to this day, such as "groundwater in some parts of China is decreasing," especially in the North China Plain.³⁹⁶

In 2017, there were also a number of developments. *People's Daily* blared that China will build

394 "[China Focus: Mines getting greener despite challenges](#)," *People's Daily*, Mar 13, 2015; "[China Focus: 8,500 arrested for environmental crimes in 2014](#)," *People's Daily*, Jun 29, 2015.

395 "[Xi calls for building of socialist ecological civilization](#)," *China Daily*, Dec 3, 2016; "[Xi stresses efforts to build ecological civilization](#)," *Global Times*, Aug 29, 2017; Hu Yongqi, "[Wetlands focus of protection drive](#)," *China Daily*, Dec 20, 2016; Chen Liang and Li Yingqing, "[Conservation efforts boost Yangtze River wetland](#)," *China Daily*, Dec 6, 2012; Xu Wei, "[Reforms aim for more sustainable, greener farming](#)," *China Daily*, Dec 21, 2016.

396 "[Water table falling in China: research](#)," *Xinhua*, May 3, 2018.

“the world's largest clean and efficient coal power system before 2020” (even though “clean coal” is an oxymoron) while admitting that “while the coal-fired industry cut its emissions...the emission of volatile organic compounds, which mostly come from petrochemicals, chemical engineering, industrial coatings, and packaging industries, has not been controlled effectively.”³⁹⁷ Other articles talked about offshore wind power, tree plantings, and efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Similar topics were written about in *Xinhua*, which said that renewable power generation in China is growing, the environmental violations are being addressed, banning of coal sales in certain areas, use of bioethanol fuel nationwide by 2020 to replace gasoline, efforts of “desert control,” and effort for eco-urbanism. Related to this is an article in *Qiushi*, in October 2013, saying that China can have an “ecological civilization,” but admitted that “...environmental pollution is becoming more severe...[there had been] excessive discharge of major pollutants, with environmental capacity being exceeded in some cases. In addition, the worsening trend of water, soil, and air pollution has yet to be fundamentally curbed. Third, ecosystems are deteriorating. The quality of our forest ecosystems is not high.” This means that China is in bad shape environmentally. This does not bode well for China, even today, as it is operating under its unique capitalist model and these measures are just “green” capitalism, since this article supports the horrid ideas of carbon emission trading and a cap-and-trade system!

China Daily has a slew of articles on this topic. Some say that “supply-side structural reform” makes China’s economy stronger and greener, others say that “green manufacturing” is being boosted, the world’s largest floating solar farm starting operating in China, a Panda-shaped solar power station

397 Sun Wenyu, “[China to build world's largest clean coal power system in 2020](#),” *People's Daily*, Sept 21, 2017; “[Offshore wind power plant of China Huaneng Group under full test run](#),” *People's Daily*, Sept 28, 2017; “[Xi attends tree planting activity, calls for understanding, protecting nature](#),” *People's Daily*, Mar 30, 2017; “[China's largest offshore wind farm goes into service](#),” *People's Daily*, Oct 30, 2017; Zhang Huan, “[China expected to overfulfill goals of cutting greenhouse gas emission](#),” *People's Daily*, Nov 3, 2017; “[China tops the world in renewable energy production: BP report](#),” *Xinhua*, Jul 10, 2017; “[Xinhua Insight: China strives for cleaner environment amid development shift](#),” *Xinhua*, Jun 5, 2017; “[Capital of China's coal province bans coal sales](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 2, 2017; “[China plans nationwide use of bioethanol fuel by 2020](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 13, 2017; “[China among "most successful" countries in desert control: UN deputy chief](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 12, 2017; “[Feature: China's eco-urbanism begins to be model](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 3, 2017; Ma Kai, “[Committing to the Development of an Ecological Civilization](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5, No.4, Oct 1, 2013.

was built, and air pollution was targeted in varying cities.³⁹⁸ Another article in *China Daily* said that “5,763 officials have been held accountable for inadequate environmental protection in the latest round of national inspections...the teams received a staggering 59,848 public complaints. After sorting through them and accounting for duplicate reports, that number was whittled down to 39,586 cases.” This means that following environmental laws is still a problem in China. Following this are articles saying that China will set up a national park system, that solar energy is surging in China, that environmental production measures have not raised prices, that dozens of companies have been suspended for environmental violations, that goals for “green agriculture” have been said, and that China is making good on Xi’s environmental pledge.³⁹⁹ However, as you would expect from state media, this obscures the reality. Even by 2020, renewable energy were supply only “20% of the total electricity generated in the country,” with most obviously dominated by fossil fuels.

Non-Chinese state media takes a similar tact. The *South China Morning Post* says that China’s environment is one of Xi’s “greatest tests” he faces, with other articles note that the Beijing has pledged to “turn China’s sprawling, overcrowded capital into a liveable, international city with cleaner air,” that China is building a national park system by 2020, that thousands were punished in China’s “sweeping” crackdown on pollution, and a new tax posed on businesses in China for pollution.⁴⁰⁰ However, again

398 “[Reform makes China's economy stronger, greener](#),” *China Daily*, Jul 19, 2017; “[China to boost green manufacturing in Yangtze River Economic Belt](#),” *China Daily*, Jul 31, 2017; Guo Kai, “[World's largest floating solar farm starts operating](#),” *China Daily*, Aug 15, 2017; “[Panda-shaped solar power station starts operation](#),” *China Daily*, Aug 15, 2017; Zheng Jinran, “[Air pollution targeted in 28 cities](#),” *China Daily*, Aug 26, 2017; “[5,763 officials held accountable in latest environmental inspections](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 18, 2017;

399 “[China to set up national park system](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 27, 2017; Zhang Zhihao, “[Powering toward a clean energy future](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 27, 2017; “[Ministry: Pollution fight is not pushing prices up](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 28, 2017; Zhang Xu, “[Hebei suspends dozens of polluters in crackdown](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 29, 2017; “[China sets goals for green agriculture](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 1, 2017; “[China makes good on Xi's environmental pledge](#),” *China Daily*, Oct 21, 2017; Mridul Chadha, “[Renewable Energy Share In China's Power Generation To Reach 20% By 2020](#),” *CleanTechnica*, Jul1, 2014; RE100, “[China's fast track to a renewable future](#),” Apr 2015;

400 Wang Xiangwei, “[Xi faces one of his greatest tests yet – China's environment](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Aug 27, 2017; Stuart Lau, “[Beijing unveils vision for 'downsized', liveable city with cleaner air](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 29, 2017; Laurie Chen, “[China plans national parks network by 2020 to fend off environmental threats](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 28, 2017; Nectar Gan, “[12,000 officials disciplined and 18,000 companies punished in China's sweeping crackdown against pollution](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 2, 2017; “[New environment tax will hit businesses in China hard, say experts](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Oct 3, 2017;

this does not mean that China is socialist. Media favoring the Chinese revisionists have similar articles. Some declare that the “manufacturing future” of China is embodied in its solar power, while others praise the Chinese efforts at environmental enforcement and reduction of smog.⁴⁰¹ Western media, bourgeois and not, was a bit different. They talked about China’s efforts in solar production, which is trying to bring in foreign capitalists and connects to the renewable energy market, Chinese efforts to restrict coal production, promotions of individuals are tied to environmental production, “clean energy” production in China, and China’s efforts to cover a quarter of the country with forests by 2020. Others wrote about how “for seven continuous days, over 5 million citizens living in the Qinghai Province in northwest China survived on 100 percent renewable energy,” as a trial measure by the State Grid Corporation of China, that China is building a “forest city,” building solar farms, and that China is cementing its global dominance in renewable technology and energy, connecting it again to the global capitalist system. Beyond this are articles talk about Chinese investments in renewable energy, cracking down on polluters, creating a market for electric cars, Chinese solar production in coming years, and varied other environmental initiatives, especially ones to limit pollution.⁴⁰² Sadly, there has also been an

401 John Ross, [“Solar power illustrates China's manufacturing future,”](#) *China.org.cn*, Sept 29, 2016; John Ross, [“Solar power illustrates China's manufacturing future,”](#) *Learning from China*, Sept 29, 2016; [“China to Tackle Urban Smog This Year with 'Zero Tolerance' Environmental Enforcement,”](#) *TeleSur English*, Aug 26, 2017; [“China's Eco-Crackdown a Success: 20% Decrease in Beijing Smog in 2017,”](#) *TeleSur English*, Dec 29, 2017; Chris Baraniuk, [“Future Energy: China leads world in solar power production,”](#) *BBC News*, Jun 22, 2017; Jeff McMahon, [“How China, Not Obama, Waged The War On Coal,”](#) *Forbes*, Jun 16, 2017; Hannah Beech, [“China Ties Officials' Promotions to Saving the Environment,”](#) *Time*, May 6, 2015; Richard Blackwell, [“China now the largest installer of clean energy, report says,”](#) *The Globe and Mail*, Jan 18, 2016; [“China Announces That It Will Cover Nearly A Quarter Of The Country In Forest By 2020,”](#) *Ecosnippets*, May 2016; [“Green is gold: The strategy and actions of China's ecological civilization,”](#) *reliefweb*, May 26, 2016; Carly Cassela, [“China Just Ran an Entire Region on 100% Renewable Energy For 7 Days,”](#) *Science Alert*, Jun 27, 2017; [“Watch: China is building world's first forest city,”](#) *FirstPost*, Jun 30, 2017; Michael Holtz, [“Following damage caused by economic rise, China tackles ambitious conservation experiment,”](#) *Christian Science Monitor*, Aug 20, 2017; Tom Phillips, [“China builds world's biggest solar farm in journey to become green superpower,”](#) *The Guardian*, Jan 19, 2017; Michael Slezak, [“China cementing global dominance of renewable energy and technology,”](#) *The Guardian*, Jan 6, 2017. One *Reuters* article listed on the /r/swcc page is now a [dead link](#).

402 [“China to invest £292bn in renewable power by 2020,”](#) *Reuters*, Jan 5, 2017; Sam Morgan, [“China eclipses Europe as 2020 solar power target is smashed,”](#) *Euractiv*, Aug 30, 2017; RP Siegel, [“China Now Handing Down Death Penalty to Worst Polluters,”](#) *Earth First! Newswire*, Jul 3, 2013; Trefor Moss, [“China, With Methodical Discipline, Conjures a Market for Electric Cars,”](#) *Wall Street Journal*, Oct 2, 2017; [“Chinese province runs on 100% renewables for 7 days,”](#) *climateactionprogramme*, Jun 26, 2017; [“This is a Big Deal: China to Ban Gas-Powered Cars, Push Electric Vehicles,”](#) *Sputnik*, Sept 10, 2017; Jelor Gallego, [“China Wants to Build a \\$50 Trillion Global Wind & Solar Power Grid by 2050,”](#) *futurism*, Apr 4, 2016; Lauri Myllyvirta, [“China kept on smashing renewables records in 2016,”](#) *Greenpeace*, Jan 6, 2017; Lulu Chang, [“China is now the world's largest solar power producer,”](#) *Digital Trends*, Apr 4, 2017; Tom Lawson,

increased interest in nuclear power. Some admit problems: in 2017, “solar energy production accounts for just 1% of China's total energy demand” with a huge demand from coal, Chinese subsidies for solar energy have been unevenly distributed, the Chinese see natural areas are providers of “natural capital,” including “biodiversity as well as ecological services that are essential for human life,” even developing “a monitoring system for tracking the country’s natural capital and quantifying its value,” a worrying thought. Other problems include the fact that by 2020, by the estimates of China’s National Energy Administration, “renewables will still only account for just 15% of overall energy consumption by 2020, equivalent to 580m tonnes of coal” meaning that more than “half of the nation’s installed power capacity will still be fueled by coal” from 2016 to 2020! Others noted that “the grid operator and power companies often fail to cut power generation from coal when generation from renewable sources increases...leading to massive waste of clean energy and slower growth in the use of renewable energy.” This is connected to a *Shanghai Daily* article, saying that “China, in particular, faces the paradox of a “cash glut” and a “cash famine,” that complicates macro-economic policy-making” saying that to address this, the Chinese government aimed to “reduce the tax burden for business and boost fiscal spending on general welfare, so as to rev up corporate investment and household consumption” but also blames a “third of China's economic dilemmas originat[ing]...from outside the country,” saying that “protectionist policies and parochial demands for bigger market shares in emerging economies” by the capitalist world (which they call the “developed” world), “adds to the complexity of the world economy and poses tremendous challenges to manufacturing powerhouses like China.”⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³ Sun Lijian, “[How China can find a way forward amid global economic dilemmas](#),” *Shanghai Daily*, Jan 31, 2013. “[Plans for China’s first ‘city of trees’ take root](#),” *Positive.News*, Jun 29, 2017; Lucy Perdy, “[The ‘vertical forest’ to combat pollution in China](#),” *Positive.News*, Mar 10, 2017; Keith Bradsher, “[China Hastens the World Toward an Electric-Car Future](#),” *New York Times*, Oct 9, 2017; Rob Schmitz, “[China Shuts Down Tens Of Thousands Of Factories In Unprecedented Pollution Crackdown](#),” *NPR*, Oct 23, 2017; “[China is Winning Environmental Clean-Up Race, Minister Says](#),” *Wall Street Journal*, Feb 19, 2016; Barbara Finamore, “[Good News: China's Dropping Coal Consumption Is Putting the Brakes on Global Carbon Emissions](#),” *NRDC*, Jan 27, 2016; “[Greenpeace says China city air pollution drops by 10 percent](#),” *AP*, Jan 20, 2016; “[Greenhouse Pollution Drops in China, India Thanks to Low-Tech Fixes](#),” *National Geographic*, Jul 19, 2006; Richard Martin, “[China Could Have a Meltdown-Proof Nuclear Reactor Next Year](#),” *MIT Technology Review*, Feb 11, 2016; Jane Gleeson-White, “[‘My job is to clean up the environment. China really wants to do that’](#),” *The Guardian*, Sept 9, 2017; [Official document](#) by Chinese government in Oct 2017.

This leads us to a discussion of the reality of China's energy production at the present. Over 60-65% of China's electricity is generated from "thermal" power, meaning "coal, oil or gas is burned in a furnace to produce heat."⁴⁰⁴ This means that fossil fuels (usually refers to natural gas, petroleum, and coal) generates over 2.6 times more of China's electricity than renewable energy! Of the renewable energy, the vast majority is hydropower, not covered often in the Western media, with the second biggest being wind power, and smaller amounts of solar and biomass power. Even worse is the fact that nuclear power generates more than twice of all the established capacity of solar power in China! Despite the Chinese leadership's claims to be on the road to "ecological civilization," power production grew for fossil fuels, renewable energy, and nuclear power between 2016 and 2017. Of that, solar power grew the most, but like all the other energy sources (biomass, wind, hydropower, nuclear), it was still outranked, by a long shot, by fossil fuels. The similar dynamic was also present in 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006.⁴⁰⁵ Another element is worth mentioning: the resistance of the Chinese masses. For example, from 1980 to 1990, Chinese villagers protested to "receive adequate compensation for land lost due to the [Dahe] dam, gain collective ownership of the calcium-carbide factory built to restore the area economically, and bring corrupt local officials to justice."⁴⁰⁶ Additionally, from 2007 to 2009 in 2011-2012, residents, farmers, middle-class folks, and

404 China Energy Portal, "[2017 electricity & other energy statistics](#)," Feb 6, 2018; "[Generation of electricity](#)," BBC, accessed May 4, 2018; King John, "[Thermal Power in China 2016 Market Analysis, Consumption, Trend, Outlook And Forecast to 2020](#)," *energycentral*, Jul 26, 2016; PowerChina, "[Thermal Power Planning, Investigation, Design and Consultation](#)," Jul 3, 2013; "[Vietnam's coal-fired thermal power dependent on China](#)," *VietnamNet*, Feb 10, 2017;

405 China Energy Portal, "[2016 detailed electricity statistics \(update of March 2018\)](#)," Mar 21, 2018; China Energy Portal, "[2015 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Sept 22, 2016; China Energy Portal, "[2014 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Nov 30, 2015; China Energy Portal, "[2013 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Jun 6, 2014; China Energy Portal, "[2012 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Nov 7, 2013; China Energy Portal, "[2011 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Jun 6, 2012; China Energy Portal, "[2010 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Jun 6, 2011; China Energy Portal, "[2009 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Jun 6, 2010; China Energy Portal, "[2008 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Jul 7, 2009; China Energy Portal, "[2007 & 2006 detailed electricity statistics](#)," Aug 14, 2008.

406 William Lawrence, "[Chinese villagers seek reparations for effects of Dahe Dam, 1980-1990](#)," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Sept 24, 2010; Pauline Blount, "[Chinese residents force relocation of chemical plant in Xiamen, 2007](#)," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Nov 20, 2011; Pauline Blount, "[Chinese middle-class and farmers protest petrochemical plant in Chengdu \(Chengdu Stroll\), 2008](#)," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Apr 12, 2011; Pauline Blount, "[Guangzhou residents protest incinerator, 2009](#)," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Nov 26, 2011; Pauline Blount, "[Chinese middle class protesters challenge chemical plant in Dalian, 2011](#)," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Nov 13, 2011; Pauline Blount, "[Chinese farmers protest solar panel plant pollution, Haining, 2011](#)," *Global*

students protested construction of chemical, copper, petrochemical, incinerator plants across China, especially in the East. Significantly, in 2011, Chinese farmers protested pollution from the JinkoSolar solar power plant near the industrial city of Haining run by the “Chinese JinkoSolar Holding Company, which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange.” This seems to indicate other possible actions have occurred since then, but may have declined due to the Chinese government trying to take up the environmental mantle, perhaps to blunt the environmental movement in the country, other than promoting Chinese nationalist goals. After all, considering that Chinese autoworkers struck to “demand higher wages from Honda” in May and Jun 2010 and Shanghai truck drivers struck to protest “overpriced diesel fuel in China and high port fees” in April 2011, it is entirely possible for environmental protests to occur in China.⁴⁰⁷

In closing, you can praise China all you want on the environment, but the fact is that their fossil fuel production easily dwarfs their renewable energy and nuclear power production. At the same time, China’s efforts are connected to the global capitalist system since they are participating in the renewable energy market and have created their own internal markets to sell products, like electric cars and solar panels, for example. So, their “ecological civilization” effort clearly is underdeveloped. At current rates, it could be 2050, or even later when renewable energy dwarfs fossil fuels in China, if that even happens at all. At that point, the globe will be a fiery hell thanks to climate change, the global climate catastrophe. So, you can praise their efforts all they want, but in the broader scheme of the world as a whole, they are woefully inadequate. The efforts of China will not save the world from a calamity since they are, after all, part and parcel of the global capitalist system. Only socialism will save the world from such a calamity and that will not come from the revisionist Chinese leadership.

Nonviolent Action Database, Jun 10, 2011; Iris Fang, “[Shifang students prevent copper plant construction, China, 2012](#),” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Oct 14, 2012; Iris Fang, “[Chinese residents and students stop petrochemical plant expansion in Ningbo, 2012](#),” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Nov 11, 2012.

407 Julio Alicea, “[Chinese autoworkers strike to demand higher wages from Honda, 2010](#),” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, May 10, 2011; Nikki Richards, “[Shanghai truck drivers strike to lower trucking fees, 2011](#),” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, Sept 30, 2012.

China and U\$ imperial aggression

This is another area where revisionists think they have the advantage. The /r/swcc document cites three links, one in *TeleSur English* by John Pilger writing about U\$ warmongering toward China and China's efforts to resist it, saying this "resistance" involves ramped-up militarism and acknowledges elements of capitalism in China another in *The Duran* declaring that "the US continues to feel threatened by Chinese economic dominance in the global marketplace," adding that "while the US has long felt threatened by Chinese trade and industrial dominance, now the US Dollar is being actively challenged by the growing power of the Chinese Yuan."⁴⁰⁸ This same article also said that "...China holds the fate of the Dollar in its hands more than ever" and the U\$ wants to preserve its hegemony. Following this is an article in the *American Herald Tribune*, declaring that "In an attempt to "contain" China, the US has facilitated a pivot to Asia...US hostilities toward China date back over a century...it is obvious that the US views China as a global threat" and apparently dislikes the "achievements" of China's economy. The same position is held by the PSL and *Workers World*.⁴⁰⁹ The former admits that in the late 1970s, "China had opened its doors to capitalist investment" while they claim that China was "socialist," and condemning U\$ provocation toward China. The latter says something similar, adding that Japan joined in such efforts. However, it is an open question how much China challenges the murderous empire. Recently the editors of *Global Times* called for China and the U\$ to cooperate, while China has become even more militarily aggressive, stationing its forces in the Spratly Islands, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry declaring that "China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and its nearby waters. It is needed to protect the sovereignty and security of

408 John Pilger, "[The Coming War on China](#)," *TeleSur English*, Dec 3, 2016; Adam, "[America's cold war on China is no longer just a trade war – it is a war for the Dollar and Federal Reserve](#)," *The Duran*, Oct 11, 2017; Daniel Haipong, "[Is Poverty Reduction the Real Reason Why the US Seeks War with China?](#)," *American Herald Tribune*, Oct 6, 2016;

409 Mike Wang, "[Encircling China: origins of 'Asia Pivot'](#)," *Liberation*, Jul 21, 2014; Derek Ford, "[North Korea missile test a response to U.S. provocations, not the other way around](#)," *Liberation*, Feb 14, 2017; Fred Goldstein, "[U.S. & Japanese imperialism threaten China](#)," *Workers World*, Dec 5, 2013; "[Korea: The facts, please](#)," *Workers World*, Apr 26, 2017, accessed May 4, 2018.

China, and justified for China as a sovereign nation to carry out peaceful development activities and necessary defense constructions. The related deployment is not directed at any country.”⁴¹⁰

Additionally, the ROK called “in China's ambassador on Saturday after a Chinese military plane violated South Korea's air defense identification zone (KADIZ),” and “Vietnam demanded China to immediately end illegal activities in the areas of Vietnam’s Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagos,” showing clashing ROK, Vietnamese, and Chinese sovereignty. Additionally, U\$ and Chinese investors are even meeting together.⁴¹¹ So, it is questionable how much China is resisting U\$ hegemony, but they are annoying the imperialists enough to have a pivot in place. But such efforts do not, in any matter, make China socialist. It still has its own unique capitalist model. What is happening now is simply a “trade spat” between China and the U\$, with the Chinese capitalist class benefiting, as some countries are willing to move closer to China than the U\$.⁴¹² At the same time, the revisionist CPUSA is working on strengthening its links with the CPC, and the Chinese are sticking to keeping their economy open (and part of) to the global capitalist system, wanting Chinese firms to be on a “level playing field” with U\$ firms, even using the WTO to try and aid their position! You can talk about China’s counter-measures, but China doesn’t mind giving global imperialists concessions.

410 “[China, US will have to find ways to cooperate](#),” *Global Times*, May 3, 2018; “[China-U.S. consultation will be constructive if U.S. delegation is sincere: FM spokesperson](#),” *Xinhua*, May 3, 2018; “[U.S. delegation led by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to visit China Thursday](#),” *Xinhua*, May 2, 2018; Lyuba Lulko, “[China shows its military might on disputed Spratly Islands](#),” *Pravda*, May 3, 2018; Kang Jie, “[A small quick step for China’s PLA Navy](#),” *Global Times*, May 1, 2018; Liu Xuanzun, “[China has right to peaceful activities in South China Sea: FM](#),” *Global Times*, May 3, 2018; Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “[China has big plans for a modern bomber](#),” *Popular Science*, Apr 27, 2018; “S. Korea summons Chinese diplomats over violation of air defense zone,” *Yonhap News Agency*, Apr 28, 2018; “[Vietnam condemns China’s illegal activities in Hoang Sa, Truong Sa](#),” *People’s Army Newspaper*, Apr 25, 2018;

411 “[U.S.-China Investor Forum to be held in Buffett’s hometown](#),” *Xinhua*, May 1, 2018.

412 Jorge Heine, “[Latin America and the US-China trade spat](#),” *Global Times*, Apr 23, 2018; Alan Crawford, “[Everything Is for Sale in Cyprus, and China’s Buying](#),” *Bloomberg*, Apr 23, 2018; “[China’s first home-built carrier looks set to start sea trials](#),” *Reuters*, Apr 23, 2018; Mike Ciandella, “[Chinese retaliatory tariffs hitting the US sorghum industry hard](#),” *The Blaze*, Apr 20, 2018; “[Interview: U.S. Communist Party leader says Marxism “vibrant, philosophical” outlook](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 15, 2018; Wang Cong, “[Chinese market cannot be opened up by threatening rhetoric](#),” *Global Times*, Apr 15, 2018; “[Spotlight: Chinese firms want level playing field in U.S.](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 13, 2018; “[China Focus: President Xi reviews navy in South China Sea](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 13, 2018; “[China asks WTO to intervene to stop US trade war](#),” *PressTV*, Apr 10, 2018; “[US treasury secretary says he expects no trade war with China](#),” *PressTV*, Apr 9, 2018; Reuters Staff, “[China’s state media urges U.S. industry to rally against Trump tariff threat](#),” *Reuters*, Apr 7, 2018; “[Chinese Navy Begins Testing Joint Unmanned-Manned Aviation Operations](#),” *Sputnik*, Apr 6, 2018;

China, Tibet, and imperialist narratives

This section gains a number of articles from the revisionists. For one there are articles from Chinese state media thundering that about increased GDP in Tibet from 1965 to 2014, deceptively trying to link the Maoist and Dengist periods together, and declaring that Tibet is one of the “fastest growing” regions.⁴¹³ Then, there’s articles from the PSL tries to disprove the Western image of Tibe. One says that “in 1959...the Dalai Lama’s troops based on Tibetan landowners and elites were defeated by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army...In 1950, the first units of the People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet...the Chinese communists came armed with a Leninist position on national minorities—expressed in their recognition of the right to self-determination—and the class loyalties of peasants of all nationalities...Over the next years, a class struggle emerged in Tibet based on the continued existence of the old feudal ruling class coexisting with the Chinese revolution’s advancing of workers’ and peasants’ rights,” with the PSL also praising the market “reform” efforts of China. The other PSL article focuses U\$ destabilization in Tibet. This echoed a Wikipedia page (“CIA Tibetan program”), a *New York Times* article in 1998 in which the Dalai Lama admitted that he got money from the CIA, a *Sputnik* article about the “untold stories” of CIA intervention in Tibet, and Don Tow, a bourgeois analyst, saying that before 1950, Tibet “was a theocratic, semi-feudal and semi-slave society with great disparity between the small ruling class of religious leaders and great landlords on the one hand and the masses of serfs and slaves on the other hand” and adding that “in 1950 the Liberation Army entered Tibet. In the latter part of April 1951, negotiations between representatives of the Central Government and representatives of the Tibetan Local Government (including the Dalai Lama’s and the Panchen Lama’s representatives) took place in Beijing.” Tow said that that the Chinese Communist government

413 “[Tibet’s GDP increased by 281 times in 50 years](#),” *China’s Daily*, Sept 16, 2015; “[Tibet now among fastest growing Chinese regions: legislator](#),” *China Daily*, Apr 26, 2016; Heather Benno, “[Tibet, imperialism and the right of self-determination](#),” *Liberation News*, Apr 6, 2008; Liberation Staff, “[China, Tibet and U.S.-sponsored counterrevolution](#),” *Liberation News*, Apr 1, 2008; AP, “[World News Briefs: Dalai Lama Group Says It Got Money From C.I.A.](#),” *New York Times*, Oct 2, 1998; “[Secret Files: Untold Story of CIA Covert Operations in Tibet](#),” *Sputnik*, Dec 13, 2016; Don Tow, “[Some Thoughts on Tibet](#),” *Don Tow’s Website*, Apr 2008.

has made “serious mistakes in Tibet” during the Cultural Revolution, called on China to “pay significant more attention to the disparity between the rich and the poor, to corruption, to government bureaucracy, to environmental pollution, to freedom of the press, to freedom of religion, to individual rights, and to the rule of law,” especially when it comes to Tibet. There was also *TeleSur English*, which quoted the Dalai Lama as making a strong anti-immigrant statement and a bourgeois study saying that “for centuries, agriculture and animal husbandry have been the major economic activities in Tibet... Before 1952, grain production in Tibet was generally at a self-sufficient level...By modern standards, industrial production did not exist in Tibet before 1952...The serf system dominated in Tibet for centuries...The regime in Tibet before 1952 was a combination of religious institutions and civil administration...Generally, Tibetan society before 1952 can be compared with the European Middle Ages.”⁴¹⁴ This same study also said that in 1951, “the “Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (17-Point) was signed by the central government and the Dalai Lama's government...The Dalai Lama agreed to carry out social reform and to help the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops enter Tibet, while the central government agreed not to change the social and economic systems (serfdom and estate systems) by force...During 1952-1959, the basic situation in Tibet did not change very much. However, “land reform” brought some social and economic changes to the Chamdo District, which was under the direct control of the central government.” It goes onto say that “in 1959, serfdom was abolished and monasteries lost their administrative power” and the land reforms from 1959 to 1960 liberated all slaves and serfs, distributed land and animals to them (and herdsmen) and was followed by a commune system “gradually established” from 1965 to 1975. It later stats that the reforms in the 1980s, redistributed the land and animals yet again, and that under the Cultural Revolution the Tibetans reportedly were negatively effected. Still, if you look at the

414 “[The Imperialist Dalai Lama: ‘Too Many Refugees in Europe’](#),” *TeleSur English*, Jun 1, 2016; “[Economic Patterns of the Tibet Autonomous Region: The Past and Present](#),” this paper was originally published in *Population, Ethnicity, and Nation-building*, edited by Calvin Goldscheider (Westview Press, 1995), pp. 37-75. This is a revised version.

information, it is clear that from 1952 to 1975, agricultural production has tripled, grain production quadrupled, livestock numbers steadily increased, with the same being the case for industrial production, and ultimately coal. In fact, a chart in the study shows that from 1975 to 1995, the amount of coal produced declined from its high in 1975, never recovering, while population only slowly inched upwards, livestock numbers barely increased, lumber production was unsteady (and ultimately declined), knitting wool production declined, while some other indicators went up. So, Tibet may have had some gains in the Dengist period, but in a number of areas, as just indicated, there were declines, even in some areas of trade! What is important to remember is that “in 1959, the central government controlled Tibet. Social reform abolished serfdom, and monasteries lost their traditional power.” This should be undoubtedly applauded despite problems in the Dengist period.

There are three other articles on the subject worth mentioning. The first is an article by Arthur Clegg in *Labour Monthly* in 1950.⁴¹⁵ He described Tibet as a “country of serfs, poverty and illiteracy,” adding that “almost all the cultivated land and much of the pastoral land is owned by a handful of feudal families,” adding that the PLA coming into China offers a “fruitful solution” to the problems of the suffering Tibetans. He later added that American journalists, from 1949 on, have been encouraging the Tibet region and Dalai Lama to “make public appeals for American support,” but the Tibetans and Chinese agreed on a “common programme,” which he said began “the liberation of Tibet by the Tibetans.” With this, we can move onto Michael Parenti’s article on Tibet, titled “Friendly Feudalism: The Tibet Myth.”⁴¹⁶ He makes some of the same points that have already been made. However, it, like the version on *Swans* does not include a section added in 2007 in which he directly criticizes China’s capitalist model, from which I quote directly:

Finally, let it be said that if Tibet’s future is to be positioned somewhere within China’s

emerging free-market paradise, then this does not bode well for the Tibetans. China boasts a

415 Arthur Clegg, “[Tibet](#),” *Labour Monthly*, Feb 1950, pp 86-91.

416 Michael Parenti, “[Friendly Feudalism: The Tibet Myth](#),” *Dissident Voice*, Dec 27, 2003, also printed in [Swans](#).

dazzling 8 percent economic growth rate and is emerging as one of the world's greatest industrial powers. But with economic growth has come an ever deepening gulf between rich and poor. Most Chinese live close to the poverty level or well under it, while a small group of newly brooded capitalists profit hugely in collusion with shady officials. Regional bureaucrats milk the country dry, extorting graft from the populace and looting local treasuries. Land grabbing in cities and countryside by avaricious developers and corrupt officials at the expense of the populace are almost everyday occurrences. Tens of thousands of grassroot protests and disturbances have erupted across the country, usually to be met with unforgiving police force. Corruption is so prevalent, reaching into so many places, that even the normally complacent national leadership was forced to take notice and began moving against it in late 2006. Workers in China who try to organize labor unions in the corporate dominated "business zones" risk losing their jobs or getting beaten and imprisoned. Millions of business zone workers toil twelve-hour days at subsistence wages. With the health care system now being privatized, free or affordable medical treatment is no longer available for millions. Men have tramped into the cities in search of work, leaving an increasingly impoverished countryside populated by women, children, and the elderly. The suicide rate has increased dramatically, especially among women. China's natural environment is sadly polluted. Most of its fabled rivers and many lakes are dead, producing massive fish die-offs from the billions of tons of industrial emissions and untreated human waste dumped into them. Toxic effluents, including pesticides and herbicides, seep into ground water or directly into irrigation canals. Cancer rates in villages situated along waterways have skyrocketed a thousand-fold. Hundreds of millions of urban residents breathe air rated as dangerously unhealthy, contaminated by industrial growth and the recent addition of millions of automobiles. An estimated 400,000 die prematurely every year from air pollution. Government environmental agencies have no

*enforcement power to stop polluters, and generally the government ignores or denies such problems, concentrating instead on industrial growth. China's own scientific establishment reports that unless greenhouse gases are curbed, the nation will face massive crop failures along with catastrophic food and water shortages in the years ahead. In 2006-2007 severe drought was already afflicting southwest China. If China is the great success story of speedy free market development, and is to be the model and inspiration for Tibet's future, then old feudal Tibet indeed may start looking a lot better than it actually was.*⁴¹⁷

This is a worthwhile comment that revisionists will get angry over, but that doesn't matter.

Elsewhere, Parenti wrote about the Chinese embassy in Serbia bombed by the US, China's economic nationalism, said that Cuba is different from China and Vietnam which are, in his words, "energetically encouraging the growth of a low-wage, private investment sector."⁴¹⁸ He also argued that "the Russians haven't been acting like an enemy, they don't rattle their sabre against the United States, and neither do the Chinese nor anybody else," poking a hole in the revisionist argument that the Chinese are strong anti-imperialist, rather than the reality: they are strongly nationalist.

Finally there is the book by Anne Louise Strong on Tibet, titled *When Serfs Stood up in Tibet* published in 1959.⁴¹⁹ Apart from reprinting the "Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" in 1951, a "Resolution

417 Michael Parenti, "[Friendly Feudalism: The Tibet Myth](#)," updated and expanded version, Jan 2007. *The Espresso Stalinist* quotes Parenti's comments in a post titled "[Michael Parenti on Chinese Capitalism](#)." Related is [a comment](#) by the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador saying that capitalism is being consolidated in China, not socialism, which can easily be seen!

418 Michael Parenti, "[Yugoslav Sojourn: Notes from the Other Side](#)," Jan 2000; Michael Parenti, "[Afghanistan, Another Untold Story](#)," 2009; Michael Parenti, "[Imperialism 101](#)," Chapter 1 of *Against Empire*; Michael Parenti, "[Syria, Sarin, and Casus Belli](#)," Sept 30, 2013; Michael Parenti, "[U.S. Aggression & Propaganda Against Cuba](#)," *Z Magazine*, Sept 2004; John Robles interviewer, "[Michael Parenti: U.S. Empire successful in stopping the betterment of the world's people](#)," *Voice of Russia*, Dec 21, 2013.

419 Anna Louise Strong, *When Serfs Stood up in Tibet* (Beijing: New World Press, 1959), specifically citing in the next sentence: "[Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet](#)"; "[The Resolution on Carrying Out Democratic Reform in Tibet Adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet on July 17, 1959](#)"; "[The Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region August 25, 1965](#)"; Staff Members of *China Reconstructs* titled "[Tibet — From Serfdom to Socialism](#)".

on Carrying Out Democratic Reform in Tibet Adopted by the Second Plenary Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet on July 17, 1959,” “The Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on the Establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region August 25, 1965,” and a document by Staff Members of *China Reconstructs* titled “Tibet — From Serfdom to Socialism,” in the appendix, the book has 13 chapters in her book. In the first chapter, she described how the Chinese cared for her at the age of 73, Tibet’s history before 1959, adding that:

...Serfdom had been less than a month legally abolished by the resolution issued July 17th, 1959 by the new local government of Tibet. The law's enforcement had yet to be organized. This was what we were to see...This Democratic Reform had been decreed in two stages. Personal servitude and the forced, unpaid labor known as ula were at once abolished; the organizing of local governments based on the peasants would take longer, and the transfer of land to the tillers longer still. For law cannot make men free; each man must take his freedom and each community must organize its law. One of the most sensational changes would be in the monasteries, announced by the Panchen Lama himself. The courts, jails, torture system and floggings which they had imposed not only on lamas but even on laymen, would be abolished, and yield to a system of county courts under secular rule⁴²⁰

This is momentous accomplishment, to say the least! Her next chapter was again told in a story format. She described the happiness felt by the Tibetans:

...Herdsman appeared among the animals or standing beside rock shelters. The rags that hung in festoons of filth from their bodies indicated incredible poverty, and their tiny rock shelters were poor barriers against the outer cold of night. But they stood erect, and most of them waved or shouted greeting. Near one cluster of shelters, four small boys rushed up to the road and lined up in salute. Our trip had been nowhere announced yet, and nobody on these pastures

420 Anna Louise Strong, Chapter 1: “[Take-off for Tibet](#),” [When Serfs Stood up in Tibet](#) (Beijing: New World Press, 1959).

*knew who we were, but they knew from the line of autos that we came from the airport and had some connection with the great innovations sweeping their country. The words "a million serfs have stood up" seemed very appropriate. It was as if the landscape had come alive.*⁴²¹

Her chapters go on from here. In the third chapter she gave some more historical background for Tibet itself and its development. She wrote that

China is a multi-national country and Tibet is one of its largest sub-divisions. That Tibet has been an integral part of China for seven hundred years is held by all Chinese and recognized, at times with reservations, by all foreign powers. It is also the view of most Tibetans, though movements of secession have at times occurred, none of which rallied enough strength to succeed...All basic changes in Tibet from the time of Kublai Khan, were made or sanctioned by the Chinese Emperors, even the institution of the Dalai Lama itself...No claim of Tibet's independence from China has rallied wide support from the Tibetan people or recognition by any foreign power, in the past seven hundred years. Tibet's modern history dates from May 23, 1951, when the Dalai Lama signed with Peking the Agree-ment of Seventeen Articles, which affirmed Tibet's long existence "within the boundaries of China" and her present "return to the motherland"...It is clear from this brief survey that the arrival in Tibet of the People's Liberation Army in 1951 was not an "invasion", as commonly held abroad. Chinese would not in any case consider it an invasion, since they hold Tibet to be an integral part of China...Eight years later, the Dalai Lama, after he fled to India, said the agreement had been "imposed at the point of a bayonet". That it followed the-defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo was true. But after that defeat, the victorious PL A had waited eight months to secure the unanimous consent of the Dalai Lama and the kashag and the "monks and people"...The Dalai Lama, speaking in 1959 from India, told the world that the 1951 agreement had been "imposed on an unwilling

421 Anna Louise Strong, Chapter 2: "[De Luxe to Lhasa](#)," [When Serfs Stood up in Tibet](#) (Beijing: New World Press, 1959).

*Tibet" and violated at once by Peking. He listed no concrete violations...The Dalai Lama, set up as god and king, was a symbol around whom and through whom the biggest serf-owners struggled for power...Such was the kind of society that in March 1951 "unanimously agreed" to move towards socialism, under the leadership of Peking!*⁴²²

In the next chapter, Strong talked about the March Rebellion in Tibet. She said that the world press claimed that there was “ruthless suppression” of the rebellion in Tibet, the “massacring the Tibetan nation,” but this was a distortion of the reality. She added that the “total number of armed rebels had been estimated at about 20,000” while the “total PLA force in those parts of Tibet where rebellion occurred had been some 5,000 men,” meaning that they were outnumbered, but they were still successful! From here, she added that

When the serf-owning rulers of a society in which serfdom had been the way of life for a thousand years, agreed in 1951 to move towards socialism under the leadership of Peking, the stage was clearly set for a long struggle. This must have been known to both sides from the start. Yet Peking's Communists and Tibet's serf-owners both signed that 1951 Agreement, and the Dalai Lama wired Mao Tse-tung that Tibet's "officials, monks and people", were giving it unanimous support. Both sides had reason for postponing struggle, both counted on the changes time might be made to bring...The People's Liberation Army had beaten the Tibetan Army but had not "won Tibet". It had won from Tibet's local government the recognition that Tibet was part of "the motherland of China", and the right to place the PLA in frontier posts towards India and Nepal as "the national army". This was the first essential at the time, for in 1951 American troops were fighting Chinese in Korea and off Taiwan and threatening to fight in Indo-China, while Washington was raising the question of "Tibet's independence" as Britain had done for decades, as a means of detaching Tibet from China...So, from the very "unanimous

422 Anna Louise Strong, Chapter 3: ["First Briefing,"](#) [When Serfs Stood up in Tibet](#) (Beijing: New World Press, 1959).

acceptance" of the 1951 Agreement, both sides began to prepare for future conflict for the loyalties of the Tibetans. Peking began with the behavior of the People's Liberation Army, with the great highways, that knit Tibet to the motherland of China, not only in a military but in a political and economic sense, with hospitals, schools, experimental farms, seed loans without interest, free gifts of better farm tools to peasants...The third move in Peking's strategy was the building of three great highways, connecting Tibet with the rest of China, militarily, politically and economically. Its advantages for Tibetans have been noted in the previous chapter, the improved communications, the consequent lowering in prices of consumer goods, like tea and textiles, the wages paid to serfs...Already the staff for the reform was coming, prepared for eight years by Peking. Over ten thousand Tibetans had been getting some education in other parts of China, most of them serfs who had run away to the PLA. Of these 3,400 were returning to help the reform; fifteen hundred came in early June, the rest after the June graduations. Five hundred and fifty Tibetan cadres, civil servants in autonomous Tibetan districts in adjoining provinces, were being transferred into Tibet; of these one hundred and twenty-five had enough experience to become county secretaries or district chiefs...Thus the Tibetan people were never forced to choose between loyalty to Peking and to Lhasa. When the PLA moved out across the land to confiscate the whips and torture implements and tell the serfs that the harvest would be theirs, they went in the name of Peking and of Lhasa too. The people...could realize how deeply they hated those old torments and how they could now be free.⁴²³

I could go on and take quotes from Strong's other chapters. But, I feel that I have devoted enough space to this topic already. It is worth saying as a final comment that just because China engaged in liberation of Tibet, does not mean that China is socialist today.

423 Anna Louise Strong, Chapter 4: "[The March Rebellion](#)," [When Serfs Stood up in Tibet](#) (Beijing: New World Press, 1959). Her other chapters are: [V. Visits in Lhasa](#); [VI. Nachi in Jokhang](#); [VII. Village East of Lhasa](#); [VIII. Lhalu's Serfs Accuse](#); [IX. I Climb the Potala Palace](#); [X. Reform in a Major Monastery](#); [XI. The Lamas of Drepung](#); [XII. Their First Own Harvest](#); and [XIII. "Building Paradise"](#).

Taiwan, China, and imperialist narratives

The folks of /r/swcc only list two links, both from the PSL, aiming to counter “imperialist narratives” on Taiwan, while in a sense supporting revisionist China.⁴²⁴ The first link says that the US fuels tension by pumping weapons into Taiwan while the second declares that the phone call of the orange menace to Taiwan’s president is a signal of coming aggression. The relations between mainland China and Taiwan came into international news recently: the Dominican Republic broke ties with Taiwan and said it would establish them with China.⁴²⁵ The article said, and I quote,

The Dominican Republic and China announced Tuesday they were establishing diplomatic relations as the Caribbean country became the latest nation to dump Taiwan, leaving it with just 19 diplomatic allies around the globe...The Dominican Republic said it believed its switch to ties with China would be "extraordinarily positive for the future of our country", in an official statement...Beijing announced Tuesday morning that it would exchange ambassadors with the Dominican Republic "as soon as practicable"...Taiwan now has 19 diplomatic allies left -- 10 in Latin America and the Caribbean, two in Africa, six small island nations in the Pacific and the Vatican...The Dominican Republic joins a long list of small countries that "in a heartbeat will throw principle out the window for the sake of getting more from China"

This shows that the competition between China, nationalist in nature, and Taiwan, backed by the Western imperialists, for influence on the international stage. It will be a tough fight to be sure. But what is more sure is that if China were to take over Taiwan, it could become even more capitalist. This seems to have happened when China absorbed Macau and Hong Kong, so why wouldn’t it happen if China absorbed Taiwan? This would accomplish a nationalist objective for China. Sadly, if it happened today, it would hurt the proletariat on the island.

424 Radhika Miller, “[Washington fuels conflict by pumping weapons into Taiwan](#),” *Liberation News*, Oct 22, 2008; Meghann Adams, “[Trump Taiwan phone call a signal of aggression to come](#),” *Liberation News*, Dec 12, 2016;

425 “[Dominican Republic breaks with Taiwan to establish ties with China](#),” *AFP*, May 1, 2018.

Hong Kong, China, and imperialist narratives

There are only two sets of links on this topic. The first are from *Workers World* in 1997. One declares that Britain stole Hong Kong from China, saying that after the first Opium war, there was a “treaty [which] forced the Chinese government to pay \$15 million to the British merchants. Furthermore, it opened up five ports to English trade” and China “ceded Hong Kong to the British,” beginning “Hong Kong's 155 years as a British colony. It paralleled imperialist conquest in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the rest of Asia.”⁴²⁶ The other article said that Hong Kong was now in the hands of China, adding that “Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty in a peaceful transfer negotiated by the British and Chinese governments” due to an agreement between “British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping, leader of the People's Republic of China” in 1984 which stipulated that “the British would pull out of Hong Kong and that for at least 50 years [until 2034] China would not interfere with the capitalist system that British and world imperialism have maintained in this deep-water harbor enclave on China's southern coast.” The article also added that under Chinese control, “the properties foreign capitalist corporations now own will also continue to belong to their current owners” and noted that “Mao Zedong and the other early leaders of the PRC did not favor forcibly seizing Hong Kong, even when that was clearly possible from a military viewpoint.” This article went onto say that “the People's Republic of China was certainly strong enough to have seized Hong Kong by force of arms at any time since the 1949 revolution...Given that, one might conclude that British and world imperialism would be thoroughly satisfied with the terms of the current settlement” but it said that such forces are never satisfied. The second set of links are from the PSL. One gave an “educational background” on the crisis in Hong Kong in 2014 for “pro-democracy” effort and another analyzed this crisis.⁴²⁷ With this, the revisionists undoubtedly, still, distort the reality.

426 Kristianna Tho'Mas, “[How Britain stole Hong Kong from China](#),” *Workers World*, Jul 10, 1997; Brian Becker, “[With Brits out, it's Hong Kong, People's Republic of China](#),” *Workers World*, Jul 10, 1997.

427 PSL Central Committee, “[Educational background material on Hong Kong crisis prepared by the PSL](#),” *Liberation News*, Oct 6, 2014; PSL Central Committee, “[Hong Kong crisis analyzed](#),” *Liberation News*, Oct 6, 2014.

China, Tienanmen Square, and imperialist narratives

Like many other topics, this is where the revisionists think they can get the upper hand. With MIM (Prisons) quick mention of the “Tianamen [sic] Square massacre,” even if they do not endorse the label, it is worth broaching this topic.⁴²⁸ All the articles favoring the revisionists share a common story: the Tiananmen Square Massacre did not occur, saying it was a “fictitious narrative” and that the protesters engaged in violence. Still, they had to admit that China “put down” the protests (which they call a “rebellion”) with force, justifying it by saying it was a “counter-revolution” and declaring that “Tiananmen student protestors were backed by the most right-wing forces inside the leadership of the CCP.” An article in *Workers World* admitted that “the turn toward a market economy under Deng Xiaoping had alienated many workers. There was also a counter-revolutionary element trying to take advantage of popular grievances to completely restore capitalism” while others said that “the Tiananmen Incident was awful, not just the death of the college students, but also the purge afterwards” and that “there's no question many people were killed by the army that night *around* Tiananmen Square, and on the way to it — mostly in the western part of Beijing.” U\$ diplomats in released Wikileaks cables also addressed this, saying that there was some shooting but not “mass firing,” but there were still attempts to restore “order,” especially noted in an eyewitness account by a Latin

428 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), “[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#),” *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017; “[Tiananmen: The Massacre that Wasn't](#),” *Liberation News*, Jun 13, 2014; Richard Becker, “[PSL response to ISO on China and Tiananmen](#),” *Liberation News*, Jun 16, 2009; “[Looking back at Tiananmen Square, the defeat of counter-revolution in China](#),” *FSRO*, May 7, 2009; Thomas Hon Wong, “[Tiananmen: the Empire's Big Lie](#),” *CounterPunch*, Jun 6, 2017; Deidre Griswold, “[Tiananmen Square 'massacre' was a myth](#),” *Workers World*, Jun 29, 2011; Robin Daverman response to [What do mainland Chinese think of the new revelation that at least 10,000 people died in Tiananmen incident \(they have been saying hardly anyone died\)?](#) on *Quora*; Gregory Clark, “[Tiananmen Square Massacre is a Myth, All We're 'Remembering' are British Lies](#),” *International Business Times*, Jun 4, 2014; Richard Roth, “[There Was No 'Tiananmen Square Massacre'](#),” *CBS News*, Jun 4, 2009; Godfree Roberts, “[Quora asks: 'Why is the Chinese government still trying to deny the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989?'](#),” *Greenville Post*, Oct 20, 2017; Jeff J. Brown, “[Tall Tiananmen Tales and the Little Red Pill](#),” *Greenville Post*, Jun 2, 2017. FSRO declares that “of those who took the lead in putting the farm situation back in order, many would later be unjustly branded as “capitalist roaders” during the Cultural Revolution.” Why should we feel sad for them? These charges ended up being right especially in cases like Deng! Wong says something similar, snarling that “a decade of groundbreaking reforms inspired by Deng Xiaoping had brought the moribund economy to life and freed the nation from the ideological shackles imposed by radical Maoists during the cataclysmic Cultural Revolution.”

American diplomat at the time.⁴²⁹ Other sources, from radical, anti-revisionist sources give a bit of an antidote to what has been said so far. The Maoist Internationalist Movement addressed this in two posts. In their first, they wrote that “what the West calls the Tiananmen Square massacre happened June 4, 1989. The leaders of our movement in China were executed and imprisoned in 1976 and 1977 by Hua Guofeng and the allies of Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping and his allies were responsible for the "Beijing Spring" massacre in 1989 just as they were responsible for initial repressions in the Cultural Revolution in 1966,” adding that “the U\$. government and media thought highly of the capitalist-roaders, but some bourgeois spokespeople did an about-face after the June 4th massacre...The leaders that carried out the massacre on the city streets on the way to clearing Tiananmen Square were not Maoist. China is state-capitalist.”⁴³⁰ In their second post, they specifically addressed what happened:

On the weekend of June 3rd-4th, the Beijing regime shot down hundreds of student-led demonstrators opposed to government corruption and dubbed as pro-democracy by the Western press. The figures for the death tolls are estimates...Apparently, the urban areas largely supported the students while the countryside was silent...The massacre has reportedly created a small, perhaps permanent armed resistance... The reason that the U.S. government did not do more is that the U.S. imperialists obtain electronic intelligence information from China in the kind of alliance against the Soviet bloc that the U.S. seeks to preserve at any cost...Students started their demonstrations this year in Beijing with a commemoration of former party leader Hu Yaobang, who died. Hu had lost his job for being soft on the student movement in the past...The government had reason to fear the movement's attacks on government corruption... One scholar found that a majority of those participants in the Cultural Revolution (1966- 1976) were ready for another campaign against government corruption...One common poster in the

429 “[Wikileaks Tiananmen cables](#),” *The Telegraph*, Jun 4, 2011; “[Latin American Diplomat Eyewitness Account Of June 3-4 Events On Tiananmen Square](#),” Jul 12, 1989

430 Maoist Internationalist Movement, “[What about Tiananmen Square?](#),” accessed May 5, 2018; Maoist Internationalist Movement, “[Maoist View of Beijing Massacre, July 3-4, 1989](#),” *MIM Notes* 38, 1989.

demonstrations said that "Mao's son died in Korea." This referred to the fact that Mao gave his son no particular privilege. He died fighting for the communists in North Korea when China aided Korea in fighting the Western imperialist invasion. Something of a Mao revival occurred with demonstrators carrying posters of Mao, especially outside Beijing. This is not to say that all the demonstrators sang the communist song "Internationale," which some did. There was also an important section of the movement dedicated to copying the West as the mock Statue of Liberty brought to Tiananmen proved...Deng Xiaoping is the most powerful leader in China. Deng, Yang Shangkun and Li Peng appear to be mainly responsible for the massacre...Deng Xiaoping came under attack by Mao for his repression of students and that in fact Mao purged Deng just before his death in 1976...When Deng did things the capitalist media liked, it proclaimed him a hero. When the same man massacred the students, they blamed Mao...Mao certainly instructed that the army should not attack its own people...Deng Xiaoping orders the crackdown on students and suddenly he becomes described as a "hard-liner" himself. No one ever suggested that the very people who advocated free markets, unemployment and private or quasi-private property in agriculture were also the same people in favor of repression of political movements in China...The West is concerned about its ideas about democracy, but it did not care that Deng implemented anti-democracy in the workplace and women's roles. Maoists on the other hand support democracy for the working classes...in both politics and economic matters. It is especially hypocritical to associate Mao with Deng when Mao purged Deng and the West supported Deng all along until the massacre.

You can disagree with their perspective, but it is more nuanced than the revisionists, without a doubt. In other instances, Maoists have criticized China's actions, saying that some praised the Cultural Revolution, giving a different character to what happened.⁴³¹

⁴³¹ Maoist International Movement, "[Rally for Ward Churchill in Indiana stopped by police](#)," 2001; "[Big Mac Or Big Mao? : Chinese Youth Interested In Mao](#)," MIM Notes 64, May 1992; Ehecatl, "[Review: China's Urban Villagers: Changing](#)

General elements of China's International Relations

There are varied elements of the international relations of revisionist China. One of these is the One Belt One Road program, also called Belt and Road. Revisionist Roland Boer declares that this initiative, launched in 2013, “arises from Chinese tradition and culture,” claims that people only call it “colonialism” because they had a colonial history, going onto claim that “the Belt and Road Initiative, has a significant pedigree in Chinese tradition...In many respects...[it] is fostering a new phase of the anti-colonial struggle.”⁴³² He then claims that “the Belt and Road Initiative offers a very different model, developed out of Chinese experience. Any country with an infrastructural need is potentially eligible. In Africa, Latin America, the Pacific, Asia, project after project is being built by Chinese companies.” Of course, this distorts the reality. Some take the same line as Boer, but others are more critical, admitting it interconnects with global capitalism and say it encourages the “China model” to be adopted by other countries.⁴³³ In this way, it is a nationalist effort in the sense it opens markets for the Chinese bourgeoisie, but is also internationalist in the sense that it allows bourgeoisie of different countries to interlink, complimenting the IMF and World Bank, not necessarily competing with them! One article even admitted that “the BRI scheme has attracted some funds in the US. New York investment firm KraneShares inaugurated their One Belt One Road (OBOR) Fund on September 8, 2017.” Doesn’t sound like it is standing up to the Western bourgeoisie then! One opinion piece in *People’s Daily* declares that Belt and Road initiative is about “economic openness, free trade and shared development” while Xinhua says that “human capital,” simply a “quantification of the economic

[Life in a Beijing Suburb](#),” *prisoncensorship.info*, Jan 2017.

432 Roland Boer, “[The Origins of the Belt and Road Initiative](#),” *Stalin’s Moustache*, Apr 28, 2018. Boer claims it was launched in 2016 but he is incorrect. It was launched in 2013, per [Xinhua](#).

433 Sara Flounders, “[China builds new type of globalization](#),” *Workers World*, May 28, 2017; Patrick Lawrence, “[How China Is Building the Post-Western World](#),” *The Nation*, May 16, 2017; Yanfei Li, “[Can China’s Belt and Road plan bring Chinese-style prosperity to developing nations?](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Aug 2, 2017; Liew Mun Leong, “[China’s belt and road strategy offers a winning growth formula, and the world must get on board](#),” *South China Morning Post*, May 31, 2017; Peter Wong, “[How China’s belt and road is transforming Asean](#),” *South China Morning Post*, May 1, 2017; “[Plugging China into Europe](#),” *South China Morning Post*, accessed May 5, 2018; “[Khorgos: the biggest dry port in the world](#),” *South China Morning Post*, accessed May 5, 2018; Tai Wei Lim, “[China Pledges Billions of Dollars for Belt and Road Projects](#),” *IPP Review*, Oct 3, 2017.

value of a worker's skill set” since, as one bourgeois economist thundered, “people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or values,” will have a role in this initiative, along with efforts serving the primary goal: increasing the countries which interconnect with China, serving as a form of soft power.⁴³⁴ The latter was clear, in a *Reuters* article describing Belt and Road as a “sweeping plan to rebuild Silk Road trade links with Europe and Asia,” adding that this effort “aims to carve out new markets for goods that China makes too much of.” One capitalist, Zhou Junjia, sales manager with Baifeng Iron and Steel Corporation, told *Reuters* that “we don’t mind whether it is ‘One Belt, One Road’ or something else. As long as it gives us more export opportunities” and capitalist Hanson Liu, assistant president at Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, saying that “This is China’s grand strategy. It’s like how a person in a village has gotten rich and wants to fix roads, build power points, street lamps for the neighbourhood...Our company, from top to bottom, is focused on this,” while another, a manager at a steel mill, complained that “There has been a little impact from ‘One Belt, One Road’, but it is not evident. The market involved is too big, and now it’s more just a concept.”

I am reminded, at this point, of what was stated in the most recent Five-Year “Plan,” actually a strategy by the Chinese state which puts in place ways to appease the populace to prevent social disturbances and benefit the Chinese bourgeoisie. It declared that, from 2011 to 2015, and I quote, “China’s soft-power has continued to become stronger,” as has the country’s military power.⁴³⁵ This is

434 Dominique de Villepin, “[Belt and Road gives momentum to redraw globalization](#),” *People’s Daily*, Sept 21, 2017; “[“One Belt, One Road” initiative brings more than infrastructure to Central and Eastern Europe](#),” *Xinhua*, Oct 8, 2017; Gary S. Becker, “[Human Capital](#),” *The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, 2008; “[Human Capital](#),” *Investopedia*, accessed May 5, 2018; Brenda Goh and Koh Gui Qing, “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ looks to take construction binge offshore,” *Reuters*, Sept 6, 2015.

435 “[The 13th Five Year Plan: For Economic And Social Development Of The People’s Republic Of China \(2016-2020\)](#),” Central Compilation and Translation Press, accessed May 5, 2018; Yang Jiechi, “[China’s Public Diplomacy](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 3, No.3, Jul 1, 2011; Yang Jiechi, “[World Expo Diplomacy: A New Starting Point for China’s Diplomacy](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.1, Jan 1, 2011; “[China’s economic diplomacy showcases fresh style with new blueprint](#),” *Xinhua*, Nov 22, 2013; “[Xi stresses core socialist values](#),” *Xinhua*, Feb 26, 2014; “[President Xi’s interview in Sochi draws high comments](#),” *Xinhua*, Feb 10, 2014; Hu Angang and Mao Jie, “[Seeking Truth from Facts: The Secret to the Success of China’s Policy-Making](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5 No.1, Jan 1, 2013; Lu Gang, “[The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Successful Model for Regional Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5 No.1, Jan 1, 2013; Yang Jiechi, “[Serving the Nation with Vigorous Steps: China’s Diplomacy in 2011](#),” *Qiushi*, Apr 7, 2014; “[Xi’s Sochi trip highlights China’s emphasis on soft power, high-level diplomacy: British experts](#),” *Xinhua*, Feb 10, 2014; Liu Yunshan, “[Work for Thriving Development of Philosophy and the Social Sciences at This New Historical Starting Point \(Extract\)](#),” *Qiushi*,

not uncommon in state publications. *Qiushi* has had numerous articles on this subject. One in 2011, after noting that soft power “mainly comprises of values, systems, political views and cultural influence,” declared that “China should actively engage in public diplomacy in order to comprehensively develop its soft power, further boost its international appeal and influence, and ensure that the Chinese people gain a greater understanding of not only the outside world, but also themselves” while another, the same year, said that holding the Beijing Olympics and Shanghai World Expo has “demonstrated China’s image as a large responsible country and further enhanced China’s soft power,” connecting “development” of China’s soft power to its “capacity to safeguard...sovereignty, security and development interests.” Other articles, in later years, held a similar line, calling for a “strong cultural soft power,” with revisionism as part of this equation, along with “sports and...high-level diplomacy,” the latter manifested in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Even the most recent CPC constitution declared that their party shall “strive to...enhance our country’s cultural soft power”!⁴³⁶

There are a number of other articles aiming to put China in a positive light. Chinese state media had an article on “Xi’s diplomacy,” Chinese investment in Greece, and further “opening” to the outside world (i.e. more opportunities for foreign capitalist exploitation).⁴³⁷ At the same time, revisionists and Trotskyists alike declare that China is not imperialist. With this, we move onto other varied efforts of the Chinese revisionists. Those favorable to such efforts declare that China’s world strategy is about the

Vol.2 No.1 January 1,2010; Carlos Aquino, “[China's influence grows in US' 'backyard'](#),” *China Daily*, Jun 25, 2012; Yang Jiechi, “[Working for World Peace and Development for All](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol. 2, No.1, Jan 1, 2010; Lu Jingtang, “[The Core Issue in Improving the Conduct of the CPC](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.6 No.1, Jan 1,2014; Harvey Dzodin, “[More than media needed to boost soft power](#),” *China Daily*, Feb 26, 2016; “[Senior CPC official calls for "cultural confidence"](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 2, 2016; Yan Shan, “[Cultural Awareness, Cultural Confidence, Cultural Strength](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.3 No.1 Jan 1,2011.

436 “[Constitution of the Communist Party of China](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan-Mar 2018, Vol.10, No.1, Issue No.34; Another post, titled “Cultural Innovation: A Self-Conscious Mission of the Communist Party of China” [declares](#) that “Traditional Chinese culture is profound, containing a vast range of cultural elements that form the basis of [China’s] soft power.”

437 “[Xi’s Diplomacy: Philosophy, wisdom and honors](#),” *China Daily*, accessed May 5, 2018; Liu Lulu, “[NYT sees Chinese investment in Greece through Western centrist lens](#),” *Global Times*, Aug 31, 2017; “[China to open wider, share development opportunities: Premier](#),” *Xinhua*, Sept 30, 2017; Johannes Stern, “[Behind the designation of Russia and China as “imperialist”: A case study in theoretical charlatanry](#),” *World Socialist Web Site*, Apr 12, 2016; Steven Argue, “[Russia and China Are Not Imperialist](#),” *Greenville Post*, May 6, 2015.

survival of China, “the need to maintain China’s sovereignty...integrating itself into the world economy; opposing US domination; promoting ‘balance’ – a larger...number of influential powers; promoting South-South cooperation; utilising the rivalry between the different imperialist powers to push forward the development agenda; and promoting the general rise of the third world,” with one commentator declaring, with a degree of validity, that Washington has begun a new Cold War aimed against China.⁴³⁸ However, even they had to admit that “the economic reforms [since 1978] have undoubtedly brought serious problems...[such as] unemployment...a massive increase in wealth disparity, regional disparities...reliance on exports, the growth of unregulated cheap labour, and an unstable ‘floating population’ of rural migrants” and grumble that “only time will tell if the Chinese vision will lead to the long-term strengthening of socialism and a more equitable world.” The fact is that such a vision will not come to pass under the current revisionist Chinese leadership especially since China “integrating itself into the world economy” means it is integrating itself into the global capitalist system. Some may cite the story that China imprisoned or killed multiple CIA sources, which only relies on “current and former U.S. officials” quoted by the *New York Times*, Chinese “network of influence” in New Zealand, or a rail linking China to Belarus, another part of its “economic corridor,” China donating its money for hurricane relief in Antigua and Barbuda, or laying down new rules on overseas investment, to say that China is strongly “anti-imperialist.”⁴³⁹ They may even say that China still follows the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” meaning “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” This is muddled, as “the core idea” behind

438 Carlos Martinez, [“Book review of ‘China’s Global Strategy – Towards a Multipolar World’ by Jenny Clegg,”](#) *Invent the Future*, Jul 13, 2013; Alan Nasser, [“The New \(Cold?\) War With China,”](#) *CounterPunch*, Dec 27, 2016.

439 [“China Imprisoned or Killed Multiple CIA Sources,”](#) *Reuters*, May 20, 2017; [“Revealed: China's network of influence in New Zealand,”](#) *New Zealand Herald*, Sept 20, 2017; Sidney Lang, [“Next stop Belarus: China gets rolling on direct Shenzhen-Minsk freight rail link,”](#) *South China Morning Post*, May 23, 2017; [“People’s Republic of China donates 2.5 Million US Dollars to Barbuda Hurricane Relief Efforts,”](#) *Antigua Observer*, Oct 3, 2017; [“China Codifies Crackdown on ‘Irrational’ Outbound Investment,”](#) *Bloomberg*, Aug 18, 2017.

these principles is interpreted by China today as about sovereignty and China's "alternative design for the world," which is not the same as the U\$ approach.⁴⁴⁰ One favorable account admits, the problems with this strategy: China does not exercise their veto, writing that "at the U.N., China often abstains or refrains from voting on resolutions that mandate sanctions or interventions to reverse invasions, end civil wars, or stop terrorism. As a permanent Security Council member China's negative vote would constitute a veto, angering countries who favor intervention. By not voting or casting an abstention, China has allowed several interventions to go ahead without reversing its commitment to non-intervention." This doesn't sound like "promoting the general rise of the third world" at all!

This leads us to the final link provided by the /r/swcc folks. They cite a poll by Pew Research Center, with the full report used for this paragraph, not just the one page they provided.⁴⁴¹ It notes that most of those surveyed across the world, "think China has eclipsed or will eventually eclipse the U.S. as the dominant superpower," an understandable thought based on China's aggressive nationalism manifested in its hard power and soft power. It notes that China's rise has "generated anxiety and security concerns among many of its neighbors...[with] half or more in Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia and South Korea say a greater American military commitment to the region would be a good thing because it could help maintain peace" this is troubling. On the flip side, many Chinese see the U\$ as trying to limit their nation's power on the international stage while many of those in the ROK and Australia value economic relationships with China. The survey then thunders that "overall ratings for China are mostly positive. A global median of 55% express a favorable view of China, while 34% have a negative opinion. Ratings tend to be especially positive in sub-Saharan Africa...although they are still slightly lower than the ratings received by the U.S. in the region. The U.S. also receives higher

440 Andrew J. Nathan, "[Principles of China's Foreign Policy](#)," 2009, draws from Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

441 Richard Wike, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, "[Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture: Asian Nations Mostly Support TPP, Defense Pivot – but Also Value Economic Ties with China](#)," Jun 2015, pp 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

marks than China in Asia, Latin America, and especially Europe.” Hence, China’s efforts of soft power are being successful than U\$ efforts. The survey goes onto say that “one thing China and the U.S. have in common is that both nations tend to get better ratings among young people” and notes that a “global median of just 34% believe the Chinese government respects the personal freedoms of its people” even though in ten countries/regions (Occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia), at least six-in-ten say China does respect individual liberty,” while the “U.S. gets relatively high marks on individual liberty – a global median of 63% says the American government does respect the personal freedoms of its citizens.” Beyond this, the survey says that more Chinese have unfavorable ratings of the U\$ than favorable, but not by much, hovering mainly in the 42-58 range from 2005 to 2015, although in 2007 it dropped to 34%. At the same time, the Chinese youth broadly see China favorably: “59% of 18-29 year-olds in China have a positive opinion about the U.S., compared with just 29% of those ages 50 and older” while Obama received divided confidence on his handling of world affairs, the economy, and climate change, by the Chinese public. In a later part of the report, it was noted that “China’s image has improved in the last year across the countries polled. And these favorable views are particularly evident among the young. But China’s human rights record is still a stain on its reputation,” which could account for the focus on the topic of human rights in varied white papers and Chinese state media. Apart from that, more in Canada, Germany France, Russia, Jordan, and Australia, saw China as the “leading economic power” than the U\$, while other countries surveyed saw it differently. Even the percentage the number that say China has replaced (or will replace) the U\$ as a superpower has grown, encompassing majorities of all countries except the Philippines, Japan, Brazil, and Vietnam, a sentiment strongest among young people. This survey does not “prove” that China is socialist or that it is engaging in an effort to “save” the global periphery from imperialism. Rather, it demonstrates China’s effectiveness in spreading its message, convincing peoples and countries it more “fair” than the U\$, which isn’t hard to do.

China-Africa relationship

This is another area where revisionists think they have the upper hand. Chinese media writes about this topic time and time again.⁴⁴² *Qiushi* declares that “China’s genuineness towards Africa is embodied in the following three aspects. First, China cherishes the traditional friendship that it shares with African countries,” citing how in the “1950s and 1960s, the first generation of leaders of the People’s Republic of China—Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others—joined hands with their African counterparts to usher in a new epoch in China-Africa relations...The Chinese people will never forget the great efforts that African people made in the restoration of China’s lawful seat in the United Nations.” Yet, this does not recognize that China has changed since then, declaring that it has “never interfered in their internal affairs” although it seems that China had at least some role in the ousting of Mugabe in Zimbabwe. This article even has to admit that “China has no intention of challenging the presence of other countries in Africa, including the US and European countries” which makes it clear this is more about promoting Chinese interests in terms of opening new markets than countering US and European imperialism! Then, there’s FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation), founded in 2000, which “smoothly cancelled 150 mature debts of 32 African countries” in 2009.⁴⁴³ While this may seem like great, recognize who all these efforts are benefiting: the Chinese bourgeoisie. This was shown when China’s Ambassador to the UN, Liu Zhenmin, said, as summarized by FOCAC, that “the Chinese government has also attached great importance to the issues on market access and trade imbalance of African countries and taken plenty of measures to strengthen the trade with African countries” as summarized by FOCAC. On the same subject, *CTGN* said that China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang disagreed with the comment by the President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani that “Africa risks becoming a Chinese colony, but the Chinese need only natural

442 Li Xinfeng, “[The Cornerstones of China-Africa Friendship](#),” *Qiushi*, Vol.5 No.4, Oct 1, 2013

443 “[China has cancelled 150 mature debts of 32 African countries](#),” *FOCAC*, Oct 21, 2009.

resources, they're not interested in stability.”⁴⁴⁴ Kang declared this was “shocking” and “illogical” because “the concept of colonialism does not exist in China's foreign policy,” while he admitted that he agreed with Tajani’s plan on African immigrants coming to Europe, and added that “China's aid to Africa didn't start recently. It started since the beginning of the People's Republic, when China itself was in deep poverty. It was the anti-colonialism movement that contributed to the bond between China and Africa.” We can say that is true, but it does not mean that China does not have a capitalist model or that its influence is spreading across Africa. This is accepted broadly. A country does not have to be colonialist to engage in capitalist relations, as colonialism is only one manifestation of imperialism and capitalism itself. *China Daily* held a similar line, saying cooperation with Africa is “fair” and citing how China learned about Marxist principles from some Chinese thinkers like Mao and Liu Shaoqi.⁴⁴⁵ One article notes that Annick Patricia Mongo, director general of the Agency for the Promotion of Investment in Congo, said that “she hoped Congo could be the country of priority for Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in central Africa,” with this meaning that the Republic of Congo wants Chinese capitalists to bring in their resources, which could benefit Congolese, but would benefit the Chinese bourgeoisie even more as they would gain a new market. The same is stated in a *People’s Daily* article, celebrating that “Nigeria is a fertile land open to foreign direct investments with a high return rate,” which means it has more openings for foreign capitalists to exploit the populace!⁴⁴⁶

There are two other state media outlets worth mentioning. The first is *Global Times*. Within this publication, Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, a capitalist with Quantum Global Group, an investment firm focused on Africa, says that “in Africa...China is playing an increasingly transformative and visible role that is extending beyond that of a distant investor...Chinese support...has been building for

444 Gong Ze, “[China colonizing Africa? MOFA urges EU parliament chief to 'learn basic facts'](#),” *CTGN*, Mar 31, 2017.

445 Zhang Hongwei, “[China not neocolonialist](#),” *China Daily*, Nov 16, 2011; Bob Wekesa, “[Mandela and the China connection](#),” *China Daily*, Aug 2, 2013; Pan Zhongming, “[Congo wants Chinese investment in central Africa](#),” *China Daily*, Sept 26, 2017.

446 Sun Wenyu, “[Chinese train producer makes Africa’s fastest trains](#),” *People’s Daily*, Sept 15, 2017.

more than a decade...it is...through sustainable, long-term investments that China can create significant economic opportunities...The [special] economic zones...will provide new products and services for Angolans and new markets for their goods. This new gateway between global trade and African markets is a game changer, leaving the lasting legacy that Chinese companies are searching for in today's increasingly challenging global markets.”⁴⁴⁷ He also goes on to declare that “major Chinese companies have an increasing brand presence in the region, which provides growth for Chinese products while also creating local jobs and contributing to the local supply chain...Smart sovereign investors such as China's Eximbank have proven to policymakers and wider stakeholders that the country is in Africa for the long term.” Taking this into consideration, it casts doubt again on the idea that China is “socialist,” as it is clearly adopting capitalist principles, even if they get a fairer deal than the US. Even its efforts on health talk about the magical concept of “human capital,” which fits in with capitalist thinking.⁴⁴⁸ The final article in *Global Times* admitted that China is involved in DR Congo's cobalt mines, but it was not as harsh as the bourgeois media portrayed it.

The final set of Chinese state media articles came from *Xinhua*. The first quoted former South African president Jacob Zuma saying that China is not colonialist but that “China is working with us and is ready to sit down and discuss what it can do to help Africa...China listens to what Africa is saying. Therefore, it didn't come with its own thought-out ideas, it actually met the expectations to African leaders...Western countries had been in Africa for centuries to rob Africa's resources. They should be admitting what they have done. Some [Western countries] are rich because of the resources they took from Africa. They never thought of helping Africa to develop.”⁴⁴⁹ Being that as it may, it does not deny the capitalist principles practiced by the Chinese, conducting a different model than the US

447 Jean-Claude Bastos de Morais, “[Chinese investment spurs economic growth in Africa](#),” *Global Times*, Oct 11, 2017.

448 Joyce Chimbi, “[China's growing health aid to Africa encouraged](#),” *Global Times*, Aug 20, 2017; Xing Xiaojing, “[A video allegedly staged by UK journalists in DR Congo has nobody fooled about Sino-Congolese relations](#),” *Global Times*, Dec 20, 2017.

449 “[Zuma lashes at "Chinese colonialism" in Africa](#),” *Xinhua*, Dec 7, 2015.

and Europeans. The second article was also about South Africa. It said that Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong “hailed Sino-South African relationship as an example for solidarity and cooperation between China and Africa and between major developing countries,” and added that “our bilateral relationship has maintained a strong momentum and kept enriching itself. It is now in its best time ever,” also saying that “China has been South Africa's largest trading partner for eight consecutive years.”⁴⁵⁰ Since each country has a bourgeoisie, it is clear that these efforts will benefit those groups much more than the proletariat in each country. The final article said that China was building a “3,000-hectare irrigation project” which sounds great since it supposedly “is part of the Ethiopian government's plan to ensure food self-sufficiency and earn hard currency from the export of crop products” but it is actually funded “jointly by the World Bank and the Ethiopian government”!⁴⁵¹ Once again, China is not operating independently of the Western imperialists. Let us again recall what *Qiushi* said in 2013: “China has no intention of challenging the presence of other countries in Africa, including the US and European countries.” Revisionists would like you to forget these words.

So far, China has been able to sell itself as being victims of Western imperialism. Despite this, some Western scholars have claimed that China is acting in a neocolonial manner, along with a “brain drain” from Africa, such as bourgeois scholar Denis M. Tall. Others balk at the fact that China is creating markets which exclude Africans, but it is clear that you can’t call it colonialism like the old European variety. Instead, China portrays itself as a “mentor” or big brother to African countries, which is different from Western discourse, reportedly giving them more autonomy, and does not have any equivalent to what Nick Turse has called “an extensive archipelago of African outposts, transforming the continent...into a laboratory for a new kind of war,” built by the US military, on the African continent.⁴⁵² Even so, China is operating within a capitalist framework and Africans will be exploited.

450 “[China hails ties with South Africa as example for solidarity, cooperation](#),” *Xinhua*, Apr 24, 2017.

451 “[Chinese firm building 55-mln-USD irrigation project in Ethiopia: official](#),” *Xinhua*, Jun 16, 2017.

452 Nick Turse, “[Tomgram: Nick Turse, America's Empire of African Bases](#),” *TomDispatch*, Nov 15, 2015.

With this, we get to the views of revisionists. Babette Zoumara, PhD candidate at Xiamen University, writes that “Africa is the World’s powerhouse of untapped natural resources,” adding that “critics attribute the grown relationship to China’s ‘hunger’ for raw materials to feed its booming economy.”⁴⁵³ Zoumara goes on to say that some consider “China a reliable partner for Africa...China has given Africa the rarest opportunity and the needed revenue to plan and execute its developmental programs” and add that “the relationship between China and Africa has been mutually beneficial.” However, she admits that “China like any nation pursues policies (foreign, domestic, trade, investment) based on its national interests and must not be bedeviled.” A similar argument is made by Horace Campbell in the *Monthly Review*, saying that “it would be simplistic to argue that China is imperialist because there are large-scale Chinese investments in Africa...the levels of Chinese investments in Africa lag behind the volume of Chinese investments in Europe, North America, or in Eastern Europe.”⁴⁵⁴ Even he has to admit that “China has been so successful in opening its economy as a cheap labor reservoir for Western corporations that the future of Chinese workers now rests on an alliance with African and other workers to transcend capitalism. Chinese investment in African infrastructure has at best created an imperfect alternative for Africa to the existing forms of U.S.-dominated international financial control, but is seen by the United States as a threat and challenge.” This connects to an article about Chinese investment in Kenya railways and another in which Zuma declared that “the emergence of China as a power among others gives or offers an opportunity to African countries to be able to free themselves from the shackles that are really colonially designed.”⁴⁵⁵ This, again, does not mean that China is socialist. The same can be said about China expanding its skills program in Africa to try and train 200,000 African professionals and canceling debt on varied African countries. This

453 Babette Zoumara, “[China in Africa: ‘Imperial power’ or ‘altruist’?](#),” *Pambuzuka News*, Mar 6, 2013.

454 Horace Campbell, “[Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism in Africa](#),” *Monthly Review*, Jun 1, 2015.

455 “[East Africa: Chinese-Built Modern Railway Unleashes Huge Benefits in Kenya – Official](#),” *AllAfrica*, Mar 1, 2016; “[Zuma: China can free Africa from 'colonial shackles'](#),” *Mail and Guardian*, Dec 5, 2014; Taddeo Bwambale, “[China to expand skills programme to Africa](#),” *New Vision*, Mar 2, 2016; Mbiyimoh Ghogomu, “[China Is Canceling the Debt of the World’s Most Impoverished Nations](#),” *The Higher Learning*, Sept 29, 2015.

connects to a series of other articles by revisionists. One is a talk on *Radio Sputnik* about China opening its “first ever overseas military base in Djibouti today” and another adapting a speech by a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist).⁴⁵⁶ The latter speech declares that “if the West opposes something, there is usually something to recommend it,” a highly reductionist view, going onto say that “China’s need for many of the resources that Africa possesses in such abundance has given a remarkable boost to Sino-African economic cooperation,” while saying that “the modern relations between China and Africa begin and are defined by the liberation struggles of the two peoples against colonialism and imperialism.” This article went onto note how Langston Hughes, Paul Robeson, Robert F. Williams, and Malcolm X recognized Chinese resistance, embracing the Chinese revolution, as did the Black Panther Party. It also said that “during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, when many countries shunned China, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia were among the very few heads of state to visit. At the start of the 1970s, the People’s Republic finally won the right to take its lawful seat in the United Nations, and on the Security Council. It was the votes of the African countries that were crucial in securing that victory for China.” After giving a bit more of history, highlighting China’s role in African liberation, they admitted that “the focus of the relationship between China and Africa has changed somewhat, as economic relations increasingly come to the fore” but acted like this was not a problem. The speech went onto praise Chinese investment and “debt cancellation to Africa” but noted a 2006 statement saying that China would “open the Chinese market to Africa...[and] set up three to five overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in African countries in the next three years” with eight commitments in 2008 including supporting “the establishment by Chinese financial institutions of a special loan of US\$1 billion for the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Africa,” further opening its market to African countries.” The speech admitted that “whilst China’s policy

⁴⁵⁶ Radio Sputnik, “[What's Behind the Opening of China's First Overseas Military Base?](#),” 2017; “[China in Africa](#),” *Lalkar*, Mar/Apr 2011.

statements and intentions are clear and laudable, there are, of course, at times, mistakes and shortcomings in its policies and practices towards Africa,” saying that China still has “many people...living in poverty and...faces many challenges, including poverty reduction, pollution, sustainability, external threats, [and] repeated natural disasters.” The speech also grumbled that “since the late 1970s...the country’s leaders have introduced a series of market reforms, which, among other things, have widened inequality in China and led to a revived private sector gradually taking a major, but not dominant, role in the economy,” and that “relations between China and Africa may today appear more pragmatic and less ideological than in the past...[but] they are more real and more tangible” and continue to have “problems.” So its not all happy cooperation like articles from *TeleSur English* portray it, to take an article about China-Rwanda relations as an example.⁴⁵⁷

Finally we get to analysis from bourgeois media, Western analysts, and others. Starting with non-Western media, *South China Morning Post* describes the Chinese military base in Djibouti, writing that while “Beijing has described its military outpost as a logistics facility for resupplying Chinese vessels on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions,” satellite imagery and unofficial reports show it has “military infrastructure, including barracks and storage and maintenance units, and docking facilities that can handle most vessels in its naval fleet.”⁴⁵⁸ It added that this “base in Djibouti – situated en route to the strategically important Suez Canal, at the mouth of the Red Sea – has stoked concerns it would be a platform for Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions overseas,” also saying that since “many other countries have a presence in Djibouti, [this] a factor that was critical in Beijing’s decision to build its first overseas military base in the African nation,” quoting Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang as saying that the bases will “help promote economic and social development in Djibouti.” The article also said the basis is about protecting Chinese interests along those countries involved in the

457 “[Rwanda Seeks to Grow Links as China Looks to Curb Spending](#),” *TeleSur English*, Aug 21, 2017.

458 Sarah Zheng, “[China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions overseas?.](#)” *South China Morning Post*, Oct 1, 2017.

Belt and Road Initiative, since Chinese firms have provided “US\$1.4 billion in funding for the nation’s major investment projects” and some claim it is about countering India. Not an article which is pleasing to the revisionists at all! Move onto another article from the *South China Morning Post*.⁴⁵⁹ It says that “China is investing massively in its 21st-century reimagining of the Silk Roads,” going on to give history of Kenya’s colonial railway, while adding that currently “42 per cent of Kenyans live below the poverty line” and that Chinese railway builders “were given permission to cut through Nairobi National Park, the country’s oldest reserve,” leading to some protests, coupled with worries about corruption in dealings between China and Kenya. On a related note is an article in an Australian e-journal, about China’s role in Africa.⁴⁶⁰ They write that “the facts on the ground show China’s engagement in Africa has been more positive than this [Western] discourse claims” while admitting that “China and the West have many activities in common in Africa,” as they add that “there are also some distinctly Chinese trade and investment practices and these are often more appealing to Africans.” The article goes onto say that “China’s stock of investments in Africa rose from US\$49 million in 1990 to US\$7.8 billion in 2008,” also saying that “a comparison of Chinese and Western firms in Africa would find that many on both sides have oppressive conditions, but Western firms garner much higher profits.” It ends by saying that that the “Chinese who don’t fully practice neo-liberalism” which implies they embrace the principles in their own way! Linked at the bottom of that post is another article by the same authors in *Japan Focus*.⁴⁶¹ Right at the beginning of the article they said that “some PRC activities in Africa do violate the human rights of Africans...through disadvantageous terms of trade, the extraction of natural resources, oppressive labor regimes, and support for authoritarian rulers...These are practices that

459 Thomas Bird, “[The Lunatic Express: how Kenya’s colonial railway compares to new China-built line](#),” *South China Morning Post* magazine, Aug 4, 2017.

460 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “[Demonising China: pundits get its role in Africa wrong](#),” *On Line opinion*, Feb 15, 2010, accessed May 6, 2018.

461 Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, “[Trade, Investment, Power and the China-in-Africa Discourse](#),” *Japan Focus*, Vol. 7, issue 52, no. 3, Dec 28, 2009.

China's elites used to denounce, but now come close to extolling as dynamic capitalism." They even quote from Jian Junbo, a Shanghai scholar writing in the *Beijing Review*, seemingly a Chinese state media outlet, writing that "more and more companies from China are entering Africa, but they simply focus on profits regardless of their harmful influences on African society, such as environmental pollution, excessive development and exploitation of local labor" while saying that China's path is consistent with the logic of market capitalism-liberal trade," making China "a successful capitalist in Africa."⁴⁶² While rightly pointing out problems in capitalist efforts, they admit that "as a player in the world system, China in Africa has more in common with the West than is usually acknowledged" while saying there are "notable differences between Western and Chinese presences in Africa," and that "China-Africa trade is rising sharply." It also says that "China does participate in an exploitative business [since] historically, the price of oil and other globally-traded primary products...have been significantly determined by asymmetries in political power" while also pointing out that "China is still far from capable of competing with Western firms for control of African oil...much [of the] oil that China takes from Africa...is not brought to China, but traded on the open market," ending my saying that "many Africans are wary of attempts to cast it [China-African discourse] in Manichean terms."

Other articles focus on this topic, but are not as critical. One article talks about China's railway project in Ethiopia. It declares that "an over 800-km-long railway has been built by the Chinese, connecting the port of Djibouti and Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital," saying that this has "enabled

⁴⁶² Jian Junbo, "[China's Role In Africa](#)," *Beijing Review* (but apparently reprinted from *Asia Times*), Feb 5, 2007. In this article, Junbo brushes aside any concern: "Though China is not a colonialist, it is a successful capitalist in Africa. The path it has taken on that continent is consistent with the logic of market capitalism-liberal trade based on fair contracts. Of course, we cannot be blind to the possibility of China becoming a colonizing power some day. The day might come when African national economic systems have become so dependent on Chinese investments and export commodities that their domestic and foreign policies would in effect be decided by Beijing. With its increasing investments in Africa, there is the possibility that Chinese business people will push African national industries aside and bankrupt national economic systems; meanwhile, more and more companies from China are entering Africa, but they simply focus on profits regardless of their harmful influences on African society, such as environmental pollution, excessive development and exploitation of local labor. However, this worry should not be taken too seriously...Although capitalism implies exploitation to many, China's capitalists have to limit their exploitation within the framework of the WTO and abide by local laws. If Chinese business people are intent on destroying local national economic systems...African governments have the power to stop them, because all these states are sovereign."

the government to transport the grain and other food products it has bought overseas to the 8.2 million people affected in the drought-stricken areas, in a matter of hours and days, thus saving thousands of lives.”⁴⁶³ It adds, however that “neither the International Monetary Fund nor the European Union has agreed to finance the railway...[and as such] the Chinese...built the line, [and]...ended up funding most of the \$3 billion project.” As such, this article is revisionist hogwash as it is not one ounce critical. One article, from *Sixth Tone* says that China’s increased presence on the African continent has led to social conflict. He writes that “China has been steadily increasing its business presence in Africa over the past decade, as China’s diverse capital and labor resources continuously traverse the conflict zones of Sudan and South Sudan, contend with the xenophobic excesses in the southern African region, and encounter local fury in eastern, western, and northern Africa.”⁴⁶⁴ He goes onto write that there is a “creeping phenomenon of anti-Chinese fervor and populism in different communities across Africa where financial capital and labor from China competes with African development efforts,” saying that there is a “wedge between Chinese migrant labor and their host communities as a contributory element to deterioration in relations between the migrants and their African hosts.” He adds that “the inability of Chinese migrant workers to quickly learn English in Anglophone Africa or French in the Francophone parts can easily make them targets of criminal activities or even lead them to unintentionally disregard local laws and conventions” and that in states such as South Africa, Zambia, and Kenya, “Chinese labor and capital often encounter frustrated unemployed or underemployed masses with the lawful right to protest, petition, and vote against “all things Chinese” that often compete with “all things local”.” He adds that as such “Beijing also risks being caught between politically opposed parties, who are normally in relentless pursuit of political armor to depose each other...Predictably, China’s continued profiting by access to vital resources and markets in Africa comes with the risks of inciting local anger at Chinese involvement in unlawful and unregulated activities, or perceived connivance with elites and

463 “[Chinese Railway Project Saves Lives in Ethiopia](#),” *The Schiller Institute*, Feb 23, 2016.

464 Richard Aldoo, “[Why Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Africa Is on the Rise](#),” *Sixth Tone*, Jul 18, 2016.

locals in exploitative ventures.” He ends by saying that “whatever the causes and effects of these sporadic anti-Chinese outbursts in Africa may be, they are definite, bitter reminders of globalized capital and labor, and their struggle for local spaces.” Such a piece is more thoughtful than some others. I am reminded of what Li Anshan, the director of African research center, Peking University, suggested: that “the recent protests in Africa aiming at Chinese may imply that some Chinese’s activities in Africa have affected the daily life of local residents there...some Chinese businessmen sell products with a lower price, which have affected the market of some local stores, and some even have to shut. On the other hand, largely hiring Chinese labors in the constructions in Africa may have threatened the local labor market.”⁴⁶⁵ It is added that “how to regulate some misbehaved economic activities in Africa may be another issue that China needs to seriously think about.” Related to this is a paper about Chinese development in Africa which the revisionists seem to like.⁴⁶⁶ It says that the Chinese state provides the basis for Chinese firms to go to Africa, supporting them with varying networks within China, connected with “economic diplomacy,” and Chinese business itself benefiting from “warmer relations generated by the Chinese state’s wider political diplomacy.” This brings Chinese firms into the African market, along with interlinkages between African and Chinese firms, which benefits bourgeoisie across the continent and in Africa itself, although they don’t say the last part because these individuals are bourgeois analysts. They do say that Chinese capitalists in Africa seem to be driven by “capitalistic interests” like their “Western counterparts.” Later on, the article says that the Chinese firms in Zimbabwe were granted special exemptions from the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act which established that “at fifty-one per centum of the shares of every public company and any business shall be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans.” On a related note is another analysis by a bourgeois

465 “[China in Africa: Cooperation, debates and challenges](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan 20, 2014, a reading guide of posts relating to China in Africa. The post which was excerpted in that *Qiushi* article was “[An Analysis of the New Challenges and Sustainability Faced by China-Africa Cooperation](#).”

466 Jing Gu, “[The Political Economy of State Business Relations in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa](#),” *Future Agricultures*, Working Paper 120, especially pages 5, 6, 7, and 8.

analyst.⁴⁶⁷ They write that “Chinese enterprises have been rapidly expanding their business footprints in Africa,” noting that there are cases of many Chinese workers coming in to work on Chinese-funded projects in Africa but not as many as some claim, while admitting that there was a “sudden influx of so many Chinese into the continent,” but saying that it “may have led to the wrong perception that Chinese companies only bring their own workers.” It goes on to say that “Chinese investors need huge numbers of laborers, both Chinese and Africans...[and that] it is as well necessary to bring a considerable number of Chinese to implement the projects and train the local workers.” They admitted that “China’s own market reform has been affecting its enterprises’ employment practice in various manners” leading to some low wages, but not everywhere since “Chinese enterprises in Africa have various salary levels, which are mainly decided by the companies’ business models.” The article also says that “when Chinese mining enterprises come to Africa, they find a different legal and social context” such as bad safety records in China’s mines. It was also noted that “the Chinese managers view the employees’ private life as part of the business concern...the Chinese companies do realize the problem of distance and miscommunication...not every Chinese enterprise in Africa has established strong personal ties with the local employees.” Moving beyond a YouTube video about China’s involvement in Africa, quoting revisionists, we can move fully onto the bourgeois media.⁴⁶⁸

Bourgeois media has often written about China’s actions in Africa. Articles in *The Guardian* are a good place to start. One article in January 2011 notes that “China is gradually using diplomatic means to push for the resolution of some conflicts...China is becoming a major supplier of conventional arms to African states...China has increased its troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions 20-fold since 2000...China is set to play a greater role in post-conflict reconstruction through its economic

467 Tang Xiaoyang, “[Does Chinese Employment Benefit Africans?: Investigating Chinese Enterprises and their Operations in Africa](#),” *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol 16, issue 3-4, Dec 2016, especially pp 107, 109, 110, 112, 113, 119, 120, 121.

468 Workers World Party, “[Abayomi Azikiwe on China](#),” *YouTube*, Jun 17, 2017, from a panel on Imperialism at the Left Forum. I was actually there for that talk at the time, but my views have changed since then. Much of what he says is addressed elsewhere in this publication.

engagement...China's global arms exports remain relatively low compared to those of traditional arms exporters.”⁴⁶⁹ Others the same year wrote about major Chinese investment in Ethiopia where “Chinese banks continue to show interest in financing large hydro-power projects with daunting environmental and social challenges” and Chinese capitalists in Africa whom are described positively as “thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs who are investing in Africa.” In other years, *The Guardian* summarized Wikileaks cables saying African governments prefer dealing with China over the US, even though “China's interest in Africa is...driven by...clear foreign policy and commercial objectives,” talked about China writing off debts, rural wages in China increasing, seed trade between China and Ethiopia, China’s approach to education of Africans, aid between China and Africa coming with strings attached, and a Chinese-built railway opening in Ethiopia.⁴⁷⁰ This reminds me of an article in *Qiushi* declaring that “Western countries have long faced security threats in Africa...China is now facing the same threat. China will find that it must make more efforts to protect its own interests.” That sounds aggressively nationalistic and part of the China-Africa relationship. *Quartz* claimed they had the “real story” about China’s buying of African farmland, said that Chinese investment is more diverse than some think, wrote that China is training new officials in local Africa, noted that China is becoming a destination for African students, and added that China’s model of economic development is gaining more acceptance in Africa than ever before. All these developments must be music to the ears of the Chinese revisionist leadership, as their soft power initiative is a success, while the West falters.⁴⁷¹ This doesn’t make China

469 David Smith, “[New report discusses China's role in Africa's conflicts](#),” *The Guardian*, Jan 27, 2011; Deborah Brautigam, “[Ethiopia's partnership with China](#),” *The Guardian*, Dec 30, 2011; Nick Francis and Marc Francis, “[China's meeting with Africa](#),” *The Guardian*, Jun 30, 2011.

470 Jonathan Glennie, “[WikiLeaks cables: China's aid to Africa has strings attached](#),” *The Guardian*, Dec 10, 2010; “[China pledges \\$2bn for development goals and says it will write off debts](#),” AP, Sept 27, 2015; Steve Wiggins, “[Rural wages are rising in Asia – and Africa could also reap benefits](#),” *The Guardian*, Oct 1, 2014; Tom Levitt, “[Ethiopia's sesame seed trade with China – a partnership of equals?](#),” *The Guardian*, Jul 10, 2013; Stephen Chan, “[How China is educating Africa – and what it means for the west](#),” *The Guardian*, May 13, 2013; Jonathan Glennie, “[The west has no right to criticise the China-Africa relationship](#),” *The Guardian*, Feb 8, 2012; “[Next stop the Red Sea: Ethiopia opens Chinese-built railway to Djibouti](#),” *AFP*, Oct 5, 2016; “[Japanese media: China faces various challenges in Africa](#),” *Qiushi*, Jan 7, 2014, accessed May 6, 2018, translated.

471 Deborah Brautigam, “[The real story behind China’s alleged conquest of African farmland](#),” *Quartz*, Oct 20, 2015; Wenjie Chen, “[Chinese investment in Africa is more diverse and welcome than you think](#),” *Quartz*, Aug 27, 2015; Lily

socialist. Rather, China has convinced African countries, through their actions, that they are fairer than the West and capitalist institutions like the IMF and World Bank. To some extent, this is based in reality. However, the Chinese capitalist class will profit from such deals with African countries, tying these countries to Chinese largesse so they aren't really independent. It is probably too much to say this is "neocolonialist" but is undoubtedly not proletarian internationalism!

This brings us to the last group of links. Some talk about China's vague "debt cancellation submit" for Africa, China's investment in African infrastructure with the Chinese seeing opportunity where the West sees "instability, migration and terrorism," China pursuing a "unique" path to protect their interests, forgiving \$5 million of Mozambique's debt, canceling Zimbabwe's \$40 million debt, symbolically canceling more than \$1 billion of debt by African countries in 2000, Chinese railways in east Africa and China building in African itself.⁴⁷² Most interesting of all was a *Washington Post* article saying that African attitudes toward China are generally positive, but "the average African opinion on China's economic development assistance was less enthusiastic" and "cheap Chinese products, however, are also a source of China's negative image in Africa." In closing, this chapter shows that the revisionist views on China again distort the reality!

Kuo, "[China is training Africa's next generation of transport and aviation experts](#)," *Quartz*, Jul 18, 2017; Victoria Breeze and Nathan Moore, "[China has overtaken the US and UK as the top destination for anglophone African students](#)," *Quartz*, Jun 30, 2017; Lily Kuo, "[China's model of economic development is becoming more popular in Africa than America's](#)," *Quartz*, Oct 28, 2016.

472 Jubilee USA, "[China Announces Debt Cancellation at African Summit](#)," *Common Dreams*, Dec 4, 2015; David Piling, "[China by far the largest investor in African infrastructure](#)," *Financial Times*, Jun 13, 2017; Deborah Brautigam, "[5 Myths About Chinese Investment in Africa](#)," *Foreign Policy*, Dec 4, 2015; "[China will not take path of 'Western colonists' in Africa -foreign minister](#)," *Reuters*, Jan 12, 2015; "[China forgives \\$5 million of Mozambique's debt](#)," *Reuters*, Jun 14, 2015; Corbus van Staden, "[Here's How China Is Changing Africa's Future](#)," *HuffPost*, Oct 30, 2017; Wenjie Chen, David Dollar, and Heiwei Tang, "[China's direct investment in Africa: Reality versus myth](#)," *Brookings Institution*, Sept 3, 2015; "[Zimbabwe says China to cancel \\$40M debt, increase yuan use](#)," *CNBC*, Dec 21, 2015; "[China cancels \\$1bn of African debt](#)," *BBC News*, Oct 11, 2000; Yun Sun, "[China and the East Africa railways: Beyond full industry chain export](#)," *Brookings Institution*, Jul 6, 2017; Janet Eom, "[China Inc.' Becomes China the Builder in Africa](#)," *The Diplomat*, Sept 29, 2016; Kim Yi Dionne, "[Here's what Africans think about China's influence in their countries](#)," *Washington Post*, Oct 28, 2016. *Financial Times* is somewhat critical, writing that "many, including some Africans, are suspicious of what they see as a neocolonial land grab, in which companies acting as proxies for the Chinese state extract minerals in return for infrastructure and finance that will saddle governments with large debts. The behaviour of Chinese actors in Africa...has often fallen short of the exemplary. There have been legitimate complaints about Chinese companies...From Africa's perspective, although China presents risk it brings tangible benefits in finance and engineers. More importantly, it brings choice...[but] African governments are taking on so much Chinese debt that they will be in economic and political hock to Beijing."

China-Latin America and the Caribbean Relations

This is another part of China's foreign policy revisionists use to "prove" their argument. The articles within this section, assembled by /r/swcc, not surprisingly, praise China's efforts, noting investment by China in Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba (accounting for Fidel's positive statements), Haiti, Ecuador, Peru, and undefined other countries in Latin America.⁴⁷³ In addition, they may cite Fidel's comment in August 2014. At the time he wrote that "Xi Jinping is one of the strongest and most capable revolutionary leaders I have met in my life" but never expands on this statement.⁴⁷⁴ Hence, he is wrong in saying this, plain and simple. No further discussion is needed, as it is clear that China has a unique capitalist model and is interconnected into the global capitalist system. This is coupled with the rise of China's aggressive nationalism and a disgusting distortion of Marxism for their own ends!⁴⁷⁵

473 ["Morales hails China's cooperation, investment in Bolivia," Xinhua](#), Oct 22, 2016; ["Venezuela receives medicine from China for Zika," CCTV](#), May 29, 2016; Lucas Koerner, ["Venezuela and China Sign New \\$2.7 Billion Development Deal," VenezuelaAnalysis](#), Feb 15, 2017; Iramsy Peraza Forte, ["Cuba-China relations at all-time high," Granma](#), Jun 2, 2017; ["Cuba Doesn't Trust the US, Instead Goes to China for Investment," TeleSur English](#), Mar 18, 2016; ["China and Cuba Strengthen Relations, Invest in Direct Flights," TeleSur English](#), Jan 14, 2016; Iramsy Peraza Forte, ["Communist Party of China's 95th anniversary celebrated in Havana," Granma](#), Jul 1, 2016; ["President Xi visits Fidel Castro," Xinhua](#), Jul 23, 2014; Georgianne Nienaber, ["China Extends Her Silk Road To Haiti," Huffington Post](#), Aug 4, 2017; ["Bolivia says China to lend \\$7 billion for energy, transport infrastructure," Reuters](#), Oct 19, 2015; ["Ecuador and China Bolster Ties with Xi Jinping Visit," TeleSur English](#), Nov 18, 2016; CNC, ["Fidel Castro in the eyes of Chinese people,"](#) Dec 4, 2016; ["China, Others Condemn Belligerent US Stance on Venezuela," TeleSur English](#), Aug 14, 2017; ["China Rejects New US Sanctions Against Venezuela, Calls for Internal Solutions," TeleSur English](#), Aug 28, 2017; ["China, Latin America to Expand Links With International Expo," TeleSur English](#), Aug 17, 2017; Nelly Luna Amacio, ["Peru wants more mining, more industry, more China," OpenDemocracy](#), Jul 27, 2016; ["China won't allow US to strangle Cuban economy: Pundit," PressTV](#), Jun 19, 2017; Jonathan Kaiman, ["China agrees to invest \\$20bn in Venezuela to help offset effects of oil price slump," The Guardian](#), Jan 8, 2015; Simon Romero, ["Chávez Says China to Lend Venezuela \\$20 Billion," New York Times](#), Apr 18, 2010; Ajit Singh, ["China Is Most Promising Hope for Third World: Fidel," TeleSur English](#), Nov 28, 2017; ["China restructures Cuban debt, backs reform," Reuters](#), Dec 23, 2010; ["Don't Mess With China's Silk Road Initiative: Venezuela," TeleSur English](#), May 14, 2017; ["China Works with Venezuela to Diversify Economy, Expand Agriculture and Industry," TeleSur English](#), Jun 10, 2017; ["Cuba and China Agree to Strengthen Military Cooperation," TeleSur English](#), Mar 31, 2017; Andrea Torres, ["China reiterates support for Venezuelan socialist regime," Local10](#), Sept 20, 2017; ["Cuba and China sign cooperation agreements in strategic sectors," Granma](#), Sept 26, 2016; Iramsy Peraza Forte, ["Hubei, a Chinese province committed to Cuba," Granma](#), Sept 21, 2017; ["Work Begins Soon to Bring Haiti into 'Silk Road' After China Invests US\\$30 billion to Develop Infrastructure," TeleSur English](#), Sept 1, 2017; ["China and Cuba Reaffirm Solidarity as First Shipment of Aid Arrives After Irma," TeleSur English](#), Sept 23, 2017; Dayron Rodríguez Rosales, ["Cuba and China sign agreements to promote economic and commercial ties," Granma](#), Oct 26, 2017; Iramsy Peraza Forte, ["A cooperation model based on equality, respect, and mutual benefit," Granma](#), Oct 2, 2017. There is also one [dead link](#), [another](#), and [another](#).

474 Fidel Castro Ruz, ["Palestinian Holocaust in Gaza," Granma](#), Aug 4, 2014.

475 David Sheparson, ["U.S. condemns China for 'Orwellian nonsense' over airline websites," Reuters](#), May 6, 2018; Christopher Woody, ["China's latest triumph over Taiwan points to its growing influence in the US's neighborhood," Business Insider](#), May 2, 2018; ["China Focus: World Congress on Marxism begins in China," Xinhua](#), May 5, 2018; ["Xi Jinping: Marxist Thought Continues to Transform the World," TeleSur English](#), May 4, 2018.

China and West Asia (Middle East)

Like with the rest of China's foreign relations, revisionists think they are proven "right."

Chinese media stated that "efforts are being made to resolve a stalled copper mining deal between China and Afghanistan, a decade after the US\$3 billion contract was signed," while other articles, both of which are Chinese state media, pointed out that "Beijing was encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan" and the Syrians saying that "the huge economic rise of China has made it an important power, attracting the attention of the countries desiring to achieve technical and economic developments."⁴⁷⁶ These developments, again, do not prove that China is socialist. Media favorable to the Chinese revisionists declared that "focus is starting to gradually shift to re-building Syria's damaged infrastructure. China is set to be the key player in this respect and preparations to increase China's business ties to Syria are already in the works," not seeing that such anchoring of capital in Syria will benefit the Chinese bourgeoisie! The same is undoubtedly the case for the Iranian and Russian bourgeoisie, which also are increasing their capital in Syria. At the same time, China is also providing a credit line in the billions "for Iranian banks," tying the Chinese and Iranian bourgeoisie closer together. Additionally, the Chinese ambassador to Lebanon, Wu Zexian, admitted in 2012 that "there is an imbalance in the development of different areas in China," adding that "China does not seek to procure its interests at the expense of others," but does not deny such interests. Worst of all is the Chinese bourgeoisie working with the Omani bourgeoisie, whom are royalist and anti-democratic!⁴⁷⁷ As such, the Chinese bourgeoisie may smile, but the Chinese proletariat will suffer.

⁴⁷⁶ Laura Zhou, "[Is there still hope for China, Afghanistan's long-stalled US\\$3 billion copper mining deal?](#)," *South China Morning Post*, May 12, 2017; Li Xiaokun and Li Lianxing, "[Pakistan assured of firm support](#)," *China Daily*, May 19, 2011; "[Spotlight: China helps prevent Syria's division with 'balanced' role in resolving Syrian crisis: experts](#)," *Xinhua*, Aug 22, 2017; Adam, "[BEIJING: China set to help rebuild Syria](#)," *The Duran*, Jul 10, 2017; "[China: 'We Oppose Attempts to Divide Syria'](#)," *TeleSur English*, Sept 30, 2017; Chris Tomson, "[While the US drops bombs, China invests \\$2 billion in rebuilding Syria](#)," *The Arab Source*, Jul 22, 2017; "[China provides \\$10 billion credit line to Iran](#)," *AFP*, Sept 26, 2017; Omar Nashabe, "[China's Ambassador in Lebanon: Hezbollah Arms a Trade Matter](#)," *Al Akhbar English*, May 4, 2012, accessed May 7, 2018.

⁴⁷⁷ Wade Shepard, "[Why China Is Building A New City Out In The Desert Of Oman](#)," *Forbes*, Sept 8, 2017; "[Exploring the China and Oman Relationship](#)," *The Diplomat*, May 10, 2014; Zainab Calcuttawala, "[Oman To Become A Key Part Of China's Silk Road](#)," *Oil Price*, Sept 7, 2017; Nawied Jabarkhyl, "Oman counts on Chinese billions to build desert

China and South Asia

Revisionists think this part of China's foreign relations proves that China is "socialist." Chinese media talks about how the McMahon Line, "drawn at the behest of the British Raj in 1914, has been adopted by the Indian government...[but] has never been accepted by any Chinese government" was embraced by the US, ending my saying "the American ambassador went to a stolen town to endorse an illegal boundary consecrated by a blatant forgery. Just another day in the Great Game."⁴⁷⁸ This does not make China socialist, but shows it is concerned about sovereignty like every other state in the world. The same is the case for China's connection to Pakistan, with billions, in US dollars, planned as part of new infrastructure, including planned "optic fibre cables, power plants, gas pipelines and highways," would connect "China to the Gulf of Oman," with a huge light rail project for the city of Lahore facing "stiff public opposition...[because] activists say Lahore's local government bypassed transparency laws." Then there's an article from *People's Daily* saying that "China Construction Third Engineering Bureau won a...contract to engineer, procure, and construct the Allama Iqbal International Airport...it will be Pakistan's largest airport after reconstruction" and it wasn't the first time this Chinese company "has won a bid in Pakistan."⁴⁷⁹ Additionally, China has supported diplomatic settlements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, giving Chinese capitalists a safer environment to plop down their capital. More absurdly, the revisionists cite alleged links between Chinese revisionists and Maoists in India, according to unnamed Indian intelligence reports and claimed evidence from Delhi police or Nepal moving closer to China as "evidence" that China is socialist. This is weak at best.

boomtown," *Reuters*, Sept 5, 2017; Michael Fahy, "[China's investment in \\$10.7bn city in Oman to provide building boost](#)," *The National*, Aug 20, 2016.

478 Peter Lee, "[The British forgery at the heart of India and China's Tibetan border dispute](#)," *South China Morning Post*, Nov 1, 2016; "[China's super link to Gwadar Port](#)," *South China Morning Post*, accessed May 7, 2018.

479 Shan Xin, "[Chinese company contracted to build Pakistan's largest airport](#)," *People's Daily*, Jul 11, 2017; Baqir Sajjad Syed, "[China brokers Pak-Afghan crisis mechanism](#)," *Dawn*, Jun 26, 2017; "[Broadening Horizons: Nepal Cozies up to China](#)," *Sputnik*, Sept 22, 2017; Deepak Sharma, "[Maoists building weapons factories in India with help from China](#)," *India Today*, Apr 26, 2012; Dwaipayan Ghosh & Neeraj Chauhan, "[Cops nail China link with Naxals](#)," *Times of India*, Oct 8, 2011, accessed May 7, 2018.

China and East Asia

Like other Chinese policies, revisionists think they can use these elements to prove their case. One article said that China was rejecting “tougher sanctions” in Juche Korea, but stated that the U\$ and China agreed to “pursue a new UN Security Council resolution on the matter” of Juche Korea’s nuclear tests, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi seeming to accept the idea of sanctions, although saying they are not “an end to themselves,” and Jingdong Yuan, a professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, saying that “I think China will be accommodating where sanctions can be effective in curbing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes,” but not the “sweeping sanctions” the U\$ is proposing.⁴⁸⁰ Other articles state that China and Vietnam still have warm relations despite maritime disputes (and courting U\$ imperialists), and China supplying 90% of Juche Korea’s oil, supposedly, likely to make sure the country will not fall apart and to protect interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Other articles on the topic, favoring the revisionists, defend China’s brash claims to “the majority of the South China Sea,” note Xi’s letter to Kim Jong Un, China donating aid to the Rohingya, and warm relations between Laos and China.⁴⁸¹ These individuals do not realize that one can criticize the U\$ imperialists and Chinese revisionists at the same time! Other articles note that China-Juche Korea relations are “remarkably stable,” that China should be neutral “if North Korea launches an attack that threatens the United States” but not if the U\$ “attacks first and tries to overthrow North Korea’s government,” relating to a protection of “China’s interests,” and opposing

480 Cary Huang, “[China rejects US call for tougher sanctions against North Korea over nuclear bomb test](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Jan 27, 2016; Jiang Xun, “[Leaders of communist neighbours China and Vietnam won’t let maritime dispute sour relations](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Jan 11, 2017; Kristin Huang, “[It supplies 90 per cent of oil to North Korea ... so why is China’s pipeline excluded from UN sanctions?](#),” *South China Morning Post*, Sept 13, 2017; Tuong Vu, “[Despite courting US, Vietnam won’t break up with China](#),” *Today*, Aug 28, 2017; “[Xi calls for broader, deeper China-Vietnam cooperation](#),” *Xinhua*, Nov 12, 2017.

481 Sara Flounders, “[U.S. threats in South China Sea](#),” *Workers World*, Dec 20, 2016; “[Chinese President Responds to Letter from Kim Jong Un](#),” *TeleSur English*, Nov 2, 2017; “[China Donates More Than 100 Tons of Aid to Rohingya Refugees](#),” *TeleSur English*, Sept 28, 2017; “[China, Laos to build community of shared future](#),” *Xinhua*, Nov 13, 2017; Mu Chunshan, “[Why China-North Korea Relations Can’t Be Broken](#),” *The Diplomat*, Mar 10, 2016; “[Chinese paper says China should stay neutral if North Korea attacks first](#),” *Reuters*, Aug 10, 2017; “[China urges US, South Korea to cancel THAAD deployment](#),” *PressTV*, Sept 30, 2016. There’s also a [dead link](#).

THAAD deployment in the ROK because it doesn't help "maintain peace on the peninsula" but also because it "will seriously harm the strategic interests of China, and upset the strategic balance in the region." Related to this is what Lim Jie-hyun, a history professor at Hanyang University, said: that for China "to make a hegemonic block in northeast Asia, it needs other voices, and that voice is represented by North Korea."⁴⁸² At the same time, other articles pointed out that the export and import of Juche Korea has risen from 2000 to 2012, continued strong economic (and diplomatic) relations, alleged surge of food imports, claims that "China's current measures [against Juche Korea] may just be a temporary move," some continued Chinese coal shipments while still complying with existing sanctions, that "China can make an offer and you can always say no," and that China forgave Cambodia's debt and provided millions more in yuan. It is here I am reminded of what ComIntelligence, who seems to be revisionist, says that tests have negative effects from the nuclear tests of Juche Korea, wearing down relations between the two countries.⁴⁸³ Being that as it may, China has agreed to support murderous sanctions! Even worse are the trade and commercial ties between China and the Philippines since Duterte is leading a campaign to suppress a Maoist people's war in his country, but is still supported by China, with the revisionists sharing an article claiming the Chinese are still in support, which is highly unlikely.⁴⁸⁴ In closing, there is much of China's foreign policy in East Asia to criticize, and that doesn't entail taking the side of U\$ imperialists!

482 Andrew Salmon, "[China's support of North Korea grounded in centuries of conflict](#)," *CNN*, Nov 26, 2010; "[China – DPRK Trade \(In Millions\)](#)," *NK News*, Feb 2013; Zheping Huang, "[On North Korea, China is taking away with one hand and giving with another](#)," *Quartz*, Sept 27, 2017; Lucy Craymer, "[China's Food Exports to North Korea Surge](#)," *Wall Street Journal*, Sept 27, 2017; "[China forgives \\$90 million debt, provides \\$15 million more to Cambodia](#)," *Hindustan Times*, Oct 13, 2016; Nyshka Chandran, "[China's real reasons for enforcing North Korea sanctions: Trump, Party Congress](#)," *CNBC*, Oct 2, 2017; Clyde Russell, "[China buys record North Korean coal as sanctions ignored](#)," *Reuters*, Sept 26, 2016; Daniel Shane, "[Did China just break its promise not to buy North Korean coal?](#)," *CNN Money*, Sept 27, 2017; "[North Korea's Total Trade \(share of total\)](#)," data 2000-2016, accessed May 7, 2018; "[Juche Korea trade in untitled chart](#)," data 1993 to 2011, *Council of Foreign Relations*, accessed May 7, 2018; "[North Korea total trade \(imports + exports\)](#)," *CNBC*, data 2000-2013, 2014; "[North Korea's Imports And Exports By Country](#)," data for 2015, *Business Insider*; Oki Nagai, "[China buys up North Korean coal on eve of UN import ban](#)," *Nikkei*, Sept 27, 2017; Tho Xin Yi, "[China can make an offer and you can always say no](#)," *The Star*, Jul 23, 2017; Soyoung Kim and Ben Blanchard, "[China's Xi says hopes to promote relations with North Korea: KCNA](#)," *Reuters*, Nov 1, 2017.

483 [ComIntelligence comment](#) on /r/communism posted 2 years ago.

484 "[China, the Philippines to expedite work on cooperative projects](#)," *Xinhua*, Sept 9, 2017; "[New People's Army Backs Duterte with Chinese Weapons](#)," *Opensourceinvestigations*, accessed May 7, 2018;

Other writings on China

There are some articles that I did not address in the publication so far. This includes a history of china, Chapter 2 of Albert Szymanski's *Is the Red Flag Flying?*, a revisionist history of China from 1949 to 1988, and an article by Trotskyists. Of these sources, they need little response.⁴⁸⁵ For Szymanski's book, considering it is a revisionist work applying to the Soviet Union, it would be better to address it in that realm than in relation to China. After all, the book is subtitled "the political economy of the Soviet Union." When there are writings on Soviet revisionism, this work will be addressed fully and specifically. There is similar reasoning for the revisionist history of China and another general history of China: these are whole books. As such, responding to this would take effort which is not worth my time in this publication. As for the Trotskyist argument, it's not even worth addressing since Trotskyists are basically counter-revolutionary.

Let us move onto the posts on /r/DebateCommunism on this topic.⁴⁸⁶ On /r/DebateCommunism some commented that "central planning isn't entirely a socialist innovation" while others said that "centralised societies can last a long time" and that "I don't think china is going to reverse their market reforms. It benefited the country too greatly. Doing that will not only negatively effect their economy but also the world economy," a sentiment I'll agree with. One user, eaterofclouds, gave a full-throated defense of Vietnam's revisionism, then declared that China has a "different rationale behind marketization" with the supposed idea that "China is currently in the primary stage of socialism, in which productive forces are underdeveloped." In order to support this, he linked to Wikipedia articles, and a speech by Deng. Interestingly, in that same speech, Deng gives lip service to Marxism-Leninism and Mao, while saying that China is "still backward" and that more "development" is needed, necessitating that China "invigorate the domestic economy and open to the outside world" including

⁴⁸⁵ See "[Chapter 2: What is a Socialist Society](#)", *Is the Red Flag Flying? The Political Economy of the Soviet Union* by Albert Szymanski, pages 13-35; [A History of China: Years of Trial, Turmoil and Triumph: China From 1949 to 1988](#), Part IV; [Trotskyist comments](#) on "Chinese question."

⁴⁸⁶ See a post by /u/floatingnutcase on /r/DebateCommunism titled "[Can central planning work long term?](#)".

welcoming “foreign investment and advanced techniques.” He claims this won’t disrupt China’s “development” or be a risk, and that there “there will not be excessive disparities in wealth,” but he was wrong, since such efforts led the country to move away from its Maoist roots.⁴⁸⁷ Back to the commenter. They went onto declare that “the CPC sees the PRC [China] as still in a developmental stage, where they are pursuing developmental goals,” claiming they can get to this through “capital reproduction and accumulation...[using] market mechanisms to accelerate the schedule for their developmental goals”! They then go on to basically claim that state ownership means socialism, which is incorrect, citing some official state media sources, but also *The Guardian*, Wikipedia, and *Forbes*. In the rest of their comment they claim that capitalist policy in China won’t “last forever,” citing articles in CNBC and a Princeton University book, declaring that it “seems increasingly likely that when the market has run its course and all the low-hanging fruits have been picked, the CPC will begin a process of returning to total state planning, in accordance with the vision of advanced socialism.” That seems to be filled with doubt. It is only “extremely likely”? They aren’t even sure of it themselves? They further write that “only planned economies can work "long-term"” but never says if China is moving in that direction. In another comment they declare that “the PRC state is explicitly structured to reproduce socialist social relations...the PRC is a dictatorship of the proletariat” and claims that China may be socialist, but not sure about it themselves! Later on, they say that an anti-revisionist gives “extremely poor reasoning” while using a quote from Deng (“It doesn’t matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice”), a sentiment Mao disagreed with, articles from *Business Insider*, and two Chinese state media sources. That’s it.

From here, we move onto a post on /r/communism which defends Chinese revisionism.⁴⁸⁸ In this post, /u/zombiesingularity declares that China’s “primary contradiction was *not* proletariat vs

487 Deng, “[Building A Socialism With A Specifically Chinese Character](#),” Jun 30, 1984. Deng also mentions the “defeat of the Gang of Four” in the first sentence of his speech, showing that China has left the Maoist era behind and that there is not continuity between Mao and Deng.

488 /u/zombiesingularity’s post on /r/communism titled “[China as a Socialist & Marxist-Leninist State: A defense](#)”.

bourgeoisie, it was how to build socialism with underdeveloped productive forces,” claiming that the “answer” after 1978 was “inspired by Lenin's NEP: a form of market-socialism, controlled by the Communist Party of China. The goal is to modernize the productive forces, to enable the building of higher stage Socialism. This is *not* a "betrayal" of Socialism or Mao.” He goes onto declare that “all land in China is owned by the state...it can only be leased, but never purchased outright. It is 100% publicly owned.” He then declares that “China *appoints* top management, and can fire them. This is nothing like "Capitalism". This is a Marxist-Leninist tool” and claims that there is no privatization in China. The sources he finds, which he claims “provide a very strong case for my stance that China remains a Socialist country, and a Marxist-Leninist state” including that horrible article by Jeff J. Brown in *Greenville Post*, an article in *ML Today* asking if China or capitalist or socialist, the horrible article by Sherman (return2thesource) on Chinese revisionism, and the article in the P2P Foundation, again defending such revisionism, many or all of which I refuted in part 1 of this publication. In response to a well-thought criticism, he declared “the media is state owned and controlled, the education system instills a socialist value system, and entertainment is mandated to do the same as well...in the previous thread everyone seemed to agree that the superstructure was Socialist.”⁴⁸⁹ It is

⁴⁸⁹ The criticism, by /u/VinceMcMao, which I'd say is valid, was: “Read through this and the whole argument comes down to China being socialist because the means of production are under ownership of the state. The problem with this is that DOTP is more than just the state ownership of production and it is revisionist to reduce socialism merely as an economic task. The primary task for the proletariat is one of politics and to ensure the political basis of transitioning to Communism. This isn't happening in China and class contradictions between the people and the bourgeoisie within the party are antagonistic and opposite of cultural revolution. If there is no class struggle under socialism then it isn't heading to Communism.” In response to the claim that China has a “socialist value system” in education, one user, /u/donkeykongsimulator, also refuted this: “Does it really? Maybe it claims to but I've heard many say that the "Marxism" being espoused by current Party leadership is completely opposite of Marx's ideas for socialism, such as considering joint-stock ownership of a corporation a form of collective ownership.” Then one user says “I'm not convinced that there is sufficient dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the current day, and without forceful oppression they would only grow stronger no? Admittedly China is one of two (three?) countries (asides from Vietnam) that I know definitely has no problem executing or imprisoning millionaires and billionaires. Something else is that the Chinese bourgeoisie are not allowing their children to be exposed to socialist indoctrination in Chinese universities, they're all sending their children abroad to places like Canada and the USA, who more often than not, *return to China fully indoctrinated with reactionary liberal ideology*, to serve as technocrats in these SOEs and other well-paying industries. Even Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping's children couldn't be bothered with Chinese education and studied in the USA. If upper level management are all full blown liberals, then how does that not spell disaster barring some sort of second cultural revolution?” Others, like /u/marxism-feminism, take a middle ground, declaring “This [difference between revisionists and anti-revisionists] is clearly a methodological issue, and a productive discussion would probably address the difference at this level, rather than get too bogged down in quibbling about specific details.” How is it instilling a

worth responding to this. One person noted in comments that “the need for heavy industry to fulfill social needs is a prerequisite of all Socialist production, not something unique to China” and added that there is a “Dengist wholesale allowing foreign capitalism to own industry,” while also noting that “and can be owned and purchased in China...the banking and investment system in China does not instill wide spread confidence...[Chinese] Eminent Domain isn't socialism...China has increasingly converted State Owned Enterprises into straight up private ownership...CEOs and Presidents and VPs of large companies are all hired (appointed) by the board of investors and can be fired...The CPC State merely has the audacity and will to circumvent market regulations to maintain their control...The West and Tibet, however, is heavily Socialized in its labor practices, but it is still ultimately at the behest of a market economy.” I don’t want to get pulled into the weeds too much with the comments. I will quote a number of other rebuttals however. Some said that “Lenin was clear that the NEP was temporary, controlled by proletarian leadership,” while /u/Iguessillrespondbun said that “China has experienced an opening of its markets...there is political control, no it's not primarily aimed at benefiting the people...Old institutions [sic] were dismantled...to try to defend China as some sort of modern day socialist state is ridiculous...It's "ultra" capitalist....China, is not socialist, nor is it "marxist-leninist"” Others, like /u/lovelycone93 pointed out, rightly, that “NEP lasted only a short time after war communism until they went towards a completely planned socialist economy in 1928, while Deng/Bukharin style revisionism has been going on for over 30 years”! To refute /u/zombiesingularity, I’d like to quote Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), as they note how what has happened in China since 1978 is not the same as the NEP in early Soviet history, leading to horrid effects in China:

Lenin's NEP came in the post-war years, a few years after the proletariat seized power in Russia. The argument was that capitalist markets and investment were needed to get the economic ball rolling again. But China in 1978 was in no such situation...Imposing capitalist

socialist value system?” There were also commenters who held the revisionist line: /u/China_comrade, /u/smokeytheweed9, /u/firerisesUSA, /u/Phomon, /u/MonsieurMeursault, and /u/FreakingTea.

*market economics on China's socialist economy in 1978 was moving backwards. And while economic growth continued and arguably increased, social indicators like unemployment, the condition of women, mental health and crime all worsened significantly*⁴⁹⁰

With this, we move onto the response to /u/zombiesingularity's post by u/whatsunoftruth. He begins by saying that "...I'm fairly disappointed with the level of theoretical comprehension of some so-called Marxists who published these sources...The claims by those who defend China as socialist state are factually wrong," he adds that he tries to show "our comrades that China is just simply capitalist in the normal sense."⁴⁹¹ He goes on to write that

Lenin's NEP was not a form of "market-socialism" – as that is an oxymoron in and of itself. No one denies the necessity of building up the productive forces. This, however does not validate the existence of "market socialism". This is an invention of bourgeois opportunists who to distort Marxist theory to serve their own interests...Lenin characterized Russia's economy during the NEP as transitional "state capitalism". And so, if we were to be honest with ourselves, even if modern China's economy completely similar to that of Russia during the NEP, it cannot be anything but state capitalism. "The fastest growing economy of human civilization" – let us not forget for a moment, the cost of this growth. Environmental destruction, dehumanizing conditions of labour, concentration of wealth into the hand of the few...What government doesn't appoint top management of government owned companies? This is the case in every capitalist country where a state sector is present...large scale privatization occurred in 1997-1998, documented by domestic and foreign observers...SOEs own about 38 % of all industrial assets. Again, 38% is a significant, but nowhere near being dominant...SOEs are also nowhere near being the main employer in China...No one, in their right mind, would deny the shrinking role of state companies...What's also peculiar, is the accusation of

490 Wiawimawo of MIM(Prisons), "[China 2017: Socialist or Imperialist?](#)," *Prison Censorship*, Oct 2017.

491 /u/whatsunoftruth, "[Response to "China as a Socialist & Marxist-Leninist State: A defense" - POST #1](#)," /r/communism.

“relabeling” mixed ownership enterprises as private. Most statistics concerning SOEs do include mixed ownership enterprises. As far as I’m concerned, such relabeling is quite rare. The capitalist institutions usually take the opposite method, exaggerating the role of the state sector as much as possible, and blame the economic issues on this “public sector boogeyman” to push for even more privatization...Calling modern China “not really communist”...can be verified with empirical data. The opposite claim on the other hand, requires the deliberate distortions of truth...The constitution of China, therefore, can hardly be considered a useful tool to explain current events in Chinese society...Land in China is no different. It has a use-value. This use-value can be exchanged on the market. Officially, land has no money-price; however on the market the rights to usage of the land has a money-price. Legally, there’s a difference between the rights to usage of land being a commodity, and the land itself being a commodity...The land usage rights in China are not products of labour. They do not respond to the laws of socially necessary labour time. Yet, the process of obtaining these rights from different private investors take the form of commodity exchange...Let’s not forget that most of the land in the real estate market, is registered as “for residential purpose”...The overall trend suggests that the private sector dominates in the production of consumer goods and the service sector, which happens to be the majority of what China manufacturing sector produces...state ownership of media, does not automatically mean socialism...Capitalism in China by no means, is unfettered. And I do not for a second, disagree that in the key strategic sectors of the economy, state ownership is dominant...whether this translates to socialism is completely different story. “Keynesian economics” is perhaps the best term to describe the economic policies of the Chinese government at this point in time. The state plays an active role in the economy, but to label this as socialism is far-fetched...FDI plays a significant role in the Chinese economy, rivaling that of the state...The Chinese situation has developed far beyond

*“small concessions to develop the productive forces”; something which certain misguided Western Marxists don’t seem to understand...China is not a neoliberal economic miracle. It’s a Keynesian economic miracle. And if we look closer, it’s not a miracle at all, considering the resources available and the price that the Chinese working class had to pay.”*⁴⁹²

Then, of course, /u/zombiesingularity responded to this wonderful anti-revisionist post. He grumbled that Lenin’s NEP is the same as what is happening in China, that their reforms are “similar and inspired by the NEP” claiming it is “a situation where Capitalists have zero [sic] political power, and where the socialist state owns and controls the most important parts of the economy,” going onto declare that “of China’s top 500 enterprises, 60% are state owned” and claims there is regulation of foreign capital.⁴⁹³ He also admits that capitalists knew “that Deng Xiaoping had a particular path in mind for China, one that was safe for foreign direct investment,” which downgrades their argument. Some, like /u/MrWalrusSocks, responded to this by asking how “the radically unequal distribution of wealth in China be justified in a socialist system,” why China appears “to be somewhat at odds with the DPRK” and why “the PRC backed the Khmer Rouge and invaded Vietnam when the US/Chinese-backed Rouge was (rightfully) destroyed and replaced with a socialist government.”

/u/Revolutionary_Prole said that the three worlds theory wasn’t Mao’s brainchild, and /u/deathvevo said that “it is absolutely disingenuous to use the NEP to justify Deng’s betrayal of communism because...the material conditions behind the two were completely different..."market socialism" reforms were...a strategic retreat...selling out of a nation and a revolution to capitalist interests.”⁴⁹⁴

492 Revisionist /u/zombiesingularity said that this was “the most thought out and researched one yet. I appreciate this because most responses to me are merely dogmatic” while saying that “I ultimately found it to be misleading in some parts, and unconvincing in others” and another revisionist, /u/smokeuptheweed9, said that “I think your response is excellent, the original post had a lot of problems which are really problems with the Chinese government’s conception of “socialism with chinese characteristics.” But your larger claim, that China is simply capitalist, is much more problematic. You correctly claim that “market socialism” does not exist because socialism (a planned economy for social need) is incompatible with the free market of commodities” and then goes on. In response to some critics, whatsuntruth said that “Five Year Plans of China is not socialist planning in any meaningful way”

493 /u/zombiesingularity, [“Is China Socialist? My response to anti-China claims,”](#) /r/communism.

494 Deng Xiaoping, [“Speech By Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, At the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly,”](#) Apr 10, 1974; Harry Powell, [“Mao Tse-Tung: Revisionist or](#)

Following this are two other posts on Reddit by revisionist /u/xplkqlkcassia.⁴⁹⁵ The first declares that China is engaging in a process of “advanced-stage socialism,” declaring that “a lot of leftists treat socialism with Chinese characteristics as some kind of extraordinary rightist deviation, but in reality, there's nothing new at all behind it,” although it was a concept directly created by Deng himself! He then says that “...Chinese socialism has been wildly successful,” saying that “the PRC can either be...a dictatorship of the proletariat, or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. If it is not one, then it cannot be anything but the other” and cites articles from *VICE*, *South China Morning Post*, *Workers World*, and other sources, to support the ideological “initiatives” of the CPC, saying they are Marxist-Leninist. He then says that the “same people who claim the PRC is a brutal hell-hole of rabid exploitation where workers have no power...do a rapid about-face and say that the Chinese government is just compromising with workers.” In his second post he declares that “if you think that the PRC was, at any point, a dictatorship of the proletariat, then you can't claim that it's now a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie” (that doesn't even make sense logically), and claiming there was no “rupture in China” (of course there was) since the 1950s! He further claims that the CPC can pull off a transition to socialism, citing the “state monopoly in every important industry sector” as supposed “evidence,” and then citing Wikipedia yet again (not a good source). He ends by saying that “the CPC has not deviated from Marxism-Leninism” but admits that “the bourgeoisie is active in China” but claims it “is actively working to overthrow the socialist CPC” instead of part of China itself (which they are, since they can be members of the CPC!). To counter this, I'll summarize the argument of a *Truthout* writer, whose beliefs on this issue are well-thought out, since he is critical of capitalism, although his anti-communism clouds his argument in other ways.⁴⁹⁶ He writes that the Chinese leadership profits from the market returns of China's SOEs, saying that they “resemble capitalist corporations but they're not

[Revolutionary?](#),” *Revolutionary Praxis*, 1994.

495 Comments by /u/xplkqlkcassia on /r/communism [here](#) and [here](#).

496 Richard Smith, “China's Communist-Capitalist Ecological Apocalypse,” *Truthout*, Jun 21, 2015.

driven by the same motor of market competition.” He adds to this by noting that “China's state sector has all the superficial trappings of a market economy: corporations, CEOs, IPOs, stock markets and so on.” He goes on to say that there is a “buffet of benefits available to the upper ranks” and notes that “in the boom years of the 1990s and 2000s in China's ruling class, taking their cue from New York bankers who were becoming their partners and backers, corruption flourished on a previously unimagined scale.” He later claims that “the maximand of China's SOEs is not profit maximization. Their maximand is the security, wealth and power of the Chinese Communist Party and that's not the same thing” which misses the reality: they are still driven by profit. However, he later comes back from this false argument to say that “SOE overseas companies open still other opportunities to privately pocket profits earned overseas before they're sent back to China...with the turn to the market, the government abolished guaranteed employment in the mid-1990s and SOEs laid off some 50 million superfluous workers in the 1990s to make their industries more efficient.” It is this reality that revisionists do not like to mention.

Finally we get to the strange article, with Trotskyist leanings, on karlmarx.net about China.⁴⁹⁷ It sort of refutes a revisionist argument by Mick Brooks’ but says that China was forced, they claim by the military, to “open the gates to foreign investments” leading to great profits for imperialism, making available an “infinite work force” for such imperialists. Apart from their claims which could support imperialism, they argue that China officially formulated its connection with imperialism when it joined the WTO in 2001, with negotiations which had started in 1987 ending, adding that with this, the “world-wide accumulation of capital took a global boost.” The article goes on to say that this WTO agreement removed any element of economic planning remaining, producing the “ordered establishment of capitalism,” with fully-developed capitalism in Hong Kong and Macau. The article goes on to say that the number of stock-holding accounts in China exceeded the size of the actual

⁴⁹⁷ “[Debate on China: Dynamics and interactions between private and state capitalisms in China](http://karlmarx.net),” *karlmarx.net*, May 18, 2012, accessed Apr 19, 2018.

membership of the CPC. It also claimed that China has a state economy which operates “according to the calculus of value,” such as prices, capital, wages, profit, and interests, the “operational principle of capitalism.” With this, they say China has a “state-capitalist economy” which supposedly supports revisionist claims, except they say it is “not sustainable in the long run.” That’s not all. The article also says that China is a member of the IMF with the Central Bank of China “obligated to act in a “financially correct” way defined by its IMF formal engagements,” adding that contemporary China has been constructed by and through partnership and association “with imperialism.” As such, they argue, China cannot be a workers state in the “narrow, class, sense of the term,” with the CPC not a proletarian party nor state policies against “the private accumulation of capital.” They also add that the “Chinese proletariat has a relatively strong petit-bourgeois aspect,” claiming that “China is a politically disguised military dictatorship.” They also argue that the “rudimentary” social security system in China is economically unequal. They close by saying that the Chinese bureaucracy is the “best ally and business partner of world imperialism insider China” and is, outside China, “an integral part of world imperialism,” further saying that China is not socialist, and claiming that in order for it become socialist, China needs to “establish a delegative political system which incorporate the right to recall all the elected delegates and determines that each elected delegation representations in all the Institutions...the number of votes casted in his/her favor every single moment.” In some ways, this article goes against revisionist theses, but in other ways it supports it. So, in all, it is a strange article to say the least! Let us remember that Mao argued that “bourgeois right, which is necessary for socialism, has to be restricted, and in the long course of socialist revolution and construction, the three great differences, will be narrowed so that the material and ideological conditions will gradually be created for closing up all these gaps” as one organization sympathetic to him argued.⁴⁹⁸ We can take that and remember that only socialism, not of a “market” variety, can save China from its fate!

498 “[Chairman Mao, Live Like Him, Dare to Struggle, Dare to Win!](#),” *Workers Viewpoint*, Vol. 2, No. 9, October 1977.